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Abstract 
This research investigates the ways in which cities leverage Olympic bids for 
positive outcomes. Recent Olympic bid cycles have seen a decline in interest 
in hosting the Games and so the IOC is seeking to encourage bidders to 
consider how a bid can benefit a city. This is not necessarily a new concept, 
with case studies including Lyon 1920 (Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010), 
Manchester 2000 (Cook and Ward, 2011), Berlin 2004 (Alberts, 2009), and 
Toronto 2008 (Oliver, 2011), yet research into this area is still emerging. This 
present research contributes to the existing literature, through considering the 
leveraging strategies employed as part of the bid, rather than post bid legacies. 
To answer the research question of how cities can leverage Olympic bids, two 
stages of data analysis were conducted. A content analysis was conducted of 
16 bid cities’ answers to the question ‘what will be the benefits of bidding for 
the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the 
bid?’ (IOC, 2009: 66). Second, qualitative case studies were developed using 
Cape Town and Toronto’s bids for the 2004 and 2008 Games respectively; 31 
interviews were conducted with various stakeholders across both bids. 
The data collection identified three key leveraging objectives: urban 
development, sports development and raising the city’s global profile. The key 
finding is that the Olympic bid provided cities with the opportunity to leverage 
national government funding. The leveraging strategies for sports 
development and the raising of the profile were less successful as these 
strategies were implemented solely by the city and did not appear to have the 
same level of planning as the urban development goals. This research has 
contributed to the burgeoning literature surrounding Olympic bidding, but 
perhaps the practical implications are more significant. This research provides 
bidders with information regarding how an Olympic bid can benefit a city, 
irrespective of the bid’s success. In particular, cities should view a bid as an 
opportunity to catalyse or contribute to already existing plans. Without this 
level of strategic planning forethought, it is unlikely that the leveraging plans 
will be successful.
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1 Introduction 
 Introduction and Purpose 
This thesis explores how cities seek to use bids for mega-events for the good 
of a region. More specifically, this thesis investigates the ways in which 
unsuccessful bids for the Olympic Games are leveraged to bring positive 
impacts to a city. 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the background to the research and 
provide a rationale and context for the study. First, the current bidding ‘crisis’ 
facing the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is discussed. Next, it is 
demonstrated that there is a gap in the literature for a study of this nature. 
Then, the research question which guide the study is introduced, together with 
the aims and objectives. Finally, an overview of the research undertaken will 
be provided. 
 Background to the Research 
It can be argued that sport mega-events are facing their worst crisis since the 
bidding scandal surrounding the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. This crisis can 
be characterised in three current interlinking trends. First, it is clear that there 
is an issue in attracting cities and nations willing to host sport mega-events. 
Since the reintroduction of the modern Olympic Games by Pierre de Coubertin 
in 1896, 34 hosts for the Summer Games have been chosen across 20 nations 
(IOC, n.d.). For much of this time, the competition to host the Games has been 
as fierce as the battle for medals within the stadia; on average, five cities 
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compete to host each Olympic Games. Unlike the battles within the stadia, in 
this competition, there is no silver medal. 
However, in recent years, this competition has calmed, with a significant 
reduction in the number of bids. The 2004 Olympic Games saw a post-war 
record of 11 bidders, with every continent except Oceania submitting a 
candidate (Sydney had hosted the previous event in 2000). Since this high 
point, the number of bidders has steadily declined, culminating in there 
essentially being only two bidders (Los Angeles and Paris) for both the 2024 
and 2028 Games. Figure 1.1 below shows the number of bidders for every 
iteration of the Olympic Games to date. 
 
Figure 1.1: Number and profile of bidders for Summer Olympic Games 1896-
2028 
While there are likely to be a multitude of reasons for this drop-off, an obvious 
possible reason is the rising costs involved in hosting mega-events; the 
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second current trend. In recent years, hosting has appeared to resemble an 
arms race, with successive hosts seeking to make their Games bigger and 
better than the previous iteration, with all the additional costs that this entails. 
The 2008 Olympic Games were believed to have been the most expensive in 
history, costing $44 billion (Rabinovitch, 2008). Six years later, this expense 
was eclipsed, as Russia’s official spend on Sochi’s hosting of the 2014 Winter 
Olympic Games was $55 billion (Adesnik, 2014). These costs only relate to 
the actual hosting of the event; for example, the construction of infrastructure 
needed for the sporting events. Both Beijing and Sochi entered into a 
competitive bid process that would have seen further expense. Figure 1.2 
shows the cost of hosting mega-events since the turn of the century. 
 
Figure 1.2: Cost of Staging Sport Mega-Events, 2000-20181 
                                            
1 Full references can be found on page 56 
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These cost increases provide great justification for critics of hosting mega-
events and, in particular, the opportunity cost of hosting these events. Cost 
increases have resulted in bidders withdrawing from the race before the final 
decision is made. This issue came to a head with the bids for the 2024 and 
2028 Olympic Games. Five bidders formally became candidate cities for the 
2024 Games; however, Budapest, Hamburg and Rome all withdrew their bids. 
This left just Paris and Los Angeles in the running, the fewest bidders since 
Los Angeles bid for the 1984 Games. In an unprecedented move, the IOC 
decided to award both the 2024 and 2028 Games at the 131st IOC session in 
Peru in 2017, with Paris being awarded 2024, and Los Angeles hosting in 
2028. 
Table 1.1: Referenda on Olympic Games Since 20002 
Event Venue 
Outcome of 
referendum 
2006 Winter Olympics Sion, Switzerland Bid 
2010 Winter Olympics Vancouver, Canada Bid 
2010 Winter Olympics Bern, Switzerland Not bid 
2022 Winter Olympics Vienna, Austria Not bid 
2022 Winter Olympics Graubünden, Switzerland Not bid 
2022 Winter Olympics Oslo, Norway Bid 
2022 Winter Olympics Munich, Germany Not bid 
2022 Winter Olympics Kraków, Poland Not bid 
2024 Summer Olympics Hamburg, Germany Not bid 
2026 Winter Olympics Sion, Switzerland Not bid 
2028 Summer Olympics Vienna, Austria Not bid 
 
These withdrawals from the bid process by Budapest, Hamburg and Rome are 
not remarkable. Indeed, they are indicative of this trend in recent years, which 
                                            
2 Adapted from Maennig (2017) 
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has seen public support for the hosting of the Games dwindling. As can be 
seen in Table 1.1, referenda held for Olympic Games early in the 21st Century 
were all in favour of bidding; however, this trend has very much reversed, with 
seven recent completed referenda resulting in cities not bidding for the 
Games. 
Further, the costs in Figure 1.2 relate only to the hosting costs; each of these 
cities spent more during the bid phase. For example, England spent £21 
million on its bid to host the 2018 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association) World Cup (BBC Sport, 2011); this expense was viewed 
disparagingly within English football, with little consideration as to whether any 
good may have come from it. While £21 million is far less than the billions that 
are needed to host the Olympic Games, it is not an insignificant investment. 
The cost is intensified when you consider that entering into a bid is essentially 
a gamble. If there are five bid cities for every iteration of the Olympic Games 
then, by default, four of these lose, and their investment into the bid process 
is also lost. 
These increased costs, as a result, lead to the third identifiable trend within 
hosting; the nature of the nations hosting the events. As costs rise and nations 
are held accountable to the populace, the number of states willing to host 
these mega-events is rapidly shrinking, resulting in a change in the nature of 
hosts. The 1990s were characterised by advanced Western nations hosting. 
The FIFA World Cup was hosted in Italy, USA and France, while the Olympic 
Games were held in Spain and the USA. After the turn of the century, it was 
clear that there was a plan for developing nations, and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
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India, China and South Africa) nations in particular, to host mega-events. From 
2008-2018, Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa hosted six of the seven 
football World Cups or Summer Olympic Games. 
Yet, while many commentators noted the rise of BRICS nations in hosting 
mega-events (Zimbalist, 2016), this was arguably not the real trend. Rather, 
mega-events were being bid for and hosted by nations which had little 
obligation to their citizens and only wished to spend large amounts of money 
to showcase themselves to the rest of the world (the idea of hosting mega-
events to leverage international prestige is covered further in Chapter 2); the 
2018 FIFA men’s World Cup took place in Russia, while the 2022 Winter 
Olympics will be hosted in China and, in the same year, the World Cup will 
take place in Qatar. These nations are among those with the fewest political 
rights in the world. Freedom House, a non-governmental organisation, 
categorises the three nations of Russia, China and Qatar as ‘Not Free’, with 
an average ‘freedom rating’ of less than 20% (Freedom House, 2018). The 
awarding of World Cup and Olympic events to these nations has led to strong 
criticism of FIFA in particular, with allegations of bribery as part of the bid 
process, culminating in 14 FIFA officials being arrested (Bason et al., 2018). 
These issues with the hosting of mega-events have led to changes within the 
IOC, as it seeks to entice more nations to bid. The IOC has encouraged bid 
cities to consider the fact that losing a bid may not be entirely negative. While 
bidding for the Olympic Games, each candidate city now completes a 
Candidature Questionnaire. In 2008, as part of the bid process for the 2016 
Summer Olympic Games, a new question was introduced; ‘What will be the 
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benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, irrespective of 
the outcome of the bid?’ (IOC, 2009:66). Every bid city reaching the Candidate 
Stage since has had to answer this question. 
1.2.1 Agenda 2020 
In the decade since this question was added, the bid crisis has become more 
prominent, and so the IOC introduced Agenda 2020. Agenda 2020 
encompasses a wide range of recommendations relating to the reform of many 
elements of the Olympic Games (IOC, 2014a). Of particular note are the first 
three recommendations:  
Shape the bidding process as an invitation (IOC, 2014:4)   
Cities considering submitting a bid will be given more information on the bid 
process and the requirements of a bidder. This information will include the 
formal procedures that a bidder needs to follow, and also information as to 
how previous bidders have ensured that a legacy is possible from a bid.  
Evaluate bid cities by assessing key opportunities and risks (IOC, 2014:5) 
Rather than encourage bidding cities to construct new facilities, ‘the maximum 
use of existing facilities and the use of temporary and demountable venues 
where no long-term venue legacy need exists or can be justified’ (IOC, 
2014:10) will now be viewed as a positive. While this recommendation has 
good intentions, as will be seen in Chapter 3, a positive impact that a bid may 
have is the construction of new facilities. If the building of new stadia is viewed 
as a negative when assessing the bid, this could make bid cities less likely to 
invest before the award decision is made. 
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Reduce the cost of bidding (IOC, 2014:6). 
In order to reduce costs, the number of presentations a Candidate City is 
required to make will be reduced, while the IOC will fund much of the required 
travel for the bid teams; however, while this recommendation also comes with 
good intentions, the reduction in cost is likely to be modest compared to the 
current level of expense that bid cities face. Full information regarding the 
costs of bidding, and suggestions to reduce costs further is detailed in Chapter 
3. 
1.2.2 The New Norm 
In February 2018, the IOC developed Agenda 2020 further with the 
implementation of ‘The New Norm’, a set of 118 reforms that reimagines how 
the Olympic Games are delivered. These new reforms focus on three areas: 
candidature, legacy and the seven-year journey, and it is the first area, 
‘candidature’, that is of relevance to this study. In part due to the already-
mentioned bidding crisis, the IOC reviewed the candidature process and has 
implemented six new measures. First, there is to be a new stage of dialogue 
between interested cities and the IOC, with the IOC footing the cost of 
technical experts who provide the bid cities with support. The IOC will also 
work closely with stakeholders involved in the bid, carrying out its own 
feasibility analyses. Finally, the candidature stage will be shortened and 
streamlined, with the requirements for candidate cities being simplified. 
Through the implementation of these new measures, the IOC is seeking to 
simplify and reduce the costs of the Olympic bidding process (IOC, 2018a). 
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 Practical Implications 
As has been demonstrated in the previous section, the IOC is currently facing 
a bidding crisis. This is further demonstrated by the fact that the IOC took the 
unprecedented step of awarding two Olympic Games in the same session. 
This followed FIFA’s decision to award the 2018 and 2022 World Cups at the 
same time in 2010. The IOC has taken steps to resolve the bid problem, with 
the first three of the IOC’s 40 recommendations for reform relating directly to 
bidding and to the bid process; however, the issue shows no signs of abating. 
Therefore, the primary practical implication of this research is that it will provide 
bid cities with information as to how an Olympic bid can be leveraged for 
positive outcomes. As has already been discussed and will be further 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, a bid for a mega-event is an expensive 
undertaking, with a prevalent view being that if the city does not ultimately host 
the mega-event, then this money has been lost. This research demonstrates 
that this is not necessarily the case and that it is possible to use a bid for a 
sport mega-event to provide positive benefits for a city and/or nation. 
Given the issues faced by the IOC and potential bid cities, it is perhaps a little 
surprising that there has, thus far, been very little research investigating 
whether the bid process itself can generate positive outcomes for a region. 
The next section will consider the academic contribution that this research will 
have. 
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 Academic Contribution 
The fall in the number of bidders for mega-events is a relatively new issue, 
and thus research into Olympic bids is sorely underrepresented in the 
literature. This is slightly surprising given the sheer number of Olympic bids. 
Since St. Louis was selected over Chicago to host the 1904 Games, there 
have been 146 unsuccessful bids just for the Summer Olympic Games alone. 
The IOC itself collates literature regarding the legacies and impacts of the 
event. Of the 411 research articles identified by the IOC pertaining to legacy 
and impact, just 13 exist regarding ‘Other Candidate Cities’ (Olympic Studies 
Centre, n.d.). 
A lack of literature on a subject does not immediately mean that research 
needs to take place. However, given the escalating costs of bidding (to be 
discussed further in Chapter 3), it seems pertinent to consider the extent to 
which bids have provided benefits for a bid city and/or nation. This potential 
benefit may help explain why nations such as Puerto Rico and Cuba have bid 
for the Olympic Games, with little chance, in reality, of actually hosting a 
Games. Thus, this research will seek to fill a gap in the literature; that of the 
benefits that can be teased out of bids for the Olympic Games. 
In addition to expanding upon the extant literature regarding bidding cities, this 
research also develops the theoretical understanding of leverage. As is seen 
in Chapter 2, much of the literature regarding leverage is focused on the 
strategies employed to benefit from hosting events. The present study adapts 
Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage to include the bid phase for the 
Olympic Games. 
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Further information regarding the literature surrounding leveraging mega-
events, and the impact of mega-event bids, can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 
respectively. 
 Research Question 
This study starts with one primary research question: ‘In what ways have 
bids for the Olympic Games been leveraged for positive outcomes?’ 
With this principal question as the starting point, the aims and objectives are 
as follows: 
1.5.1 Research Aim 
The primary aim is to investigate the different ways in which cities have 
leveraged bids for the Olympic Games. 
1.5.2 Research Objectives 
 To examine a range of unsuccessful Olympic bids to identify the 
leveraging strategies employed, if any. 
 To scrutinise two bids in detail to explore the leveraging strategies put 
in place and the outcomes of these strategies. 
 To adapt Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage to view demonstrate 
leveraging opportunities for bidding cities. 
 Chapter by Chapter Outline 
This section outlines the structure of this thesis. Given that this research 
focuses on a specific section of the area of mega-events, Chapter 2 first 
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introduces the wider literature. Key definitions are introduced, with 
consideration of the difference between legacy and leverage. This research 
uses the concept of leverage, and so the application of leverage to mega-
events is analysed. The chapter introduces the theoretical model of event 
leverage around which this research is structured. 
Once the concept of leverage and the theoretical model to be used have been 
introduced, Chapter 3 examines the literature surrounding the impact of failed 
bids. This part begins with a brief history of Olympic bidding to provide the 
historical context, before it identifies the key periods during the bid process. 
The main areas of leverage are then introduced, followed by an introduction 
to the two cities included as case studies. 
In Chapter 4, the methodology used in this research is explained. This chapter 
starts with a review of ontological and epistemological positions, which then 
inform the methods used for data collection: content analysis and interviews. 
Throughout this chapter, the methods utilised are justified, together with the 
steps taken to ensure that the research is reliable and valid and that it adheres 
to all ethical guidelines. 
Chapter 5 is the first chapter in which empirical data is provided. This consists 
of a content analysis of the 16 candidate cities’ answers to the question, ‘What 
will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, 
irrespective of the outcome of the bid?’ (IOC, 2009:66). Data is presented first 
in terms of themes, and second by categorising the bidders. This chapter 
corresponds to objective number one. 
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Following the secondary analysis, the primary data collection is introduced in 
Chapters 6 and 7, and achieves objective two. In these two chapters, the 
strategies employed to leverage Cape Town’s and Toronto’s bids for the 2004 
and 2008 Olympic Games respectively are introduced. The empirical data is 
presented first, before it is linked to the literature on leveraging. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the research. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the results presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7; demonstrating the 
consistency of the findings. The conceptual framework, utilised to framework 
this research, is then applied to the data. Following this discussion, the 
practical and academic contributions of this research are presented, before 
the limitations of the research are then considered. This thesis finishes with a 
discussion of directions for future research. 
The structure of the thesis is summarised in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2: Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter Section Key Content 
1 Introduction Background and rationale; research 
question, aims and objective 
2 Literature Review: 
Leveraging 
Introduction to mega-events; leverage or 
legacy; theoretical concepts regarding 
leverage 
3 Literature Review: 
Bidding for Mega-Events 
Historical context of bids; areas to 
leverage; Cape Town 2004 and Toronto 
2008  
4 Methodology Methods used and data collection 
5 Results: 
Candidate File Analysis 
Secondary data analysis of Olympic 
Candidate Files 2016-2024 
6 Results: 
Cape Town Case Study 
Interview and documentary analysis 
regarding Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 
Olympic Games 
7 Results: 
Toronto Case Study 
Interview and documentary analysis 
regarding Toronto’s bid for the 2008 
Olympic Games 
8 Conclusion Discussion of the data analysis; 
conclusions; practical and academic 
implications; areas for future research 
 Summary 
This introductory chapter has outlined the background and context for this 
research; that is, that in recent years there has been an alarming decline in 
the number of bids submitted for the Olympic Games. This chapter has also 
begun to introduce the theoretical and practical implications of this research; 
these will be expanded upon in Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter then introduced 
the research question, aims and objectives underpinning this research before 
outlining the remainder of this thesis
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2 Literature Review: Leveraging Mega-Events 
 Introduction and Purpose 
Following on from the previous chapter, which introduced the research and 
stated the research question, the next two chapters place this research within 
the field of mega-events and, in particular, sport mega-events. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, there is scant literature available regarding the 
ways in which an Olympic bid has been leveraged for positive outcomes. 
Therefore, this chapter discusses the current literature surrounding the 
leveraging of mega-events before Chapter 3 considers the impact that an 
Olympic bid may have on a city. 
This chapter starts with the placement of mega-events within the field of mega-
projects, reviewing the differing definitions of major, hallmark and mega-
events (Section 2.2). Much of the literature surrounding mega-events focuses 
on the idea of ‘legacy’ and ‘leverage’; accordingly, this chapter defines what is 
meant by these terms (Section 2.3.1). Following this, detailed information is 
provided on the various leveraging strategies that host cities have put in place 
(Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Finally, this chapter concludes with the introduction 
of the academic framework around which the research will be structured 
(Section 2.4). 
 What is a Mega-Event? 
Given the focus of this research on mega-events, it is first important to define 
what is meant by the term ‘mega-event’. 
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2.2.1 Definition of ‘Mega-Event’ 
Mega-events are considered to be part of the wider events industry, which 
covers a spectrum of events from the World Cup and Olympic Games, through 
to Christmas fetes in the local village hall. There have been numerous 
attempts to classify different types of mega-event, with no agreed-upon 
definition. Jago and Shaw’s (1998) definition is one of the more commonly 
used; identifying mega-events as being either unplanned and ordinary, or 
planned and therefore special. Jago and Shaw go on to divide the special, 
planned events into minor events (local, attracting a small audience) and major 
events (attracting a larger audience, media attention, prestigious, and can 
generate legacies). These major events are then divided again, into hallmark 
events (infrequent, with a fixed location), and mega-events (unique events 
whose location moves). In contrast, Bowdin et al. (2006) treat major events, 
hallmark events and mega-events as separate categories, placing them on a 
scale of impact; measuring attendance, media, profile, infrastructure, cost, and 
benefits. 
To add further to the confusion, the same events have often been classified 
differently. For example, the Olympic Games have been classified as ‘hallmark 
events’ (Smith, 2001; Westerbeek et al., 2002; Solberg and Preuss, 2007) and 
‘mega-events’ (Pomfret et al., 2009; Fourie and Santana-Gallego, 2011; 
Giulianotti et al., 2014). Even among those authors using the term ‘mega-
event’, there is no clear, readily-agreed definition, with most agreeing with 
Roche’s (2000:1) definition that mega-events are ‘large-scale cultural 
(including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, 
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mass popular appeal, and international significance’, which are ‘typically 
organised by variable combinations of national governmental and international 
non-governmental organisations and thus can be said to be important 
elements in ‘official’ versions of public culture’. Roberts (2004) adds to this, by 
identifying that mega-events are often one-off events that do not take place in 
the same way each time. 
However, these definitions could be used to apply to Jago and Shaw’s (1998) 
definitions of major, hallmark and mega-events. While the size of the event is 
a factor when establishing whether it reaches ‘mega’ status, the placement of 
these boundaries is less obvious. A range of different events have been 
classed as ‘mega-events’ in the literature; the Olympic Games and the World 
Cup are the two most recognised mega-events, due to their size and global 
attention. Yet, other events such as the Paralympic Games (Dickson et al., 
2011; Misener et al., 2013), Winter Olympic Games (Deccio and Baloglu, 
2002; Baade et al., 2009), and even the likes of the British and Irish Lions 
playing three rugby union tests in tours of South Africa (Fourie and Santana-
Gallego, 2011; Fourie et al., 2011) have been classified as mega-events. The 
extent to which a rugby series consisting of two teams playing each other on 
multiple occasions can be applied to either Roche’s or Jago and Shaw’s 
definition of mega-events is debatable, certainly given that there is a limited 
number of nations globally with an interest in the sport of rugby union. 
A more recent attempt to define mega-events has seen a new classification; 
‘giga-events’. Müller (2015a) uses four factors derived from previous 
definitions to classify 13 different events: (1) the number of people who attend, 
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(2) media reach, (3) total cost, and (4) infrastructural development. Each of 
these can be problematic individually. For example, Marris (1987) suggested 
that mega-events require a minimum of one million visitors, but this restricts 
mega-events to those which take place over a longer period as no stadium 
can accommodate one million attendees for a single event. Conversely, 
media-reach perhaps benefits shorter events, with viewers of the UEFA 
Champions League Final, which lasts 90 minutes, possibly having a higher 
average viewership (165 million worldwide watched the 2014 final (UEFA, 
2014)) than the Olympic Games which lasts for several weeks. Finally, using 
total cost and infrastructural development may limit mega-events to occurring 
only in certain countries. Los Angeles’ hosting of the 1984 Olympic Games is 
famed due to a lack of infrastructural investment, yet few would contend that 
this is not a mega-event. Müller uses these four factors to assign points as to 
whether they are L, XL or XXL, finding that seven events are ‘major’, five are 
‘mega’ and the Olympic Games are ‘giga’. 
This classification does have obvious flaws; the use of media rights is 
becoming further problematic with the development of online media, with 
websites such as Periscope allowing the piracy of such events. A second issue 
is that only one iteration of each event is considered, with the Super Bowl 
being Müller’s smallest event. This is due to the selected Super Bowl being 
held in New Orleans’ Mercedes-Benz Superdome, built in 1975, and is the 
only Super Bowl since 2010 not to be played in a purpose-built stadium. 
Similar to Müller (2015a), Black (2008) identified a number of ‘second-order’ 
and ‘third-order’ events. Second-order events, while still having a global 
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interest, do not have the same sort of profile and interest in them as ‘first-order’ 
events such as the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup. Black identifies the 
Commonwealth Games, and the Cricket and Rugby World Cups as ‘second-
order’ events, and those events that have a more regional interest, such as 
the Africa Cup of Nations or Pan American Games, as ‘third-order’ events. 
Coates (2012) identifies several events that are generally not considered to 
be mega-events, for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the Winter Olympics is often 
seen as a mega-event (Deccio and Baloglu, 2002; Baade et al., 2009), yet this 
is perhaps due to the immediate association with the Summer Olympics. Other 
events that Coates classes as ‘not-so-mega events’ are Formula 1 Motor 
Racing, NASCAR, the X-Games, the Rugby World Cup (identified by Jones 
(2001) as a mega-event) and UEFA’s European Football Championship.  
Müller’s (2015a) classification is notable for its lack of non-sport mega-events; 
only the Shanghai Expo in 2010 is a mega-event, according to Müller, with all 
non-sport ‘mega’-events being given a value of zero for media attention. This 
supports Bowdin et al. (2006), who identify only the World’s Fair as a mega-
event, while Hiller (1995) recognises conventions as being mega-events. 
However, there have been a number of non-sport events in recent years which 
have garnered great media attention; the Royal Wedding in 2011, and Barack 
Obama’s inauguration have both been estimated as having global television 
audiences of over one billion (Irvine, 2009; Winnett and Samuel, 2011). 
However, perhaps due to their ad hoc nature, there is little academic literature 
on non-sport mega-events.  
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2.2.2 Mega-projects 
Mega-events can be placed inside the field of ‘mega-projects’, which are 
identified as being ‘large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a billion 
dollars or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public 
and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people’ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014:6). Both the Olympic Games and World Cup fit this definition. 
The idea of a specific cost being used in a definition can be troublesome; for 
example, one billion dollars in 2012 in London is likely to have a different value 
to one billion dollars in 2022 in Qatar, as inflation and exchange rates fluctuate. 
However, the figure of one billion dollars used by Flyvbjerg is to be used as a 
guide rather than a specific characteristic and, in any case, the hosting of both 
the World Cup and Olympic Games requires far more investment than this 
(see Figure 1.2 on page 3). 
A key characteristic of mega-projects is that they are often poorly managed, 
overrun in terms of cost and time, and fail to produce the effects post-event 
that were initially promised (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). Yet, despite this, mega-
projects are appealing, with Flyvbjerg (2014:8) identifying four reasons for this 
to be the case. The first, which is perhaps the least relevant to sport mega-
events, is the opportunity for engineers to develop new and innovative 
technologies which can potentially be viewed as the best or first of their kind. 
Secondly, mega-projects appeal to politicians, primarily because of the public 
exposure the politicians are afforded. However, should a mega-project 
ultimately be unsuccessful or of no value, those politicians responsible for 
instigating the project could suffer a loss of reputation as a result. This was 
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seen in the UK following the building of the Millennium Dome by the Labour 
government, which attracted fewer than half its predicted visitors. Coupled with 
the political appeal are the economic benefits of a mega-project, with the 
construction and ongoing maintenance thought to provide jobs and inject 
money into the economy. Finally, workers and managers of mega-projects 
enjoy the opportunity to develop something that will be viewed as iconic. 
2.2.3 Section Review 
This section has summarised the key definitions as to what constitutes a 
‘mega-event’. This research will use Black’s (2008) classification of there 
being first, second and third order mega-events and this literature review will 
focus mainly on the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, together with the 
Football World Cup. Both leveraging and bidding for mega-events are 
relatively new areas within the academic literature, and so this literature review 
is constrained by a lack of prior research. The first phase of this research 
(secondary data analysis of bid books) will use both the Winter and Summer 
Olympic Games, while the primary research will focus on the bids for two 
Summer Olympic Games.  
 Impacts of Mega-Events 
Section 2.2 identified what is meant by the term ‘mega-event’. Several of the 
definitions included reference to the significant costs of hosting an event; 
therefore, there may be some expectation from host cities that they will receive 
benefits in return. This section will now consider the terms ‘legacy’ and 
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‘leverage’, before introducing the theoretical framework on which this research 
will be based. 
2.3.1 Legacy and Leverage 
Much of the discourse surrounding the impacts of mega-events uses the term 
‘legacy’ to discuss what happens due to, and after, the hosting of a mega-
event. 
Gold and Gold (2009) provide a history of the term ‘legacy’ in the Olympic 
Games, identifying that it first appeared in Olympic bid documents for the 1956 
Melbourne Olympic Games. The first modern Olympics had little concern 
regarding legacy, aside from the experience that the organisers gained in 
sports administration. It was not until White City Stadium was built for London’s 
hosting of the 1908 Olympic Games that there was an obvious legacy from a 
Games. While the term ‘legacy’ was used during the bids for the 1956 
Melbourne Olympic Games, the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles was the 
first to use the term on a consistent basis. Yet, as the two subsequent Olympic 
Games were hosted in non-English-speaking nations, the term was not utilised 
in either the 1988 Seoul or the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. When the 
Games returned to the English-speaking world, in Atlanta in 1996, the term 
‘legacy’ became more prominent (Gold and Gold, 2009; Andranovich and 
Burbank, 2011). 
As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the impacts of mega-events are not 
necessarily always positive for a host. It is perhaps for this reason that the IOC 
has sought to marry the legacy narrative with hosting, to justify the ever-
increasing budgets required to host such an event (Chalip, 2014; MacRury, 
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2015). The IOC Charter states that the role of the IOC is to ‘promote a positive 
legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries’ (IOC, 
2014:17), yet it is less clear about its own definition of ‘legacy’. A 2003 IOC 
International Symposium sought to clarify the definition of legacy but was 
forced to conclude that the different cultures and languages of the various 
contributors resulted in several different definitions being used (de Moragas et 
al., 2003). Indeed, during the 2003 IOC International Symposium, six different 
authors acknowledged the lack of a clear definition and instead proposed their 
own definition to be used for the purposes of that specific paper (Barney, 2003; 
Chappellet, 2003; Essex and Chalkley, 2003; Hiller, 2003; McCloy, 2003; 
Roche, 2003). 
In the years since the symposium, the use of the term legacy has multiplied 
significantly, and so has the academic understanding of the definition. A key 
driver of the use of legacy is Preuss, whose 2007 definition is the most widely 
used. Preuss identified six dimensions that make up a definition of legacy 
(Preuss, 2007:210-211): 
1) Legacy continues beyond the event itself. While legacy may 
originate from structures constructed prior to the event, most legacy 
occurs from changes that occur during or after the event. 
2) As the environmental factors change, new opportunities for legacy 
are derived. 
3) Legacy impacts different groups of stakeholders in different ways. 
The same action may bring benefits to one group but negatively 
impact another. 
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4) Legacy may be tangible or intangible. 
5) Legacy will typically be restricted to the host area but may permeate 
beyond the immediate region. 
6) Legacy may be unintentional; negative impacts are unlikely to be 
planned. 
As can be seen, the definition of legacy is rather wide-ranging and can be used 
to fit a number of scenarios. 
A key criticism of legacy, which will be further demonstrated later in this 
chapter, is that many hosts expect a positive legacy to occur naturally (Grix et 
al., 2017) when this is unlikely to be the case. Indeed, as per Preuss’s (2015:5) 
definition, legacy can lead to negative impacts as well as positive. Chalip 
(2014) notes further issues inherent with the idea of legacy. If legacy is 
expected to occur as part of hosting, then it is likely to be the responsibility of 
an organising committee that a) is focused on organising the event, and b) is 
likely to be disbanded after the event occurs.  
Chalip has, instead, been a proponent of the idea of ‘leverage’. Whereas 
legacy focuses on the outcomes of an event, that is, what occurs after the 
event has taken place, leverage has a different emphasis. Rather, leverage 
studies the strategies that are put in place by the host organisations to achieve 
a particular objective (Chalip, 2006). As Chalip (2014) argues, if legacy is 
unplanned, it may not be immediately obvious what led to this legacy 
occurring. This is where leverage differs from legacy; if hosts implement 
specific strategies and tactics, these can be evaluated to measure their 
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effects. Those strategies that are successful can then be adopted and adapted 
by future hosts who are seeking to achieve similar positive outcomes. 
The term ‘legacy’ dominates the narrative, both from an academic and 
practical point of view. Leverage is a more recent concept that first became 
considered at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. Rather than relying on the 
Olympic Games to generate positive outcomes automatically for Sydney and 
Australia as a whole, a series of strategies was put in place to ensure that the 
Games delivered positive benefits (Chalip, 2002). These strategies sought to 
leverage the Games to boost Australia’s tourism. In the years since, a number 
of studies have demonstrated how other nations have sought to leverage the 
hosting of mega-events for positive benefits, such as Germany’s hosting of the 
2006 World Cup (Grix, 2012), the 2010 South Africa World Cup (Knott et al., 
2015), and Qatar 2022 (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014). 
This first section has established the key differences between the terms 
‘leverage’ and ‘legacy’. This research will be using the concept of leverage 
rather than legacy. It is not seeking to view the unplanned outcomes of bidding. 
Instead, this study is investigating the plans that bidders have put in place to 
leverage positive benefits for the nation or city. However, there is scant 
literature focusing on the ways that cities have leveraged an Olympic bid for 
positive benefits. Therefore, this literature review will now consider the ways 
that leverage has been applied to the hosting of mega-events and will 
introduce the theoretical framework that will be used for this research. 
Chapter 2 | Literature Review: Leveraging Mega-Events 
26 
2.3.2 Leveraging Mega-Events 
The term leverage can be defined as the ‘power to accomplish a purpose’ 
(Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010:509). In the studies of sport and events, it 
has often been used to describe the ways that sponsors activate their 
sponsorships. Purely paying a fee and having the company name associated 
with a sport or event brand will often not gain the sponsor the outcomes they 
are hoping for. Instead, additional investment is required to create ancillary 
activities around the sponsorship as a lever to bring additional gains, often 
through advertising and sales promotions (Papadimitrou and Apostolopoulou, 
2015). VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) argue that the leveraging of events has 
its roots in the business literature, as corporations seek to identify assets, 
which are used to create value. 
Since Chalip introduced the term in regard to mega-events in 2002, leveraging 
has come to mean the additional strategies that are put in place by hosts to 
ensure that the hosting of mega-events leads to positive outcomes (Chalip, 
2014). Smith (2014) took this further, identifying that there are two ways in 
which this can be achieved. The first is event-led leveraging. Event-led 
leveraging occurs when hosts seek to amplify the positive benefits that would 
typically be expected from the hosting of an event and could not occur if the 
event did not take place. Smith (2014) gives the example of a host putting in 
place measures to help local businesses secure contracts as well as business 
associated with hosting. In comparison, Smith also offers event-themed 
leveraging. These are those plans that use the event as a ‘hook’ to achieve 
objectives; for example, a government may seek to use the hosting of an 
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Olympic Games to leverage an increase in participation in sport. This is a 
policy objective that could be sought regardless of whether an Olympic Games 
is taking place or not, but the hosting may be used to amplify the outcomes. 
As with the concept of legacy, the temporal nature of leverage is an important 
consideration. Sport mega-events have very strict time periods. An event itself 
is likely to last 4-6 weeks, yet the host has a build-up period that typically lasts 
seven years before the event takes place. This has been termed the 
‘pregnancy period’ for leverage, which is identified as being the key time for 
leveraging strategies to be put in place (Weed et al., 2012; Dickson, 2017). 
These strategies should then last longer than the event itself. This is a key 
factor of leverage. It is potentially easy for a city to use the time during the 
event for positive benefits; jobs are created (Feddersen et al., 2007), and there 
is often a carnival-like atmosphere during the event that can be harnessed 
(Kellett et al., 2008). However, neither of these benefits is long-term, and once 
the event finishes, government and media attention move to other areas 
(Rogerson, 2016). 
While there are opportunities for leverage, it is unlikely that an event organising 
committee will be able to take advantage of them. After all, with the eyes of 
the world upon them, any organising committee is likely to be solely focused 
on ensuring that the event takes place successfully (Chalip et al., 2016). 
Further, the organising committee is likely to be disbanded shortly after the 
event takes place and is unlikely to consider long-term legacies at the expense 
of hosting a successful event in the short-term (Theodoraki, 2007; Agha et al., 
2012). This lack of post-event continuation is thought to have contributed 
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towards London’s failure to leverage successfully the 2012 Olympic Games 
(Bell and Gallimore, 2015). 
Consequently, the leveraging literature notes the importance for a host to 
ensure that a separate organisation is responsible for making sure that 
leveraging plans continue beyond the event itself. This was demonstrated 
successfully at the 2011 Rugby World Cup, as a separate organisation was 
formed to ensure that the event was leveraged to enhance tourism, exports 
and branding (Dickson, 2017). This approach has further benefits, in that it 
frees the organising committee from needing to consider legacy at the time of 
the event (Chalip and Heere, 2014). 
The need for a separate delivery organisation is particularly necessary when 
leveraging strategies encompass more than one event (Ziakas, 2015). 
Chalip’s (2004) initial model for event leverage (to be discussed further in 
Section 2.4) featured an event portfolio, and this concept has been explored 
further by Ziakas (2010). The concept involves using the cross-leveraging of 
a portfolio of events with the product and service mix of the host; this can 
involve a region hosting multiple events on a regular basis, together with the 
involvement of a one-off mega-event (Ziakas, 2013). A key aspect of cross-
leveraging is recognising that different events can attain different goals within 
the portfolio (Ziakas, 2010); a separate delivery organisation will be needed to 
ensure that these differing goals are achieved. However, while cross-
leveraging can bring obvious benefits to a region, there are potential issues; 
cross-leveraging may require a holistic approach, involving inexperienced 
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businesses which view each other as competitors and so do not wish to work 
together (Chalip, 2014). 
2.3.3 Areas to Leverage 
This chapter has so far discussed leverage from a holistic point of view. 
However, given the differences and nuances between different hosts, it is 
unlikely that each is seeking to leverage the same outcomes. Therefore, it is 
now important to consider the different areas that host cities and states wish 
to leverage. 
One of the first ways to categorise areas of leverage is using the ‘triple bottom 
line’. This is a concept that was introduced in 1994, encouraging firms to look 
beyond the bottom line of a profit and loss account and, in addition, to consider 
social and environmental development (Weed, 2009; Ziakas, 2015). However, 
it does not take more than a cursory glance at the literature to see that states 
have objectives that move beyond those named in the triple bottom line. While 
these three areas may be appropriate for a business to focus on, they do not 
represent the full spectrum of objectives for a nation. Therefore, in addition to 
economic, social and environmental strategies, leveraging for sports 
development, nation branding and international prestige will also be 
considered. 
2.3.3.1 Economic 
There has long been a view that hosting a mega-event will automatically lead 
to economic gains. First, hosting is often thought to increase tourism. This 
increase occurs on a short-term basis, as attendees enter the economy and 
spend money which then multiplies through the economy (Lee and Taylor, 
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2005). Moreover, the hosting of a mega-event leads to wider tourism gains, as 
people around the world are made aware of the host and its benefits 
(Karadakis, 2010). Similarly, a nation that hosts a mega-event signals to the 
rest of the world that it is a nation that can be traded with (Rose and Spiegel, 
2011). Finally, hosting a mega-event is thought to lead to job opportunities. 
Studies have shown that Barcelona 1992, Atlanta 1996 and Sydney 2000 all 
saw falls in unemployment around the Games (Centre for Regional Economic 
Analysis, 1999; Hotchkiss et al., 2003; Malfas et al., 2004). 
However, none of these four economic gains is guaranteed. For every 
example of a nation benefitting economically from hosting a mega-event, there 
are just as many examples of a negative legacy. For example, there is little 
guarantee that any money spent will stay within the local economy and it 
appears to be unlikely given the international nature of the organisations 
involved in mega-events (Matheson, 2009). Even if local businesses are 
selected to work with the event, it is possible that the organisers will source 
products and services from outside the local area (Porter and Fletcher, 2008). 
Furthermore, the hosting of an event may actually discourage spending. There 
is evidence to suggest that a displacement effect may occur, as people actively 
avoid the area that is hosting due to fears of artificially raised prices and 
overcrowding (Karadakis et al., 2010). Finally, while unemployment may 
reduce during an event, this is also likely to be problematic. First, it is possible 
that additional employees are brought in from other areas, and indeed other 
countries, but if these workers then move their earnings outside the economic 
area, then the host region does not benefit economically. Second, many of 
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these jobs are likely to be in construction, and therefore not sustainable post-
event (Briedenhann, 2011).  
Consequently, if economic benefits do not occur naturally, hosts need to put 
in place strategies and tactics to ensure that the local area does benefit. 
Indeed, the first leveraging model focused on ensuring economic benefits. 
This model, and the one that will be central to this research, is Chalip’s (2004) 
schematic representation of event leverage. In this model, Chalip divides 
leveraging strategies into two areas: immediate and long-term leverage. 
Immediate leverage focuses on maximising the spending by visitors to the 
event, with Chalip offering four means by which to achieve this. First, visitors 
who attend the event should be encouraged to spend more. There will likely 
already have been spending on tickets, food and drink, but visitors should also 
be persuaded to visit local tourist attractions. A way of encouraging this is to 
increase the length of time that visitors remain in the host area, as the longer 
a visitor stays, the more money they will spend. Chalip also recognises the 
earlier mentioned issue of keeping money in the local economy by engaging 
local businesses in the event. This also contributes to Chalip’s final point; 
enhancing business relationships. The hosting of mega-events provides a 
unique opportunity for local businesses to work with international sponsors 
(Chalip, 2004). 
Grix et al. (2017) argue that local businesses are often excluded in favour of 
international organisations. Kirby et al. (2018) take this idea and modify 
Chalip’s (2004) model to incorporate the ways in which micro and small 
businesses can be included within the hosting of a mega-event. Kirby et al. 
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identify three phases of the hosting process (bidding and selection, planning, 
and delivery and handover) and provide a series of strategies and tactics for 
bidders and hosts to leverage a mega-event to benefit local businesses. Many 
of these strategies involve the harnessing of greater cohesion, both between 
the event organisers and local businesses, but also between the businesses 
themselves. 
Indeed, one of the earliest leveraging strategies to be discussed in the 
literature was Sydney 2000’s Business Club Australia initiative (O'Brien, 
2006). The Australian government recognised that the Sydney 2000 Olympic 
Games would involve a wide range of corporations; from local businesses 
supplying the Games to international conglomerates which pay large sums in 
sponsorship fees. Yet, there was no formal way for these disparate 
organisations to connect (O'Brien, 2006). Thus, Business Club Australia was 
formed, with a wide range of stakeholders in the Games; businesses, 
executives attending the Games, and sponsors were all included. Business 
Club Australia had both a physical and virtual hub, with international visitors 
being paired with potential domestic business partners to enhance 
international trade (O'Brien, 2006). O’Brien reported that the Business Club 
Australia initiative was successful, and several similar schemes have been 
implemented in the years since. However, the initiative was not without issue. 
As has already been discussed, timing is also very important in leveraging 
strategies, and O’Brien found that Business Club Australia was marketed to 
Australian businesses too early. In addition, the inclusion of Olympic sponsors, 
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although adding a degree of legitimacy to the initiative, precluded other 
potential businesses from taking part.  
Mhanna et al. (2017) tested the immediate leveraging strategies of Chalip’s 
model on London’s hosting of the 2012 Olympic Games. The key finding of 
this work was that without carefully planned strategies, economic benefits do 
not occur. First, there was an issue with the location of the Games. London 
2012 was deliberately built in the East End of London to regenerate the area. 
Indeed, the hosting of the Games was itself a leveraging strategy. As the 
Mayor of London at the time of the bid, Ken Livingstone, said: “I didn’t bid for 
the Olympics because I wanted three weeks of sport. I bid for the Olympics 
because it’s the only way to get the billions of pounds out of the government 
to develop the East End” (Evening Standard, 2008). Using a mega-event to 
catalyse regeneration of an area is prominent in the literature (Barghchi et al., 
2009; Stevens, 2005). However, this causes difficulties if principal tourist 
attractions are elsewhere in the city. Mhanna et al. (2017) found that visitors 
to the East End were reluctant to travel to the other areas of the city housing 
the tourist attractions. In addition, the excitement generated throughout the UK 
surrounding the Olympic Games meant that many people preferred to watch 
the Games rather than partake in more conventional leisure activities. This 
supports Green’s (2001) work around subculture. It is not enough to expect 
that visitors will automatically visit the tourist attractions that are already there; 
rather, hosts should seek to augment the mega-event with additional activities 
and entertainment. 
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In addition to issues in enticing visitor spend while in London, there were also 
problems with increasing the length of visitor stays. As Chalip (2002) himself 
had previously noted, many visitors base their travel around the event itself 
and have their travel booked long in advance (Mhanna et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, tickets are often sold through approved agencies which have 
little interest in encouraging visitors to stay longer (Chalip, 2002). This adds 
weight to the earlier assertion that the ‘pregnancy period’ is an important 
period for leveraging strategies. If a host waits until the event itself to attempt 
to lengthen visitor stays, this is likely to be far too late. 
Chalip’s (2004) model also identifies strategies for long-term economic 
benefits, both of which lead to enhancing the image of the host. A mega-event 
will have the eyes of the world upon it via the global media (Karadakis et al., 
2010; Knott et al., 2015). For example, the broadcasting rights to the 2018 
Football World Cup were sold to 219 territories across the globe (Bason et al., 
2018). A mega-event, and a sporting event in particular, is a unique 
opportunity for a host to get its message to the rest of the world. In order to do 
this, the host needs to work with various external organisations. First, the event 
will be advertised by the governing body (i.e. IOC or FIFA), and the host should 
seek to build relevant images of the regional area into this advertising (Chalip, 
2004). Second, the event will be reported on by various media outlets. Green 
et al. (2003) suggest that media outlets and reporters should be provided with 
the information and images that the host wishes to convey to the world. Finally, 
many sponsors will use images of the host region to strengthen their links with 
the event in the eyes of the consumer and avoid being ambushed by marketing 
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(Chalip, 2004). Again, it would be prudent for the host region to work with 
sponsors to ensure the images and messages being conveyed are the ones 
that the host wishes to communicate. 
This approach can also work in another beneficial way. A host region can use 
the idea of the mega-event in its future promotion and advertising material 
(Chalip, 2004). This can be particularly successful if the event has an image 
that the host wishes to transfer to its own image and can then build this image 
into its current marketing mix (Chalip, 2004). However, it should be noted that 
this is most likely to be successful if the event is contributing to an already 
existent promotional strategy, rather than being expected to generate interest 
on its own (Swart and Bob, 2004). 
2.3.3.2 Social 
Closely linked to economic leveraging are the social impacts of hosting. 
Indeed, many commentators have noted that social legacies are a natural by-
product of economic leveraging; that is, if a region successfully leverages 
economic benefits, then it is possible that society within the region will also be 
made more affluent. However, this can be a double-edged sword, for if event 
organisers believe that social legacies will occur naturally, then they are less 
likely to employ economic leveraging strategies (Bob and Swart, 2010).  
It is clear that the hosting of events can create positive feelings for residents 
of the area where the event is taking place. This has been described as 
‘community spirit’ (Malfas et al., 2004; Kellett et al., 2008) and was noted 
during the FIFA World Cup in South Korea (Kim and Morrison, 2005). These 
positive feelings, or community spirit, are not limited to the immediate local 
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area, with spillover effects being reported by Deccio and Baloglu (2002), and 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011). The positive feelings towards an event ex-post are 
often at odds with negative feelings before the event takes place; Kim et al. 
(2006) found that prior to the 2002 Football World Cup, residents ranked social 
problems as their third largest issue. By the time the event had taken place, 
social problems were deemed to be the least troubling issue (Kim and Petrick, 
2005). 
Of a similar nature to community spirit is the ‘feel-good’ factor that can be 
created. Both these impacts are difficult concepts to quantify, and so data has 
often been anecdotal. One way in which it can be estimated is through 
calculating ‘willingness to pay’. Du Plessis and Maennig (2007) found that 
German residents would pay a cumulative total of €640 million to host the 2006 
Football World Cup; however, it should be noted that this is well below the 
overall cost of over €3 billion (DW.com, 2006). 
Given the similarities between community spirit and the feel-good factor, it is 
unsurprising that the criticisms are similar. First, it is noticeable that many of 
the cited instances occur when the host team is successful during the 
tournament. The South Korea, Germany and South Africa national teams all 
achieved beyond expectation as they hosted World Cups, leading Heere et al. 
(2013) to suggest that it might be advantageous for governments to invest in 
the success of their sports teams rather than hosting events. However, this is 
not in agreement with Kavestos and Szymanski’s (2010) assertion that hosting 
an international football tournament increases life satisfaction, but national 
team success does not. Second, the temporal aspect of both is questionable. 
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Both tend to occur as the event itself is taking place, with Kim and Petrick 
(2005) noting that enthusiasm for hosting an event dissipates only three 
months after the event has taken place. 
If these impacts cannot then be classed as legacy, they can still play a part in 
leveraging social benefits. As with economic leveraging, Chalip (2006) was 
the initial proponent for leveraging for social outcomes. In this paper, Chalip 
observes that events can be liminoid; that is, they engender a feeling of 
communitas within the participants and therefore can be used to generate 
liminality through the fostering of social interaction and creating a feeling of 
celebration (2006). Chalip (2014) later notes that the liminoid feeling can be 
focused to achieve specific social objectives through four primary methods: a) 
the event can be affiliated with a social cause, b) the sporting subculture can 
be aligned with the social issue, c) visitor stays may be lengthened to 
maximise exposure to the social cause, and d) targeting event visitors with 
specific causes. However, whereas Chalip’s model for economic leverage has 
been tested at events (O'Brien, 2006; Perić et al., 2016; Mhanna et al., 2017), 
there has been little empirical analysis into the creation of liminality at events. 
Despite this, Grix (2016) suggests that such collective feelings conceptualised 
in ‘communitas’ and feel-good factor play a crucial role in society letting off 
steam and developing a sense of ‘we-ness’ amongst its citizens. 
That is not to say there has been no research into leveraging mega-events for 
social gain. One of the key criticisms of mega-events, and even their 
leveraging, is the distribution of benefits. The same impact may benefit one 
group of stakeholders while at the same time disadvantaging another. While 
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numerous hosts have stated that society will be better off as a result of hosting 
a mega-event, these benefits are very rarely focused on the worse off in 
society (Minnaert, 2012). Indeed, as Smith (2014) notes, those who are 
already worse off in society are likely to be those most disadvantaged by the 
event itself. For example, there has been a recent trend of cities using the 
hosting of mega-events to regenerate poorer areas of a city. However, as 
Malfas et al. (2004) noted, a direct impact of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games 
was an increase in house prices and rents in the poorest areas of the city, by 
7% and 38% respectively. This has further implications if public taxes are 
paying for the event (Kellett et al., 2008). 
Parent (2016) offers a potential solution to this issue, through increasing the 
involvement of all stakeholder groups in the event planning process. Minnaert 
(2012) notes that there is very little evidence that this has ever occurred, 
before reviewing the literature to suggest strategies by which this could be 
achieved. Minnaert argues that a network should be built involving all possible 
stakeholders in the event, including the socially excluded. As Balsas (2004) 
recognises, the hosting of a mega-event may accelerate planning processes, 
with public participation being thrown aside in a bid to ensure that the city is 
ready to host the event. Leveraging committees also need to recognise that 
universal programmes are unlikely to reach those who need them most 
(Minnaert, 2012). If regions have social groups who are already excluded from 
general society, there is no guarantee that they will be reached by leveraging 
tactics. Therefore, organisers need to create specifically focused strategies to 
ensure that those who need them most are positively affected. Finally, the 
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already discussed ‘pregnancy’ period is identified by Minnaert (2012) as being 
key, as any potential momentum is likely to be lost post-event.  
Rogerson (2016) further analyses the ways in which the Glasgow 2014 
Commonwealth Games were leveraged to generate social benefits. While 
Glasgow sought to regenerate a poor area of the city, it passed responsibility 
for regeneration to the council rather than the responsibility resting with the 
organising committee. This had a key benefit in that it was built into the long-
term plans for the city rather than being an ad hoc occurrence. As a result, the 
Athlete Village was built with the knowledge that it would be turned into 
accommodation post-event, crucially including social housing and 
accommodation for the elderly (Rogerson, 2016). 
While Rogerson (2016) demonstrates the way that the Glasgow 2014 
Commonwealth Games were leveraged for social benefits, it was not perfect. 
Prior to the event taking place, there were reports in newspapers that many 
people were being displaced from Glasgow East End (Saltiel, 2013), with anti-
homeless ‘spikes’ being installed around the city (Evening Times, 2014). This 
is typical of the displacement that often takes place during the hosting of mega-
events, with The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) (2007) 
estimating that two million people have been displaced from their homes due 
to the Olympic Games since Seoul 1988. Displacement is one of the five 
human rights issues identified by Worden (2015), with the others being migrant 
worker mistreatment, suppression of the media (including journalist 
incarceration), suppression of free speech and discrimination.  
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As yet, much of the literature has sought to view how mega-events can be 
leveraged to bring positive impacts for a region. Weed (2009) argues that this 
should not be the sole focus. Rather than seeking to leverage positive results, 
cities should seek to leverage outcomes that mitigate the negative impacts 
associated with hosting mega-events. 
2.3.3.3 Environment 
The third aspect of the triple-bottom-line is the environment. The impact that 
hosting a mega-event has on the environment is often included in leveraging 
social impacts (Grix et al., 2017). It is perhaps because of this that there is a 
stark lack of literature surrounding the ways in which a mega-event can be 
specifically leveraged for environmental gains. This is despite there being a 
wealth of literature detailing the negative impacts that a sport mega-event may 
have; an area that has received intense scrutiny since the environmental 
disaster of the Albertville 1992 Winter Olympic Games (Cantelon and Letters, 
2000). A consequence of this environmental disaster was the consideration by 
the IOC of the environmental impacts of all Olympic Games, resulting in the 
‘environment’ ultimately being added as the third strand of Olympism, together 
with ‘sport’ and ‘culture’. 
As the issue of environmental impacts has become more important in the eyes 
of the IOC, it has also grown in importance for residents whose local area is 
likely to be impacted in the long term by newly-constructed infrastructure 
(Deccio and Baloglu, 2002; Gursoy and Kendall, 2006). Given the pressure on 
a host to be ready in time for the event, it is possible that environmental 
considerations will be disregarded in favour of haste (Konstantaki and 
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Wickens, 2010; Gaffney, 2013). Moreover, this infrastructure has to be placed 
somewhere, which may include areas of natural beauty. For example, the 
PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympic Games saw a ‘sacred’ forest being 
destroyed to make space for a ski slope (McCurry and Howard, 2015). The 
hosting of a mega-event will not only have a long-term environmental impact, 
but is also likely to have an immediate impact. Gaffney (2013) estimated that 
288 tonnes of waste was produced by the 2013 Confederations Cup, an event 
that is far smaller in scale than either the Olympic Games or the Football World 
Cup. 
Given the likely negative environmental impacts of hosting an event, it is 
perhaps rather surprising that there are few studies investigating how mega-
events can be leveraged for environmental gains, or even just to mitigate the 
negative impacts. VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) utilise Chalip’s (2004) model 
to demonstrate the environmental leveraging that took place at the Vancouver 
2010 Winter Olympic Games. The work of Vancouver can be seen as event-
themed leveraging (Smith, 2014); Vancouver did not seek to make the event 
itself more sustainable, but rather sought to use the Winter Olympic Games 
as a hook to introduce environmental practices to the city in the long term 
(VanWynsberghe et al., 2012). 
While Death (2011) notes that the extensive media circus that comes with 
mega-events can be used to generate awareness of environmental issues, he 
also recognises that net environmental gains are by-products of other 
leveraging plans. For example, the greatest environmental benefit of the 2010 
Football World Cup in South Africa was not a direct environmental leveraging 
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strategy; rather, South Africa set in place a strategy to leverage the World Cup 
to improve public transportation networks, which indirectly benefitted the 
environment (Death, 2011). 
2.3.3.4 Sport Development 
A second area closely linked to the social impacts of mega-events is sport, 
and particularly participation. Increased participation in sport is often a key 
promise made by hosts. For example, London 2012 had the tagline ‘Inspire a 
Generation’, yet sport participation figures have declined since the Games 
(Sport England, 2015). As Weed (2014) notes, there were no firm strategies 
put in place to leverage London 2012 to increase sport participation. This is 
indicative of the general trend. Many hosts believe that merely hosting a sport 
mega-event will automatically lead to enhanced sport participation, despite 
there being a wealth of literature suggesting that this is not the case (Haynes, 
2001; Veal et al., 2012; Taks et al., 2018). Hosts generally believe that a 
‘demonstration effect’ will occur; that is, people will be exposed to sport and 
thus be inspired to try it themselves (Weed et al., 2012). While a couple of 
studies have found that exposure to mega-event may increase participation in 
the short term (Perks, 2015), or increase intention to participate (Bauman et 
al. 2014), the majority of research indicates that a demonstration effect does 
not occur. 
There are various reasons why a demonstration effect does not necessarily 
occur. Chalip et al. (2016) offer reasons for this. First, people lacking in self-
efficacy may be further put off by the excellence of the athletes, believing that 
they cannot match the prowess on show. In addition, those who do wish to try 
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the sports on offer may not be able to. It is reasonable to assume that most 
sports clubs attempt to operate efficiently, and so may not have the spare 
capacity to take on additional participants inspired by the Games. Indeed, 
capacity may actually be reduced during the period of a mega-event if the 
venues are used for the mega-event itself. Even training facilities in the area 
may be commandeered by athletes who require such facilities during the event 
(Chalip et al., 2016; Taks et al., 2018). 
As such, there are few examples in the literature of hosts successfully 
managing to leverage sport participation, and none relating to first-order 
mega-events. The two positive examples that this literature review has found, 
both relate to second-order mega-events. First, Frawley and Cush (2011) 
found that registrations for rugby clubs in Australia rose following its hosting of 
the 2003 Rugby World Cup. Australia recognised that the Rugby World Cup 
was a unique opportunity to increase participation as domestic rugby was 
experiencing commercial growth at the time, allowing it to fund the leveraging 
plans. In addition, the timing of the tournament took place just before the start 
of the domestic rugby season, allowing the media exposure that the rugby 
received to boost recruitment drives (Frawley and Cush, 2011). These key 
features supported the EdRugby school-based programme, which resulted in 
a significant increase in junior rugby players. It should be noted that the 
Australian rugby team performed well during the 2003 Rugby World Cup, and 
this may have had as much of an influence as the hosting of the event itself. 
In addition, Australian rugby was already in a recruitment drive, and so it is not 
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known how much of the impact could be attributed to the Rugby World Cup 
alone (Veal et al., 2012). 
Whereas the Rugby World Cup is a single sports event, Rogerson (2016) 
details the tactics used by Glasgow to leverage the 2014 Commonwealth 
Games. These tactics mitigated the problems identified by Chalip et al. (2016). 
Glasgow sought to take advantage of the oft-mentioned ‘pregnancy period’ by 
ensuring that the new sporting venues constructed were available to be used 
in the build-up to the Games (Rogerson, 2016). Further, while these new 
venues were not available during the period of the Games themselves, 
Glasgow also ensured that the previously existing facilities were upgraded to 
enable any new sports participants to be captured. This contributed to a 
significant growth in users; from fewer than 11,000 in 2005 to 37,000 by 2014 
(Rogerson, 2016). 
It is clear from these two examples that the leveraging strategies were part of 
a wider strategy to enhance sport participation within the city. This was not the 
case with London 2012. In the years following London winning the bid (2005-
2012), the UK Physical Education and Sport Strategy for Young People 
successfully brought together schools and sports clubs (Griffiths and Armour, 
2013). However, as the Games approached, this strategy was abandoned in 
favour of a new policy to introduce competitive sport into schools. This was 
not as effective and failed to engage schoolchildren in the same way (Griffiths 
and Armour, 2013). This lack of cohesion in the government’s plans is likely to 
have contributed to the failure of the Games to successfully leverage 
participation in sport (Grix et al., 2017). 
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Hayday et al. (2017) similarly investigated the ways in which sport participation 
was leveraged through the London 2012 Olympic Games and found that there 
was a real disconnect between sport clubs and policy. Whereas one of the 
reasons for the 2003 Rugby World Cup in Australia successfully increasing 
rugby club membership was that the Australian Rugby Union had funds to 
spend (Frawley and Cush, 2011), the UK was undergoing a period of austerity, 
and so national governing bodies did not have the resources necessary to 
engage with all sport clubs and ensure that the proposed policies were 
implemented. This was particularly an issue with those sports not part of the 
Olympic Games (and not centrally funded), who felt that they were isolated 
and disengaged (Hayday et al., 2017). 
As has been demonstrated so far, if a host fails to enact policies specifically 
designed to enhance sport participation, it is unlikely that pre-event promises 
will be delivered. There has not been any evidence in the literature of an 
Olympic Games or World Cup being leveraged to enhance sport participation, 
yet there are lessons that can be learned from other, smaller events. Taks et 
al. (2013:19) offer a model for sport leveraging, noting that it cannot be the 
responsibility of just one organisation to deliver sport participation. Instead, it 
is necessary for the event organising committee to work with both sport and 
non-sport agencies to utilise knowledge and human and physical resources to 
enhance sport participation. However, caution is noted; that at the core of this 
model are sport development goals to be achieved. If these development 
goals are not aligned across the various stakeholders driving the leveraging, 
then they are unlikely to be successful (Taks et al., 2013). 
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In addition to the generic model for participation leverage, Taks et al. (2013) 
also offer eight specific leveraging tactics. As with Frawley and Cush’s (2011) 
work, it is noted that the involvement of schools is key; before, during and after 
the event. This should involve providing schoolchildren with the opportunity to 
play sport and meet with athletes. This should not necessarily just be limited 
to schoolchildren. Taks et al. (2013) also recognise the importance of involving 
local sport clubs. As with many leveraging plans, the ‘pregnancy period’ is a 
key period, while the enhanced media interest can be leveraged to ensure that 
the message is properly communicated. Finally, it is also suggested that free 
transportation should be provided to ensure that those in distant communities 
can be involved. 
This final suggestion is also supported by Weed et al. (2015), who state that 
leveraging activities are most likely to be successful if the activities are tailored 
to individual communities. This is of particular importance if a host is seeking 
to increase participation from those who are currently disengaged from sport 
and participation (Hamlyn and Hudson, 2005). These groups are unlikely to 
be reached if a generic sport participation message is conveyed. Indeed, 
Weed et al. (2012) note that sport participation leveraging tactics will have the 
greatest effect on those who already partake in sport. Instead, Weed et al. 
(2012) suggest a different strategy for those who do not currently partake in 
sport activity. As Chalip et al. (2016) observe, those people who do not 
currently partake in sport may be daunted by the thought of taking part in 
competitive sport. Therefore, Weed et al. (2012) suggest that this group should 
be specifically targeted to enhance physical activity and therapeutic exercise 
 Chapter 2 | Literature Review: Leveraging Mega-Events 
47 
rather than partaking in actual sport activities; however, thus far there has 
been very little research into the area of leveraging sport mega-events for 
physical activity as opposed to actual sport participation. 
In addition to a lack of research for enhancing physical activity, there are 
further areas that have not yet been fully studied. Barrick et al. (2016) perceive 
this area of research as being dominated by quantitative work, with a distinct 
lack of empirical research. This argument is supported by Hayday et al. (2017), 
who further contend that, thus far, there is a lack of empirical research, with 
many studies discussing theoretical plans rather than exploring how hosts 
deliver, or fail to deliver, sport participation legacies. There is currently an 
absence of qualitative studies investigating how leveraging strategies and 
tactics are received by the residents. This is possibly due to the lack of 
attention paid to leveraging strategies by hosts and made more difficult by 
changes in the ways in which data is collected. For example, Australia altered 
its data collection procedures around the Sydney 2000 Olympics, making it 
difficult for researchers to truly ascertain the impact of the Games (Veal et al., 
2012). Qualitative data collection could contribute to overcoming this difficulty. 
Enhanced participation is not the only way that sport can be leveraged through 
hosting a sport mega-event. Nations are also likely to seek to enhance their 
own sporting performance as part of hosting (Grix and Houlihan, 2014). There 
is little doubt that this is effective. As Grix et al. (2017) remark, in the three 
Olympic Games since London won the bid, Great Britain finished fourth in the 
2008 medals table, third in 2012, and second in 2016. Within a year of winning 
the right to host the 2012 Games, the UK government had invested an 
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additional £200 million into elite sport development (Grix et al, 2017). The UK 
is by no means the only nation to enhance elite sport as part of hosting. Figure 
2.1 shows the number of medals won by Olympic hosts since 1988. During 
this period, South Korea, Spain, Australia, Greece, China and Brazil each won 
the most medals in the Games that they hosted. This is likely to have been 
due to three reasons. First, the aforementioned feel-good factor may lead to 
fervent support within a stadium and encourage the home athletes. Second, 
each nation invests heavily in elite sport (producing elite athletes) in the build-
up to the Games and uses the hosting of a Games as an opportunity to secure 
extra funding. Finally, athletes may find it easier to compete at home Games 
in comparison to events that require extensive travel, while officiating may also 
benefit the home nation (Balmer et al., 2003). The two nations that have 
bucked this trend are Great Britain, whose record medal tally of 65 medals in 
2012 was surpassed in Rio 2016, and also the USA, a nation typically at the 
top of the medal table each Games and thus does not need a home Games 
boost. 
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Figure 2.1: Medals won by Olympic host nations, 1988-2016 
As can be seen, there is clear evidence that nations that host Olympic Games 
enhance their sporting success at their event. Yet, there is a distinct lack of 
research into this; there appears to be an assumption that hosting an event 
means that nations invest more in their elite sporting development, but there 
is a lack of empirical research into a) how this occurs, b) how it can be 
maximised, and c) whether it applies to all states. 
2.3.3.5 Nation Branding and International Prestige 
Elite sport performance is just one of the ways that a nation can gain 
international prestige. The other is through the hosting of sport mega-events 
(Grix and Houlihan, 2014). Purely the act of hosting a mega-event will see the 
host’s profile rise globally; for example, the 2014 World Cup was broadcast in 
219 territories worldwide, while the Olympics is shown in 170 countries (Bason 
et al., 2018; Olympic.org, n.d.). This exposure provides host countries with a 
global reach that is unlikely ever to be achieved again, and therefore provides 
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the host with the single best opportunity to improve, attempt to change or even 
create an image in the eyes of the world (Knott et al., 2015). 
There are several ways that a host nation can use a mega-event to attempt to 
leverage a change of image. Knott et al. (2016) suggest that the intense media 
focus of a host event provides the first opportunity. However, it is important 
that hosts appreciate that this media opportunity does not always occur and 
does not always provide positive benefits. It is not the media’s job to promote 
the host. Western media’s reporting of the 1996 Cricket World Cup 
exaggerated Western-held prejudice towards Asian states and carried a 
predominantly negative image (Dimeo and Kay, 2004), while the emphasis of 
British newspapers on crime in South Africa in the build-up to the 2010 Football 
World Cup was viewed as a ‘colonial hangover’ (Hammett, 2011:70). Thus, to 
ensure that this opportunity is capitalised upon, hosts should work closely with 
the media, and indeed provide the media with materials that paint the host in 
a positive light and allow the host city to be distinguished in the eyes of the 
world (Green et al., 2003). 
The host should also consider the images to be broadcast. The logo of a 
tournament is likely to be broadcast more often than images of a city and used 
on official merchandise that will be sold all over the world (Green et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the host should consider the design of the logo very carefully and 
ensure that it incorporates images of the city. Further, these city images should 
be distinguishable from any other city. After all, an image of a city skyline could 
realistically be representative of many cities across the world (Green et al., 
2003).  
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Finally, hosts should seek to engage the tourists who will visit the city for the 
event. This is not dissimilar to the tactic identified in Chalip’s (2004) model for 
economic leverage (see Section 2.3.3.1). Knott et al. (2016) discuss the ways 
that fans and visitors were engaged during the 2010 Football World Cup in 
South Africa. This included both event-specific initiatives (e.g. the ‘fan walk’ 
from the fan park to the stadium in Cape Town), and non-event related 
initiatives, such as utilising the unique tourist attractions in the region. The use 
of media and experiences of visitors are typical of the research that has been 
conducted into image management (Knott et al., 2016). 
A tactic for image management that has been further explored is ‘soft power’, 
a term coined by Joseph Nye (1991) to mean the co-opting of people to want 
the same outcomes as you rather than using hard (i.e. military) power. Nye 
(2004) identifies three primary ways in which soft power can be cultivated: 
culture, political values and foreign policy. First, hosts often demonstrate 
culture during opening ceremonies. The opening ceremony of the London 
2012 Olympic Games was famously directed by Danny Boyle and featured 
Daniel Craig as James Bond together with several prominent British 
musicians. Second, the political values of a nation can also influence soft 
power; for example, the domestic policies of Qatar have been spotlighted 
since it was chosen to host the 2022 Football World Cup, as the global media 
focuses on its human rights record (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014). 
Conversely, South Africa used hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup to 
demonstrate that it was now a united nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Finally, 
foreign policy can affect soft power, with Russia’s soft power likely to have 
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fallen as it annexed the Crimean region of the Ukraine after it hosted the 2014 
Winter Olympic Games. However, the focus on Russia’s domestic policy in the 
build-up to the event and, in particular, its laws on homosexuality, indicate that 
it is unlikely Russia viewed hosting as a pure soft power strategy (Grix and 
Kramareva, 2017). 
Soft power cannot be created purely through marketing or self-promotion; 
there needs to be substance behind the actions to ensure that the message 
conveyed is credible (Grix and Brannagan, 2016). Grix and Brannagan (2016) 
offer five key leverageable resources: culture, tourism, branding, diplomacy, 
and trade, and demonstrate the ways in which Germany and Qatar sought to 
use the 2006 and 2022 Football World Cups respectively to alter perceptions 
of the nation. Germany saw the 2006 World Cup as an opportunity to move 
the perception of the nation away from associations of Nazism, with visions of 
World War II still dominating Germany’s image abroad (Grix and Houlihan, 
2014). Thus, Germany put in place a long-term strategy to leverage soft power, 
by cultivating interest in their nation centring upon campaigns to make 
Germany more appealing to visitors. For example, as far back as 1994, 
strategies were in place to promote ‘Destination Germany’ (Grix, 2012). 
‘Destination Germany’ was later augmented by the ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign, 
designed to promote Germany internationally with the attempt to increase 
tourism and foreign investment. Germany also sought to leverage the liminality 
created by the event. First, the festival-like nature was enhanced through the 
training of those in the service industry to be more hospitable to foreign 
visitors, and the festival nature was then captured with the creation of fan 
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parks. This had the specific aim of capturing those tourists who may not 
normally be interested in football or its World Cup, but who may be impacted 
by the carnival-like atmosphere created (Grix, 2012). 
While Grix’s (2012) work focuses on the strategies that were put in place rather 
than the outcomes, it is still acknowledged that these tactics were successful. 
The ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign was deemed to be successful enough that it is 
still running today. Further, Grix notes that Germany’s position on the Anholt-
Gfk Roper Nation Brands Index improved from seventh place in 2004 to first 
place in 2007. In addition, the Football World Cup is likely to have played a 
pivotal role in Germany shedding its century-old image of warmongering. 
Following the tournament, even British newspapers, hitherto stalwarts of the 
anti-German rhetoric, started to move away from the lazy, German 
stereotypes of World War II (Grix, 2012). 
Grix (2012) uses his study of Germany’s 2006 Football World Cup leveraging 
to develop Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage to include an ‘outcomes’ 
section. Grix (2012) identifies that each of Chalip’s methods to entice 
increased visitor spending were also used by Germany’s leveraging strategy; 
and finds that these methods can also contribute towards improving both the 
volume of tourists and their perceptions of Germany, thus contributing to 
Germany’s soft power. 
However, while Germany’s attempts to leverage the 2006 Football World Cup 
to improve its image were clearly successful, simply because a nation seeks 
to change its image does not mean that it will automatically be successful. 
Qatar is currently seeking to leverage the 2022 Football World Cup for soft 
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power benefits, with the particular goal of distinguishing itself from other states 
in the Middle East and removing stereotypical views of Arabs as being lazy 
and undeveloped (Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016). Grix and Brannagan 
(2016) identify that Qatar has set up a number of ancillary activities to leverage 
the Football World Cup; for example, Qatar has invested heavily in European 
football. Qatar Airways became the first non-charitable firm to sponsor FC 
Barcelona before Qatar Sports Investments purchased Paris Saint-Germain 
(PSG). PSG was funded to the extent that, in 2017, the world transfer record 
was broken for the transfer of Neymar from Barcelona to PSG. Further, the 
Doha GOALS Forum has developed to be one of the most prestigious 
gatherings of sport academics and practitioners. This forum has the aim of 
embedding the idea of sport into the image of Qatar and moving away from 
the typical images of Middle Eastern states (Grix, 2012). 
However, this has not necessarily been successful. From the moment Qatar 
was controversially announced as the host of the 2022 Football World Cup, 
global media perception has been heavily focused on Qatar, amid ultimately 
proven allegations of bribery and backhanders (Blake and Calvert, 2015). 
Unfortunate media attention is exacerbated by the very long run-in to the 
event. Qatar was awarded the World Cup in 2010, 12 years before the event 
will take place. This intense scrutiny has moved beyond the bid process to 
discussions of Qatar’s suitability to host the World Cup and, most pertinently, 
gay rights and Qatar’s human rights record for workers (Brannagan and 
Giulianotti, 2014). Brannagan and Guilianotti (2014) term this ‘soft 
disempowerment’: that is, the spotlight on Qatar’s domestic issues has 
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resulted in a loss of international prestige. Qatar is not the only nation which 
has struggled to improve its international prestige. Manzenreiter (2010) notes 
how China has also struggled to improve its global image as a result of the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games. 
2.3.4 Leveraging Issues 
It is not the purpose of this literature review to frame leverage as a perfect 
concept. In each of the areas of leverage discussed, concerns regarding 
leverage have been identified. This section will now build upon these criticisms 
to further critique the concept. 
First, as with legacy, it has been argued that leverage is merely a way for hosts 
and organisers (i.e. the IOC or FIFA) to justify the large costs of hosting sport 
mega-events (Smith, 2014). The costs required to host a mega-event are 
substantial; Flyvbjerg (2014) estimates that for an event to even qualify as a 
mega-project, a budget of one billion dollars is required. Given the financial 
requirements needed to host an Olympic Games, it is unsurprising that every 
host since Barcelona in 1992 has spent in excess of this sum, with the Beijing 
2008 Olympic Games and Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic Games both costing in 
excess of $40 billion (Zimbalist, 2016). Table 2.1 below shows the costs 
required to host a sport mega-event. 
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Table 2.1: Cost of Staging Sport Mega-Events, 2000-2018 
Event Type Cost Reference 
Russia 2018 
Football World 
Cup 
$14 billion 
The Moscow Times, 
2018 
PyeongChang 
2018 
Winter Olympic 
Games 
$12.9 billion Forbes, 2018 
Rio de Janeiro 
2016 
Summer Olympic 
Games 
$13.1 billion NBC Sports, 2017 
Brazil 2014 
Football World 
Cup 
$11.6 billion Forbes, 2014 
Sochi 2014 
Winter Olympic 
Games 
$51 billion The Guardian, 2013 
London 2012 
Summer Olympic 
Games 
$18 billion 
Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2018 
South Africa 2010 
Football World 
Cup 
$3 billion The Telegraph, 2010 
Vancouver 2010 
Winter Olympic 
Games 
$7.6 billion 
Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2018 
Beijing 2008 
Summer Olympic 
Games 
$44 billion Pravda, 2008 
Germany 2006 
Football World 
Cup 
$4.9 billion DW.com, 2006 
Turin 2006 
Winter Olympic 
Games 
$4.5 billion 
Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2018 
Athens 2004 
Summer Olympic 
Games 
$16 billion 
Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2018 
Japan/South Korea 
2002 
Football World 
Cup 
$7 billion 
The Washington Post, 
2002 
Salt Lake City 
2002 
Winter Olympic 
Games 
$2.5 billion 
Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2018 
Sydney 2000 
Summer Olympic 
Games 
$6.9 billion  
Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2018 
 
Given the costs involved, Smith (2014) argues that leverage is often an 
afterthought that hosts consider once they see that pre-event promises will not 
be realised. If this idea suggests a certain naivety in hosts, Ziakas (2015) offers 
a more cynical view, claiming that many of these expenses serve only the elite. 
The problem of mega-events disadvantaging the worst off in society is 
highlighted by Müller (2017), who includes this under the umbrella term of 
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‘event seizure’, detailing the ways in which the owners of an event (such as 
the IOC or FIFA) are able to dictate terms to the host that serve their own 
interests. For example, the building of the new Cape Town Stadium for the 
2010 Football World Cup was initiated by FIFA, not the South African 
Organising Committee which wished to use the existing Athlone Stadium (Bob 
and Swart, 2009).  Dowse and Fletcher (2018) argue that developing nations, 
such as South Africa are more likely to be exploited by event owners. A lack 
of control can be further exacerbated by ‘legal seizure’ (Müller, 2017) which 
occurs when the likes of FIFA and the IOC enforce rules on a host region 
(James and Osborn, 2016).  
Müller (2017) also identifies ‘infrastructural seizure’, as infrastructure is built 
for the event at the expense of infrastructural development needed elsewhere 
in the city. Infrastructure is often discussed in terms of legacy but, as yet, there 
has been little attention as to how hosts can leverage infrastructural 
development. This is likely to be because infrastructure needs to be built in 
order to host an Olympic Games or World Cup event. For example, hosts of 
the Football World Cup need one stadium with 80,000 seats, two with 60,000 
seats, and seven stadia with a capacity of 40,000 (Alm, 2012). Having the 
required facilities for the Olympic Games is arguably even more onerous given 
the wide number of sports. If a host does not meet these requirements with 
existing stadia, then new ones need to be built. It is for this reason that 
investment in sports stadia is often a major part of a host’s spending 
(Szymanski, 2002). The one mega-event that has managed to avoid this cost 
is the Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games 1984, which built only two new 
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venues and relied on existing stadia. LA 1984 is widely recognised as one of 
the most economically sustainable Olympic Games (Preuss, 2004; Matheson, 
2006). However, the costs do not end once the mega-event is over; if the 
facilities are not passed on to private companies, it is likely that the host will 
need to continue to spend on maintenance or see the facilities fall into a state 
of disrepair (Searle, 2002; Hiller, 2006). 
It is not just sporting infrastructure that is required to host a sport mega-event. 
As has already been discussed, sport mega-events are often used to develop 
underprivileged areas of cities. This often means that these areas do not have 
the capacity to deal with the influx of visitors that arrive for the event, and new 
infrastructure is needed to cope with the increased number of visitors. This will 
often include transport upgrades. Even a well-developed nation such as the 
UK felt the need to build a new rail service and upgrade airport facilities. 
Furthermore, the IOC specifies that any host must have 40,000 hotel rooms 
available during the Games (IOC, 2017a:.42). However, Ferreira and Boshoff 
(2014) found that these regulations actually lead to an oversupply of hotel 
rooms within host cities. 
If the costs needed to host are ever-growing, they are only likely to increase 
further as leveraging plans are piled on top. While Smith (2014) asserts that 
leveraging costs are small compared to the overall costs needed to host, this 
has been disputed. VanWynsberghe (2016) found that Vancouver’s costs rose 
from $2.5 billion to $6.2 billion once leveraging plans had been taken into 
account. If this had been viewed as taking the event over budget, the 
leveraging plans would probably have been the first to be discarded (Smith, 
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2014). If the leveraging plans are successful, then it is likely that the increased 
investment will be viewed as a positive investment; however, if the leveraging 
strategies fail, this could contribute to the reluctance of nations to host mega-
events, as detailed in Chapter 1. Smith (2014) argues that to counteract these 
added costs, event organisers should seek to reduce event-related 
expenditure. However, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, often 
infrastructural development is a basic requirement to get hosts up to the 
requisite standards. If the IOC and FIFA restrict hosting only to those nations 
that already have the levels of infrastructure needed, this will severely reduce 
the number of potential hosts. A further alternative could be to involve 
sponsors in the leveraging strategies, perhaps through CSR-based initiatives 
(Smith, 2014). However, this may be difficult if sponsors are not involved from 
the outset, as sponsors will often have fixed budgets that they are prepared to 
invest in the sponsorship and may not have the capability to invest further in 
leveraging strategies (O'Brien, 2006). 
This is not the only issue with sponsorship and leveraging. Several authors 
have noted the effects that the IOC and FIFA’s strict regulations regarding 
ambush marketing have had on leveraging plans. Both FIFA and the IOC rely 
on sponsorship revenue and are therefore very diligent about preventing other, 
non-event sponsors from using any trademarks associated with the Football 
World Cup or Olympic Games (Schmidt et al., 2018). While it may be 
reasonable to protect Coca-Cola and Visa from Pepsi and Mastercard, this 
potentially causes leveraging issues. Businesses, or even sport clubs who are 
not official sponsors, cannot use the FIFA or IOC brand as part of their 
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leveraging campaigns. This issue was highlighted during London 2012 when 
small businesses were targeted by the IOC. For example, it was reported that 
small businesses such as cafes and butchers were sent warnings for infringing 
the IOC copyright (Wagg, 2015). While an argument for the hosting of the 
Olympic Games and Football World Cup is that it will bring business to the 
local area, the zealousness of the ambush marketing legislation makes it 
difficult for organisations to capitalise on this. It can therefore be argued that if 
the host ability to leverage is to be maximised, the event owners need to 
relinquish some of their tight grip on event logos and intellectual property. 
2.3.4.1 Research Issues 
The final issue with leveraging that it seems prudent to discuss is research into 
leveraging itself. This is still a research area very much in its infancy, especially 
compared to the far more developed research into legacy. As hosts are putting 
together much more complex leveraging strategies, more studies are needed 
to investigate the techniques that are used (Grix, 2013). This has one obvious 
problem. Studies into legacy can often be undertaken ex-ante and do not 
necessarily require access to decision makers; after all, these studies are 
looking at the legacy impact post-event. However, leveraging is more 
concerned with the strategies put in place rather than the outcomes 
themselves (Chalip, 2004). This creates problems for researchers, as the full 
detail of these strategies will often not be made publicly available, and 
therefore researchers require access to direct stakeholders. 
A further issue with research into leveraging is the ‘one size fits all’ approach. 
As will be demonstrated in the next chapter and beyond, a wide range of cities 
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and nations host sport mega-events, and so it is unlikely that all approaches 
to leveraging will be the same. For example, the last four Football World Cups 
have been hosted in Germany, South Africa, Brazil and Russia, while the next 
will take place in Qatar. It is very unlikely that these nations will all employ the 
same leveraging plans, and the extent to which they could learn from the 
current literature is questionable. The case studies that have dominated this 
literature review are the Sydney 2000 and London 2012 Olympic Games, the 
2010 South Africa Football World Cup, and the 2011 Rugby World Cup in New 
Zealand. It is debatable to what extent states such as Qatar or China could 
learn from these examples (Ziakas, 2015). 
Further, there has been a uniform approach to the events themselves, a trap 
that this literature review has fallen into. First, there is a marked difference in 
approach between the Olympic Games (which mostly take place in one city, 
but with other venues around the country being used) and the Football World 
Cup (which covers an entire country, with the 2002 World Cup being shared 
between Japan and South Korea). Even with the Olympic Games, the spatial 
effects can differ from region to region, as the hosting of an event can 
positively or negatively impact remote areas. For example, trickle-down effects 
could boost the local economy of an area that is not directly focused in hosting 
an event, or services and funding could be withdrawn from this area to provide 
for the event itself (Cornelissen et al., 2011). 
The differences between legacy and leverage cloak a further issue with 
leveraging research. Mega-events have such an impact on the host region that 
it is unlikely that researchers will be able to separate the outcomes of the 
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carefully-planned leveraging strategies from the impacts of events that occur 
automatically (Smith, 2014). Similarly, as yet little research has been 
conducted into the way that these event impacts can be leveraged further. For 
example, Chalip (2014) notes that while it is clear that liminality occurs at 
mega-events, there is little understanding of how it can be directed for 
leveraging strategies. Finally, the very definition of leveraging means that it is 
something that has been planned and is therefore beneficial to at least one 
stakeholder group. Aside from the discussions regarding the uneven 
distribution of benefits (see Section 2.3.3.2), there has been little research into 
considering the ways that leveraging tactics might actually harm a host region. 
 Conceptual Framework 
This literature review of research into the leveraging of sport mega-events has 
identified a number of potential models with which this research may be 
underpinned; however, this study will be framed around Chalip’s (2004) model 
of event leverage (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of event leverage (Chalip, 2004) 
 
This model has already been discussed in relation to economic leveraging of 
mega-events (see Section 2.3.3.1 on page 29), but it is worth going into some 
detail regarding how the model works. First, there is a leverageable resource; 
in the case of Chalip’s work, it is a portfolio of events. This should be the start 
point for leveraging, as hosts identify what it is that is going to be leveraged. 
Next are the opportunities that the leverageable resource provides. In the case 
of the above example, Chalip identifies that a portfolio of events presents a 
host with visitors to the region, and media presence; these provide the host 
with the opportunity to achieve the strategic objective. These are the end 
results that the host wishes to accomplish. Chien et al. (2018) argue that the 
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strategic objectives should be identified first. In Chalip’s model, the host should 
be seeking to optimise trade and improve the image of the region. Finally, and 
most crucially for leverage, are the means by which these strategic objectives 
will be achieved. This is the fundamental difference between research into 
legacy and leverage. Studies considering legacy will have the most interest in 
the strategic objectives and measuring whether they were achieved, whereas, 
conversely, research into leveraging will have a greater focus on the means; 
that is, analysis of the tactics that were put in place to achieve the goals.  
Chalip’s model has been modified four times; first by O’Brien (2007), then by 
Grix (2012), VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) and finally Kirby et al. (2018). First, 
O’Brien (2007) incorporated subculture into the model to demonstrate the 
importance of this factor. O’Brien’s study found that a surfing festival relied 
heavily on subculture to achieve the economic goals; however, a surfing 
festival is likely to attract participants and attendees with a specific interest in 
surfing. It is likely to be the aim of an Olympic bid to attract as wide a population 
as possible, and so subculture is unlikely to play as large a role. Following this, 
Grix (2012) also modified the model to demonstrate how the means necessary 
to achieve economic gains also could help modify a host’s image. 
VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) turned the model towards the environmental 
leveraging of Vancouver’s 2010 Winter Olympic Games, and in particular 
moved away from the leverageable resource being a portfolio of events. This 
led to VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) arguing that Vancouver has a range of 
leverageable resources available, not just the hosting of an event. 
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Perhaps of most relevance to the present study, Kirby et al. (2018) modified 
the model to consider leveraging business opportunities in three distinct 
periods; the bid, the planning phase before the event, and then the event and 
handover period. However, while the bid period is considered in this model, 
there is no consideration as to failed bids. The study only considers bids that 
went on to be successful (London 2012, Glasgow Commonwealth Games 
2014 and Gold Coast Commonwealth Games 2018). The paper assumes that 
the strategies put in place during the bid phase will continue into the planning 
phase; there is little consideration as to whether these strategies would still be 
valid for a failed bid. 
 Chapter Summary 
This literature review has sought to set out the literature surrounding the 
leveraging of hosting sport mega-events. While this research is investigating 
the leveraging of bids for mega-events, there is a distinct lack of research in 
this area. Nevertheless, the literature review has played an important role in 
this study. The academic framework that will be used to support the results 
has been identified. This research will seek to adapt Chalip’s (2004) model of 
event leverage to demonstrate the strategies and tactics that are available for 
Olympic bidding cities. In addition to the identification of an academic 
framework, the literature review has also extrapolated five key lessons that, 
for leveraging, are consistent throughout the literature: 
1) One size does not fit all; leveraging strategies need to be tailored to 
individual communities. 
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2) Leveraging is unlikely to solve a problem on its own, if it is not 
integrated into wider planning within the city. 
3) A separate delivery organisation may be required. 
4) The delivery organisation should aim to work with a range of 
stakeholders to maximise benefits across different social groups. 
5) There is an optimal time at which to deliver leveraging plans. For 
hosting, this is during the pregnancy period, although some 
outcomes may be delivered years later. 
The next chapter will introduce the literature surrounding bidding for sport 
mega-events.
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3 Literature Review: Bidding for Mega-Events 
 Introduction and Purpose 
The previous chapter introduced the concept of leverage regarding mega-
events, and the strategies that may be employed to ensure benefits for a host. 
As this literature review will demonstrate, as yet, there has been very little 
discussion as to the ways in which leverage can be applied to the bid process. 
Rather, much of the literature regarding bidding is in relation to hosting, that 
is, the ways in which bids translate to the event taking place. The limited 
scholarly activity regarding failed Olympic bids typically uses legacy, with often 
little thought as to the strategies put in place to achieve them. 
Therefore, this chapter takes the following structure. It shall first provide 
historical context of Olympic bids (Section 3.2), in order to ascertain the levels 
of the current bidding problems. Following this, the concept of leverage will be 
applied to the bidding literature. It will first explore the key elements of a bid 
that provide opportunities for leverage (Section 3.3), before discussing the 
potential areas for leverage from a bid. This chapter will finish with a discussion 
regarding the two case studies utilised in this research; Cape Town and 
Toronto. 
 A History of Olympic Bidding 
Given that a key rationale for this research is a decline in cities wishing to bid 
for an Olympic Games, it is prudent to expand on the information provided in 
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Chapter 1. In addition, given the case study nature of this thesis, this will also 
help place the Cape Town and Toronto bids into historical context. 
The trends for bidding for the Olympic Games can be broken into five clear 
periods of time: 
Period 1: 1896 – 1932 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 3.3 
While the first Olympic Games were held in Athens in 1896, it was not until 
1904 that there was direct competition to host a Games, as Chicago and St. 
Louis (both USA) went head-to-head. Three of the first five Games had just 
one bidder, as Chicago (1904), Berlin and Milan (both 1908) each failed with 
their bids. The geographical nature of these bids is indicative of the time, with 
the majority of bid cities being from the USA and Europe. Alexandria in Egypt 
was the only bidder from outside the USA and Europe to bid for a Games 
during 1896-1932. Ironically, the Games that Alexandria bid for was the 1916 
Games, which ultimately did not take place due to the First World War. 
Period 2: 1936 – 1960 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 8.6 
Following Alexandria’s bid for the 1916 Games, two decades later it bid again, 
for the 1936 Games. A major difference this time was that it was not just 
competing with European and US cities, but also faced competition from South 
America, as Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) entered the 
fray. Although Berlin ultimately hosted the 1936 Games, four years later Tokyo 
became the first Asian city to bid for, and become the first non-European or 
US city to be awarded the Games; however, the Games did not take place 
following the outbreak of World War II. In the aftermath of the War, bidders 
were again restricted to USA and Europe. It was not until Melbourne, Mexico 
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City and Buenos Aires bid for the 1956 Games that the Games would be taken 
outside of the USA and Europe as Melbourne’s bid was successful. 
While this period was still dominated by USA and European cities (50 out of 
58 bidders), it saw bids from countries from Asia, South America and Oceania, 
and Tokyo and Melbourne being awarded the Games. These additional bid 
cities from other continents contributed to the 1936-1960 period being the first 
truly competitive era in terms of bid cities, with there being on average 8.3 
cities bidding for each iteration. 
Period 3: 1964 – 1988 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 2.9 
Despite the previous period averaging 8.3 bidders per Games, this figure 
declined quickly in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The 1960 Games had seven 
bidders, with Rome being successful. It can be argued that it was Rome’s 
hosting of this Games that led to the disinterest of many cities due to its heavy 
investment (Chalkley and Essex, 1999). Indeed, the levels of spending by 
Rome even raised questions as to whether the 1964 Games in Tokyo would 
take place. These worries about cost were further exacerbated following the 
1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal, which bankrupted the city 
(Kavetsos and Szymanski, 2010). Subsequently, Moscow and Los Angeles 
were the only two cities competing to host the 1980 and 1984 Games.  
Period 4: 1992 – 2020 | Average bids per Olympic Games: 7.9 
Despite being the only bidder for the 1984 Games, Los Angeles hosting of the 
Games was financially successful, and this led to renewed interest from bid 
cities. The 1992 Olympic Games, the first bid process following Los Angeles 
1984, had six formal bids, with the number of bidders increasing throughout 
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the 1990s until 11 cities bid for the 2004 Games. This has proved to be the 
high watermark for post-war Games, as the number of bidders fell to six for 
the 2020 Olympic Games. However, this period is epitomised by the distinct 
variance of the bidders. The 2000 Games were the first to have bidders from 
four continents, and this continued until the 2016 Olympic Games held in Rio 
de Janeiro. There has also been a strong Asian flavour to the bids. Of the 57 
bids for the Olympic Games taking place in the 21st century, 12 have come 
from Asia; a figure which increases to 17 when bids from Istanbul and Moscow 
are considered. This has coincided with a fall in bids from the USA, partly due 
to the IOC changing the regulations, banning National Olympic Committees 
from having more than one bidder. While this period saw an average of eight 
bidders per Games, this declined from 11 cities bidding for the 2004 Games, 
to six bidding for 2020. 
Period 5: 2024 – date | Average bids per Olympic Games: 3 
While the number of bids for the 2020 Games was a significant decline on the 
bids for the 2004 Games, the bids fell even further for the 2024 and 2028 
iterations. While five cities formally submitted bids for the 2024 Games; 
Hamburg, Budapest and Rome did not even reach the voting stage, with each 
withdrawing part-way through the bid process. With just Paris and Los Angeles 
in the running for the 2024 Games, and few bids anticipated for the 2028 
Games, the IOC decided to award both the 2024 and 2028 Games in 2017 
(IOC, 2017b). 
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 The Bid Process 
Much of the research that has been conducted into bids for mega-events is 
framed around hosting. There is a relatively large amount of research into the 
bid process and the reasons why cities’ bids are successful. While this 
research is focused on the ways in which Olympic bids can be leveraged, it is 
worth detailing the bid process in order to explore the opportunities that the 
process provides for leverage. 
3.3.1 The Decision to Bid 
Any Olympic bid starts with a group or individual who first has the idea to bid. 
The stakeholder responsible for the decision will change from state to state, 
and this will particularly depend on the political structure. In Western 
democratic nations, the initial bid suggestion will often come from the private 
sector rather than from politicians. For example, bids by Los Angeles 
(Andranovich et al., 2001), Amsterdam (Westerbeek, 2009), Atlanta 
(Andranovich,  et al., 2001), Manchester (Law, 1994), Sydney (Lenskyj, 1996), 
London (Brown et al., 2012), and New York (Shoval, 2002) are all described 
as having groups of businessmen at the heart of the initial drive to bid. This 
instantly raises a question regarding which stakeholders are most likely to 
benefit from bidding and, ultimately, hosting. If a bid is led by the private sector, 
it perhaps stands to reason that it is the private sector that will be the ultimate 
beneficiary, resulting in the type of inequalities from hosting that were 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
Conversely, authoritarian states are more likely to be driven by the ruling 
governments (Foley et al., 2012). This decision is made simpler by the fact 
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that many of the stakeholders involved in a bid are not independent (Könecke 
and de Nooij, 2017). These centralised decisions provide authoritarian states 
with a further advantage, as Western states will often need to have a pre-bid 
competition to decide which city will be put forward, and potentially a pre-bid 
plebiscite (Foley et al., 2012). 
Since the bids for the 1960 Olympic Games, each National Olympic 
Committee (NOC) can put forward only one bid city. Should two cities from the 
same nation wish to submit a bid, it is the NOC’s responsibility to decide which 
city should submit the formal bid (Burroughs, 1999). Eight American cities 
submitted proposals for the 2012 Olympic Games, with New York selected by 
the United States Olympic Committee (Shoval, 2002). At this stage, the NOC 
will often consider which competing city is the most likely to win. Hamburg was 
selected by the German Olympic Sports Confederation to bid for the 2024 
Olympic Games over Berlin, in part because Hamburg had the support of the 
German national sport associations as well as public support (Wicker and 
Coates, 2018). The proposal selection decision may also be guided by the 
IOC, and it is typically ‘global cities’ (Tolzmann, 2014) that are put forward at 
this stage. Indeed, following failed bids from Manchester and Birmingham in 
the 1990s, the IOC recommended to the British Olympic Association that 
London should be the only UK city put forward (Feblowitz, 2012). 
This additional round of bidding potentially provides a wider range of cities with 
leveraging opportunities. This literature review has found no research 
considering the domestic battle to be the NOC representative, and the impact 
this may have on a city. For example, in 2017, there was a high-profile battle 
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(in the UK media at least) between Liverpool and Birmingham to be the UK 
bidder for the 2022 Commonwealth Games. While this domestic battle would 
not be expected to provide an international platform for either of these cities, 
it is likely that there would have been some impacts on the losing city of 
Liverpool. 
3.3.2 Submitting the Bid 
The Olympic bid procedure is currently in a state of flux. The decision to award 
Los Angeles the 2028 Olympic Games means that there is not likely to be a 
new Summer Games bid decision until 2025 (seven years before the 2032 
Olympic Games). However, there is currently an ongoing candidate process 
for the 2026 Winter Olympic Games, with the winner expected to be 
announced in September 2019 (IOC, 2018b). As part of Agenda 2020 and The 
New Norm recommendations, this now involves a ‘dialogue stage’ which 
allows interested cities and NOCs to engage with the IOC prior to formally 
submitting a bid. The IOC Executive Board will then recommend the cities to 
make a bid (IOC, 2018b). Given that the first ‘dialogue stage’ took place in the 
summer of 2018, this is an element of the bid process on which there has yet 
been no research. 
Those cities invited to bid following the dialogue stage then submit a 
Candidature File and are visited by the IOC Technical Experts and Evaluation 
Commission. The IOC publishes its Evaluation Commission Report on each 
bidder, before each city presents to the IOC Session. Following this, the IOC 
members vote on the winner of the bid (IOC, 2018b). This stage has been 
simplified from previous years to reduce the large costs associated simply with 
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submitting a bid. As far back as 2002, Persson estimated that the average cost 
for submitting a bid for the Olympic Games totalled $15 million (Persson, 
2002). 
3.3.2.1 Costs of Bidding 
As Table 3.1 shows, the cost of bidding for mega-events is not 
inconsequential, especially considering that the bidder does not receive any 
of this investment back if the bid is unsuccessful (Masterman, 2008). 
Table 3.1: Costs of bidding for sport mega-events 
Bidder Event Bid For Approx. 
Cost 
Reference 
Birmingham, UK 
1992 Summer 
Olympic Games 
£5 million Feddersen et al., 2007 
Manchester, UK 
1996 Summer 
Olympic Games 
£3 million Hill, 1994 
Manchester, UK 
2000 Summer 
Olympic Games 
£5-8 million Lawson, 2006 
Sydney, Australia 
2000 Summer 
Olympic Games 
£13 million White, 2011 
Salt Lake City, 
USA 
2002 Winter 
Olympic Games 
£8 million Andranovich et al., 2001 
England 
2006 Football 
World Cup 
£10 million 
Sugden and Tomlinson, 
2002 
Toronto, Canada 
2008 Summer 
Olympic Games 
£10 million Tufts, 2004 
London, UK 
2012 Summer 
Olympic Games 
£30 million Walters, 2011 
Chicago, USA 
2016 Summer 
Olympic Games 
£69 million Rundio and Heere, 2016 
England 
2018 Football 
World Cup 
£21 million 
The Football Association 
Limited, 2010 
Australia 
2022 Football 
World Cup 
£22 million de Nooij, 2014 
 
As with the cost of hosting mega-events, there are issues with analysing the 
cost of bidding. Bidders may use an Olympic bid to catalyse infrastructural 
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developments. The extent to which this investment should be included, 
particularly if the development was planned anyway, is questionable. Indeed, 
de Nooij (2014) questions these costs, noting that an estimated €190 million 
cost for an Amsterdam bid includes the construction of accommodation which 
has a value even if the bid does not win, yet does not include the cost of civil 
servants working on the bid. 
While the IOC has streamlined the bid process, some commentators have 
argued for an even more efficient bid process in the form of a single auction. 
Baade and Matheson (2002) argue that the current bid process encourages 
the IOC to seize economic rents from bidders, an argument supported by 
Maennig and du Plessis (2009). Both Baade and Matheson (2002) and 
Mitchell and Stewart (2015), argue that a single sealed bid would be a more 
economical way of deciding the next host of a mega-event; specifically, much 
of the spending on lobbying and attempting to gain IOC members’ support 
would be negated. While it could be considered that this may result in rich 
countries with little event management capability hosting the event, it is argued 
that this would not be the case. Baade and Matheson (2002) propose that a 
bidder should include its hosting plans in the bid, while Mitchell and Stewart 
(2015) argue that the global embarrassment of mismanaging an Olympic 
Games would ensure that only competent nations would bid. 
Sheng (2010) argues that bidding for an Olympic Games is not a simple 
business transaction as political and social considerations must be taken into 
account. Therefore, rather than a straight auction, with the highest bidder 
hosting, Sheng proposes that bidders communicate with each other. In this 
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process, bidders who place the highest valuation on hosting would be able to 
negotiate with other bidders to leave the bid race. This form of cooperation 
would maximise the total welfare of all nations involved; those bidders with 
high valuations of hosting would ultimately host, while those who do not bid 
would be adequately compensated for dropping out. While Sheng (2010) 
argues that politicians who have invested their reputation on a bid may not be 
easily bought off, it would also allow an easy way out for cities who do not 
believe they will win, without the embarrassment of losing. This process may 
also persuade bidders who do not believe they will ultimately be successful to 
enter a speculative bid, in the knowledge that there will be an escape route 
before it comes to the final decision. 
3.3.2.2 Stakeholder Involvement 
While a bid will often initially be driven by the private sector, there will likely be 
other stakeholders involved. The Candidature Committee (bid team) itself will 
draw in support from both private and public organisations. Theodoraki (2007) 
details the structures of Vancouver’s and Sochi’s Candidature Committees for 
the 2010 and 2014 Winter Olympic Games, respectively, and notes that the 
bid committee will likely grow over time. Indeed, Griffiths (2000) argues that 
the late inclusion of the South African government into Cape Town’s 
Candidature Committee disrupted the team and was a potential reason for 
Cape Town not being awarded the 2004 Olympic Games. 
This is not to say that the government should not be involved; indeed, the IOC 
requires that the cost of hosting is underwritten by the national or city 
government (Mackay, 2012). This can often be a bone of contention during 
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the bid. If a bid is driven by the private sector, which is likely to be the 
beneficiary, should it be the government and ultimately the taxpayer that bears 
the brunt of the costs? This is particularly pertinent in the USA, as it is the city 
rather than the national government which is responsible for underwriting the 
costs (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014). 
This is not the only way in which government support plays a role in the bid 
process. There is not a great deal of literature surrounding the ways in which 
government support plays a role in a bid being successful; however, Booth 
and Tatz (1994) note that both the governing and opposition parties in 
Australia backed Sydney’s successful bid for the 2000 Olympic Games. Other 
studies have shown that a lack of government support may result in a failed 
bid; for example, both the Birmingham (Hill, 1994) and India (Bandyopadhyay, 
2014) bids for the 1992 Olympic Games were thought to be hindered by a lack 
of government support, while, more recently, many politicians voiced their 
concern regarding bids from Berlin (Alberts, 2009), Munich (Coates and 
Wicker, 2015), and Hamburg (Lauermann and Vogelpohl, 2017) for the 2016, 
2018 and 2024 Olympic Games respectively. 
Furthermore, government policy may hinder bids. As noted by McKelvey and 
Longley (2015) and Müller (2017), the IOC requires hosts to change their 
legislation. Should a government not be prepared to agree to these legislative 
changes during the bid process, it is unlikely to win the vote. Indeed, Walters 
(2011) argues that the UK government’s reluctance to change tax laws 
resulted in the Football Association losing the hosting of the 2010 Champions 
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League Final. Ultimately, the UK government agreed to the changes, with 
Wembley hosting the Final in both 2011 and 2013. 
Government interest in a bid provides a city with a key opportunity that can be 
leveraged, as an Olympic bid may open up sources of funding that otherwise 
would not be available. This has not gained a great deal of traction within the 
literature, but evidence indicates that it is a route for cities to leverage the 
Olympic bid. For example, Cochrane et al. (1996) write that although 
Manchester’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games was unsuccessful, it enabled 
the city to gain public sector funding that otherwise would have been 
inaccessible. This funded numerous projects within the city, including a 
velodrome, and also funded clearance of the site that would ultimately become 
the stadium for the Manchester Commonwealth Games and, latterly, the home 
of Manchester City Football Club (Hill, 1994). This £5 million investment can 
be compared to that of Tokyo, whose bid for the 2016 Olympic Games secured 
$4.5 billion worth of funding, resulting in a $1.8 billion investment in new sport 
facilities (Lauermann, 2015). The availability of public funding for a bid does 
depend somewhat on the political situation within a nation; for example, public 
funding is not available for American bidders, as the cities themselves are 
often the highest level of government responsible for funding a bid (van Dijk 
and Weitkamp, 2014). 
This demonstrates the importance for a bid team to be backed by politicians. 
The co-operation between the three levels of government within Brazil is 
thought to have a played a large role in Rio de Janeiro securing the 2016 
Olympic Games (Toledo et al., 2015). This is not merely the responsibility of 
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politicians, as often a public-private coalition will take responsibility for the bid 
(Kassens-Noor and Lauermann, 2017). This public-private coalition will be 
made up of different stakeholders with varying interests in the bid process. 
Some may have an interest in the bid process and wish to be involved, 
whereas others will be invited to take part as they have expertise that is 
needed (Hautbois et al., 2012). These stakeholders will be a mixture of 
government officials, local businesspeople, developers, local elites, and those 
involved in sport organisations (Kassens-Noor and Lauermann, 2017). Each 
of these is likely to have their own role to play in the bid. For example, 
government officials provide a degree of legitimacy to the bid; Lee (2006) 
details the important role that Tony Blair played in securing IOC votes for 
London’s successful bid. Similarly, many IOC members are often former 
sportspeople, and therefore may be seduced by those stakeholders from the 
sport industry (Hautbois et al., 2012). 
As has already been discussed, the Olympic bid process now includes a 
dialogue stage, with communication being encouraged between the bid team 
and the IOC (but not with individual IOC members). This allows these 
coalitions and networks to develop further, in particular through exposure to 
international expertise (Lauermann, 2015). This provides Olympic bidders with 
a clear opportunity that can be leveraged, through collaborations that may take 
place once the bid is over (Richards and Marques, 2016). Indeed, as was 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the development of networks is a key 
facet of leverage. Yet, while some unintentional legacies driven by these 
networks have been documented, for example, Salisbury et al. (2017) note 
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that these networks have resulted in urban and transportation development, 
there is very little evidence that any bidder has sought to purposefully leverage 
a bid coalition to drive development within a city. 
A further, critical member of the bid coalition are consultants who specialise in 
the development of bids to host sport mega-events (Theodoraki, 2007). 
Lauermann (2014a) notes that eight bid consultants have been involved with 
13 mega-event bids since the start of the century, with five consulting agencies 
being used per bid. This consultancy service is of particular importance to first 
time bidders. A key legacy that has been noted in the literature and will be 
expanded upon later in this literature review, is that of experience and bid 
knowhow (Emery, 2002). Cities bidding for the first time will not have this bank 
of knowledge, and so rely on the consultants’ expertise; however, it is possible 
that these consulting firms take the same knowledge from bid to bid, potentially 
resulting in similarities from bid to bid and reducing the uniqueness of each 
city’s offering. 
Consultancy firms are not the only business likely to be part of the bid coalition; 
sponsors will often play a large role. Indeed, Chicago’s 2016 Candidature File 
lists three pages of donors (Chicago 2016, 2009), ranging from global 
conglomerates to local businesses. This, again, echoes the opportunities for 
business development leverage discussed in the previous chapter, 
highlighting the opportunities for both the city and domestic firms to learn from 
international businesses. While some of these organisations may wish to 
support a bid without an ulterior motive, many wish to benefit from the lucrative 
contracts that arise from hosting (Alegi, 2001). Firms may also have public 
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relations motives for being associated with a bid; for example, Anglo American 
plc, a multinational mining company based in Johannesburg, revealed its 
support of Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Games during a period in which it 
was facing widespread criticism for benefiting from apartheid (Cornelissen, 
2004a). 
A key stakeholder that bidders may wish to engage with further, is the media, 
as it can impact public opinion (Theodoraki, 2007). Media firms may work with 
the bid team to offer services in kind, that is, rather than pay cash to be 
associated with the bid, they will instead offer favourable media coverage. This 
was a key facet of both Sydney and London’s successful bids for the 2000 and 
2012 Olympic Games respectively. Booth and Tatz (1994) note the number of 
media outlets formally involved with Sydney’s bid, while Gong (2011) 
describes the support that the bid received in newspapers; in particular, 
Australian newspapers repeatedly criticised the human rights record of its rival 
Beijing (Gong, 2011). While it could be argued that the Australian media were 
doing this for humanitarian reasons, the fact that criticism was not spotlighted 
during Beijing’s successful bid for the 2008 Games suggests that this was not 
the case (Gong, 2011). On a similar note, the London Olympics Bid Committee 
worked closely with The Sun newspaper to encourage its readers to ‘back the 
bid’ (Mackay, 2012). Media support does not always guarantee a successful 
bid however, as experienced by Toronto, whose 1996 bid was partnered by 
two television networks yet still faced mounting public criticism (Lenskyj, 
1996). 
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3.3.2.3 Public Support 
The reason why bid teams wish to engage with the media is to engage public 
support for the bid, which is a key factor in the final bid decision (Coates and 
Wicker, 2015). However, as the previous section demonstrated, the bid team 
will often be a coalition of government officials and private enterprise, and 
public opinion is very rarely considered at the start of the bid (Andranovich et 
al., 2001). It is expected that elected politicians are there to represent the 
public; therefore, if the government decides to proceed with a bid, it is 
assumed to be doing so at the behest of its voters (Coates and Wicker, 2015). 
The IOC considers public support as part of the bid criteria. Each bidder is 
required to include data on public support in its Candidature File, while the IOC 
also conducts its own surveys. Hiller and Wanner (2016) provide a detailed 
critique of the data collection involved. There is no specific question that cities 
must ask. Each city words their question differently, with some requiring a 
yes/no answer and others being on a 5-point scale. Further, there is often 
scant information regarding the sample; some surveys have seen as few as 
500 respondents, and there is no requirement for the sample to be derived 
from the city itself, the region, or even the country (Hiller and Wanner, 2016). 
This makes it extremely difficult to compare the results between cities. Indeed, 
Hiller and Wanner argue that government support is more important to the IOC 
than public support, despite Maennig and du Plessis’s (2009) findings that 
cities that achieve 66% public support fare better than cities without. 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the impacts of hosting are not 
necessarily positive. Thus, it is of little surprise, that as the narrative of legacy 
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has become more prominent, so too has the importance of public support and 
a rise in protest groups in democratic states. The first protest group to gain 
widespread coverage was the ‘Bread Not Circuses’ coalition that was created 
to protest against Toronto’s bid for the 1996 Olympic Games. Their protests 
are believed to have played a significant role in Toronto’s bid being 
unsuccessful (Whitson, 2004; Oliver, 2011a). Bread Not Circuses reconvened 
to protest against Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, while a similar 
group, ‘No Games Chicago’ swayed the public against Chicago’s bid for the 
2016 Olympic Games (Rundio and Heere, 2016). These protests are typically 
based on a lack of public consultation and the opportunity cost of bidding and 
hosting, with the argument being that the money could be better invested 
elsewhere (Mowatt and Travis, 2015). 
While the IOC seeks to gain figures regarding public support for bids, this has 
been formalised in recent years, with several bid cities holding a referendum 
regarding whether to bid. Figure 3.1 shows the results of referenda for Olympic 
Games since 2000, together with the year the referenda took place. 
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Figure 3.1: Referenda results for Olympic Games, 2000-20183 
As can be seen, the recent trend is for the public to vote against continuing a 
bid for the Games. It should also be noted that referenda only occur in 
democratic states. In nations governed by authoritarian regimes, it is highly 
unlikely that the population will be given an opportunity to have any say in the 
decision-making process. Once an authoritarian nation has submitted a bid, it 
will progress until the IOC makes its final decision (Könecke and de Nooij, 
2017). In contrast, bids made by democratic nations can end at any point. 
Even a positive referendum result does not guarantee that a bid will reach 
fruition; for example, Oslo withdrew its bid despite securing over 54% public 
support (Seippel et al., 2016). 
                                            
3 Adapted from Maennig (2017) 
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Given the recent trends of protest groups and referenda, it is clear that bid 
committees should seek to understand the views of the public on the hosting 
of mega-events. Studies have been conducted on referenda in Munich 
(Coates and Wicker, 2015) and Hamburg (Maennig, 2017; Scheu and Preuss, 
2018). Coates and Wicker (2015) found that young males were more likely to 
support a bid, while areas of low employment also voted yes, suggesting that 
the rhetoric regarding an Olympic Games providing jobs had found an 
audience. However, this contrasted with Maennig’s (2017) findings in 
Hamburg, where deprived areas were more likely to oppose the bid, 
suggesting that gentrification and displacement were a concern. The research 
by Coates and Wicker (2015) also highlighted the importance of government 
support, with voters likely to follow the views of the political party that they 
would typically support. 
These findings demonstrate that the public’s view of legacy was a key factor 
in their referendum voting decision and, in particular, the economic and social 
impacts of an event (Streicher et al., 2016). Scheu and Preuss (2018) found 
that 77% of the public based their vote on whether they believed hosting would 
leave positive or negative legacies. While this may indicate that bidders should 
do their best to promote the positive legacies accrued by hosting, it may also 
have an adverse impact if voters believe that promises are being embellished. 
Coates and Wicker (2015) found that voters had little trust in either the IOC or 
cities and national governments. Further, voters are often risk averse; if they 
believe that benefits are being exaggerated, they may wish to avoid the risk of 
any negative impacts on the region (Scheu and Preuss, 2018).  
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While criticism of bids from the likes of Chicago, Boston, Munich and Hamburg 
have focused upon the negative aspects, this does not mean that the public 
are always in opposition to an Olympic Games. As discussed in the previous 
section, many bidders use the media to build support for a bid (Mackay, 2012). 
Should this tactic be successful, it may provide cities with an opportunity that 
can be leveraged. Newman (2007) reports that over one million Londoners 
had ‘backed the bid’ online, with 11,000 people congregating in Trafalgar 
Square to view the bid decision. This echoes the feeling of pride that 
Manchester’s bid for the 2000 Olympic Games exuded in Mancunians (Law, 
1994). These feelings are not unlike the festival-like nature identified as an 
opportunity to leverage the hosting of events. 
This use of feelings created during a bid is not without issue, however. If a city 
attempts to leverage positive feelings when there is a generally negative 
opinion of the bid, then it is likely to backfire. Furthermore, there is a strict 
timeframe on these feelings. Should a bid be successful, then leveraging plans 
will be dictated by hosting rather than the bid itself; however, if the bid is 
unsuccessful, it is unlikely the positive feelings will continue. If residents 
believe that the failed outcome was the wrong decision, then the feelings of 
pride may be replaced by anger towards the mega-event owner (McGillivray 
and Turner, 2017). Alternatively, citizens may focus their ire towards the bid 
and the city itself. Strohmayer (2013:197) reports that the defeat of Paris to its 
fiercest rivals was ‘the nail in the coffin for French ambition and self-esteem’. 
Either way, it is likely that the positive bubble will be burst following the bid 
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decision, highlighting the importance of leveraging the positive sentiments 
before the bid finishes. 
3.3.2.4 The Candidature File 
As has already been mentioned, bid cities submit a Candidature File to the 
IOC, outlining their plans for hosting the Games (although, as Theodoraki 
(2009) noted, Greece provided very little information regarding the legacy of 
Athens 2004 during the bid phase). Despite the Candidature File being a 
binding contract with the IOC, there is often criticism for the disparity between 
the promises made during the bid and actual outcomes post-event (Bellas and 
Oliver, 2016). This is often the case regarding costs, as seen in Table 3.2 
below 
Table 3.2: Disparities between Bid Projections and Actual Costs 
Bidder Pre-Games 
promise 
Actual Cost Change Reference 
South 
Africa 2010 
Stadia cost = 
R1bn 
Stadia cost = 
R8.4bn 
740% Davies, 2009 
London 
2012 
Total cost = 
£2.4bn 
Total cost = 
£8.9bn 
271% 
New Statesman, 
2012 
Brazil 2014 
Stadia cost = 
$1.1bn 
Stadia cost = 
$4.4bn 
300% Müller, 2017 
Sochi 2018 
Stadia cost = 
$2.8bn 
Stadia cost = 
$6.6bn 
136% Müller, 2017 
 
It is not just costs that may differ between the bid phase and the event itself. 
For example, in Atlanta’s bid for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, it was 
promised that the Games would be used to reduce poverty within the city, yet 
15,000 Atlanta residents were displaced (Stewart and Rayner, 2015). 
Similarly, London’s bid for the 2012 Olympic Games painted the city as a 
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smorgasbord of cultures, and open and welcoming, yet at the time of the 
Games this was not necessarily the case (Bulley and Lisle, 2012). This is partly 
due to the bid process itself, with cities producing information designed to 
attract support for the bid, potentially leading to an overpromise of benefits 
(Stewart and Rayner, 2015) but underbidding to secure the event (Zehndorfer 
and Mackintosh, 2017).  
The cost promises made in the bid are designed to ensure that the bid is 
successful and are often designed by the aforementioned consultants. 
Crucially, these consultants are then not responsible for delivering the 
promises. Indeed, Müller discusses the environmental planning of Sochi’s bid 
for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, with bid promises labelled as ‘science 
fiction’ (Müller, 2015b:9). The promises made were never feasible for Sochi to 
achieve. This adds to the argument put forward in Section 3.3 that a public-
facing bid process is not the most efficient solution and, instead, a single, 
sealed auction may result in better outcomes for the event. 
While it is possible that bidders may underbid and overpromise in order to 
secure support, this is not the only reason for discrepancies made in a bid and 
what actually occurs. The bid process typically takes place seven years before 
the event occurs. Over this long period, it is possible that circumstances will 
change, and assumptions given in the bid will not actually come to pass 
(Müller, 2015b). In addition, it may be that the event owner (e.g. IOC/FIFA) 
requests changes once the bid has been won. For example, in South Africa’s 
bid for the 2010 Football World Cup, Newlands and Athlone were identified as 
the stadia to be used in Cape Town. After South Africa was elected host, FIFA 
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requested that a new stadium be built in the more picturesque Green Point 
(Bob and Swart, 2009), resulting in a R4.4 billion stadium being built in place 
of the R14 million redevelopment promised during the bid (Davies, 2009). 
3.3.3 The Final Decision 
Assuming a bid is not withdrawn beforehand, the final decision as to who will 
host is made at an IOC session. For the current bid process, Candidate Cities 
for the 2026 Winter Olympic Games will have the opportunity to present their 
bids at the IOC Session in Milan in September 2019 (IOC, 2018b). At this 
session, IOC members will then vote for the city that they want to host the 
Games. After each round, the city with the fewest votes is eliminated, until 
there is just one, winning city remaining. This city will then have seven years 
to prepare for hosting. 
Since the turn of the century, there have been several studies examining the 
reasons why IOC members vote in the way that they do. It should be noted 
that, in the meantime, there have been changes to the bid process, following 
the Salt Lake City bidding scandal. The Salt Lake City bid team had a 
$400,000 ‘humanitarian assistance fund’ which was used to grant scholarships 
to IOC members’ families, as well as a raft of other bribes (Wenn and Martyn, 
2006). While there was considerable attention on Salt Lake City, it was by no 
means the only bidder to use such tactics. Indeed, in 1994, Booth and Tatz 
(1994) detailed how Sydney lobbied IOC members with scholarships and 
offers of employment for members of their family. Poast (2007) subsequently 
found that corruption has only an insignificant impact on the bid process. Thus, 
Chapter 3 | Literature Review: Bidding for Mega-Events 
90 
if IOC members are no longer being paid for votes, it is worth considering the 
other factors contributing to whether a bid is successful or not. 
The first criteria are the bid city and the nation itself. In recent years, there has 
been a clear commitment to taking the Olympic Games to as many different 
regions of the world as possible. This was a key facet of Beijing’s successful 
bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, as it presented Beijing as a new location, 
and indeed one with issues that could be helped by the Olympic movement 
(Haugen, 2005). The need to take mega-events to new areas of the world was 
highlighted by FIFA, who put in place a plan to take the Football World Cup to 
each confederation in turn. While this plan has since been watered down (the 
World Cup will now take place in a confederation that did not host either of the 
two previous events), this has resulted in the past three Football World Cups 
being held in Africa, South America and Europe, with the 2022 edition to take 
place in the Middle East. With Mexico, USA and Canada hosting the 2026 
tournament, five successive Football World Cups will take place on different 
continents. 
In addition, the economic status of a nation would appear equally important. A 
study by Maennig and Vierhaus (2016) found that cities with over 2.5 million 
inhabitants, located in nations with strong recent GDP growth, are more likely 
to be voted to host. This supported earlier work by Poast (2007), who also 
found that population and GDP are important factors. This perhaps suggests 
that the IOC is concerned with the economic impact of the Games, as a host 
city with a large population and high GDP per capita is likely to be able to sell 
a large number of tickets for the event. Along similar lines, Preuss (2000) also 
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argued that the IOC is concerned with the time zone in which Games take 
place, in order to maximise TV viewers and satisfy sponsors. However, this 
was disputed by Poast (2007), who found that there is no statistical bias for 
Olympic Games to be hosted in either North America or Europe. 
The geographic location and economic status may be used as an initial filter, 
but this is clearly not the only factor. Several studies have argued that the 
primary consideration is the city’s ability to host a mega-event (Emery, 2002; 
Westerbeek et al. 2002). This information is communicated to the IOC 
members via the Candidature File and the Evaluation Commission’s support 
(Preuss, 2000), but, as was seen in Section 3.3, the promises made during 
the bid may not be wholly realistic. Therefore, it is important for bid cities to 
prove their mega-event hosting capability, often through the hosting 
beforehand of other events such as World Championships (Maennig and 
Vierhaus, 2016; Westerbeek et al., 2002). If a city has not previously hosted a 
large-scale event, then voters prefer that cities already have a strong sporting 
infrastructure, as this both raises the credibility of the bid and also suggests 
that the city will be able to utilise the new sport facilities once the event is over 
(Maennig and Vierhaus, 2016; Persson, 2002). This infrastructure does not 
include just stadia. The Olympic Village is also important, in particular, its 
location. Feddersen et al. (2007) found that a short distance between the 
Olympic Village and the competition venues was a positive factor. 
As has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, public and government 
support for a bid play a role in swaying votes. Maennig and Vierhaus (2016) 
find that having 66% public support for a bid boosts the chance of success. 
Chapter 3 | Literature Review: Bidding for Mega-Events 
92 
Political support is likely to be more crucial, and may go beyond what the event 
owner would expect. Indeed, governments may have a significant role in 
securing votes. This was demonstrated during FIFA’s voting for the 2006 
World Cup, when Charlie Dempsey ignored instruction from the Oceania 
Football Confederation to vote for South Africa, and instead abstained from 
the vote (Griffiths, 2000). At the same time, Germany struck an arms deal with 
Saudi Arabia in exchange for votes (Gibson, 2015). These two separate 
incidents had a clear impact on the final decision as Germany defeated South 
Africa by 12 votes to 11. 
This example shows that, while the event itself is important, IOC members are 
individuals and may consider other criteria when casting their votes. Preuss 
(2000) notes that members may support, or vote against, nations with certain 
political systems or religions. While direct lobbying for votes has been banned, 
many bidders still seek to target their bid directly to IOC members (Westerbeek 
et al. 2002). For example, the successful bids by Beijing and Vancouver for 
the 2008 Summer and 2010 Winter Olympic Games respectively, targeted 
their bid narrative at IOC members (Preuss, 2006; Sant and Mason, 2015). 
Similarly, IOC members may be influenced by recent trends in hosting. Voters 
for the Sydney 2000 Summer Olympic Games were likely to have been 
swayed by the environmental issues of the 1992 Albertville Winter Games, 
and this may have played a part in Sydney’s ‘Green Games’ vision being 
selected (McGillivray and Turner, 2017; Preuss, 2000). 
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3.3.4 Section Review 
This section has acknowledged the three stages of a bid and attempted to 
recognise the opportunities these provide for leveraging opportunities. The 
initial idea to bid often comes from private enterprise. Simply to submit a bid, 
a public-private coalition is often formed, including stakeholders from national 
governing bodies and the government. A stakeholder often not considered is 
the general public, and this has led to numerous bids being beset by criticism 
and protest groups. The general public as stakeholder is crucial for a bidder, 
as the level of public support is deemed one of the factors determining whether 
a bid is likely to be successful or not. 
 Post-Decision: Impacts of the Bid 
The previous section detailed the process of an Olympic bid, with a focus on 
identifying the key stages and the opportunities to leverage. The potential of 
benefiting from a bid was identified by Torres (2012) who was one of the first 
to truly notice the opportunity that a bid provides. Torres goes so far as to 
recognise bidders with little intention to host the Olympic Games, who instead 
wish to use the bid process for the sort of benefits detailed in the previous 
section. Torres terms these ‘utilitarian’ bidders, with ‘legitimate’ bidders being 
those who truly want to win the bid. 
This section now details the legacies that have emanated from Olympic bids. 
As will be seen, the idea of legacy is far more prevalent in the bid literature 
than leverage. These legacies may be intentional, and so align to the strategic 
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objectives in Chalip’s (2004) model. Where possible, the opportunities and 
means that lead to these outcomes are identified. 
As with the previous chapter, this is structured using the key areas identified 
in the literature: economic, social, sport and branding. 
3.4.1 Economic 
Of all the impacts of a bid that will be discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter, the area with most coverage in the literature is that of the economic 
benefits of bidding. It should be noted, however, that much of this research is 
not directly aiming to measure the economic benefits of bidding; rather, cities 
and nations with failed Olympic bids are often used as the control group to 
measure the actual impacts of hosting an event. The result of this approach is 
that there is a breadth of research providing information on the economic 
benefits of an Olympic bid. Given the nature of the economic data available to 
researchers, this has typically been directed towards the macroeconomic 
benefits, as it is rare for researchers to have specific economic information on 
individual cities. 
The key, and most discussed paper regarding the economic impacts of 
Olympic bids is that written by Rose and Spiegel (2011). This research argued 
that bidding to host an Olympic Games acts as a ‘costly signal’ to other nations 
that a country is liberalising, and therefore open and willing to trade. The 
Olympic bid is appropriate to this, as the costs involved in bidding, and indeed 
in potentially hosting, are large enough to deter governments who are not 
liberalising from bidding. Rose and Spiegel found that cities involved in an 
Olympic bid saw exports rise significantly, and for a sustained period of time. 
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Indeed, Rose and Spiegel observed that the exports of all bidders increased, 
whether the bid was successful or not, and argued that it is the bid process 
that leads to increased exports, and not the hosting. 
These results were supported by Demir et al. (2015), whose study found that 
failed bidders saw an increase in exports at a similar rate to hosts. However, 
Rose and Spiegel’s findings have been contested by Maennig and Richter 
(2012), and Matheson (2012), who argue that the results derive from selection 
bias. This is due to the fact that those nations who bid for Olympic Games are 
typically larger nations who are already leading exporters and are likely to 
experience trade growth anyway (Matheson, 2012). When Maennig and 
Richter (2012) controlled for this factor, they found that bid nations, no matter 
their economic state, typically did not experience an increase in exports. 
Gains in trade are not the only economic benefit that can be gained from a 
failed Olympic bid. Brückner and Pappa (2011) found that a number of 
economic indicators all improve during the bid period, including output, private 
investment, and private consumption; however, this economic improvement 
did not continue once the bid had been lost. These initial economic gains are 
likely to have come about due to the private investment that a bid receives, 
which is then lost when the bid is unsuccessful (Brückner and Pappa, 2011). 
A second study by Brückner and Pappa (2015) further investigated the impact 
that bidding for an Olympic Games has on an economy. Again, it was found 
that an Olympic bid has a significant impact upon an economy, as output and 
investment rises dramatically. However, as with the first study, Brückner and 
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Pappa found that there was little lasting impact on the economy. These results 
have been questioned by Langer et al. (2018), again due to selection bias. 
While Brückner and Pappa (2011; 2015) found that there is little economic 
impact following a bid decision, research has investigated the impact of the 
decision itself. Mirman and Sharma (2010) studied the reaction of the stock 
market following Olympic host announcements. It was found that there is a 
stock market growth for all countries involved in the bid, whether the country 
wins the bid or not. However, Martins and Serra (2011) found that the day after 
the host was announced, there was a positive stock market reaction to the 
winner but a negative reaction to losing bidders. A similar study was conducted 
by Charles and Darné (2016), but this time the study investigated stock market 
reactions to World Cup host announcements. In this research, it was found 
that the stock market reacted negatively to losing bids in Morocco and Egypt. 
It should be noted that these are two developing African nations, reinforcing 
Cornelissen’s (2004b) assertion that developing nations need to take 
particular care when considering whether a decision to bid is correct or not. 
Indeed, Dowse and Fletcher (2018) take this further, questioning whether 
event owners have an ethical obligation not to award mega-events to 
developing nations. 
The literature regarding the macroeconomic benefits of an Olympic bid have 
largely suggested that there may be benefits during the bid period itself, yet 
these dissipate once the bid is over. This echoes the idea of a ‘pregnancy 
period’, as discussed in Chapter 2; if a nation wishes to benefit economically 
from an Olympic bid, it needs to act during the bid process itself. 
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As demonstrated, much of the research regarding the economic benefits of an 
Olympic bid have been on a macro level. Kirby et al. (2018) do consider the 
bid phase in their study of how a mega-event can be leveraged to benefit micro 
and small businesses (MSBs). Drawing on Chalip’s (2004) model of event-
leverage, Kirby et al. (2018) include a ‘bidding and selection phase’ during 
which MSBs should seek involvement from the start as this increases the 
opportunities of being a stakeholder in the event itself. However, it is 
recognised that MSBs may play a role in generating support for the bid, and 
therefore the bid committee should seek the engagement of MSBs at the 
earliest opportunity (Kirby et al., 2018). This could be accomplished through 
the creation of business networks, in a similar way to that identified by O’Brien 
(2006). 
Much of the research has typically only considered the legacies of Olympic 
bids, and many of these impacts appear to be unplanned. Aside from the study 
of Kirby et al. (2018), no other papers have directly considered how bidders 
can actively leverage an Olympic bid for economic benefits (and the study by 
Kirby et al. does not consider the bid as an entity in itself; many of the 
managerial implications assume that the bid will be successful). It is entirely 
plausible, that if a nation sought to employ strategies specifically designed to 
use a bid to boost an economy, that the economic benefits may be felt beyond 
the period of the bid itself, regardless of its success. 
3.4.2 Social 
While there is a wide literature regarding the ways in which Olympic bids can 
be leveraged for social benefits, and even more regarding the positive and 
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negative social legacies of an event, there is a paucity of information regarding 
the social impact of a bid (Richards and Marques, 2016). There has already 
been discussion in Section 3.3.2.3 regarding the ways in which a bid can 
promote a feeling of pride and goodwill, with evidence showing that citizens in 
Cape Town (Swart and Bob, 2004), Manchester (Law, 1994) and London 
(Falcous and Silk, 2010) reported positive post-bid attitudes. However, there 
is little evidence to show that this feeling of euphoria has ever been leveraged 
for positive outcomes. 
The bid process itself may result in positive benefits from a bid. Section 3.3.3 
detailed the factors that influence whether a bid is successful or not, one of 
which is the political and economic status of the country. If a nation wishes to 
host an Olympic Games, it may believe that it needs to comply with Western 
norms and modify its society accordingly; in the build-up to Beijing’s hosting of 
the 2008 Olympic Games, Theodoraki (2004) wrote of sport contributing to the 
liberalising of China’s international trade policies. Foley et al. (2012) detail how 
bidding for the Olympic Games resulted in a degree of social change within 
Qatar. Most obviously, the Olympic Games is an event for both male and 
female competitors, and, in order to comply with this, Qatar established the 
Women’s Sport Committee as part of a number of development policies 
designed to advance women’s sport in the state. While Foley et al. (2012) 
argue that this was a pragmatic move, entirely with the intention of securing 
the event, this perhaps should not matter. Any progressive social movement 
within a state could be seen as a positive, whatever the reasons for the policy 
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change, providing the state does not revert back to its old ways, and bidding 
for an Olympic Games can be viewed as a driver for this change. 
However, this does not mean that cities have not sought to leverage an 
Olympic bid previously for social benefits. One of the most prominent vehicles 
for leveraging social benefits is Vancouver’s ‘Legacies Now’ programme, 
believed to be the first time a bid city created a separate organisation to deliver 
benefits regardless of the outcomes of the bid (Leopkey and Parent, 2012). 
Legacies Now was developed in 2000, three years before Vancouver was 
ultimately awarded the 2010 Winter Olympic Games (Sant and Mason, 2015). 
By the time of the bid decision, Legacies Now had run 192 social outreach 
events across British Columbia, estimating that over 500,000 British 
Columbians were reached (Weiler and Mohan, 2009). It is perhaps unfortunate 
that Vancouver’s bid was successful, as this limits research into the way the 
bid was leveraged. Following the 2010 Winter Olympics, Legacies Now 
became LIFT Philanthropy Partners, and continues to ensure that the Games 
provides a positive social impact (Leopkey and Parent, 2012). While this is 
obviously a positive for British Columbia, from a research perspective, it 
makes it difficult to separate the impact of the bid from the hosting of the Winter 
Games themselves. 
The discussion regarding social leverage included consideration of leveraging 
environmental benefits. Aside from a fleeting mention by Torres (2012) of 
Sion’s Olympic bid promoting sustainability awareness, there is no real 
information in the literature regarding the ways that an Olympic bid may be 
environmentally friendly. This is perhaps because, unlike the hosting of an 
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event, a bid itself may not have large negative impacts on the environment, 
and so there is little need for a bid to attempt to offset these. That is not to say 
that environmental impacts are not considered at the bid stage, but these 
relate to the actual event rather than the bid itself. 
3.4.3 Sport 
Legacies Now did not just have a mandate for social benefits within British 
Columbia; in fact, its primary aim involved the development of sport, having 
four principal objectives (Sant and Mason, 2015). First, Legacies Now had a 
responsibility to promote sport and physical activity within the area, working in 
partnership with the Vancouver 2010 Sport Plan to develop the Olympic Youth 
Fund (Weiler and Mohan, 2009). Legacies Now also provided a platform for a 
partnership between Health, Sport and Education within the state to actively 
promote sport to the youth of Canada (ibid). In addition, Legacies Now 
developed elite sport and athletes within British Colombia (Sant and Mason, 
2015), running clinics for 2,000 winter sport athletes, promoting winter sport to 
the youth in the region and putting CA$8 million of leveraged funds into the 
Canadian sport system. This was deemed to be successful, with many of the 
athlete beneficiaries going on to compete at an elite level (Weiler and Mohan, 
2009). It is believed that Legacies Now also played a role in enhancing 
awareness of sport in the region, leading to support for the Vancouver bid. The 
drawback to this, is that it is impossible to separate the impacts of Legacies 
Now from those of the 2010 Winter Games themselves. 
Similar to Legacies Now, and perhaps inspired by its success in helping 
Vancouver secure the 2010 Winter Games, Chicago developed a similar 
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organisation, ‘World Sport Chicago’ (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014), a 
programme designed to increase youth involvement in sport and raise the 
profile of the Olympic and Paralympic movements within the city (Chicago 
2016, 2009:21). World Sport Chicago used money raised by the bid committee 
that was not needed as part of the bid to promote sport in the region. Given 
Chicago’s already well-developed elite sport infrastructure (it is one of only 10 
US cities to have professional baseball, NFL, basketball, ice hockey and 
football teams), World Sport Chicago instead focused on promoting low level 
sport and enhancing physical activity (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014). 
However, as Salisbury et al. (2017) discuss, the ambitious initial plans have 
since been downgraded, with a new programme called ‘SCORE!’ taking 
precedence in the city. 
While these are two clear examples of cities attempting to use an Olympic bid 
to leverage sport, there are other ways in which a bid indirectly impacts sport 
within a city. An Olympic bid focuses attention on sport within a city. Post-bid, 
both Manchester and Istanbul increased investment in sport within the cities 
and focused their sport strategies (Salisbury et al., 2017). Similarly, Tokyo’s 
bid for the 2016 Olympic Games, and the necessary government guarantees 
as part of a bid, resulted in the realisation that new legislation was needed to 
define the position of the government in developing sport within the country 
(Yuan, 2013). This directly led to the new Basic Sport Law, which formalised 
the Japanese government’s role in enhancing sport participation and 
guaranteeing the funding necessary to bid for and host such events 
(Yamamoto, 2012)  
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3.4.4 Infrastructure 
A prominent legacy of hosting mega-events that is not evident in the leveraging 
literature, is that of the infrastructure left behind following an event. While no 
studies explicitly state the fact, the inference is that the bid is seen as an 
opportunity for a city to leverage development. Rather than use the word 
leverage, the bid is often described as a ‘catalyst’ for urban regeneration. 
Indeed, Oliver (2011a) argues that an Olympic bid is an opportunity for a city 
to activate urban development strategies that are already in place, with the bid 
providing the impetus for the development to begin.  
Oliver and Lauermann (2017) have extensively researched the impact that 
bids may have on the infrastructure of a city and are one of the few authors to 
use the term leverage to describe a city’s strategies. Lauermann (2016a) 
specifically notes that cities are likely to have pre-existing urban development 
plans, and an Olympic bid can be used to catalyse these. Lauermann 
specifically notes two aspects of a bid that provide the opportunity for this. 
First, a city may have access to bid-related sources of finance that it would not 
normally have, based on the potential revenues to be secured from hosting. 
Second, an Olympic bid provides a city with access to global networks whose 
experience can be utilised (Lauermann 2014b). In addition, an Olympic bid, 
with its finite deadlines, can provide an impetus for development that a city 
may not otherwise have (Oliver and Lauermann, 2017). Indeed, a study by 
Lauermann (2015), across bids from 1991 to 2012, found that over 30% of 
planned use takes place regardless of the success of the bid. This study only 
considered urban transformation. Had it also included transport development, 
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it is likely that the figure of 30% would have been much higher. However, it is 
possible that bidders include urban development plans already in place in their 
bid documentation that would take place even if a city was not bidding. It is 
unclear the extent to which plans such as these should be considered as being 
an impact of a bid. 
Lauermann is one of the few authors to consider urban development on a 
macro scale, as much of the research focuses on individual case studies. 
Moss (2011) outlines the numerous improvements to the various areas of New 
York following its defeat in bidding for the 2012 Olympic Games. The bid 
deliberately pushed through a number of initiatives, aware that any impetus 
would die along with the bid (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011). Thus, nine 
different regeneration projects in areas of New York were started as part of 
the bid, and then continued despite the fact the bid was ultimately 
unsuccessful. This was not the case during Chicago’s bid, which had little 
impact on the urban development of the city (van Dijk and Weitkamp, 2014). 
The bid from Chicago had no plans for urban development even if the bid had 
been successful. Even though Chicago’s transportation networks were in need 
of upgrade, the bid committee did not believe it would be able to secure 
funding for the development (ibid). 
Had Chicago sought to upgrade its transportation network via the bid, this 
would not have been atypical. As far back as the 1960s, Lyon used its bid for 
the 1968 Olympic Games to improve its road, rail and air infrastructure (Lindau 
et al., 2016). More recently, London, Rio and Vancouver all committed to 
transportation upgrades regardless of whether the outcome of the bid was 
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successful or not (Brown et al., 2012; Lindau et al., 2016; Sant and Mason, 
2015). The fact that all these bids were successful, potentially indicates that 
this commitment to infrastructural improvements within the cities did not go 
unnoticed by the IOC. Indeed, Rio’s 2016 bid significantly altered its 
transportation plans from its two previously unsuccessful bids (Lindau et al., 
2016). 
Given the nature of the Olympic Games, it should be of no surprise that 
sporting infrastructure has also been developed as part of a bid, with the same 
opportunities (funding, short deadlines and access to global networks) all 
similarly playing a role (Oliver and Lauermann, 2017). Table 3.3 provides a 
summary of the facilities built by states who lost Olympic bids identified in the 
literature. 
The use of an Olympic bid to develop sport infrastructure dates back to Lyon’s 
bids for the 1920 and 1924 Olympic Games, as the Stade de Gerland stadium 
was built even though Lyon’s bids failed, and then upgraded as part of Lyon’s 
unsuccessful bid for the 1968 Olympic Games (Benneworth and Dauncey, 
2010). New York’s urban development as part of its bid for the 2012 Games 
has already been discussed, but the city also constructed the Citi Field and 
Yankee Stadium baseball venues as part of its unsuccessful bid for the 2012 
Olympic Games (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011). Similarly, Berlin saw the city 
use its bid for the 2000 Olympic Games to accelerate its already existing plans 
for sport facility development (Alberts, 2009). At the time, Berlin’s sporting 
infrastructure was not sufficiently developed to deal with the everyday needs 
of its citizens. The Berlin bid segregated its venue plans into two areas; bid-
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dependent and non-dependent projects. As a result, while these venues were 
developed, other projects, including the Olympic Village, were abandoned 
following the bid decision (Alberts, 2009). 
Table 3.3: Facilities Development as Part of Losing Olympic Bids 
City Event bid for 
Sporting 
Facility  
Bid Impact Reference 
Lyon 
1920/1924 
Olympic Games 
Stade de 
Gerland 
Built (1926) 
Benneworth 
and Dauncey, 
2010 
Rome 
1936/1940 
Olympic Games 
Stadio 
Olympico 
Built (1937) Bolz, 2015 
Lyon 
1968 Olympic 
Games 
Stade de 
Gerland 
Enlarged 
Benneworth 
and Dauncey, 
2010 
Birmingham 
1992 Olympic 
Games 
NIA Built (1991) Smith, 2005 
Berlin 
2000 Olympic 
Games 
Olympic 
Stadium 
Enhanced Alberts, 2009 
Berlin 
2000 Olympic 
Games 
Max 
Schmeling 
Boxing Hall 
Built (1996) Alberts, 2009 
Berlin 
2000 Olympic 
Games 
Velodrome Built (1997) Alberts, 2009 
Berlin 
2000 Olympic 
Games 
Swimming Hall Built Alberts, 2009 
Manchester 
2000 Olympic 
Games 
Velodrome Built (1994) Lawson, 2006 
Manchester 
2000 Olympic 
Games 
Ice Hockey 
arena 
Built (2007) Lawson, 2006 
Manchester 
2000 Olympic 
Games 
MEN Arena Built (1995) Smith, 2005 
Istanbul 
2008 Olympic 
Games 
Atatürk 
Olympic 
Stadium 
Built (2002) 
Bilsel and Zelef, 
2011 
New York 
2012 Olympic 
Games 
Citi Field Built (2009) 
Oliver and 
Lauermann, 
2017 
New York 
2012 Olympic 
Games 
Yankee 
Stadium 
Built (2009) 
Oliver and 
Lauermann, 
2017 
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A key facet of both Berlin and New York’s sport facility development was that 
the bid was used to catalyse sporting infrastructure that had previously been 
identified as being necessary and so was already being planned. Istanbul, 
however, did not do this, and instead built the Atatürk Olympic Stadium in 
anticipation of hosting the Games (Bilsel and Zelef, 2011). There was little 
long-term planning regarding the stadium, which was built 20 kilometres from 
the city centre in an area that was to be developed via the Games itself and, 
as a result, is somewhat disconnected from the city. This is further 
exacerbated by the fact that the stadium is not used on a regular basis. 
Istanbul has three major football teams (Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe and 
Galatasaray) but each already has their own stadium which is regularly used 
for other events. The Atatürk Stadium was included in Turkey’s unsuccessful 
bid for the 2024 UEFA European Football Championship, but would have 
needed to undergo a further overhaul (The Architects' Journal, 2018).  
3.4.5 Global Attention and Image 
The work by Smith (2001) explored the ways in which Manchester used the 
Olympic bid, and the sport facilities built as part of the bid, to develop its image 
as a sporting city. Indeed, Smith found that the association the city had with 
sport was able to improve negative perceptions of the city. However, this was 
not the case with Birmingham, with only 16% of those surveyed associating 
Birmingham with sport despite the city’s 1992 Olympic bid (Smith, 2005). This 
may in part be due to the non-Olympic sporting links to the city. Manchester 
United, and more latterly Manchester City, broadcast the name Manchester 
around the world, providing a strong association with sport. In comparison, 
Chapter 3 | Literature Review: Bidding for Mega-Events 
107 
Birmingham’s most recognisable team, Aston Villa, does not have a name that 
is instantly associated with the city, while Birmingham City, the football club 
that bears the city name, is somewhat less successful. This perhaps suggests 
that while an Olympic bid may contribute to a change in image for a city, it will 
not do so on its own and, rather like urban development, needs to be part of a 
cohesive strategic plan. 
However, the changes in image and reputation sought by Manchester and 
Birmingham were large-scale changes that perhaps were unrealistic. It is more 
likely, that if a city attempts to augment its position within a nation, building on 
an image and reputation it already has, it is more likely to be successful. 
Indeed, Cochrane et al. (1996) believe that Manchester’s reputation was 
improved, but only at the expense of other cities within the UK. Similarly, 
Lyon’s bid for the 1968 Olympic Games allowed the city to secure its position 
as the second city within France, heading off the challenge from Marseilles 
(Benneworth and Dauncey, 2010; Dauncey, 2010). The cases of Birmingham, 
Manchester and Lyon do raise an interesting counterpoint; none are what 
could be described as truly global cities. It is questionable whether the likes of 
London, Paris or New York (who all competed for the 2012 Olympic Games) 
would see a failed bid as benefiting the city’s domestic image (Shoval, 2002). 
Therefore, it is possible that more global cities may wish to leverage a bid to 
improve image on a more global scale. There is often an assumption in the 
literature that the mere act of entering a bid will result in a city receiving 
international attention (see, for example, brief mentions in papers by Agha et 
al. (2012), Andranovich et al. (2001), Cornelissen (2008), Haugen (2005) 
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Kassens-Noor (2016), and Tolzmann (2014)). However, the only empirical 
evidence to suggest that this might be the case is the study by Rose and 
Spiegel (2011), who argued that bidding for an Olympic Games signals to the 
world that the country is liberalising and is open to trade. However, as was 
discussed in Section 2.3.3.1, the methodology employed by Rose and Spiegel 
has been questioned, with Maennig and Richter (2012) disputing these results. 
Indeed, as Solberg and Preuss (2007) note, the IOC places extremely strict 
regulations on the levels of international promotion from a city, severely 
limiting the opportunities for leverage. As such, it appears that cities may 
largely benefit after the bid process if they manage to compete against better 
known cities. For example, Law (1994) claims that Manchester coming third in 
a race that included global cities such as Beijing, Sydney and Berlin saw the 
city’s global reputation rise. Similarly, the fact that South Africa took a sporting 
and economic behemoth such as Germany all the way in the race for the 2006 
Football World Cup, losing by just one controversial vote, proved to the world 
that many of the stereotypical views of Africa as being a continent ravaged by 
disease and poverty are untrue (Alegi, 2001).  
Again, this sort of international promotion is unlikely to be felt by the larger 
cities in the world. Had Charlie Dempsey voted in the 2006 Football World Cup 
vote, and South Africa beaten Germany to host the event, it is extremely 
unlikely that the bid would have enhanced Germany’s reputation. Similarly, 
Paris was beginning to develop a reputation as being a serial loser of bids and 
struggling to stave off competition from cities from the East (Strohmayer, 
2013). Indeed, this perhaps demonstrates that an Olympic bid may actually 
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produce negative impacts if it is not successful. India’s withdrawal from the 
1992 bid blemished its reputation, particularly in the sporting world 
(Bandyopadhyay, 2014). Similarly, as Beijing and Sydney were in direct 
competition for the 2000 Summer Olympic Games, the Australian media had 
no hesitation in highlighting China’s questionable human rights record (Booth 
and Tatz, 1994). It is noticeable that during Beijing’s successful bid for the 
2008 Games, in which no Australian city was competing, and in a period where 
Australia and China were developing trade links, the Australian media were 
far less vocal (Gong, 2011). 
3.4.6 Experience 
This literature review has thus far sought to identify the opportunities that arise 
as part of the bid process, and the areas that cities can leverage. This literature 
review has found one further opportunity; the entirety of the bid process itself, 
which provides bidders with knowledge and experience from the bid process. 
Being involved in an Olympic bidding process not only provides bid cities with 
exposure to international networks and levels of expertise that can benefit 
infrastructural development (Lauermann, 2014b), it also provides bidders with 
access to the IOC itself, and those members who vote for hosts. It is partly for 
this reason that Emery (2002) writes of an unwritten rule within the IOC that 
initial bids should be viewed only as a precursor for future bids. Figure 3.2 
shows how hosts will often have submitted a bid in the previous Olympic 
cycles. It is not since Barcelona 1992, that a nation has been awarded an 
Olympic Games without having at least one bid in the three previous cycles. 
Indeed, since Stockholm hosted the Summer Games in 1912, Korea is the 
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only first-time bidder to successfully bid for a Summer Olympic Games (Seoul 
1988). 
 20th Century 21st Century 
  '48 '52 '56 '60 '64 '68 '72 '76 '80 '84 '88 '92 '96 '00 '04 '08 '12 '16 '20 ‘24 ‘28 
Argentina   B   B         B       
Australia   H         B B H        
Brazil              B B  B H    
Canada   B    B H     B   B      
China              B  H      
Finland  H                    
France      B      B   B B B   H  
Greece  B           B  H       
Italy    H          B B    B   
Japan    B H      B     B  B H   
Mexico   B B  H                
South 
Korea 
          H           
Soviet 
Union 
       B H             
Spain       B     H   B B B B B   
UK H           B B B   H     
USA B B B B B B B B B H   H    B B  B H 
West 
Germany 
      H               
                      
Key H Hosted  B Unsuccessful Bid       
Figure 3.2: Summer Olympic Games Hosts, 1948-2028 
Numerous authors have discussed how the lessons learned from a failed bid 
were then incorporated into an ultimately successful bid (e.g. Sydney 2000 
(Burroughs, 1999), Rio 2016 (Lindau et al., 2016), PyeongChang 2018 (Merkel 
and Kim, 2011), Tokyo 2020 (Yuan, 2013)). Cities are likely to be aware of this 
prerequisite; Amsterdam’s bid for the 1992 Olympic Games, which was 
decided in 1986, was viewed as a precursor to a bid for the 2028 Games 
(Westerbeek, 2009). This is an extreme example, and it is unclear how 
relevant the IOC would view a bid made in the mid-1980s to an event held 
over 40 years later. This could be further exacerbated due to the likelihood of 
personnel changes, both within the Amsterdam bidding committee and the 
IOC. Given the 40-year gap between the bids, it is perhaps likely that there 
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may be few people with any involvement in the 1992 bid who would still be 
decision makers for a 2028 bid. The human element is clearly important here. 
As Lauermann (2016b) notes, there are well-established networks involved in 
the bid process, with sport federations and consultancies involved with each 
bid. Entering the bid process may enable a National Olympic Committee 
(NOC) access to these networks for the first time. 
This is not limited to hosting future Olympic Games, and it might be that after 
an Olympic bid, a city or nation uses the knowledge gained to bid for other 
events. For example, it became clear that Manchester was unlikely to be 
chosen to host an Olympic Games, and so the city instead turned its attention 
to the Commonwealth Games which it hosted successfully in 2002. There is a 
clear link between the failed Olympic bids and successful Commonwealth 
Games bid, as businessman Bob Scott led all of these bids (Cook and Ward, 
2011). Similarly, Doha’s bid for the 2016 Olympic Games laid the groundwork 
in making event organisers aware of the city’s event hosting capabilities, 
ahead of its successful bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Foley et al., 2012). 
The aforementioned bid consultants can play a role here to mitigate a city’s 
lack of bid experience. Manchester employed management consultants Arthur 
Young & Co (a later merger saw them become Ernst & Young), who worked 
on Los Angeles’ successful bid for the 1984 Summer Olympic Games (Cook 
and Ward, 2011). This indicates that the knowledge gained within a bid is not 
embedded into the city or nation that bids; rather, it is the individuals involved 
in the bid who then carry that knowledge forward. For example, it is individuals 
and not the NOC as a whole who build up relations with IOC members 
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(Westerbeek et al., 2002). For example, Dempsey and Zimbalist (2017) note 
the career of Terrence Burns, who worked on the bids for Beijing 2008, 
Vancouver 2010, Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018, in addition to Los Angeles’ 
bid for the 2024 Games. However, this causes a further issue, as the 
knowledge and experience of these consultants would probably stay with the 
individuals and not remain with the bidder. Indeed, this is likely to be one of 
four key times when this knowledge is lost: 
 A bid team disperses after a bid is lost; 
 The bid is successful, but a new organising committee replaces 
members of the bid team; 
 The bid is successful, and the bid team continues to the organising 
committee, but moves on to other projects once the event is over; 
 Bid consultants move on to other projects following the culmination of 
the bid, whether the bid was successful or not. 
This perhaps suggests that cities or nations who wish to bid until they are 
awarded an Olympic Games should seek to put in place specific event-bidding 
organisations to retain knowledge and experience for future bids. Turkey and 
Qatar can be viewed as ‘high frequency bidders’, which Lauermann (2015) 
defines as coalitions who bid for a minimum of three sport mega-events within 
a 10-year period. Both of these nations have created specialist bid teams, with 
varying degrees of success (Lauermann, 2015).  
While much of the discussion suggests collecting this information at a national 
level, it may also be beneficial for the IOC to disseminate information. If a 
potential bidder is aware that it needs to bid at least twice to be able to host, 
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then costs increase dramatically and need to be budgeted. While this may 
deter some potential bidders, it would be prudent for the IOC to make available 
as much information as possible. The IOC has previously introduced a Manual 
for Candidate Cities, the Transfer of Knowledge Programme, and the Olympic 
Games Knowledge Services as ways for potential bidders to gain the 
information they require. Lauermann (2014b) further recognises the 
knowledge transfer programmes such as the Olympic Observer Programme 
and seminars for applicant and candidate cities. This has since been 
augmented with the New Norm. 
This is clearly an issue that the IOC has recognised. The very first point, in 
Recommendation 1 in Agenda 2020 states that the IOC will ‘introduce an 
assistance phase during which cities considering a bid will be advised by the 
IOC about bid procedures, core Games requirements, and how previous cities 
have ensured positive bid and Games legacies’ (IOC, 2014a:9). It is not known 
how successful this has been. In 2017, the IOC released the Olympic Agenda 
2020: Half-Time Status report, detailing the progress made; however, the 
specific IOC Recommendation 1 in Agenda 2020 was not directly discussed. 
Following the Half-Time Status report, the IOC released its New Norm plans 
to enhance the communication that takes place between teams and the IOC.  
There is one clear issue with this. Why should cities with failed bids pass 
information on to other bidders who may be rivals in the future? If a city is 
bidding currently to gain experience as a precursor to a future, successful bid, 
it has little incentive to provide information that could potentially help future 
rivals. The secrecy needed during a bid actually played a part in the issues 
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faced during Boston’s bid for the 2024 Summer Olympic Games. The Boston 
bid was at pains not to give away any information that might help its rivals, yet 
this secrecy led to a lack of transparency in the bid and contributed to the 
growing anti-Olympic sentiment within the city (Kassens-Noor and 
Lauermann, 2017). Nunkoo et al. (2018) argue that greater transparency 
within the bid process would alleviate this lack of trust, but fail to recognise 
that it may also provide rival bids with information. 
3.4.7 Section Review 
This section has outlined the key areas that can be leveraged by bid cities. 
However, the extant literature focuses on the legacy of the bid, will little 
consideration as to the ways in which bid teams, cities or nations put in place 
strategies to benefit from the bid. For example, Section 3.4.3 details the ways 
that Olympic bids have led to cities developing their sporting infrastructure, but 
the literature does not consider the processes that allowed this to happen. 
If, as Torres (2012) argues, utilitarian bidders do enter the Olympic bid process 
to bring benefits to a city without hosting, then this appears to be a large gap 
in the literature. Identification of the opportunities that the bid brings and the 
means by which these opportunities can be leveraged would be useful for 
utilitarian bidders (Chalip, 2004; Torres, 2012). Further, there appears to have 
been a proliferation of utilitarian bidders towards the start of the century. Foley 
et al. (2012) notes that Qatar’s gender politics meant that it was never 
seriously considered as a host, while cities such as Tashkent, capital of 
Uzbekistan, and San Juan, capital of Puerto Rico, do not realistically have the 
base level of infrastructure needed to ever be thought of as Olympic cities. It 
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is perhaps surprising that, as yet, there has been little attempt by scholars to 
investigate the reasons for these unrealistic bids and the extent to which they 
achieved their objectives. 
 Cape Town 2004 and Toronto 2008 
Having introduced the literature surrounding bids in general, this section will 
now introduce the two case studies that will be utilised in this research and 
provide an overview of the academic literature that has already been 
produced. The two cases are the Cape Town and Toronto bids for the 2004 
and 2008 Olympic Games respectively (the rationale for the selection of these 
cases is found in Section 4.4.2). For consistency, each case is presented using 
the following structure. First, the historical context is provided, before the 
political and economic status of the cities and nations involved are discussed. 
Following this, the demographics of the regions are presented, and finally 
there is a discussion of each bid. This takes the form of a descriptive overview 
of the bid process for each city before the academic literature surrounding 
each bid is discussed. 
3.5.1 Cape Town 2004 
The race to host the 2004 Summer Olympic Games was as tightly fought as 
any of the competitions within the stadium. Eleven cities formally submitted 
bids to host the Games, with five progressing to the candidate stage: Athens, 
Rome, Cape Town, Stockholm and Buenos Aires. While Cape Town was by 
no means the most unlikely bidder, as San Juan also reached the applicant 
stage, it is the unique context surrounding Cape Town and South Africa as a 
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whole that needs to be appreciated. Three South African cities had initially 
been interested in submitting bids, as Cape Town fought off Durban and 
Johannesburg to be the South African candidate. However, this was the first 
Games that South Africa could even have considered hosting for several 
decades given that South Africa had been excluded from the Olympic 
movement for nearly 30 years (Honey, 2000). South Africa was only 
readmitted to the Olympic movement in 1991, with 94 South African athletes 
competing at Barcelona 1992; the first since 55 South African athletes took 
part at the Rome Games in 1960. Yet, just five years after readmission, Cape 
Town submitted a bid to host the Olympic Games. 
This first section will discuss the specific context of South Africa’s bid, initially 
considering the 46 years of racial discrimination in the country and the 
subsequent impact this had on the nation’s global sporting participation. Given 
that many of Cape Town’s leveraging plans sought to mend the wounds that 
apartheid caused, it is important that the background to this is covered in 
detail. Following the end of apartheid, South Africa underwent a significant 
period of change. This will be covered through analysis of the newly 
established political systems and the nation’s demographics and national 
statistics. 
3.5.1.1 South Africa and Apartheid 
As will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, South Africa’s policy of 
apartheid in the latter half of the 20th century, and subsequent exclusion from 
international sport, played a considerable role in both the Olympic bid itself 
and the leveraging plans that consequently emanated. Thus, this section will 
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first explain the policy of apartheid and the impact this had on South African 
sport. 
The 1948 South African general election saw the National Party elected as 
government, narrowly beating the United party by five seats despite winning 
122,396 fewer votes (Heard, 1974). The National Party introduced a series of 
laws formalising apartheid in South Africa. First, the Population Registration 
Act (1950) was enacted, requiring that all South Africans were categorised into 
four population groups; Black, White, Coloured4 (mixed race) and Indian 
(Parliament of South Africa, 1950). Following this Act, the Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act was introduced in 1953, which separated the facilities 
and services available to each of the population groups. This included sport 
facilities, and resulted in mixed sport being forbidden (Espy, 1979). 
This segregation did not go unnoticed by the sporting world, with racial 
discrimination being firmly against the Olympic Charter. Initially, the IOC was 
appeased by the South Africa National Olympic Committee (SANOC) 
argument that any South African could participate at the Olympic Games, but 
it was only recently that ‘coloured’ athletes had shown any interest in 
competing. However, this ignored the fact that the very nature of apartheid 
ensured that it was white athletes who had access to the better sporting 
facilities, with the lack of access to sporting facilities playing a large role in 
black and coloured athletes not developing to elite level. This segregation 
impacted a number of other sporting events, with a Brazilian football team 
                                            
4 While this phrase is not deemed acceptable in UK society, it is a term still used in 
common parlance in South Africa 
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containing three black players not being allowed to compete in South Africa. 
Despite this, the IOC allowed South Africa to compete at the 1960 Summer 
Olympic Games in Rome (Espy, 1979). 
Following these Games, the IOC felt that the assurances given by SANOC 
were not being implemented and, in 1962, warned SANOC that South Africa 
would be suspended if its apartheid policies were not amended. The IOC was 
coming under increased pressure from other nations, with other African 
nations threatening to boycott any Olympic sessions at which South Africa was 
present. The 1963 session was initially due to be held in Nairobi, but the 
Kenyan government refused to allow South African delegates into the country. 
The IOC ultimately moved the session to West Germany (Hill, 1996). The IOC 
then issued an ultimatum to SANOC; amend the policy of apartheid and 
acquiesce to the Olympic Charter or do not compete at the 1964 Summer 
Games in Tokyo. SANOC failed to apply the modifications, and so the 
invitation to compete at the Games was withdrawn (Hill, 1996). 
The Tokyo Games passed without South Africa competing, and SANOC made 
a number of concessions including the proposed sending of a mixed team to 
the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City. However, while the IOC viewed this 
as progress, 25 nations, including the majority of African countries and the top 
American black athletes, declared that they would boycott the Olympic Games 
if South Africa was allowed to enter (Espy, 1979). With the legitimacy of the 
Games being in jeopardy, on 21st April 1968, South Africa was excluded from 
the Mexico City Olympic Games (IOC, 1968:9). The following year, the IOC 
put eight charges to SANOC; seven of these involved racial discrimination and 
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one involving the illegal use of Olympic insignia. In 1970, a vote of 35 to 28 
(with three abstentions) resulted in South Africa being expelled from the 
Olympic movement (IOC, 1970). 
The Olympic Games was not the only sport in which apartheid limited South 
Africa’s participation. Eight years after it was expelled from the IOC, FIFA 
suspended South Africa from World Football (FIFA, 2004). This also caught 
the attention of political leaders. The United Nations (UN) repeatedly advised 
nations not to engage with South Africa in sporting contests and, in 1977, 
Commonwealth Heads of State agreed the Gleneagles Agreement. This 
obliged Commonwealth nations to reduce sporting interaction with South 
Africa (Payne, 1991). This arguably hurt South Africa more than the IOC 
suspension; rugby and cricket were very important sports to South Africa and 
played almost exclusively by Commonwealth nations. With South Africa 
unable to enter the Olympic Games, or compete in international football, 
cricket or rugby matches, South Africa was cast into the sporting wilderness. 
However, as Keech and Houlihan (1999) note, South Africa was not entirely 
excluded; the British Lions rugby union team toured South Africa in 1974 and 
1980, while a number of international cricket teams visited South Africa on 
‘rebel tours’ (Payne, 1991). 
In 1989, due to the ill health of incumbent president P.W. Botha, F.W. de Klerk 
became president and embarked on negotiations to end apartheid in South 
Africa. The following year, in 1990, at the Stockholm International Conference 
against Apartheid in Sport, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch offered 
South Africa the opportunity to compete at the 1992 Barcelona Olympic 
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Games (Hill, 1996). Following de Klerk’s announcement that apartheid would 
be repealed, an IOC commission visited South Africa and, in 1991, laid down 
a number of conditions for South Africa’s re-entry into the Olympic movement: 
1. The abolition of apartheid 
2. Work towards a new National Olympic Committee 
3. Agreement with the Olympic Charter 
4. Non-racial governing bodies (Honey, 2000) 
On 9th July 1991, the IOC recognised the Interim National Olympic Committee 
of South Africa (INOCSA) and South Africa re-joined the Olympic movement 
(Hill, 1996). 
Negotiations to end apartheid continued and, in 1994, South Africa had its first 
free election with universal suffrage. The African National Congress (ANC), 
led by Nelson Mandela who had been freed as a political prisoner in 1990, 
won 252 of the 400 seats, and 63% of the popular vote (Johnson and 
Schlemmer, 1996). This victory was a crucial factor in Cape Town bidding for 
the 2004 Summer Olympic Games; the ANC had long held the opinion that 
sport could be used as a tool for political and social change (Keech, 2000). As 
such, when the ANC came to power, South Africa strived to re-establish itself 
on the global sporting stage. Two medals were won at the 1992 Olympic 
Games and, in the same year, the One Day International Cricket team reached 
the semi-finals of the Cricket World Cup. The National Sports Congress noted 
the role that sport could play within the new South Africa, utilising the social 
benefits of sport, extending from youth appeal to international prestige, and 
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encouraging citizens towards ‘socially desirable and acceptable activities’ 
(National Sports Congress, 1993:5). 
In 1992, South Africa was awarded the hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup 
(Black and Nauright, 1998). This was the first time that such an event had 
taken place in the African continent and kick-started South Africa’s plans to 
host a series of international sporting events. The following year, South Africa 
hosted the 1996 African Cup of Nations, before formally submitting its bid for 
the 2004 Olympic Games in 1997. 
3.5.1.2 South African Political Systems 
Given the intense political change that occurred in South Africa in the early 
1990s, it is worth considering the new political system in place. The 1994 
general elections were not only the first elections with universal suffrage but 
were also the elections in which a new constitution was initiated. The case 
study in Chapter 6 shows how understanding these systems is key to 
appreciating the context surrounding Cape Town’s leveraging plans. 
3.5.1.2.1 Parliament 
For the 1994 general election, South Africa adopted a bicameral system of 
parliament, which consists of a National Assembly and Senate. In this system, 
voters elect members to the National Assembly with proportional 
representation, and parties are awarded seats based on the number of votes 
gained across South Africa. The President of South Africa is not directly 
elected by the people, but instead it is the 400 members of the National 
Assembly who elect a president and pass laws (Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa, n.d.). The upper house of the parliament is the Senate. This was 
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replaced in 1997 by the National Council of Provinces. The Senate consisted 
of 90 senators, with each of the nine provinces represented by 10 senators. 
The current National Council of Provinces has the power to modify, 
recommend amendments or reject legislation, and focuses on national issues 
(Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, n.d.). 
The 1994 elections were the first with universal suffrage, and the first that the 
National Party had not won since 1948. The African National Congress (ANC) 
won both the most seats and the popular vote, and elected Nelson Mandela 
as president (Johnson, 1996). 
3.5.1.2.2 Provincial Government 
The second layer of government in South Africa is formed of the provincial 
governments, governing the nine provinces. Each province elects its own 
government, in provincial elections that often take place at the same time as 
national elections. As a result, the governing party of a province is not 
necessarily the same as the national elections, a fate that fell upon the 
Western Cape and impacted Cape Town’s bid. Provincial governments have 
both legislative and provincial power alongside the national government, 
relating to matters such as education, healthcare and police services (South 
African Government, n.d.). The nine provinces established for the 1994 
General Election are shown in Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: Provincial Legislature Results 1994 
Province Capital City 
1994 Provincial 
Legislature Results 
Eastern Cape Bhisho African National Congress 
Free State Bloemfontein African National Congress 
Gauteng Johannesburg African National Congress 
KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg Inkatha Freedom Party 
Northern Province (now 
Limpopo) 
Polokwane African National Congress 
Mpumalanga Nelspruit African National Congress 
North West Mafikeng African National Congress 
Northern Cape Kimberley African National Congress 
Western Cape Cape Town National Party 
 
As Table 3.4 shows, the Western Cape, of which Cape Town is the capital city, 
was the only province to re-elect the National Party as provincial government. 
This would prove to be key in Cape Town’s leveraging plans. 
3.5.1.2.3 Local Government 
The final layer of government involves the local government, with each 
province divided into municipalities. Following the end of apartheid, there were 
1,263 local governments in South Africa. This was reduced to 843 and 
renamed ‘municipalities’ for the 1994/95 local elections (Municipal 
Demarcation Boards, n.d.). The municipalities are responsible for a number of 
issues governing the everyday lives of citizens, such as transport, education, 
and housing (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993). 
3.5.1.3 South African National Statistics 
Having provided the political context surrounding Cape Town’s Olympic bid, 
this next section will discuss the national statistics of the nation from 1990 to 
2004.  The full data can be seen in Table 10.1 on page 401. 
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As Figure 3.3 shows, it is clear that the value of the South African economy 
grew dramatically as South Africa ended apartheid, becoming the 63rd largest 
economy in the world in 1994. However, in the years following, the economy 
shrank to be the 77th largest in 2001. Unsurprisingly during this time, the GDP 
per capita also fell to 89th in the world in 2004. As the South African economy 
fell, unemployment rose. For 11 of the 14 years in question, South Africa 
ranked in the top 10 countries worldwide for unemployment, demonstrating 
the issues facing the South African government. It is noticeable that tourism 
figures grew during this period, as it became socially acceptable for foreign 
tourists to visit South Africa following the end of apartheid. Tourism continued 
to grow during the period, demonstrating the growing acceptance for the newly 
democratic South Africa. 
 
Figure 3.3: South Africa GDP, 1990-20045 
                                            
5 The World Bank (2018a) 
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3.5.1.4 South Africa Demographics 
This next section will focus on the demographics of South Africa during the 
time of the bid process. All data is taken from the 1991 and 1996 censuses, 
and, where possible, includes the data for Cape Town, the Western Cape 
(known as the Cape Province in 1991 with slightly different boundaries), and 
South Africa as a whole. The full dataset can be seen in Table 10.2 on page 
402. 
As the capital of the province, it is unsurprising that Cape Town has similar 
characteristics to the Western Province. However, these are in stark contrast 
to the rest of South Africa. Whereas the general South African populace was 
70% African (black) in 1991, and 77% African in 1996, Cape Town’s African 
residents made up just 25% of the population in 1996. Conversely, nearly half 
of Cape Town’s residents were ‘coloured’ in 1996 compared to just 9% of 
South Africans in total. Indeed, in 1996, 60% of all ‘coloured’ South African 
residents resided in the Western Cape, and 34% in Cape Town itself. 
In terms of language spoken, 46% of those within the Western Cape spoke 
Afrikaans as a first language compared to 14% of South Africans. In fact, 39% 
of all South Africans with Afrikaans as a first language resided in the Western 
Cape. The dominant language in South Africa was IsiZulu (Zulu), which nearly 
25% of South Africans spoke as a first language. However, in Cape Town, 
fewer than 4,000 of the 2.5 million population spoke IsiZulu as a first language. 
Finally, in both Cape Town and South Africa, the dominant religion was 
Christianity. In contrast, nearly half of all Muslims in South Africa in 1996 
resided in the Western Cape. 
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3.5.1.5 Cape Town’s Bid 
In total, 11 cities submitted bids for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games by the 
deadline of 10th January 1996 (Independent, 1996). These applicant cities 
then had to submit their bid books by 15th August 1996. Following this, 
members of the Evaluation Commission visited each city and studied their 
application files, before meeting from 16th to 20th January 1997 to decide which 
of the cities would be put through to the Candidature stage (IOC Evaluation 
Commission, 1997). Ultimately, five cities progressed; Athens, Buenos Aires, 
Cape Town, Rome and Stockholm (Independent, 1997). 
The key dates can be seen in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Key Dates in the 2004 Olympic Bid Process 
Date Event 
30th January 1993 
Cape Town elected as South Africa’s 
representative 
11th January 1996 Deadline to submit initial bid 
15th August 1996 Submission of Bid Book 
15th September 1996 – 25th January 
1997 
IOC Evaluation Commission site visits 
6th – 9th December 1996 
IOC Evaluation Commission visit to 
Cape Town 
7th March 1997 Five candidate cities selected 
2nd – 6th September 1997 106th IOC Session in Lausanne 
5th September 1997 Final selection of host 
 
The decision as to who would host the 2004 Olympic Games was made at the 
106th IOC session in Lausanne. Cape Town was almost eliminated in the first 
round, finishing with Buenos Aires as the city with the lowest votes. Cape Town 
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and Buenos Aires went to a run-off, which Cape Town won 62 to 44. 
Stockholm was the next city eliminated, leaving Cape Town, Athens and Rome 
in the running. In Round 4, Cape Town secured 20 votes (two fewer than it 
received in the previous round), and so was eliminated. In the final round, 
Athens defeated Rome, having won the most votes in each round. 
Cape Town’s bid was unique, in that it planned to add a new pillar to the 
Olympic Games, which highlighted the transformative nature of the planned 
Olympic Games (Hiller, 2000). This pillar was set to be ‘human’ development, 
with the bid planning to use the Games to contribute towards the ongoing 
strategic development of the city (ibid). Indeed, one of the actors within the bid 
coalition was from the Planning Department of the city, to ensure that these 
plans were utilised (ibid).  
Swart and Bob (2004) offered a retrospective view as to why the bid was not 
successful, offering several reasons why IOC voters may have preferred 
Athens. First, Cape Town did not fit all the criteria necessary for a bid to be 
successful. It did not have the type of infrastructure already in place that would 
be expected of an Olympic city and had little experience in hosting or even 
bidding for such events. There were further concerns regarding crime levels, 
while the low levels of GDP per capita in the country may also have led to 
concerns regarding the economic success of the event. Unfortunately, it is 
possible that the bid’s developmental focus had highlighted these issues. 
There was also doubt as to the level of government support that would be 
available. As Table 3.4 on page 123 demonstrates, the widespread political 
changes that had occurred in South Africa following the end of apartheid had 
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not taken place in Cape Town, which was still governed by the National Party. 
It was also clear that South Africa did not have the support of the African IOC 
members, who may have been expected to support taking the Olympic Games 
to the African continent for the first time; an issue that also beset the South 
Africa bid for the 2006 Football World Cup (Swart and Bob, 2004). Nelson 
Mandela spoke to the IOC members at the IOC session. Yet, the speech was 
changed at the last minute, and lacked the sort of warmth that would be 
needed to persuade IOC members to change their vote (Griffiths, 2000). 
However, beyond reflection on the bid itself and discussion of the planned 
event, there has been little research into the impact that Cape Town’s bid had 
on either the City of Cape Town or South Africa. 
3.5.2 Toronto 2008 
Whereas Cape Town was always considered an outsider to host the 2004 
Summer Olympic Games, Toronto entered the race to host the 2008 Games 
as one of the favourites. This was not the first time that a Canadian city had 
bid to host an Olympic Games; Montreal hosted the 1976 Summer Games, 
while the 1988 and 2010 Winter Games were held in Calgary and Vancouver 
respectively. Indeed, Black (2017) terms Canada a ‘serial user of mega-
events’. Table 3.6 below shows the bids by Canadian cities since the Olympics 
resumed after the Second World War. In total, Canadian cities have bid 17 
times for Summer and Winter Olympic Games, as seen in Table 3.6. Only the 
USA (56) and Italy (18) have bid more often. 
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Table 3.6: Canadian Bids for Olympic Games, 1956-2010 
City Year Games Type Success? 
Montreal 1956 Summer 9th in vote 
Montreal 1956 Winter 2nd in vote 
Calgary 1964 Winter 2nd in vote 
Calgary 1968 Winter 2nd in vote 
Montreal 1972 Summer 3rd in vote 
Banff 1972 Winter 2nd in vote 
Montreal 1976 Summer Hosted 
Vancouver-Garibaldi 1976 Winter 4th in vote 
Calgary 1988 Winter Hosted 
Toronto 1996 Summer 3rd in vote 
Quebec City 2002 Winter 4th in vote 
Toronto 2008 Summer 2nd in vote 
Vancouver 2010 Winter Hosted 
 
Yet, while Canada has a clear history with the Olympic Games, this has not 
always been wholly successful. The 1976 Games are seen as one of the least 
successful in history (at least in terms of finance), taking until 2006 to pay off 
the debts accrued (Alberts, 2009). Further, as will be detailed in the next 
section, Toronto had previously bid for the 1996 Games.  
Given the proximity of the two failed bids, the bid for the 1996 Games will be 
discussed in some detail. 
3.5.2.1 Toronto’s bid for the 1996 Olympic Games 
Given the problems faced by Montreal following the hosting of the 1976 
Olympic Games, it may have been expected that no Canadian city would wish 
to host the Summer Games again. However, after the economic success of 
the 1984 Games in Los Angeles, the following year, the city of Toronto decided 
to bid for the Olympic Games for the first time (Lenskyj, 1996). Seeing the 
financial success of Los Angeles 1984 encouraged the bid organisers to 
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provide a debt-free Games, and so sought to find private businesses to invest 
in the bid (Bradburn, 2015). Bid leader Paul Henderson secured sponsorship 
from 72 private corporations, with each paying CA$35,000 every six months, 
or the equivalent sum with services in kind (Henderson, 2010). 
The aim of the bid was to host a Games that would leave a positive legacy in 
the Greater Toronto Area, including improving sport facilities, developing the 
waterfront area, creating 80,000 jobs, building social housing, and improving 
the transport system (Henderson, 2010). The need for this investment was 
exacerbated by the global recession throughout the early 1990s, started by 
Black Monday in 1987. The political landscape in the Greater Toronto Area 
was also changing, with feelings rising that investment was now necessary 
elsewhere. Kidd (1992:157) writes of the city having 150,000 living homeless, 
with a further 80,000 being reliant on foodbanks. Further, a new economic 
projection in 1990 factored in new indirect costs, leading to expected losses of 
CA$90 million (Bradburn, 2015). This changing context provided the platform 
for the anti-Olympic coalition ‘Bread not Circuses’ (BNC), a group that vocally 
opposed the Olympic bid. BNC published an ‘anti-Olympic people’s bid book’, 
stating the reasons why an Olympic bid was not right for the city of Toronto 
and encouraging Torontonians to oppose the bid (The Bread Not Circuses 
Coalition, 1990). Specifically, BNC believed that hosting the Games would 
draw finance and key resources away from other areas that should be the 
priority, including ‘housing, good jobs, day care, a safe and clean city, [and] 
community-based sport’ (The Bread Not Circuses Coalition, 1990:1).  
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The BNC were an active group, even going so far as to travel to Tokyo in 
September 1990 where the final hosting decision would be made (Henderson, 
2010). In addition to this, 12 days before the final vote, a new Social 
Democratic government was elected within Ontario. While Kidd (1992) notes 
that this new government automatically backed the bid, this is disputed by 
Henderson (2010) who claims that the new Premier of Ontario, Bob Rae, was 
influenced by BNC and sent representatives to the Tokyo IOC Session who 
were less than supportive of the bid. Many Torontonians believed that their bid 
would be successful, with thousands assembling at the newly developed 
SkyDome in Downtown Toronto to watch the final decision (Bradburn, 2015). 
Toronto was competing against five other cities; Atlanta, Athens, Belgrade, 
Manchester and Melbourne. Toronto was ultimately placed third in the voting, 
with many Toronto voters then switching their vote to Atlanta, the ultimate 
hosts. 
While the 1996 bid is not the focus for this case study, there are clear 
crossovers between the 1996 and 2008 Toronto bids. The 1996 bid leader, 
Paul Henderson, went on to consult for the 2008 Summer Games bid as well 
as the successful Canadian bids for the 2010 Winter Games and the 2015 Pan 
American Games held in Vancouver and Toronto respectively. There were 
further staff crossovers. John Bitove Jr, who was on the advisory board for the 
1996 Toronto bid, then led the bid for the 2008 Games. Similarly, David 
Crombie was on the board of directors for both bids. 
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3.5.2.2 The Canadian Political System 
As mentioned in the previous section, the political environment in the late 
1980s played a crucial role in Toronto’s bid for the 1996 Summer Olympic 
Games. Thus, as with the Cape Town case study, the political context that 
existed during Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Games will now be considered. 
The Canadian political system is made up of three levels of government; 
federal, provincial and municipal. These will now be discussed in turn. 
3.5.2.2.1 Federal Government 
The Canadian Federal Government encompasses three levels. First, Queen 
Elizabeth II is ‘Queen of Canada’ and Head of State (Parliament of Canada, 
n.d.). However, in reality, the Queen has little direct involvement in the running 
of the country. Rather, the Prime Minister heads the House of Commons which 
is made up of 338 elected members of parliament (Marleau and Montpetit, 
2000). This is the lower house of parliament. Any laws put forward by the 
House of Commons then also have to be passed by the upper house; the 
Senate. The Senate is comprised of 105 senators, who are chosen by the 
Prime Minister and are representatives of Canada’s provinces. Part of the 
Senate’s role is to represent social groups that are often underrepresented in 
the House of Commons. 
3.5.2.2.2 Provincial Government 
The next layer of government is the Provincial Government. Canada is divided 
into ten provinces and three territories, as shown in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7: Provinces and Capital Cities of Canada 
Province Capital City 
Alberta Edmonton 
British Columbia Vancouver 
Manitoba Winnipeg 
New Brunswick and Labrador Fredericton 
Newfoundland and Labrador St. John’s 
Nova Scotia Halifax 
Ontario Toronto 
Prince Edward Island Charlottetown 
Quebec Montreal 
Saskatchewan Regina 
Northwest Territories (territory) Yellowknife 
Nunavut (territory) Iqaluit 
Yukon (territory) Whitehorse 
 
Each province has its own government, which has powers and is responsible 
for legislation within the provincial boundaries. These responsibilities include 
the provision of services such as schooling, health services and highways. 
The Canadian Constitution states that the federal government overrules 
provincial decisions, although this does not apply to the three territories shown 
in Table 3.7. The Government of Ontario is responsible for the Ontario 
province. 
3.5.2.2.3 Municipal Government 
Finally, a number of cities and towns across Canada have Municipal 
Governments, which are responsible for services within the smaller regional 
areas, such as libraries and parks. The authority for these responsibilities 
comes from provincial government. Within the Ontario province, municipality 
governments are required to provide social services (Sancton, 2014). 
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A summary of the governments in place at the time of the bid for the 2008 
Games can be seen in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8: Political Parties in Power, Canada 2001 
Position Leader Political Party 
Prime Minister of 
Canada 
Jean Chrétien Liberal Party of Canada 
Premier of Ontario Mike Harris 
Progressive Conservative Party of 
Canada 
Mayor of Toronto Mel Lastman 
Progressive Conservative Party of 
Canada 
 
3.5.2.3 Canadian National Statistics  
This section will now look at the Canadian national statistics from 1995-2008, 
in order to show the time prior to, during, and after the bid. 
As Table 10.3 on page 403 shows, the period in which Toronto was bidding 
for the Olympic Games was a relatively stable period. Both GDP and GDP per 
capita grew steadily, with Canadians being the 24th richest nation in the world. 
It should be noted Table 10.3 only shows the average income of Canadians 
and does not consider the distribution of wealth. Over the same period, 
unemployment fell from 9% in 1995 to 6% in 2008, perhaps indicating a better 
off society. However, in 2008, 79 other nations had lower unemployment levels 
than Canada, down from 37 in 1995. 
However, while these domestic statistics indicate a healthy economy, the data 
shows that the number of foreign visitors to Canada fell from nearly 50 million 
in 1999, to below 30 million in 2008. More specifically, foreign visitors to the 
Ontario region also fell from over two million in 1995, 1996 and 1997, to 1.25 
million visitors in 2003.  
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3.5.2.4 Canadian Demographics 
In comparison to the Cape Town case study, Toronto has little difference to 
the rest of Canada. One area of differentiation is the multicultural make-up of 
the city. Torontonians are 45% immigrants, compared to 19% of the rest of 
Canada. This has resulted in Toronto being an extremely multicultural city, 
with 209 different ethnic origins. This is further demonstrated as there are 99 
different home languages within the city. While 59% of Torontonians speak 
English (the same percentage as the rest of Canada), the second most widely 
spoken mother tongue is Italian, yet this accounts for only 4% of the 
population. This is in stark contrast to the rest of Canada, where 22% speak 
French as a first language, meaning that only 10% of the Canadian population 
does not speak French or English as a first language. Comparatively, just 1% 
of Torontonians have French as a first language, with 41% of Torontonians 
speaking a language other than English or French. The data can be seen in 
Table 10.4 on page 404. 
3.5.2.5 Toronto’s Bid 
Toronto was competing against 10 other cities to host the 2008 Summer 
Olympic Games, including Paris and Beijing. Each bid was evaluated by the 
IOC commission, with five cities remaining as candidate cities; Beijing, 
Istanbul, Osaka, Paris, and Toronto (BBC, 2000). These candidate cities were 
visited by the Evaluation Commission in February and March 2001, and 
Beijing, Paris and Toronto were identified as “excellent candidates” 
(Polumbaum, 2003:61). The full bid process can be seen in Table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9: Key Dates in the 2008 Olympic Bid Process 
Date Event 
10 November 1999 Toronto declares intention to bid 
20 June 2000 Applicant File submitted to IOC 
28 August 2001 Candidate Cities Announced 
17 January 2001 Candidate File submitted to IOC 
21 February - 29 March 2001 IOC Evaluation Commission site visits 
8 - 11 March 2001 IOC Evaluation Commission visit to Toronto 
May 2001 Evaluation reports published 
13 - 16 July 2001 112th IOC Session in Moscow 
13 July 2001 Final selection of host 
 
The final vote was conducted at the IOC’s 112th session in Moscow in July 
2001. Each candidate city presented to the IOC officials on the morning of 13th 
July, followed by the Evaluation Committee presenting their findings. After this, 
the voting for the host of the 2008 Olympic Games began. 13 IOC members 
from Canada, China, France, Japan and Turkey were not eligible to vote as 
their NOCs had competing cities. In the first round of voting, Osaka was 
eliminated, with Beijing having twice the number of votes as Toronto in second 
place. In the second round, Beijing won 56 votes, with the remaining three 
cities gaining 49 votes collectively. As Beijing won more than 50% of the votes, 
it was awarded the 2008 Games. Toronto finished in second place with 22 
votes (The Guardian, 2001).  
In comparison to Cape Town’s bid, more literature has focused on Toronto’s 
bid for the Olympic Games. In particular, Oliver (2011a; 2011b; 2014) has 
published extensively regarding the legacy of the bid and the subsequent 
development of the waterfront region. Kipfer and Keil (2002), in a paper written 
before the bid decision was made, detail the planned development of the 
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waterfront area should Toronto’s bid have been successful, with the formation 
of the Waterfront Revitalisation Task Force. The formation of this task force, 
and its impact on the bid, will be discussed more during the Toronto case study 
chapter.  
Oliver’s (2011a; 2011b; 2014) work on Toronto’s Olympic bids focuses 
primarily on the development of its waterfront area. The Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Corporation was created as part of the bid for the 2008 Games, 
ensuring that the waterfront on Lake Ontario would be developed as part of 
the bid (Oliver, 2017), which compensated for a lack of urban development 
elsewhere in the city (Kipfer and Keil, 2002). Indeed, Oliver goes so far as to 
argue that the primary driver for the Olympic bid was not actually a real desire 
to host the Olympic Games, but rather was a way in which a coalition could be 
formed to drive the waterfront development. Indeed, Oliver (2011a) argues 
that the partnerships formed as part of the bid directly led to the success of 
the Toronto Waterfront Revitalisation Corporation, and the ultimate 
development of the waterfront is a key benefit of the Olympic bid. 
Oliver (2014) also discusses the sporting legacy, or lack thereof, from the bid. 
Oliver argues that one criticism of the bid, and perhaps a reason for its failure, 
was the lack of sport development within the city and the Ontario region. 
Despite this, the IOC Evaluation Commission noted that the “bid has a well-
constructed sports concept”, and “Canada has an excellent tradition in sport” 
(IOC, 2001:57-58). Post-bid, the Toronto Sports Council was developed, with 
the remit to promote community sport and general physical activity. However, 
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Oliver argues that this intended legacy was not a success, with sport 
investment remaining low on the list for government funding (Oliver, 2014). 
The issue of sport was not the only negative to come out of the Olympic bid. 
The ‘Bread Not Circuses’ coalition, formed to such good effect for the bid for 
the 1996 Olympic Games, reformed to similarly protest the 2008 bid. Much of 
the literature regarding Bread Not Circuses has primarily focused on the 1996 
Olympic bid, but Oliver (2011a) provides some commentary; most notably, that 
the Toronto bid was shrouded in the sort of secrecy that beset Boston’s 2024 
bid, with the bid committee being reluctant to provide rival bidders with 
information. Thus, the bid book was submitted to the IOC without ever having 
been shown to the Toronto public. Unsurprisingly, Bread Not Circuses 
criticised this, with it being suggested that the 2008 bid committee had failed 
to heed the lessons from the previous 1996 bid (Tufts, 2004). 
3.5.3 Section Review 
This section is designed to provide the context for the case studies that will 
follow. As has been evidenced, the Toronto and Cape Town bids started from 
different places. South Africa as a nation was seeking to regain a place in the 
global context, both in terms of sport and international relations. In 
comparison, Canada was well established in the sporting world, having 
previously hosted the 1976 Olympic Games, and having bid 13 times for the 
Summer or Winter Olympic Games, including hosting on three occasions. This 
is perhaps reflected in the disparities in literature available for the two cases. 
There is little scholarly information available regarding the Cape Town Olympic 
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bid, as it appears to have been superseded by the legacy of South Africa 
hosting the 2010 Football World Cup. 
Comparatively, aside from Toronto hosting the 2015 Pan American Games, 
the bid for the 2008 Olympic Games (which culminated in 2001) was Toronto’s 
only flirtation with a mega-event since the turn of the century. However, much 
of this research has been conducted by one author and concentrates primarily 
on one aspect of the bid’s legacy; the waterfront development. The work of 
Oliver focuses primarily on the legacy of the bid, with less attention paid as to 
the strategies put in place for the leveraging to occur.  
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has set out the key elements of a bid process, and the 
opportunities that arise to be leveraged. As this literature review has 
established, it is possible for both legitimate and utilitarian bidders to leverage 
an Olympic bid, although logic dictates that the plans by utilitarian bidders will 
be more successful as this is the primary aim of the bid. Indeed, those nations 
who wish to host an Olympic Games are perhaps less likely to be able to 
leverage the bid, as the majority of the focus will be in making sure that the 
city is ready to secure the IOC votes. As with the previous chapter, where it 
was realised that organising committees are often too busy in making sure that 
the event takes place to properly establish leveraging plans, this is similarly 
the case with bidders; winning a bid is difficult enough without also needing to 
think about leveraging strategies as well.  
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Having established, first the opportunities in the bid process, and second, the 
areas for leverage, the next chapter will provide in detail the methodological 
process that this research involved.
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4 Methodology 
 Introduction and Purpose 
This chapter outlines the methodological processes used in this study. To 
reiterate, the research seeks to answer the overarching research question, in 
what ways have bids for the Olympic Games been leveraged for positive 
outcomes? 
This chapter follows the process suggested by Grix (2010a), who advances 
that researchers need to be clear about the foundations of their research and 
how the choices made at the foundational level lead on and impact the 
subsequent research process. First, the research philosophy underpinning the 
research is introduced (Section 4.2), and this comprises the ontological and 
epistemological approaches. Section 4.3 then discusses the project’s 
methodological approach (a qualitative analysis) before the specific methods 
that are employed are discussed in Section 4.4. Finally, ethics and research 
quality are considered in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
The key methodological decisions can be seen in Table 4.1 below, and are 
elaborated on further throughout this chapter. 
Table 4.1: Key Methodological Decisions 
Ontology Constructivist 
Epistemology Hard-interpretivist 
Methodology Qualitative research strategy 
Research Methods Content analysis and multiple case study 
Data Collection Interviews, document analysis 
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 Research Philosophy 
This first section establishes the ‘foundations’ (Grix, 2010a) of the research; 
that is, the ontological and epistemological basis upon which this research 
rests. As Grix (2010a) advises, this will consider the ontological approach, 
followed by the epistemology. Considering them in this order makes logical 
sense; it is important to understand what it is that we think we know about the 
world before we can consider what exactly we can know and how we can set 
about finding out about it. 
4.2.1 Ontological Approach 
Crotty (1998:98) provides a detailed definition, stating that ontology is 
concerned with ‘what is the nature of existence, with the structure of reality’. A 
researcher’s ontological approach will, in part, determine the research 
question to be answered and the way that the research will be carried out 
(Bryman, 2012). 
In answering the question as to ‘what exists?’ in the social world, there have 
traditionally been two schools of thought at opposite ends of the spectrum. 
First, positivists (and realists) assert that ‘objects have an independent 
existence and are not dependent for it on the knower’ (Cohen et al., 2011:6); 
that is, objects exist independently from the researcher. Positivists view the 
environment objectively with the structures which make up the world being 
able to be perceived and studied. Positivists believe that there is one truth, 
and once this truth has been determined it can be applied to a range of 
different contexts. 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum are constructivists (or relativists), who 
contend that ‘social phenomena and their meanings are continually being 
accomplished by social actors’ (Bryman, 2012:33). For constructivists, objects 
are not independent from researchers, but rather are socially constructed. 
Thus, ‘social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social 
interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision’ (Bryman, 2012:33). 
Therefore, the constructivist ontological position believes that the social world 
of the research is indeed a construct, with different researchers viewing 
different social realities. Therefore, there is not one sole truth, and rather the 
perception of what is true evolves over time and changes from actor to actor. 
A key facet of ontology is the structure-agency debate. Thus, it is prudent to 
discuss the terms and their relationship before progressing. Structure refers to 
hierarchies and arrangements within society which provide the context in 
which social activities take place (Lewis, 2002). This is a position that lends 
itself naturally to scientific studies (for example, the law of gravity would be 
seen as a structure that exists), but Hay (2002) argues that structures have 
less pertinence in the social sciences; while there are indeed structures (for 
example, the social and political context), these are not fixed in the same way. 
Typically, a positivist would maintain that these social structures do exist and, 
as they construct the social world, should be the focus of social sciences (Hay, 
2002). Conversely, agency concerns the ability of agents within society to 
make decisions for themselves. Thus, the critical tenet of the structure-agency 
problem is this; does society provide a context to influence the behaviour of 
individuals, or do individuals make their own decisions and thus create the 
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context in which they exist? At either end of this debate are the structuralist 
and intentionalist positions (Hay, 2002). Structuralists argue that structure 
determines agency, and therefore exclusively informs events. Conversely, the 
intentionalist position focuses purely on the actions of the individuals involved, 
with the agency determining structure. As the intentionalist position does not 
believe that structure plays a role, every event is based purely on agency, and 
therefore every event must be unique. These two positions are at the 
extremes, and it is very rare to come across pure forms of either structuralism 
or intentionalism. Indeed, a key criticism of these two positions is that each is 
reduced to the other with little consideration as to how they interact. 
In recent years, authors have considered the ways in which agents are 
influenced by the structures in which they exist, while also recognising that the 
actions of agents over time determine these structures (Hay, 2002). For 
example, Giddens (1981) argued that structure and agency are a ‘duality’, with 
both being different sides of the same coin. However, Hay (2002:127) later 
took this metaphor further, arguing that structure and agency are rather 
‘metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged’, and therefore should not be 
studied separately. 
Lewis (2002:19) makes the point that is critical in this research: social 
structures are a key component of researching international agency. While 
social structures may assist agency, they may also impede it. A significant 
facet of mega-events is their international nature, yet different nations have 
structures beyond those of international borders. Recent Olympic Games have 
taken place in China, UK and Brazil, three nations with differing languages, 
Chapter 4 | Methodology 
 
145 
writing systems, customs and much more. These structures may well impede 
the ability of bidders and hosts of mega-events to gain the international agency 
that is desired. While the IOC dictates that all bid documentation is to be 
presented in both English and French, less than 7% of the world’s population 
speak one of these two languages (Ethnologue, 2018). Indeed, the IOC uses 
the words ‘legacy’ in English and ‘héritage’ in French. These two words could 
have different meanings; the word legacy implies looking forward, yet the word 
heritage infers looking backwards in time (Girginov, 2018). This difference 
emphasises the ways in which social structures can impact agents, 
highlighting the potential causality between the agent and structure (for 
example, an agent who chooses to learn a language due to the social 
structures in place) (Marsh, 1999; Lewis, 2002). The concept of causality is of 
particular note for this research, which utilises a multiple case study approach 
across two different nations, and thus needs to be considered. 
Given the research question of this study and the researcher’s own 
philosophical views, this research will take a constructivist ontological 
position. This research is seeking to investigate the strategies put in place in 
order to leverage unsuccessful Olympic bids. While structure will obviously 
play a role, and in particular the political and social contexts of the bids 
considered, as the literature review demonstrated, the gains from bidding is 
as yet an underdeveloped area. While the IOC has put in place some 
assistance to support bid leveraging, there are as yet no formal guidelines; 
therefore, the decision to leverage a bid, and the plans put in place are more 
likely to be a result of agency rather than structure.  
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4.2.2 Epistemological Approach 
Once the ontological approach has been considered, the epistemological 
position can now be discussed. Put simply, if ontology looks at ‘what exists?’, 
epistemology considers ‘what can we know?’ about a topic, and what methods 
can be used to examine it (Bryman, 2012). While understanding the 
epistemology of research is vital (Grix, 2018), Weed (2005) notes that much 
of the research into sport lacks clearly defined epistemologies. 
Rather like ontology, there are two umbrella terms detailing opposing 
epistemological positions. First, foundationalism suggests that ‘true 
knowledge must rest upon a set of firm, unquestionable set of indisputable 
truths from which our beliefs may be logically deduced, so retaining the truth 
value of the foundational premises from which they follow’ (Hughes and 
Sharrock, 2014:4-5). Put more succinctly, foundationalists believe that 
knowledge is independent of reality itself and they will typically use the 
scientific approaches to research that are utilised within the natural sciences. 
The extreme foundationalist approach is that of positivism. This research is 
often deductive, with many researchers seeking to prove theories (Grix, 2002).  
In contrast, anti-foundationalists (or constructivists) believe that knowledge is 
dependent on human practices, with human agents constructing the social 
reality in which they exist and there is nothing that is not constructed in the 
human mind (Grix, 2010a). Therefore, anti-foundationalist studies generally 
involve researchers interacting with the research and are typically led by a 
constructivist ontology. Interpretivism is viewed as being an extreme anti-
foundational position. However, as Grix (2018) notes, it is rare for a piece of 
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research to fit perfectly into one of the two umbrella epistemologies, with most 
research being in the ‘grey areas’, where epistemologies overlap. For 
example, economic studies may appear to suit a positivist, foundationalist 
approach, yet as far back as the early 1980s it was noted that economic 
studies had progressed beyond this limitation (Caldwell, 1982). This project 
takes a ‘hard’ interpretivist approach (Grix, 2010b), which is at the ‘harder’ end 
of interpretivism, and thus is nearer to critical realist approaches than 
traditional interpretivism and allows researchers to account for nuances 
between different research paradigms (critical realism will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section). Goodwin and Grix (2011:541) further clarify 
hard interpretivism as being a position that places ‘emphasis on structures and 
institutions’ but remains ‘committed to incorporating meaning and 
interpretation into explanations’. This position provides researchers with the 
opportunity to place greater value on the role played by structure in the 
research, while still incorporating the value of agency. Thus, research from a 
hard interpretivism perspective provides researchers with the opportunity to 
gain a ‘thick’ description (Andrew et al., 2010:123) of the issues of agency 
within a research setting, while still allowing for the impact of structure 
(Goodwin and Grix, 2011). 
As has been noted, the lack of formal guidance for cities leveraging bids 
means that agency plays a large role. However, the plans put in place are 
shaped by the external context in which the agents exist (see for example, the 
discussion in Chapter 3 regarding the unique political climate from which Cape 
Town’s bid emerged). 
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4.2.3 Research Paradigms 
As was noted earlier, there are three key research paradigms which 
encompass the ontological and epistemological positions discussed already. 
These are positivism, interpretivism and critical realism. Table 4.2 below 
provides a brief outline of these three paradigms. This table is only intended 
to be a summary; in reality, the nuances of each paradigm are far greater than 
can be shown in a simple table. 
Table 4.2: A Summary of the Key Research Paradigms6 
 Positivism Critical Realism Interpretivism 
Ontological 
position 
Objectivism Realism Constructivism 
Epistemological 
position 
Foundationalist Foundationalist Anti-foundationalist 
View The world exists 
beyond our 
knowledge of it 
The world exists 
beyond our 
knowledge of it 
The world is 
constructed 
through agent 
interaction 
Methodology Explaining 
relationships 
Not only to 
understand, but 
also explain 
Emphasis on 
understanding 
Methods Utilises scientific 
methods e.g. 
surveys, 
observation tools, 
structured 
interviews 
May use scientific 
methods, but also 
utilises an 
interpretivist 
understanding 
Believes social 
sciences are 
distinct from natural 
sciences and may 
use different 
methods e.g. 
interviews, focus 
groups 
 
Positivism tends to relate to the scientific methods epitomised by an objective 
ontology and foundationalist epistemology. Hollis (1999:41) defines this as 
‘any approach which applies scientific method to human affairs conceived as 
belonging to a natural order open to objective enquiry’. This definition sums 
                                            
6 Information taken from Bryman (2012) and Grix (2018) 
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up the key research decisions taken by a positivist. Crucially, the positivist 
position suggests that researchers should attempt to stay objective and 
separate from the area of study so as not to influence the findings. This often 
leads to methods used in the study of the natural sciences (Bryman, 2012). 
Further, positivist research seeks generalisation, that is, the results from a 
particular study may be applied to other cases (Blaikie, 2007). The paradigm 
of positivism is an extremely broad church that covers a wide range of 
approaches. Halfpenny (1982) identified at least 12 different positivist 
approaches to research, whereas Blaikie (2007) reduces this to three. While 
some details of these approaches differ, they all seek to apply methods 
traditionally used in the natural sciences to social science research. 
The second approach, and one that is often viewed as a mirror image of 
positivism, is that of interpretivism. Again, this is a broad term that incorporates 
a wide number of similar, but differing, research approaches. Interpretivism 
developed in response to the large number of studies employing a positivist 
approach, and generally takes a diametrically opposite position to that of 
positivism (Grix, 2018). Table 4.2 provides a key summary of the key 
interpretivist position. 
Whereas positivists seek to replicate natural science approaches to research, 
interpretivists view the social sciences as being a distinct research area and 
so utilise a different approach, with an emphasis on understanding rather than 
explanation (Grix, 2010a). This approach means that researchers will often 
conduct the research from within the area of study. Thus, research cannot be 
wholly objective, and instead may be influenced by the researchers 
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themselves. Interpretivist research will further consider the double 
hermeneutic, which states that researchers are not only seeking to understand 
the agents involved in the research, but the way the agents themselves view 
the natural world needs to be considered (Blaikie, 2007). 
The third key research paradigm is that of critical realism. If positivism and 
interpretivism can be seen as opposites, critical realism can be seen as sitting 
between the two of them, seeking to combine the understanding of 
interpretivism with the explanation of positivism. Critical realism will typically 
take a foundationalist epistemology (as does positivism) but has a distinctly 
different view of the agency and structure debate. Whereas positivists have a 
focus on structure rather than agency, critical realism argues that there are 
‘deep structures which cannot be directly observed’ (Marsh et al., 1999:12). It 
is this distinction of the agency and structure debate that defines critical 
realism, which argues that structure constrains rather than determines 
outcomes. It is not only that agency is impacted by structure, but also that 
agency will in return affect structure (Hay, 2002). 
Due to the relatively recent development of critical realism, much of the 
research into events generally, and sport mega-events more specifically, have 
typically taken either a positivist or an interpretivist approach (Girginov and 
Hills, 2009; Getz, 2012), although more recently, work by Byers (2013), 
Girginov (2016) and Hayday et al. (2017) have applied a critical realist 
approach to event management research. Girginov and Hills (2009:170) argue 
that the IOC utilises both positivist and interpretivist approaches. First, there 
has been a desire for ‘objective scientific knowledge’ (ibid) with the intention 
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of informing policy and endorsing the notion of the positive impacts that the 
Games can deliver. This is supported by Bladen (2008) who argues that 
stakeholders may prefer the sort of tangible data that a positivist approach 
may provide. Comparatively, the interpretivist approach may be more likely to 
favour research into the social impacts of sport mega-events. While it could 
be viewed from a positivist perspective (for example, to examine the structures 
in place that generate such impacts), researchers may favour an interpretivist 
point of view that focuses on the impact that such events have on individuals. 
However, this is not to say that such a study could not be taken from a positivist 
point of view. The paradigm does not necessitate that a certain research 
method should or should not be used; however, it may help to support these 
decisions. 
As should be clear from the ontological and epistemological stances already 
discussed, this research is approached from an interpretivist point of view. 
The reasons for this are as follows: first and foremost, this is the approach that 
is most in line with the researcher’s philosophical stance. The concept of 
leverage perhaps lends itself more naturally to an interpretivist position. 
Girginov and Hills (2009:164) argue that an interpretivist study will likely ‘focus 
less on outcomes such as the number of jobs, facilities and participants 
created, and more on the question of what processes, mechanisms and actors 
were or will be responsible for them’. This corresponds to the original argument 
for studying mega-event leverage, which views the processes employed rather 
than the outcome (Chalip, 2006). Therefore, the concept of leverage as a 
whole is perhaps better suited to an interpretive approach than a positivist one; 
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this has resulted in several leveraging studies taking an interpretivist stance 
(Mackintosh et al., 2016; Gaudette et al., 2017; Knott et al., 2017; Mhanna et 
al., 2017). Gaudette et al. (2017) specifically note that a constructivist 
epistemology allows the researcher to gain a more in-depth understanding of 
the strategies and processes employed for leveraging purposes. 
This is not to say that research into leverage must take an interpretive stance. 
Indeed, the interpretive approach may be limited by practical restrictions. The 
methods associated with the interpretive approach often involve the 
researcher ensconcing themselves within the area of study. If an event 
organising committee does not have the time to manage a leveraging strategy 
(Chalip and Heere, 2014), then it is unlikely to have time to work with a 
researcher (Bladen, 2008). 
 Methodology 
Having set the ontological and epistemological parameters of the research, 
the methodology of the current study can now be considered. This research is 
qualitative in nature, which marries with the constructivist approach of the 
study (Holloway, Brown, and Shipway, 2010). As Grix (2002) notes, the 
methods used by qualitative researchers tend to be adaptable and allow the 
researcher to consider the differing social context of the study, hence the 
natural fit with a constructivist approach. The main purpose of a qualitative 
study is to allow the researcher to analyse the object of the study in their 
natural environment (Grix, 2002), often with the intention of developing theory 
or providing a clear picture of a certain ‘object’ of study. This object could be 
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an event, a geographical location, or an issue (Andrew et al., 2010; Grix, 
2018). The methods of analysis for this particular research are discussed in 
Section 4.4.  
Creswell (2013) identified five key types of qualitative research. First, a 
narrative study involves the researcher gleaning stories from individuals and 
fashioning these into a narrative. This research primarily involves interviewing 
the participants, but narratives can be gathered through observation and 
document analysis. There are four types of narrative research; biographical, 
autoethnography, life history, and oral history. Riessman (2008) identifies 
three steps in analysing the data: (1) draw out the themes of the narrative, (2) 
the way in which the story was told, and (3) who the story is targeted towards. 
While this research will, in some way, seek to frame a narrative regarding the 
bids for the Olympic Games, time constraints and access to the information 
has resulted in a narrative study being rejected.  
The second type of qualitative research identified by Creswell (2013) is 
phenomenological, where research is conducted on a particular phenomenon 
that has occurred. This will often comprise interviewing participants who were 
involved with, or lived through the phenomenon in question, with other 
secondary sources of data often adding to the depth of the research. The data 
will then, typically, be analysed moving from the smallest units of analysis to 
larger units and will consider what the participants experienced and how they 
experienced it (Moustakas, 1994). As with a narrative study, phenomenology 
was considered, with the view that the phenomenon in question is the bid 
process. However, phenomenological studies have often focused on the 
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experiences of the people involved, which is not wholly suitable for this 
research. 
Creswell’s (2013) third type of qualitative research is grounded theory, where 
researchers generate theories seeking to find a ‘unified theoretical 
explanation’ for a particular process or action (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:107). 
This approach will usually see a researcher interviewing participants in the 
process, resulting in the development of a theory that is ‘grounded’ in these 
responses (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). As the interviews occur over time, the 
researcher will be developing theory; thus, it is important that all ideas are 
noted as the research progresses. Grounded theory is a methodological 
process that could have been applied to this study; however, given the 
different contexts that each bidding nation operates in, it is questionable 
whether Corbin and Strauss’ ‘unified theoretical explanation’ would be 
revealed (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:107). 
Ethnographic research, the fourth type of qualitative study, relies on the 
researcher studying a group of a particular culture; this will typically be a large 
cultural group that consists of many interacting people. The researcher will 
attempt to make sense of the social norms and interaction of the group and 
will often be immersed in the group itself. This approach allows the researcher 
to observe the participants within the social group and to conduct interviews 
and build an understanding of how this social group operates (Creswell, 2013). 
While ethnography may be a useful methodology, as with the narrative study, 
it is impractical due to constraints in information access and time. At the start 
of the data collection process, there were four cities in the process of bidding 
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for the 2024 Olympic Games (Rome, Paris, Budapest and Los Angeles). The 
geographical spread of these cities, together with language issues, means that 
it was not feasible to employ an ethnographic methodology. 
Thus, we come to the fifth type of qualitative research: the case study. Case 
studies involve the researcher selecting a case (or number of cases) to be 
studied in a real-life setting (Yin, 2009). While a case study may involve 
interviews, it typically involves gathering data from a number of different 
sources that include participant observation and data analysis; Creswell 
(2013:98) is clear that just one source of information is not sufficient to build a 
case. This data will be analysed to identify themes and issues within the case. 
Given the large number of cities which have bid for an Olympic Games (274 
since the first Olympic Games in 1896), a multiple case study approach is 
applied in this study and is discussed in more detail in Section 4.4. 
 Research Methods 
This research utilised a two-part process, involving content analysis and a 
multiple case study approach focusing on two recent bidders for Olympic 
Games. This section outlines the research conducted together with 
justification for all decisions made. 
4.4.1 Content Analysis 
Content analysis is traditionally viewed as a quantitative research method, 
particularly when conducted using a deductive approach (Grix, 2010a). 
However, content analysis can also be used as a qualitative research method. 
Whereas a quantitative content analysis may focus on counting the number of 
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times that specific words appear (and thus creating a quantitative dataset), 
qualitative content analyses will often focus on the language that is used or 
the contextual meaning of the written content (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; 
Bryman, 2012). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three types of qualitative 
content analysis: conventional, directed and summative. A conventional 
content analysis will typically be used to describe a particular event; for 
example, it could be used to describe the emotional responses of citizens to 
the opening ceremony of an Olympic Games. This method is particularly 
useful for a phenomenon that has not previously been studied, and thus 
makes an inductive approach to coding appropriate. The second approach is 
directed content analysis. This would normally be taken when there is existing 
theory regarding the event, but this is viewed as incomplete and warrants 
further study. In this case, a more deductive coding will take place based on 
the theory. The third approach is summative content analysis. As the name 
suggests, this tends towards the quantitative approach in that it counts the 
number of times a particular word is used, but it also considers the 
interpretation and underlying meanings within the text (Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005). 
This research utilised a directed content analysis and followed the process 
suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006). Elo and Kyngäs (2008) provide 
information on the initial data gathering, stating that the sample must be 
representative. Once the data is gathered, it should all be read through to 
ensure that the researcher absorbs the information provided (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). When the researcher is immersed in the data, coding can begin, 
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and this involves the highlighting of key words and phrases within the text 
based on pre-determined codes (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). It is important at 
this stage to determine whether the manifest or latent content should be 
analysed. If the text is taken at face value, then this is a manifest content 
analysis. Conversely, latent content includes the researcher’s interpretation of 
the words used. Any text that cannot be coded according to these codes 
should be highlighted to be returned to later and may produce a new code 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). This then allows the already existing theory to be 
developed further according to this new data. 
Content analysis is a regularly used method within sport management. Andrew 
et al. (2010) found that content analyses of journals, books, newspapers, 
websites, company documents, adverts and television shows have all been 
conducted within this industry. Further, content analysis of Olympic bid books 
has previously been conducted. Silva dos Santos and Alves Medeiros (2015) 
conducted an analysis of London 2012, Rio 2016, and Madrid 2020 
Candidature Files in order to determine the discursive constructions regarding 
the proposed media operations.  
4.4.1.1 Review of Candidature Files 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, as part of the bidding procedure, all 
Candidate Cities have to respond to the following question in their Candidature 
File:  
What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for 
your city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid? 
(IOC, 2009:66). 
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Since this question was introduced during the bidding process for the 2016 
Summer Olympic Games, it has been answered by the 16 Candidate Cities 
for Winter and Summer Olympic Games up to 2024. It is important to note that 
these 16 Candidate Cities are the only bidders to have answered this question; 
thus, this content analysis contains all of the data available. This point is 
crucial, as it allows the research to include a wide variety of states, political 
systems and economic statuses. Each of these factors can be viewed in the 
data in Table 10.5 on page 405, and these contexts will be considered within 
Chapter 5. 
The answers provided by each of the candidate cities to the question ‘What 
will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, 
irrespective of the outcome of the bid?’ (Question 1.4 for the bidders for the 
2016 and 2022 Games; Question 1.3 for the bidders for the 2018 and 2020 
Games) were isolated from the rest of the document. It should be noted that 
for the 2024 Candidature File, this question was combined with legacies for 
hosting. The legacies pertaining to the bid process were separated from the 
answers regarding hosting. All data was uploaded to NVivo, a specialist data 
analysis software. 
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the sources used. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of the Candidature Questionnaires 
City 
Event 
Year 
Type Section Heading 
Word 
Count 
Reference 
Chicago 2016 Summer Benefits of the Bid 177 
Chicago 2016 
(2009:21) 
Madrid 2016 Summer Benefits of Bidding 455 
Madrid 2016 
(2009:19) 
Rio 2016 Summer Benefits of Bidding 216 
Rio 2016 
(2009:23) 
Tokyo 2016 Summer 
Welcome benefits 
from Tokyo's bid 
388 
Tokyo 2016 
(2009:28) 
Annecy 2018 Winter 
Benefits of the Bid 
for the City and 
Territory 
405 
Annecy 2018 
(2011:19) 
Munich 2018 Winter 
Munich is Delivering 
Tremendous 
Benefits from the Bid 
regardless of the 
Outcome 
293 
Munich 2018 
(2011:23) 
Pyeong-
Chang 
2018 Winter 
Benefits of 
PyeongChang's bid 
384 
PyeongChang 
2018 
(2011:21) 
Istanbul 2020 Summer Benefits of Bidding 175 
Istanbul 2020 
(2013:21) 
Madrid 2020 Summer Benefits of the Bid 316 
Madrid 2020 
(2013:17) 
Tokyo 2020 Summer Benefits of bidding 193 
Tokyo 2020 
(2013:6) 
Almaty 2022 Winter 
Legacy of bidding for 
the Games 
125 
Almaty 2022 
(2015:13) 
Beijing 2022 Winter Legacy of the Bid 155 
Beijing 2022 
(2015:19) 
Budapest 2024 Summer 
Bidding and Hosting 
Benefits 
307 
Budapest 2024 
(2017:24) 
Los 
Angeles 
2024 Summer 
Benefits beyond the 
Games 
640 
Los Angeles 
2024 
(2017:20) 
Paris 2024 Summer 
Outstanding 
economic, social, 
environmental and 
sport benefits 
211 
Paris 2024 
(2017:39) 
Rome 2024 Summer 
Long term benefits 
for city/region/ 
country 
302 
Rome 2024 
(2017:21) 
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The 16 answers to the question were coded to identify any evidence of 
planned leveraging from the bid, according to Chalip’s (2004:228) definition 
that leverage refers to ‘those activities which need to be undertaken around 
the event itself […] which seek to maximise the long-term benefit from events.’ 
In this respect, it is important to clarify the difference between leverage and 
legacy. If a bidder details an impact of the bid, but with no consideration of the 
strategies that will ensure these impacts come about, it is not included in this 
study. For example, Budapest 2024 (2017:24) states that the bid will bring 
‘image promotion and awareness raising’ but does not offer plans that will be 
put in place to leverage this benefit. Therefore, this statement is not coded as 
a leveraging strategy. 
The coding was conducted in two steps. First, given the lack of research into 
the area of leveraging Olympic bids, an inductive coding approach was 
undertaken to identify the areas in which bid cities seek to leverage the event. 
This coding identified four specific areas of leverage, consistent with those 
areas identified in Chapter 3: sport participation, nation and community 
building, urban development, and global profile. These four areas, together 
with illustrative examples can be seen in Table 4.4. The 16 sources were then 
coded a second time in order to identify the four elements of Chalip’s (2004) 
model; the leverageable resource, opportunities, strategic objectives, and the 
means by which they are achieved (see Section 2.4 on page 62 for more detail 
on these specific areas). 
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Table 4.4: Illustrative Examples of Coding 
Area for 
Leverage 
Illustrative Example Reference 
Sport 
Participation 
‘TMG adopted the "Master Plan for the Advancement 
of Sports" to improve sporting performance, promote 
the healthy development, of youth, and encourage 
lifelong healthy living of citizens.’ 
Tokyo 
2016 
(2009:28) 
Nation and 
Community 
Building 
‘Launch of the Integrados (Integrated) programme 
which will reach out to the city's children with 
disability or at risk of social exclusion.’ 
Madrid 
2016 
(2009:19) 
Urban 
Development 
‘The bid has drawn a sufficient amount of investment 
from the government and the private sector. The 
National Speed Skating Oval, the Biathlon Centre, 
and the Nordic Centre Ski Jumping Venue will be 
constructed as scheduled. The transport and venue 
facilities in Beijing and Zhangjiakou will be upgraded 
in a continuous manner.’ 
Beijing 
2022 
(2015:19) 
Global Profile 
‘The bidding process provides excellent 
opportunities for us to promote Madrid on the world 
stage, increasing global awareness of our city, our 
business, and tourism offers.’ 
Madrid 
2016 
(2009:19) 
 
This data is then presented in two parts. First, the four areas for leverage 
identified in Table 4.4 above were taken in turn in order to offer a holistic view 
of the leveraging opportunities available for bid cities. Second, the bid cities 
were classified into five categories: 1) Winter or Summer Olympic Games, 2) 
geographic location, 3) government type, 4) economic status, and 5) bid 
success. Table 4.5 shows the categorisation. 
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Table 4.5: Categorising the Bidders7 
City Nation 
Year 
of 
event 
Geographic 
state 
Government 
type 
Economic 
state 
Success of 
the bid 
Chicago USA 2016 Americas 
Constitutional 
federal republic 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Madrid Spain 2016 Europe 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Rio Brazil 2016 Americas 
Federal 
presidential 
republic 
Emerging Successful 
Tokyo Japan 2016 Asia 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Annecy France 2018 Europe 
Semi-
presidential 
republic 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Munich Germany 2018 Europe 
Federal 
parliamentary 
republic 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Pyeong-
Chang 
South 
Korea 
2018 Asia 
Presidential 
Republic 
Emerging Successful 
Istanbul Turkey 2020 Europe 
Parliamentary 
republic 
Emerging Unsuccessful 
Madrid Spain 2020 Europe 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Tokyo Japan 2020 Asia 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Successful 
Almaty Kazakhstan 2022 Asia 
Presidential 
republic 
Emerging Unsuccessful 
Beijing China 2022 Asia 
Communist 
state 
Emerging Successful 
Budapest Hungary 2024 Europe 
Parliamentary 
republic 
Emerging Withdrawn 
Los 
Angeles 
USA 2024 Americas 
Constitutional 
federal republic 
Advanced  Unsuccessful 
Paris France 2024 Europe 
Semi-
presidential 
republic 
Advanced  Successful 
Rome Italy 2024 Europe 
Parliamentary 
republic 
Advanced Withdrawn 
 
                                            
7 The full dataset (including references for the data) can be found in Table 10.5 on page 
405 
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Categorising the bidders in this way answers one of the issues identified in the 
literature review. There has been a recent proliferation of studies regarding 
failed bids that typically use advanced Western nations as the case studies. 
Including all cities that have progressed to the candidate stage allows a wider 
range of states to be considered. Breaking the nations down further into the 
identified categories allows this research to tease out the nuances between 
nations with different political and economic statuses. 
4.4.2 Case Studies 
A case study can be defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are clearly not 
evident’ (Yin, 2009:18). This emphasis on context is seen as being critical, as 
it is the contextual factors of the case that will be the reason for selecting the 
chosen phenomenon as a case study (Grix 2010a). Bryman (2012) notes that 
the word ‘case’ will often refer to a location, such as a specific community or 
organisation, that the researcher attempts to comprehensively study.  
Holloway et al. (2010) and Andrew et al. (2010) recognise that case studies 
are particularly important in event and sport research, as events are finite in 
nature, have a clear start and end point, and take place in a specific 
geographic location. Andrew et al. (2010) argue that there are numerous 
reasons for selecting a case-study approach. First, a researcher may wish to 
gain insight from several viewpoints (Velde et al., 2004) or gain a deeper 
understanding of an issue or phenomenon that occurs. Further, a case study 
may be used to verify that a current theory occurs when applied to a real-life 
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event, to develop new theories, or to investigate a phenomenon that has not 
been researched before (Ghuari and Gronhaug, 2005; Maylor and Blackmon, 
2005). The findings of the case will often be used to assist practitioners dealing 
with a similar issue or event in the future (Andrew, Pedersen, and McEvoy, 
2010). 
In addition, there are three differing types of cases (Grix, 2018). First, a 
descriptive case, which often deals with a historical matter and will seek to 
answer the questions who, what, when and where, rather than how and why 
(Yin, 2009). Seeking to answer these same questions is the exploratory case 
(ibid), which will attempt to test hypotheses and will often be used as a test 
case to gauge the appropriateness of this case for further study (Grix, 2018). 
Finally, an explanatory case will attempt to answer the questions how and why 
(Yin, 2009). Grix (2010a) notes that these are the case studies most applicable 
to the social sciences, with researchers seeking to find results that can then 
be generalised across further cases. 
4.4.2.1 Single-Case Study vs Multiple-Case Study Approach 
A case study analysis can be carried out using either just one case or a 
number of cases in a multiple-case study. A single-case study approach sees 
the researcher selecting just one case study for analysis, which by its nature 
will be an in-depth analysis. This will often have one unit of analysis, which 
may be a single organisation (Andrew et al., 2010); however, it is important 
that the researcher does not immerse themselves in the single-case study to 
the extent that the wider literature is overlooked. Thus, even when considering 
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a single case, it is important that the researcher ensures that the work is rooted 
to the broad research around the subject (Grix, 2010a). 
Yin (2009) discusses the different reasons for adopting a single-case study. 
First, the case may be a critical case. This is a case that can be used to test a 
theory to determine its appropriateness. If the theory does not fit with the case, 
then new theories may be devised. A case may also be chosen because it is 
an extreme or unique case. These cases are likely not to have been studied 
before, and so the results will add to the body of literature. Similarly, a 
revelatory case may previously have been unattainable to researchers and so 
research into this case will contribute to the academic knowledge. Finally, an 
average case would be studied if the researcher is attempting to investigate a 
typical situation that may be extrapolated to other instances. An average case 
may be studied from a longitudinal point of view, where the case is investigated 
in two different periods of time (Yin, 2009). Yin does go on to acknowledge 
that a case may change over time; for example, what is deemed to be a unique 
case at the start of the study may transpire to become an average case in the 
future. 
While a single-case study considers only one case, it can still take an 
embedded or holistic approach. A holistic approach will study the case from a 
macro perspective, in that it may look at an investigation as a whole. An 
embedded approach to case studies is more complicated, as it attempts to 
study more than one unit of analysis (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). For example, 
a case study researching an Olympic bid may investigate the different actions 
of numerous stakeholders within the bid, with differing levels of involvement. 
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While an embedded case study may appear to be more beneficial, a holistic 
approach is useful if there are no obvious sub-units to be studied, or if the 
theory that is underlying the study relies on a holistic approach. However, a 
holistic approach may cause issues if the researcher fails to recognise sub-
units that are present, and which may play a key role in the results. Similarly, 
an embedded approach may cause issues should the case focus only on the 
micro level and fail to report on the organisation as a whole. 
Conversely, a multiple-case study focuses on two or more case studies and is 
often viewed as being more substantial than a single-case study. In some 
ways, the rationale for selecting cases in a multiple-case study approach is 
likely to have some similarities to that for a single-case study approach. The 
researcher will still have to determine whether to take a holistic or embedded 
approach. Should a holistic approach be considered, the researcher will look 
at a number of organisations as a whole, building up a case study of each. 
Should an embedded approach be taken, the researcher will consider different 
sub-units of a number of different organisations (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
However, there will be further considerations when choosing cases in a 
multiple case study. By definition, there are unlikely to be two or more unique 
or revelatory cases which can be selected. Seawright and Gerring (2008:297-
298) provide seven types of methods for selecting case studies: 1) typical, 2) 
diverse, 3) extreme, 4) deviant, 5) influential, 6) most similar, and 7) most 
different. It should be noted that case study selection is different from sampling 
in a quantitative study. Whereas a sample in a quantitative study will attempt 
to provide conclusions that can be generalised across all cases, this is not 
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necessarily applicable to the selection of cases in a multiple-case study. In 
order to cover each of the possible variables, a researcher would need to study 
a large number of case studies. While this may be possible, for example with 
a survey, the nature of case studies and the data collection techniques that 
are required make this impractical for a multiple-case study approach (Yin, 
2009). Yin goes on to note that should a sampling approach be required for all 
research, then a number of studies would not be conducted. 
Yet, the number of cases to be selected does need to be considered carefully 
and is likely to depend upon the degree of confidence that the researcher 
wishes to have regarding the results; the more case studies, the more accurate 
the results gained are likely to be. However, it is possible that as more case 
studies are selected, the depth in which they are investigated becomes 
shallower. Further, and relevant to this study, the more case studies that are 
researched, the more resources that are needed (Yin, 2009). For example, 
should this research attempt to visit each city which has bid for a Summer or 
Winter Olympic Games, 116 cities would need to be visited. Even if the period 
was limited to Summer bids since the 2000 Olympic Games, then 39 different 
cities would still need to be considered. This approach would need resources, 
both in terms of time and finances, which are beyond the current study. 
Given the nature of this research, a single-case study is not appropriate. As 
already discussed, many different states with different characteristics and 
cultures bid to host Olympic Games, and therefore the external validity of a 
single-case study could be questioned. Thus, this research will employ a 
multiple-case study, which takes a ‘diverse’ approach to case study selection 
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(Seawright and Gerring, 2008:297). This is an approach that Barrick et al. 
(2016) argue is under-utilised for research into leveraging. In particular, it is 
argued that qualitative case studies can provide the opportunity to explore 
leveraging initiatives from several different perspectives in order to 
complement the already existing quantitative studies. The rationale and 
selection process for these case studies will be discussed in the next section. 
4.4.2.2 Case Study Selection 
The first decision to be made in terms of the case study selection is which 
mega-events to include. As stated in the literature review, this research uses 
Black’s (2008) definition that there exists first order, second order and third 
order mega-events. However, as this research is not attempting to discover 
whether bids for different events can be leveraged, it seems sensible to keep 
the mega-event in question as a constant variable. Thus, this research will 
focus on losing bids for the Olympic Games. The decision to exclude the World 
Cup from this research is due to the differing bid processes. Also, the nature 
of the hosting of a World Cup is different to the Olympics, as a World Cup 
generally takes place across an entire nation as opposed to a single city. 
However, the boundaries are becoming less clear; the Football World Cup in 
Qatar will see all of the matches take place within 65 miles of each other, while 
the London 2012 Olympic Games saw events take place as far afield as 
Glasgow and Manchester. 
Since the advent of the Modern Olympic Games in 1896, there have been 274 
bids to host the Summer and Winter Games, of which 214 were unsuccessful. 
These bids have then been further reduced for this study using five criteria: 
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1. Winning bids have been excluded. While there are undoubtedly cities 
which have successfully leveraged a bid and have gone on to host (for 
example, Vancouver 2010), it is deemed too difficult to separate the 
outcome of the bid from the hosting itself. 
2. All Winter Games were excluded in order to enhance the validity of the 
study. 
3. Bids for Games pre-2000 were excluded. The idea of legacy did not 
truly start to enter the Olympic narrative until the 1990s (Leopkey and 
Parent, 2012), while the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games are viewed as 
being the first to be leveraged (Chalip, 2002). Similarly, bid processes 
that were not complete at the time of data collection were excluded. 
Thus, only the bid processes for the 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 
2020 Summer Olympic Games were considered. 
4. The linguistic limitations of the researcher determined that 
predominantly English-speaking nations were chosen. While all official 
documentation needs to be produced in English and French, it is not 
guaranteed that all stakeholders would speak English. 
5. Due to the ‘diverse’ case study selection process (Seawright and 
Gerring, 2008:298), nations of different political, economic and social 
statuses were sought. This information can be viewed in Table 10.5 on 
page 405. It should be noted that all the data refers to the nation which 
bid for the Olympic Games as opposed to the city. 
Once the inclusion and exclusion criteria had been applied, five bid cities 
remained: Manchester 2000, Cape Town 2004, Toronto 2008, New York 2012 
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and Chicago 2016. Of these five cities, Cape Town 2004 stood out, as it is 
from a less developed nation with low levels of wealth. Thus, Cape Town was 
the first case study selected. Given the similarities between the remaining four 
cities (see Table 10.5 on page 405), it was decided that only one city would 
be studied. Each bid has been discussed in the literature (see Chapter 3 for 
more detail), and so none were excluded on this basis. Thus, the final case 
was selected on a pragmatic basis; that is, the access that the researcher 
could gain to the bid teams. As will be discussed further in Section 4.4.2.5, 
direct contact could be made with a member of the Toronto bid team through 
personal contacts. Thus, Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games was 
selected as the second case study. A summary of the differences are in Table 
4.6. 
Table 4.6: Canadian and South African Contexts8 
 South Africa (1997) Canada (2001) 
Population 40,926,063 31,081,900 
GDP (US$) 152 billion 732 billion 
GDP per Capita (US$) 3,728.30 23,573.80 
Unemployment 22.9% 7.2% 
Economy Type Developing Advanced 
 
4.4.2.3 Semi-structured interviews 
The first, and perhaps most crucial method of data collection employed in 
researching the two case studies, is semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders who were involved with the Olympic bids. Differing approaches 
                                            
8 Full details of the economic contexts of the two cases can be found in Table 10.1 on 
page 401 and Table 10.3 on page 403 
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to interviews were considered. Saunders et al. (2003) first divide interviews 
into ‘one-to-one’ and ‘one-to-many’. A ‘one-to-many’ type interview (i.e. focus 
group) was discarded due to the difficulties of being able to gather all 
interviewees together. Thus, once a ‘one-to-one’ interview format was settled 
upon, it was then important to determine the style of the interview. Structured 
interviews were not considered appropriate due to the already mentioned 
differences between South Africa and Canada, and so a semi-structured 
interview style was chosen, 
A semi-structured interview allows the interviewer to gain a greater 
understanding and appreciation of the topics discussed by the interviewee, as 
their looser nature allows the interviewer to follow up with additional questions 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). However, an issue with interviews is that 
interviewees may just answer the questions asked, and therefore the themes 
identified are derived from the questions. When constructing the interview 
schedule, it was important that there were not questions about specific 
leveraging plans; for example, a question on sporting infrastructure would 
identify sporting infrastructure as a strong theme. Thus, the interview schedule 
was constructed in a way that allowed the interviewees to discuss the 
strategies put in place that they viewed as the most important. As a result, the 
interviews themselves occasionally moved towards being unstructured, with 
the interviewee talking at length about their experiences (Saunders et al., 
2003). The indicative interview schedule used can be seen in the Appendices 
on page 413. 
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4.4.2.4 Interviewee population 
The sample for interviewees was limited to those stakeholders who had either 
worked on an Olympic bid or had worked for an agency that could have been 
impacted by the bid (e.g. city council or tourist board). This approach was 
taken in order to triangulate the data. Firstly, those stakeholders who had 
worked on a bid provided information on the strategies put in place to leverage 
the bid, and their opinion of the impact. These interviews focused on the 
leveraging strategies put in place and the reasoning behind them. This 
information was then corroborated through interviews with the agencies who 
had dealt with the actual impact of the leveraging plans. Finally, further 
triangulation was sought through document analysis, as detailed in Section 
4.4.2.8, in order to increase the validity and reliability of the study. 
4.4.2.5 Interviewee sample 
Given the specific criteria needed when identifying potential interviewees (i.e. 
interviewees were required either to have worked on an Olympic bid or for an 
agency impacted by the bid), a ‘snowball’ sampling method was employed 
(Saunders et al., 2003). This involves finding one suitable interviewee and 
asking them to put the researcher in contact with others. A snowball sampling 
technique was chosen due to the difficulty in identifying members of bid teams; 
while official bid documentation will often list the names of board members, 
there are very rarely contact details provided, or the names of other members 
of the bid team. 
For the Cape Town case study, initial contact was made through a partner in 
the CARNIVAL Project, a European Union Framework 7 Marie Curie 
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International Research Staff Exchange Scheme Programme that seeks to 
‘investigate what factors impact upon the planned and unplanned legacy 
outcomes of mega-events and their implications for stakeholders’ (CARNIVAL, 
n.d.). A member of the CARNIVAL project was able to provide contact with a 
member of the bid team, who then provided the details of other members. A 
similar approach was taken for the Toronto case study. Personal contacts 
were used to identify one member of the bid team who then provided the 
contact details of other members. In both case studies, interviewees provided 
contact details for further interviewees, leading to 31 interviews in total. 
The majority of interviews were conducted as face-to-face meetings at either 
the interviewee’s place of work or in public locations, such as cafes. However, 
given the global nature of this study, relying on the researcher travelling to 
Cape Town and Toronto, a face-to-face meeting was not always possible as 
interviewees were not always available during the short periods of travel. 
Thus, Skype was used to conduct several interviews (as shown in Table 4.7 
on page 175). While Skype is becoming a more accepted vehicle for data 
collection (Deakin and Wakefield, 2011; Hanna, 2012), it was felt that the 
Skype interviews lacked the empathy of the face-to-face interviews. For 
example, during face-to-face interviews, there is often interaction pre- and 
post-interview as the interviewer and interviewee meet and get ready for the 
interview, and then later, prepare to leave. This interaction was often lost 
during the Skype interviews, with both the interviewer and interviewee tending 
to start the interview straight away and end the call as soon as the interview 
was finished. However, given the geographical location of the interviewees, 
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conducting an interview by Skype was viewed as being a better option than 
not conducting the interview at all. 
The interviews took between 30 minutes and two hours; a summary of the 
interviewees can be found in Table 4.7. One interviewee was not prepared to 
take part in a full interview; however, they were happy for me to submit my 
questions via email and they wrote out a reply. While this did not allow for back 
and forth discussion, the written responses provided were of such detail that 
back and forth discussion would not have been necessary anyway. 
Given the ethical approval sought, and the small numbers of people working 
for each bid team, it is not possible to list the job roles of the interviewees 
without disclosing their identities. Therefore, Table 4.7 provides the detail as 
to whether they were part of the bid team, and the area on which they focused. 
  
1
7
5
 
Table 4.7: Interviewees 
Case  Code Role Area Type of Interview Interview details 
Cape 
Town 
CT01 Bid team Architect Face to face 02/05/2016 (1 hour 48 min) 
CT02 Bid team Architect Face to face 04/05/2016 (59 min) 
CT03 Bid team Community Face to face 05/05/2016 (1 hour 22 min) 
CT04 Bid team Sport Federations Face to face 06/05/2016 (32 min) 
CT05 Bid team Technical Face to face 09/05/2016 (1 hour 3 min) 
CT06 Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport, Western Cape  Face to face 15/09/2016 (49 min) 
CT07 Municipal Planning, City of Cape Town  Face to face 16/09/2016 (1 hour 8 min) 
CT08 Destination Development, City of Cape Town  Face to face 19/09/2016 (1 hour 3 min) 
CT09 Bid team Board Member Face to face 20/09/2016 (1 hour 4 min) 
CT10 Bid team Environment Face to face 26/09/2016 (2 hour 7 min) 
CT11 Bid team Board Member Written answers - 
CT12 Western Cape Convention Bureau Skype 30/11/2016 (25 minutes) 
CT13 Leisure and Tourism, Western Cape Skype 30/11/2016 (25 minutes) 
Toronto 
TO01 Bid team Community Face to face 08/06/2017 (46 min) 
TO02 Bid team  Face to face 09/06/2017 (40 min) 
TO03 IOC Member  Face to face 12/06/2017 (1 hour 28 min) 
TO04 Bread Not Circuses; social justice academic – (Helen Lenskyj)9 Skype 12/06/2017 (31 min) 
TO05 Bread Not Circuses; social housing academic  Face to face 13/06/2017 (1 hour 33 min) 
TO06 Bid team Sport Federations Face to face 14/06/2017 (46 min) 
TO07 Bid team and 2015 Pan AM Games organising committee Board member Face to face 15/06/2017 (41 min) 
TO08 Bid team Arts and Culture Face to face 16/06/2017 (56 min) 
TO09 Bid team and Waterfront Regeneration Project Security Face to face 19/06/2017 (60 min) 
TO10 Bid team Board member Face to face 22/06/2017 (1 hour 8 min) 
TO11 Bid team Sport Face to face 22/06/2017 (58 min) 
TO12 Bid team and 2015 Pan AM Games organising committee Board member Face to face 26/06/2017 (1 hour 36 min) 
TO13 Bid team Shadow Cabinet Skype 27/06/2017 (34 min) 
TO14 City of Toronto Skype 18/07/2017 (47 min) 
TO15 Toronto Sports Council Skype 22/07/2017 (39 min) 
TO16 Waterfront Toronto Skype 27/07/2017 (46 min) 
TO17 Bid team and Canadian Sport Institute Skype 28/07/2017 (40 min) 
TO18 Tourism Toronto Skype 23/89/2017 (41 min) 
                                            
9 Helen Lenskyj requested to be named 
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4.4.2.6 Data Management 
All spoken interviews were recorded and later transcribed. While Bryman 
(2012) notes that recording interviews increases the accuracy of the 
transcription, Saunders et al. (2003:264) argue that the disadvantages may 
outweigh the advantages, noting that the presence of a recorder may impact 
the relationship between the interviewee and interviewer, that there may be 
technical issues with the recording equipment, and that the time taken to 
transcribe the interviews is lengthy. Precautions were taken to avoid any 
technical issues, with interviews being recorded on two devices. However, one 
early interview took place in a location with a high level of background noise, 
and the recording was inaudible on both devices. Fortunately, notes had been 
taken during the interview which were subsequently typed up. This issue could 
be attributed partly to the researcher’s inexperience of conducting interviews, 
and each subsequent interview therefore took place in a location where 
background noise was not an issue. 
As Saunders et al. (2003:264) noted, the transcribing of interviews is a lengthy 
process, and so a transcription service was used. To verify the accuracy of the 
transcriptions, each recording was listened to again while reading the 
transcription, to ensure that there were no errors. Where the transcription 
service was unable to decipher a particular word, this was quite clear in the 
transcript and appropriate correction was made. In order to abide by ethical 
considerations, the recordings were first modified to remove any details that 
may have led to the interviewee being recognised. 
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4.4.2.7 Coding 
The coding process again followed the six stages suggested by Braun and 
Clarke (2006). The reading through of the transcript while listening to the 
actual recording corresponded to the first stage of familiarising oneself with 
the data. Once the interviews had been transcribed and checked, phase two 
began and the transcripts were uploaded into NVivo, a specialist coding 
software. As Sotiriadou et al. (2014) note, there are often contextual, specific 
and philosophical reasons for a particular choice of analysis software. In terms 
of this research, it was decided to use a coding software to reduce the levels 
of manual work required (Hilal and Alabri, 2013) and to increase the rigour of 
the analysis through the removal of human error (Welsh, 2002). Once a 
decision had been taken to use data analysis software, NVivo was chosen due 
to the researcher’s access to, and familiarity with the software. As Sotiriadou 
et al. (2014) recognise, the use of automatic text analysis can lead to 
researchers being distanced from the data interpretation; therefore, the 
transcripts were coded manually using the NVivo software. 
As evidenced by Sant et al. (2013), practitioners often do not recognise the 
difference between legacy, leverage and impact. Therefore, the interviews did 
not specify the word leverage; rather, the interviews sought to identify the 
planned legacies and the strategies that were put in place to achieve them. 
Thus, the thematic analysis was conducted at a latent level (Braun and Clarke, 
2006), that is, the content was not taken at face value; rather, the content 
analysis interpreted the underlying ideas of the interviews. This is an approach 
consistent with an interpretivist research paradigm (ibid). Further, as 
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suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) as part of stage three, it is important to 
identify as many themes as possible at this stage. This resulted in a large 
number of different codes across the interviews which were then placed into 
11 broad themes (stage four of Braun and Clarke’s (2006) coding process): 
1) Economic 
2) Environment 
3) HR Management 
4) Hosting other events 
5) Image 
6) Infrastructure 
7) Olympism 
8) Politics 
9) Social 
10) Sport 
11) Context regarding the bid 
It is beyond the scope of this research to discuss fully each of these 11 codes, 
and indeed, some referred to legacies rather than leveraging. Of those 
outcomes that were purposefully sought (and therefore fit the definition of 
leverage), infrastructure, sport, and image were the most prevalent across 
both case studies and played the largest role within the leveraging plans. As 
will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, both the Cape Town and Toronto bid 
teams deliberately upgraded infrastructure within the city and sought to 
develop the organisation of sport. Further, Cape Town sought to improve the 
image of both the city and the nation of South Africa through the Olympic bid. 
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The three themes of infrastructure, sport, and image were also prevalent in 
the Candidature File analysis; therefore, it is these three themes that will be 
discussed in detail in the two case study analysis chapters. 
It should be noted that not all coding occurred at the same time due to the 
timing of the data collection. The interviews conducted in Cape Town were 
conducted in two tranches (May and September 2016), and these interviews 
were coded over the same time period. The Toronto data collection was 
conducted in June 2017, and the coding commenced after all interviews were 
completed. First, the transcript for each interview was read through again. 
Then, in turn, each interview was coded to identify the areas for leverage. As 
themes developed through each interview, the coding changed in the first 
interviews compared to the final ones; thus, each interview was coded several 
times to ensure that the coding was consistent throughout all the interviews. 
Once this initial coding had been conducted, each interview was then coded 
again, to identify the leverageable resource, opportunity, strategic objective, 
and means, in accordance with Chalip’s (2004) model. Figure 4.1 shows an 
example of the coding that took place using NVivo. While it appears that all of 
the text is highlighted in the same colour, the right-hand side of the image 
shows that this part of the text is coded as ‘Waterfront’, ‘Bid process’, 
‘Networks’ and ‘Government investment’. 
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Figure 4.1: Coding Process Example 
4.4.2.8 Document Analysis 
In order to enhance the validity and reliability of this study, a further document 
analysis was performed. Bryman (2012) notes that organisational documents 
can provide researchers with crucial background information that does not 
necessarily emanate from the interviews. Further, given the time periods 
involved (the Cape Town bid took place in the mid-1990s), contemporary 
reports have also been examined, both to provide a context and also to 
triangulate the information gained. All of the documents used are in the public 
domain, with the majority sourced from libraries. The documents analysed can 
be found in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.8: Documents used in Cape Town Analysis 
Title Author Year Type 
A Vision for the Future of 
Metropolitan Cape Town 
Cape Town City Council 1993 
Internal 
document 
The Olympic Games Cape 
Town 2004 Preliminary 
Study: Economic Benefits 
and Opportunities 
KPMG/NN Gobodo & 
Associates 
1995 
Economic 
Impact 
Report 
White Paper on National 
Transport Policy 
Department of 
Transport 
1996 White Paper 
Cape Town 
Accommodation 
Requirements for the 2004 
Olympic Games 
Cape Town 2004 1996 Report 
Strategic Environmental 
Assessment Cape Town 
2004 Olympic Bid: Public 
Finances Analysis for Cape 
Town 2004 Olympic Bid 
Dr. Iraj Abedian (UCT) 
and BDM Consulting 
1997 Report 
Strategic Environmental 
Assessment of the Cape 
Town 2004 Olympic Bid: 
Sustainability 
Kirsten Day 1997 Report 
Cape Town 2004 Olympic 
Bid Fact Sheets: A 
Presentation by the City of 
Cape Town to host the 
Games of the XXVIII 
Olympiad in the Year 2004 
Cape Town 2004 1997 Report 
Moving Towards 2004: 
Cape Town Olympic 
Integrated Transport Plan 
Cape Town 2004 1997 Report 
Your Guide to Cape Town’s 
Bid for the 2004 Olympic 
Games 
Cape Town 2004 1997 
Promotional 
document 
A Sporting Opportunity for 
South Africa: Cape Town 
2004 Olympic Sports Plan 
Cape Town Olympic Bid 
Company 
Unknown 
Promotional 
document 
Cape Town 2004: An 
Environmental Perspective 
Cape Town Olympic Bid 
Company 
Unknown 
Promotional 
document 
Sports Events Strategy Cape Town 2004 Unknown 
Research 
Document 
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Table 4.9: Documents used in Toronto Analysis 
Title Author Year Type 
Interim Report 1989 
Royal Commission on 
the Future of the 
Toronto Waterfront 
1989 Report 
Urban Waterfront Industry 
Gene Desfor, report of 
symposium held on 
November 16, 1989 
1989 
Symposium 
Report 
Regeneration, Toronto's 
Waterfront and the 
sustainable city: final report 
Royal Commission on 
the Future of the 
Toronto Waterfront 
1992 Report 
Our Toronto Waterfront: 
The Wave of the Future 
City of Toronto 1999 Report 
Toronto 2008 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games Master 
Plan 
Toronto 2008 1999 Report 
Our Toronto Waterfront: 
Gateway to the New 
Canada 
Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization 
Taskforce 
2000 Report 
Toronto Staff Report: 
Toronto’s Olympic and 
Paralympic Games Bid 
Garrett et al. 2000 Report 
A Socio-Economic and 
Equity Plan for the 2008 
Olympic Games: 
Preliminary Report 
The Community Social 
Planning Council of 
Toronto 
2000 Report 
Toronto 2008 Olympic Bid 
Environmental Assessment 
Toronto 2008 2001 
Environmental 
Impact Report 
Economic Impact Analysis 
(2001-2013) 
Urban Metrics 2013 
Economic 
Impact 
Analysis 
Annual Reports Waterfront Toronto 
2005 – 
2017 
Report 
 Ethical Considerations 
In light of the use of interviews in this research project, there were several 
ethical considerations that needed to be taken into account, and several 
aspects of the research requiring careful ethical planning. Ethical approval was 
sought and secured from both Coventry University and the University of 
Birmingham, and later from Manchester Metropolitan University. 
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Research involving human participants often needs the most stringent ethical 
requirements, and this was the case with this research. Given the nature of 
the interviews, there was a natural selection process. All participants were 
stakeholders of bid processes that took place a minimum of 15 years ago, so 
all interviewees were over the age of 18. However, drawing on the work of 
Edwards and Skinner (2009) and Saunders et al. (2003), there were other 
ethical considerations and all interviewees were assured that: 
 Their participation would be anonymised. 
 Participation was entirely voluntary, and they could withdraw their 
participation at any point before September 2018. 
To ensure anonymity, as can be seen in Table 4.710, interviewees were 
assigned a code based on the case study they are associated with, and all 
identifying data was removed. Crucially, this was done before the recordings 
were sent off to be transcribed. Furthermore, recordings were manually edited 
to remove any identifying features, to ensure anonymity through the 
transcription process. Finally, in order to ensure that the interviewees were 
happy with the attribution of their data, the final results chapters and 
conclusions were sent to each interviewee to read and verify. 
 Assessment of Research Quality  
Qualitative research has often been criticised in the literature, with Costa 
(2005:129) noting that positivist quantitative researchers may view qualitative 
                                            
10 One interviewee requested to be named 
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studies as ‘fluffy’. Thus, it is important that qualitative research can be seen as 
both reliable and valid, internally and externally and, perhaps most importantly, 
trustworthy (Bryman, 2012). Table 4.10 below shows the key questions that 
need to be asked to consider the reliability and validity of a piece of research. 
Table 4.10: Key Questions Regarding Validity and Reliability11 
 Reliability Validity 
Internal 
Do all researchers involved in the 
study agree with the results and 
conclusions? 
Can the results be due to 
something else? 
External Can the study be replicated? 
Can the research be 
generalised across different 
social settings? 
 
First, careful selection of the case studies (Section 4.4.2.2) was made with the 
intention of encompassing as many characteristics of differing nations as 
possible. This selection will contribute towards enhancing both the external 
reliability and external validity of the research. The methods employed do not 
restrict future replication studies. This research considers the leveraging 
strategies of two very different cities in Cape Town and Toronto, allowing the 
research to be replicated across a wide range of bidders. However, it should 
be noted that replicating this particular study may be problematic; for example, 
the Cape Town bid took place over 20 years ago, with many stakeholders 
having since retired, while memories also change and fade. Further, access 
to interviewees often came through personal contact, and it is not guaranteed 
that anyone attempting to replicate the bid would gain the same access. Even 
if the same access could be guaranteed, a different interviewer might strike up 
                                            
11 Adapted from Bryman (2012) 
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a different rapport with the interviewee (Bryman, 2012). This is perhaps 
particularly likely when considering the Cape Town case study. The wider 
context of Cape Town’s bid was discussed in Chapter 3, with a particular focus 
on apartheid and the racial divisions within Cape Town. An interviewer from a 
different social and racial background may well receive different responses to 
the same questions. 
External validity and external reliability were enhanced further through the 
content analysis. This included all 16 Candidate Cities which answered the 
relevant question, ensuring that the sample size was adequate. The inclusion 
of all of these different nations, from a wide number of economic and political 
contexts, enhances the generalisability of the study. This also has a high 
degree of external reliability, as it would be easy for another researcher to gain 
access to the Candidate Files in question and replicate the study. 
Next, in order to improve the internal validity and internal reliability of the 
research, the qualitative interviews were not the only source of data used. 
Rather, this information was triangulated with secondary data, such as official 
reports, organisational documents and contemporary news reports. In 
addition, while the transcripts themselves were not ‘member checked’ with the 
interviewee, to ensure that the interviewer’s interpretation of the interviews 
was correct, the completed case studies were sent back to the interviewees 
for them to confirm the results. Similarly, this research has been presented at 
academic conferences in front of industry experts and, in some cases, the 
audience included some of the interviewees. Feedback from these 
presentations was then used to enhance the research. The fact that many of 
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the interviewees attend such conferences points to the external validity of the 
work; many of the interviewees have stayed in the industry, and so can view 
the Olympic bids as part of a wider context and not one-off, special events. 
Finally, the research itself was subject to a number of measures designed to 
enhance the credibility and dependability of the study. First, ethical approval 
was sought and gained at three UK universities, setting the ethical path from 
the outset. As Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest, in order to prove credibility 
and dependability, an audit trail should be kept. Thus, all emails between the 
researcher and interviewees have been safely stored on Coventry University’s 
secure servers, and each interview was recorded. 
As has been demonstrated, at all stages of the research process, the 
researcher and supervisory team have sought to ensure the quality of the 
research, such that it can be considered to be ethical, valid, reliable and 
trustworthy, 
 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has set out to clarify the methodological processes undertaken 
throughout this research. The chapter started by identifying the research 
philosophy that this study will take: a constructivist ontological approach, and 
a hard-interpretivist epistemology (Section 4.2). Both lend themselves towards 
a qualitative research design, which was set out and explained above. 
Next, the different qualitative approaches were considered. First, a content 
analysis of the candidate files from 2009-2016 was conducted, identifying the 
ways in which bid cities seek to leverage an Olympic bid (Section 4.4.1). This 
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analysis was then supplemented with a multiple-case study approach selected 
as the most appropriate for this study (Section 4.4.2). The primary data 
collection method was 31 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders 
involved in Cape Town and Toronto’s bids for the 2004 and 2008 Olympic bids 
respectively. These interviews identified the leveraging strategies put in place 
as part of the bid and evaluated the impact. This information was triangulated 
with documentary analysis and supported the content analysis. The interviews 
were transcribed and inductively coded using NVivo software. The chapter 
concludes with the ethical considerations (Section 4.5) and a self-assessment 
of the quality of the research undertaken (Section 4.6). 
The next three chapters introduce the empirical research, starting with the 
content analysis of the Candidate Files in Chapter 5. 
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5 Candidate File Analysis 
 Introduction and Purpose 
This first empirical chapter comprises an analysis of the Candidate Files 
submitted by applicants for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games 2016-
2024. This chapter starts by introducing the 16 bids included in the sample, 
before offering an overview of the stated leveraging opportunities sought. The 
candidate files were coded twice; first to identify the areas for leverage. This 
found that sport participation, community building, urban development and 
global profile were the four most prevalent across the candidate files. These 
were then coded a second time, to identify the areas of Chalip’s (2004) 
leveraging model: the leverageable resource, the opportunities provided by a 
bid, the strategic objective and the means by which these can be identified. 
Following this, the bidders are categorised into five sections: 1) Winter or 
Summer Olympic Games, 2) geographic location, 3) government type, 4) 
economic status, and 5) bid success. 
 The Candidates 
The bid process for the Olympic Games has already been detailed in Section 
3.3. As noted, not all cities that bid for the Olympic Games are required to 
submit a Candidate File. Only those cities that have successfully progressed 
from being applicant cities to the candidate stage will complete the candidate 
file. A summary of the cities that successfully reached this stage from 2016-
2024 can be seen in Table 5.1 on page 191. As can be seen, there is a wide-
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ranging spread of bid cities, with the majority of bidders from Europe (seven), 
and a number from North and South America, the Middle East and East Asia. 
There were no candidate cities from either Australasia or Africa.  
When considering the national statistics of the nations involved, there are 
obvious differences. The four largest countries in the world by GDP (USA, 
China, Japan and Germany) all submitted bids. The fifth largest country by 
GDP is the UK, which hosted the 2012 Games and so would not have bid 
again during this period. In addition, France (sixth largest GDP), Italy (eighth), 
and Brazil (ninth) all also submitted bids during this period. Conversely, bids 
were also submitted by Kazakh and Hungarian cities, nations ranked 56th and 
57th respectively in terms of GDP (IOC, n.d.; The World Bank, 2018a). 
Given the costs involved in bidding, it is not surprising that no ‘Least 
Developed’ country reached the candidate stage, or indeed submitted a bid. 
However, five of the 16 bid nations are classified as ‘Emerging’ nations, 
including Brazil and China whose bids were successful (International 
Monetary Fund, 2009). One final point to note, is that all candidate cities for 
the bids for the 2016 and 2018 Games were from nations termed politically 
‘free’ (Freedom House, 2018). It should be recognised that other cities did 
submit bids, but none made it to the Candidate City stage. For example, Qatar 
and Azerbaijan were both termed politically ‘not free’ at the time of their bids 
for the 2016 Summer Games. Neither Doha nor Baku were successful in 
making it to the Candidate City stage. However, from 2020, Istanbul, Almaty 
and Beijing all reached this stage, despite their respective nations being 
termed either ‘partially-free’ or ‘not free’.
  
1
9
1
 
Table 5.1: Summary of Summer and Winter Olympic Bidders 2009-201712 
City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million) 
GDP (US$ 
billion) 
GDP per 
Capita 
(US$) 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force) 
Economic 
Status 
Political System 
Corruption 
Index 
Civil 
Liberties 
Political 
Rights 
Political 
Status 
Chicago USA 2009 306.77 14,419 47,002 9.4% Advanced 
Constitutional Federal 
Republic 
7.5 1 1 F 
Madrid Spain 2009 46.36 1,499 32,334 18.1% Advanced 
Parliamentary 
Constitutional Monarchy 
6.1 1 1 F 
Tokyo Japan 2009 128.05 5,035 39,323 5.0% Advanced 
Parliamentary 
Constitutional Monarchy 
7.7 2 1 F 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
Brazil 2009 196.70 1,665 8,463 8.3% Emerging 
Federal Presidential 
Republic 
3.7 2 2 F 
Annecy France 2011 65.34 2,863 43,807 8.8% Advanced 
Semi-Presidential 
Republic 
7.3 1 1 F 
Munich Germany 2011 80.27 3,757 46,807 5.8% Advanced 
Federal Parliamentary 
Republic 
7.8 1 1 F 
PyeongChang South Korea 2011 49.78 1,202 24,155 3.7% Emerging Presidential Republic 5.1 2 1 F 
Tokyo Japan 2013 127.34 4,920 38,633 4.0% Advanced 
Parliamentary 
Constitutional Monarchy 
7.4 1 1 F 
Madrid Spain 2013 46.62 1,369 29,370 26.3% Advanced 
Parliamentary 
Constitutional Monarchy 
5.9 1 1 F 
Istanbul Turkey 2013 75.01 823 10,975 8.7% Emerging Parliamentary Republic 5.0 4 3 PF 
Almaty Kazakhstan 2015 17.54 184 8,069 5.0% Emerging Presidential Republic 2.1 5 6 NF 
Beijing China 2015 1,371.22 11,065 10,509 No data Emerging Communist State 3.5 6 7 NF 
Paris France 2017 67.12 2,583 38,477 9.4% Advanced 
Semi-Presidential 
Republic 
7.0 2 1 F 
Rome Italy 2017 60.55 1,035 31,953 11.2% Advanced Parliamentary Republic 5.0 1 1 F 
Budapest Hungary 2017 9.78 131 14,225 4.2% Emerging Parliamentary Republic 4.3 2 3 F 
Los Angeles USA 2017 325.72 19,391 59,532 4.4% Advanced 
Constitutional Federal 
Republic 
8.1 1 1 F 
                                            
12 The full dataset, complete with references and key is available in Table 10.5 on page 405 
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 Analysis of the Candidate Files 
First, it should be noted that the candidate files are not structured in a way that 
automatically fits Chalip’s (2004) model, with candidates focusing on legacy, 
rather than leverage (see Chapter 2 for discussion regarding the difference 
between these two concepts). However, this does not mean that leveraging 
opportunities, means or strategic outcomes are not discussed, but they are 
presented in a different way. 
In Chalip’s (2004) model, the leverageable resource is identified as the 
portfolio of events that a nation hosts. The key resource to be leveraged is the 
bid, and the bid process itself. An Olympic bid is a unique resource to which 
cities will only have access on a limited number of occasions. The UN 
identified 1,692 cities across the world with at least 300,000 inhabitants 
(United Nations, 2016). Of these, fewer than 7% (115 cities) have bid for either 
a Summer or Winter Olympic Games. Of these 115 cities, 55 have bid just 
once, highlighting the unique nature of an Olympic bid. Moreover, cities are 
unlikely to know whether they will be able to bid again in the future. While a 
city may plan for multiple bids, should the first bid prove successful, and the 
city hosts the Games, it will not be able to bid again in the immediate future. 
Several cities identify the positive outcomes that a bid submission will bring. 
For example, Madrid 2016 (2009) noted how Madrid’s previous Olympic bids 
were used as a catalyst to generate benefits for the city, while Rome 2024 
(2017:21) specifically stated that ‘the Rome 2024 bid is already serving as a 
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catalyst for change’. Therefore, the analysis of the bid documents has 
identified the bid itself to be the resource that can be leveraged. 
This research identified four key streams that are consistent across the 16 
Olympic bids included in the dataset: 
 Sport participation 
 Nation and community building 
 Image enhancement 
 Urban development  
These have been identified as the strategic objectives of the bids, that is, the 
area in which the bid is aiming to bring positive outcomes. These four strategic 
objectives will now be analysed in turn and, where possible, the opportunity 
and means behind them will be identified. Table 5.2 shows a summary of the 
findings. 
Table 5.2: Candidate File Leveraging Summary 
Year City 
Sport 
Participation 
Community 
Building 
Image 
Enhancement 
Urban 
Development 
2016 Chicago x x   
2016 Madrid x x x x 
2016 Rio x x  x 
2016 Tokyo x    
2018 Annecy    x 
2018 Munich x x  x 
2018 PyeongChang   x x 
2020 Istanbul x x  x 
2020 Madrid  x x x 
2020 Tokyo x x  x 
2022 Almaty  x   
2022 Beijing x  x x 
2024 Budapest x x x x 
2024 LA    x 
2024 Paris  x  x 
2024 Rome  x x x 
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5.3.1 Sport Participation 
The most prominent strategic objective identified by bid cities is that of sport 
participation, with particular focus on youth sport. Sport participation was 
identified by half of the bid cities; however, as with the hosting of the Games 
(see Chapter 2), this was often expected to be a natural by-product of a bid. 
For example, Budapest 2024 (2017) stated that increasing the promotion and 
support of already existing programmes will cultivate sport participation within 
the city, without offering any concrete plans or specific interventions as to how 
this will be implemented. 
However, three bid cities purposefully created plans as part of the bid to drive 
towards this strategic goal of sport participation. Chicago 2016 (2009:20) 
created World Sport Chicago, Tokyo 2016 (2009:28) established the Master 
Plan for the Advancement of Sports, and Istanbul 2020 (2013:21) developed 
the National Sports Plan. While the opportunity aspect of the event leveraging 
model is not stated within the bid book, it is clear that Chicago, Tokyo and 
Istanbul all viewed these bodies as the means by which the strategic outcome 
of sport participation can be achieved. 
A second means through which to enhance sport participation is through the 
building of sport facilities as part of the bid. Eleven of the 16 bid cities claimed 
that sport infrastructure will be constructed as part of the bid. While many of 
the facilities are intended as competition venues for the Games itself, this is 
not guaranteed. Instead, other cities have sought to use the bid to build 
sporting facilities for community use. Munich 2018 (2011:23) used the bid to 
‘accelerate the implementation of barrier-free measures at sport and 
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recreational facilities’, while Istanbul 2020 (2013:21) built 415 new community 
sports facilities, in addition to the 24 competition venues that are being built. 
This is not to say that bidders did not recognise an opportunity as part of the 
process. The idea of ‘Olympism’ was prominent, with half of the bid cities 
mentioning this or ‘Olympic Values’. This was particularly prevalent in those 
cities seeking to maximise youth sport participation. Four of the bidders 
specifically discussed Olympism as an opportunity to engage schoolchildren 
in both sport participation and education. For example, Munich 2018 (2011:23) 
mentioned how the bid has ‘provided the impetus for sports and club 
development and created broad educational initiatives to ensure that 
schoolchildren are exposed to Olympism’. Similarly, Madrid 2016’s (2009) 
‘Generation 16 initiative’ is designed to ‘increase participation in sport and to 
communicate Olympism throughout Madrid schools and colleges’. 
As can be seen, the strategic objective of utilising a bid to encourage sport 
participation is prevalent in many of the bid documents. Further, while not 
mentioned by all bidders, several identify Olympism and Olympic Values as 
being the opportunity provided by the bid to encourage participation; however, 
there is a lack of concrete information regarding how this opportunity will 
translate into achieving the strategic objective. The means that have been 
identified for achieving the strategic objective are the building of sport facilities 
and the creation of public bodies to encourage youth participation. This lack of 
specific plans is unsurprising given that many hosts have failed to leverage an 
increase in sport participation (see Section 3.4.3 for further information). 
However, as seen, while many bid cities have put in place plans to leverage a 
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bid for sport participation, there has been little empirical research to investigate 
whether these plans have any impact. This raises a potential direction for 
future research as sport participation is often a key strategic outcome for 
Olympic bidders, yet there is currently no evidence as to whether this is a 
feasible objective. 
5.3.1.1 Summary of Sport Participation Leveraging Strategies 
 Strategic objective: Sport participation. 
 Opportunity: Olympism. 
 Means: Creation of leveraging vehicle/public body; building of sport 
facilities; youth engagement. 
5.3.2 Community Building 
The second strategic objective that this research has found is that of 
community building. This links to Chalip’s (2006) identification of liminality and 
communitas. Chalip (2006) recognises how event organisers should seek to 
intensify the feeling of celebration that occurs during the hosting of an event. 
While this research is focusing on the bid rather than the hosting, 11 of the 16 
bid cities identify community building as a potential impact from a bid. 
However, as with sport participation, there appears to be a belief that the act 
of submitting an Olympic bid alone will enhance community cohesion. As 
Section 3.4.3 demonstrates, the literature suggests that this is not the case, 
and could actually have the opposite effect. Instead, specific plans need to be 
put in place to foster the feeling of community and togetherness. For example, 
Paris 2024 (2017:39) stated that the bid will develop ‘pride and national unity 
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around sport and Olympism’, but details are scant as to how this objective will 
be achieved and how the pride and unity will benefit wider society. 
Some bidders did provide details regarding the means by which community 
and nation building will be achieved. One way is through the building of sport 
facilities and encouraging sport participation, with the intention of using this as 
a tool to promote community cohesion post-Games. For example, Madrid 
2016 (2009) mentioned how the building of new aquatic and tennis centres 
would enable community use. Rome 2024 (2017) went further than this, 
detailing a partnership with ActionAid with the intention of using sport as a tool 
to integrate youths with different cultural backgrounds into society. There has 
similarly been a keen focus on the integration of disabled people, with Munich 
2018, Madrid 2020 and Tokyo 2020 all stating this. For example, Munich 2018 
(2011:23) stated that ‘the bid has also accelerated the implementation of 
barrier-free measures at sport and recreational-facilities and helped raise 
awareness of the need for greater social inclusion for all members of society, 
including persons with a disability’. 
While some bidders have discussed the means through which the strategic 
goal will be achieved, there is little discussion regarding the opportunity that 
will allow this to happen. Chicago 2016 (2009:20) stated that ‘the prospect of 
hosting the Games has energized the city and the nation’, while Almaty 2022 
(2015:13) claimed that purely being part of the bidding process would bring 
together ‘people of different ages, from different disciplines, religions and 
countries’. This links closely to the idea of Olympism, as discussed in the 
previous section on sport participation. It would appear the cities intended to 
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use the excitement generated by an Olympic bid as an opportunity to foster 
greater social cohesion. This strategic goal is then achieved through the 
utilisation of community facilities and using the power of sport to integrate two 
groups of people into wider society, particularly the disabled and those of 
different cultures and backgrounds. 
On a similar note to Olympism, five of the bid cities recognised that an Olympic 
bid would not just encourage sport participation, it would also enhance the 
visibility of the Olympic and Paralympic Games within the city. Specifically, 
Chicago 2016, Istanbul 2020 and Budapest 2024 all believed that the bid 
would raise the profile of the Paralympic Games, with the formation of World 
Sport Chicago seeking to ‘promote Olympic values and education and elevate 
the profile of Olympic and Paralympic sport’ (Chicago 2016, 2009:20). The bid 
is recognised as an opportunity for cities to ensure that the disabled are 
included as part of community building. 
This section has recognised that bid cities have the strategic objective to 
enhance community building. This is similar to Chalip’s (2006) detailing of the 
harnessing of liminality and communitas as a leveraging opportunity; however, 
Chalip discusses this as being part of a specific leveraging plan, but there is 
little information provided in the bid documents. There is little information 
provided as to the means or opportunity that will allow cities to create this 
specific strategic objective. As Section 2.3.3.2 discusses, there is no 
guarantee that an Olympic bid will lead to a feeling of community. Indeed, as 
Oliver (2011a) details, Toronto’s failure to successfully host the 2008 Olympic 
Games led to exactly the opposite. Similarly, as an Olympic bid gives a 
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platform to those who oppose it (Coates and Wicker, 2015), an anti-Olympic 
feeling may be generated (McGillivray and Jones, 2013). For example, 
Chicago 2016 believed that an Olympic bid would lead to positive feelings 
within the city, yet as Rundio and Heere (2016) demonstrate, this did not 
transpire, with many social groups within the city opposing the bid. Rundio and 
Heere cited in particular the formation of the group ‘No Games Chicago’. 
While the bid cities do not detail the ways in which communitas will be fostered 
during the bid, they do strongly link it to sport participation through the 
construction of facilities. The two strategic objectives of community building 
and sport participation hinge on the opportunity of Olympism, with the building 
of sport facilities being the means by which both can be achieved. The 
construction of sport facilities may help bid cities overcome an issue with 
communitas raised in the literature review, as communitas will often only last 
as long as the event itself. The long-term use of the facilities may foster 
communitas to last longer than the bid itself. 
5.3.2.1 Summary of Community Building Leveraging Strategies 
 Strategic objective: Community building 
 Opportunity: Olympism; sport visibility 
 Means: sport facility construction; sport participation 
5.3.3 Urban Development 
The third strategic objective that bid cities hoped to achieve is that of urban 
development. Of the 16 bidders, 13 discussed the ways in which a bid can 
lead to urban development such as sport facilities, urban planning, transport, 
and port and river infrastructure. The two most prevalent forms of urban 
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development are sport venues and transport infrastructure. While the building 
of sport venues can be viewed as a strategic objective in its own right, new 
venues can also be tools to facilitate sport participation and community 
building. The second most popular form of urban development, transport 
infrastructure augmentation, was stated by half of bid cities as part of their bid. 
There are three bids that have urban development as a key part of their plans. 
PyeongChang 2018, Beijing 2022 and Istanbul 2020. PyeongChang 2018 and 
Beijing 2022 both detailed the building of Winter sport facilities as part of their 
bid. PyeongChang 2018 (2011:21) particularly discussed the building of 
‘improved winter sport facilities, such as venues for cross-country skiing, 
biathlon and ski-jumping’. Similarly, Beijing 2022 (2015:19) planned to build a 
biathlon and ski-jumping centre. As mentioned in the section on sport 
participation, Istanbul 2020 (2013:21) detailed the building of over 415 
community venues and 24 elite sport facilities. These three bids all provided 
further details as to the means through which the strategic objective of urban 
development would be obtained. Each noted how being part of an Olympic bid 
has attracted additional government investment into the area. Indeed, Istanbul 
2020 specifically disclosed that the Turkish government invested US$1.77 
billion into the region. While it is not explicitly stated in any of the bid 
documents, the implication from all three bidders is that the regions would not 
have attracted these levels of government interest were they not bidding for 
the Olympic Games. 
While the strategic objective of urban development is clear, and the means by 
which it can be achieved is identified as increased levels of government 
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investment, the candidate files are less clear regarding the opportunity that 
contributes to this. As discussed in the previous section, while the idea of 
Olympism may have contributed towards the enhancement of community 
building and sport participation, this does not necessarily account for why 
governments chose to invest in other infrastructural development at this stage. 
For example, PyeongChang 2018 (2011) noted that the bid ‘will drive 
government investment into the area’ but did not detail the reasons. This is 
perhaps due to the nature of the candidate files as being a crucial part of a 
city’s bid, and so it is unlikely that a candidate file will contain information that 
does not show the city in a positive light. While Burgo and Cromartie (2018) 
argue that governments are prepared to invest in a bid to support future 
growth, this does not necessarily indicate why infrastructural development 
would occur regardless of the outcome of the bid. 
As this section has shown, urban development is a clear strategic objective for 
cities bidding for the Olympic Games. Thirteen of the 16 bid documents 
analysed discussed this objective. While the opportunity is not explicitly stated, 
the means are clear – governments are prepared to invest in an area that is 
bidding for an Olympic Games. This is an opportunity that has been mentioned 
in the literature. Lauermann (2015) in particular, notes the ways in which an 
Olympic bid can be used to catalyse urban development, with New York being 
a city that has recently successfully managed this (Moss, 2011). However, 
while it is clear that urban development is a realistic goal for an Olympic bid 
(see Section 3.4.4 for more detail), none of the bid documents provide any real 
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information regarding the reasons why a government is prepared to invest in 
a city that is bidding for the Olympic Games. 
5.3.3.1 Summary of Urban Development Leveraging Strategies: 
 Strategic objective: Urban development. 
 Opportunity: Political support 
 Means: Government investment;  
5.3.4 Global Profile 
The final strategic objective that bid cities seek to achieve is the raising of their 
global profile and image enhancement. This was stated as an outcome by six 
of the 16 bid cities. Several bids noted how being part of a bid would 
automatically increase their global profile. Madrid 2016 (2009:19) believed that 
the ‘bidding process provides excellent opportunities for us to promote Madrid 
on the world stage, increasing global awareness of our city, our business and 
tourism offers’. While it might be thought that this could be viewed as a legacy 
rather than a strategic objective, the opportunity is recognised through the 
global focus on the bid process. 
There is limited information provided by bidders as to the means that will 
contribute to this strategic objective. The most prominent is through an already 
mentioned strategic objective; the development of infrastructure. For example, 
PyeongChang 2018 (2011) discuss how the added investment into sport 
facilities in the region will develop PyeongChang as a venue for winter sport, 
and so raise its global profile. The idea that different strategic objectives are 
linked is discussed further in the next section.  
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This opportunity does have limitations. The IOC has strict regulations as to 
when and how a bid city can promote both the bid and city itself. For example, 
bid cities for the 2024 Games were not allowed to create a website or social 
media accounts until 15th September 2015, the deadline for NOCs to submit 
their candidate city (IOC, 2015:37). Similarly, the candidate process for 2024 
states that while it is possible for bidders to promote their bid domestically at 
any point, they were not allowed to promote on an international scale until 
February 2017, the date at which the final part of the candidate file was 
submitted (IOC, 2015:25). These limitations were recognised by Rome 2024 
(2017), who noted that it was not possible to work on profile raising until 
February 2017. Ironically, Rome’s bid did not reach this stage, as the city 
withdrew from the bid process in October 2016 (BBC News, 2016). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, many of the stated legacies from hosting Olympic 
bids do not come to fruition. One of the few legacies that the literature suggests 
can be achieved is an increase in global profile (Grix et al., 2015), with more 
literature covered in Section 3.4.5. However, there has yet been little 
investigation into the extent to which an Olympic bid can lead to an increased 
global profile beyond the empirical work of the likes of Rose and Spiegel 
(2011) and Demir et al. (2015), who measured increases in post-bid trade. 
However, both of these papers studied the end result; there has been little 
research discussing the strategies that may be employed as part of a bid to 
achieve this increase in global profile. 
5.3.4.1 Global Profile Leveraging Strategy Summary: 
 Strategic objective: Global profile. 
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 Opportunity: International exposure 
 Means: Building of facilities 
5.3.5 Linking Strategic Objectives 
A potential weakness of Chalip’s (2004) model, is that it treats each of the 
strategic objectives as being distinct from each other. However, the strategic 
objectives that have been identified in this data analysis are not separate. 
Indeed, they are often interlinked; for example, while raising a city’s profile is 
seen as a strategic goal in its own right, there are often links to the other 
strategic goals discussed. For example, PyeongChang 2018 (2011:21) 
discusses how its investment in sport facilities is the means by which it will 
achieve the strategic goal of becoming the ‘premier winter sports hub of Asia’. 
This investment from PyeongChang into sport facilities for a change in image 
for a city, is typical of the strategies that these cities are following. For example, 
Annecy 2018 (2011:19) notes how ‘the bid has made it possible to position 
Annecy as a global convention and major events city’. As can be seen, these 
cities are using the investment in the bid to build the facilities that enable a 
change in image. Therefore, the opportunity is the potential political support 
that can be achieved through a bid, and the means is the additional investment 
available to cities to achieve the strategic goal of an image change. 
This highlights how the strategic objectives, means and opportunities are not 
sought in isolation. Rather, for a bid city to successfully leverage an Olympic 
bid, it needs to recognise that there are limited means and opportunities 
available. However, these can be used for various strategic objectives. For 
example, the idea of Olympism within a city can be used to develop both 
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community development (e.g. Paris 2024 (2017:39) ‘developing pride and 
national unity around sport and Olympism’), and sport participation (e.g. 
Madrid 2016’s (2009:19) ‘Generation 16’ plan, which aimed to increase 
‘participation in sport and to communicate Olympism throughout Madrid 
schools and colleges’). 
As Figure 5.1 on page 206 illustrates, this can be taken further, with one 
strategic goal helping to achieve another. For example, the building of sport 
facilities can be viewed as a strategic goal in its own right. The final benefit of 
the bid identified by Budapest 2024 (2017:20), is that it will allow for a ‘renewal 
of sport facilities across Hungary’. However, for other bidders, the construction 
of sport facilities might actually be a way to leverage further strategic goals. 
For example, the building of sport facilities can contribute to an increase in 
sport participation (e.g. Madrid 2016 (2009:19): ‘development of several large-
scale projects such as our new Tennis and Aquatics Centres, both of which 
provide purpose-built venues for international events as well as facilities for 
talent development, club and community use’), community building (e.g. Rome 
2024 (2017:21): ‘Promoting active participation/involvement of local 
communities in the planning and redevelopment of local areas surrounding 
Games venues), and image development (e.g. PyeongChang 2018 (2011:21): 
‘the bid efforts have been the driving force behind attracting governmental 
investment to the region for the development of PyeongChang as the premier 
winter sports hub of Asia’). 
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5.3.6 Section Summary 
This section has reviewed the submissions by 16 bid cities for the Summer 
and Winter Olympic Games, 2016-2024, regarding the ways in which they will 
attempt to leverage their Olympic bid for positive benefits. This content 
analysis found that the leverageable resource available to bid cities is the bid 
process itself, and this provides a number of opportunities for cities to achieve 
their strategic goals. Furthermore, it is clear that the opportunity, means and 
strategic objectives do not operate in isolation; rather, they can be combined 
to enhance the successful outcomes. 
Figure 5.1 shows the strategic objectives available to bid cities, together with 
the opportunities and means. 
 
Figure 5.1: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage: Candidate Files(adapted from 
Chalip, 2004) 
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 Categorising the Bids 
The previous section (Section 5.3) provides a holistic overview of the ways in 
which bid cities have sought to leverage Olympic bids. However, this is a 
generalised view, and does not consider the nuances between the different 
bidders. First, while the bid cities are all bidding for an Olympic Games, two of 
the bid cycles are for Winter Olympic Games while three are for Summer 
Games. These are likely to provide different leveraging opportunities, with 
cities targeting different strategic outcomes. Similarly, as noted in Section 5.2 
there is a range of bid cities involved, with different geographic locations, 
government types, and economic statuses. Each of these differences is likely 
to add further nuances towards the targeted outcomes. Table 5.3 shows how 
the 16 bid cities can be divided into five key categories. 
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Table 5.3: Categorising the Bidders13 
City Nation 
Year 
bid for 
Geographic 
state 
Government 
type 
Economic 
state 
Success of 
the bid 
Chicago USA S 2016 Americas 
Constitutional 
federal 
republic 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Madrid Spain S 2016 Europe 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Rio Brazil S 2016 Americas 
Federal 
presidential 
republic 
Emerging Successful 
Tokyo Japan S 2016 Asia 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Annecy France W 2018 Europe 
Semi-
presidential 
republic 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Munich Germany W 2018 Europe 
Federal 
parliamentary 
republic 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Pyeong-
Chang 
South 
Korea 
W 2018 Asia 
Presidential 
republic 
Emerging Successful 
Istanbul Turkey S 2020 Europe 
Parliamentary 
republic 
Emerging Unsuccessful 
Madrid Spain S 2020 Europe 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Tokyo Japan S 2020 Asia 
Parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy 
Advanced Successful 
Almaty Kazakhstan W 2022 Asia 
Presidential 
republic 
Emerging Unsuccessful 
Beijing China W 2022 Asia 
Communist 
state 
Emerging Successful 
Budapest Hungary S 2024 Europe 
Parliamentary 
republic 
Emerging Withdrawn 
Los 
Angeles 
USA S 2024 Americas 
Constitutional 
federal 
republic 
Advanced Unsuccessful 
Paris France S 2024 Europe 
Semi-
presidential 
republic 
Advanced  Successful 
Rome Italy S 2024 Europe 
Parliamentary 
republic 
Advanced Withdrawn 
                                            
13 The full dataset, complete with references is available in Table 10.5 on page 405 
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The five categories identified are now taken in turn. First, there is consideration 
paid as to the nature of the Games bid for i.e. Winter or Summer Games 
(Section 5.4.1). Second, the geographic location is viewed (Section 5.4.2). 
Third, the economic and political situations of the regions (Sections 5.4.3 and 
5.4.4) are considered. Finally, the bidders are divided into whether their bid 
was ultimately successful or not (Section 5.4.5). 
5.4.1 Winter or Summer Games 
When the cities are divided into bids for Summer and Winter Games, a clear 
distinction is shown. All five of the Winter Olympic bidders specified the 
economic benefits of their bid, whereas only four of the 11 Summer bidders 
did. Conversely, 10 of the 11 Summer Games bidders sought to gain social 
benefits, but only two of the Winter Games have this as a focus. 
There is a significant focus for Winter Games bidders to leverage their bid for 
business development. PyeongChang 2018 (2011) and Beijing 2022 (2015) 
both believed that the bid would draw investment from private investors. While 
this is not a strategic goal in itself, this investment can be used to fund other 
strategic goals. Annecy 2018 recognised this opportunity and, significantly, 
provided information as to how this would be achieved, through the 
development of the ‘Outdoor Sport Valley’ (Annecy 2018, 2011:21). This is an 
organisation that seeks to promote the region’s capacity for outdoor sport and 
provide an opportunity for organisations within the industry to network and 
work together (Outdoor Sports Valley, n.d.). 
Hudson and Cross (2011) identify that Winter Sport tourism is currently in a 
period of stagnation. This has especially occurred in the traditional winter sport 
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resorts such as Western Europe and the USA, yet there has been a rise in 
winter sport participation in Russia and China (Vanat, 2017). This is likely to 
account for the rise in bidders from Asia for Winter Games. The 2014, 2018 
and 2022 Games are being hosted in Russia, South Korea and China 
respectively, and there has been a further bid from Kazakhstan (2022). While 
the success of using the Winter Olympic Games for tourism benefits has often 
had mixed results (Gaudette et al., 2017), it is evident that a Winter Olympic 
bid is viewed as a way to increase tourism and economic benefits in a way 
that a Summer Olympic bid is not. 
While bidders for Winter Games have a greater focus on economic outcomes, 
bidders for Summer Games have instead sought to leverage social benefits, 
with Los Angeles 2024 being the only bidder not to seek social benefits (Los 
Angeles 2024, 2017). As has already been discussed in Section 5.3.2, many 
bidders sought to leverage community cohesion from the bid. In addition to 
this, four of the bidders sought to leverage health benefits, and three of the 
bidders suggested that increases in sport participation would lead to a 
healthier population. Tokyo 2016 (2009:28) had already put in place the 
Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports, a vehicle to ‘promote the healthy 
development of youth and encourage lifelong healthy living of citizens.’ 
This focus from bidders for Summer Games is perhaps due to the need to 
justify the cost of bidding for a Summer Olympics. As Zehndorfer and 
Mackintosh (2017) note, a key part of a bid for a Summer Olympic Games is 
the securing of public support. It has been identified that the social impacts 
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are likely to play a large role in whether an Olympic bid will gain public support 
(Kim et al., 2015; Sant and Mason, 2015). 
5.4.2 Geographic Location 
The 16 bidders can be divided into three clear geographic locations: Europe 
(France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Turkey), Americas (USA and 
Brazil), and Asia (China, Japan and Kazakhstan). Across all regions, there 
was a clear focus on leveraging the bid for infrastructural development. When 
this is broken down further, it can be seen that different geographic areas 
targeted different types of infrastructural development. European cities 
focused on regenerating the city, with Tokyo being the only non-European city 
to target regeneration. Conversely, cities from Asia and the Americas have 
focused far more on using the bid to develop transport infrastructure. For 
example, Los Angeles 2024 noted how the bid would be used to extend the 
Purple Line to the UCLA campus, in addition to improved transport links from 
LAX airport to the city (Los Angeles 2024, 2017). Perhaps learning the lessons 
from previous Games hosted in North America, most notably Montreal 1976 
and Los Angeles 1984, neither Chicago 2016 or Los Angeles 2024 had plans 
to build sport venues as part of the bid. 
There is a similar distinction with the targeting of social impacts from region to 
region. Of the 13 cities within Europe and the Americas, 11 targeted social 
impacts, with the most prominent being community cohesion; for example, 
Budapest 2024 (2017:20) noted that the bid will ‘unite, integrate and mobilise 
society’. In addition, European cities typically sought to use Olympism to 
provide education benefits for schoolchildren. For example, Madrid 2016 
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(2009:17) had the intention to ‘increase participation in sport and to 
communicate Olympism throughout Madrid schools and colleges… 
commenced in 2007 with the creation of our Generation 16 initiative… an 
educational programme to promote sport and Olympic values that Madrid 16 
shares amongst the youth and all ages using educational campaigns in 
schools, colleges and universities’. This contrasts with bidders from other 
regions, who had far less interest in leveraging a bid for education. Tokyo 
(2016 and 2020) and Chicago (2016) are the only two non-European cities to 
mention this. 
This lack of social impact is typical of the Asian bids. Only the two Tokyo bids 
and the bid from Almaty discuss any sort of social impact, and these are not 
the main focus of the leveraging strategies; rather, bidders from Asia have 
focused on leveraging sport participation. As has already been discussed, 
Tokyo 2016 launched the ‘Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports’, while 
Beijing 2022 (2015) instigated the ‘300 Million People Winter Sports Plan’, with 
the intention of encouraging its citizens to participate in winter sport. This is in 
stark contrast to the cities in Europe, as Madrid 2016, Munich 2018 and 
Budapest 2024 are the only three European bidders with plans to enhance 
sport participation. 
5.4.3 Government Type 
Using information from the CIA World Factbook (2018), each bidding nation 
has been categorised according its government type, with parliamentary 
constitutional monarchies, republics and a single communist state all being 
included. Given that republics encompass a broad range of nations, from 
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Kazakhstan to the USA, it is unsurprising that there was little consistency 
between their leveraging plans. While nine of the 11 republics targeted 
infrastructural development, seven sought to develop their sporting 
infrastructure and five aimed for transport development. 
There is more consistency from the bids from monarchies, although there is a 
large caveat in the fact that the four bids came from just two nations who each 
bid twice: Spain and Japan. However, there are synergies between these four 
bids. Both Madrid and Tokyo sought to leverage their bids to bring about social 
change and enhance the sporting prowess of the cities. All four of these 
discussed the educational benefits that would come from the bid process, with 
Olympism often being the opportunity on which this hinged. For example, 
Tokyo 2016 (2009) discussed the ‘Olympic Reader’ series of textbooks that 
were developed to allow more than one million students to learn about the 
values of the Olympic Games. 
Both the parliamentary constitutional monarchies and the republics had a 
focus on leveraging their bids to enhance sport participation; however, they 
differ in that republics had a greater focus on the development of professional 
sport within the country. The means by which this was to be achieved involved 
another strategic objective, the building of new sport facilities. While the use 
of these new facilities to lever greater sport participation was part of the plan, 
there were also plans to use the new stadia to improve the levels of 
professional sport. For example, Madrid 2016 (2009) and Madrid 2020 (2013) 
both discussed how the newly-built tennis, aquatic, and rowing training centres 
would benefit the development of professional athletes. Of a similar nature, 
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Tokyo 2016 (2009:6) discussed the $200 million budget for the ‘Fund for 
Promotion and Exchange in Sport and Culture’ to develop future athletes and 
coaches. 
While there are three different types of government included in the analysis, it 
should be noted that 15 of the 16 bidders are democratic (even though Japan 
and Spain have monarchies, in both, the duties of the monarch are largely 
ceremonial), and so the government needs to consider the support of its 
population. China is the only nation included in the analysis where the 
government is not beholden to its citizens. This makes real analysis of whether 
different government types lead to different bid legacies, difficult.  
5.4.4 Economic Status 
There was greater distinction between the ways that bids were leveraged 
when considering the different economic statuses. The 16 bidders were 
categorised according to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database 
(International Monetary Fund, 2009), with there being six bids from emerging 
economies and 10 bids from advanced nations. While both groupings sought 
to develop infrastructure, sport participation and community cohesion, in the 
additional areas there was a clear distinction in their priorities. Advanced 
economies tended to focus on intangible benefits, such as education and the 
environment. Comparatively, emerging economies had little interest in 
education or the environment, and instead focused on the economic benefits. 
Emerging economies had a clear focus to ensure that a bid brought economic 
gains. Four of the six emerging economies targeted this, yet just five of the 10 
advanced economies sought economic benefits. This economic benefit is 
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partly due to the types of increased international business discussed by Rose 
and Spiegel (2011), achieved through the raising of the profile of the 
city/nation. Beijing 2022 (2015:19) developed the ‘Beijing-Zhangjiakou Sport, 
Culture and Tourism Belt’ as a way to enhance the region’s economic 
development. Similarly, Budapest 2024 (2017) sought to use the bid as a way 
for the city to access investment from central Europe. As Baade and Matheson 
(2017) recognise, economic development is likely to be a key aim for emerging 
nations when deciding to bid for a mega-event, and so it should not be 
surprising that it is also a goal for a bid; however, Baade and Matheson (2017) 
also go on to identify that these economic gains rarely actually come to pass. 
The need for emerging nations to leverage the bid for tangible benefits is 
further demonstrated by the attention paid to developing infrastructure within 
the city. Almaty of Kazakhstan was the only bidder from an emerging economy 
that did not specify infrastructural development as part of the bid. Each of the 
other five emerging nations indicated that sport facilities would be constructed. 
Of particular note is Istanbul 2020 (2013:23), which discussed the building of 
‘415 new community sports facilities and 24 stadia, of which 215 projects are 
already in progress’. There was a similar aim from emerging economies to 
develop transport infrastructure; for example, Rio 2016 (2009:29) stated that 
‘an enhanced city-wide high-performance transport system’ was being built as 
part of the bid. 
When considering the number of nations in each category, there was far less 
interest from advanced economies in these tangible benefits. Rather, 
advanced economies sought intangible outcomes, such as social benefits. As 
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already discussed in Section 5.3.2, bidders use the bid to bring together their 
communities; this is evident in both developing and advanced economies. For 
example, Madrid 2020 (2013:17) planned the ‘Integrados’ programme, 
designed to ‘reach out to the city’s children with disability or at risk of social 
exclusion’. 
Further, eight of the 10 advanced economies noted that the bid will be 
leveraged to bring about educational benefits. Tokyo 2016 (2009:28) planned 
to improve education through the development of ‘Olympic Reader’ textbooks, 
which were to be distributed to one million students. These educational plans 
often included elements of increasing environmental awareness; for example, 
Annecy 2018 developed the Eco-resort research programme. This programme 
brings together universities, athletes, government agencies and sport 
organisations, with a focus on researching the impacts that sport activities may 
have on the surrounding natural environment (Annecy 2018, 2011:19). In 
comparison, no bidder from emerging states discussed the educational 
benefits of the bid, and just three mentioned the environmental gains. 
5.4.5 Success of the Bid 
The final, and easiest way to distinguish between the 16 bids is whether they 
were ultimately successful or not. This is a particularly important way to 
categorise the bids. The answers that have been analysed are all part of the 
Candidate Files, which are submitted as part of the bids and are considered 
as part of the ultimate decision as to which bid will be successful. Given this, 
it is perhaps surprising that unsuccessful bids provided more information 
regarding their leveraging plans than the successful ones. Both groups 
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targeted leveraging infrastructural and sporting benefits, but successful bids 
had few other leveraging plans beyond these. Comparatively, unsuccessful 
bids had more focus on the social and environmental aspects of the bid. 
Ten of the 11 unsuccessful bidders sought to leverage the bid for social 
benefits, with the already discussed educational benefits being prominent. As 
discussed in the previous section, these educational benefits are often closely 
linked to environmental benefits. In addition to Annecy 2018’s Eco-Resort, 
Munich 2018 (2011:23) developed a ‘new German Centre for Sustainability’. 
However, neither educational nor environmental gains are prominent for 
successful bidders. Tokyo 2020 (2013) is the only successful bidder to 
mention the educational benefits of a bid, with their ‘Olympic Reader’ initiative, 
which encourages schoolchildren to learn about the value of Olympism, but 
successful bidders are all consistent in their message regarding sport. All five 
note the building of sport facilities as part of the bid, compared to just over half 
of the unsuccessful bidders. For example, Paris 2024 (2017:39) noted the 
construction of a ‘new multi-purpose arena’, while Beijing 2022 (2015) 
discussed the construction of three competition venues regardless of the 
outcome of the bid.  
This is symptomatic of the general theme of the successful bids. They tended 
to focus the bid on leveraging tangible outcomes; with education, Olympic 
values, society and the environment being largely ignored by successful 
bidders. While this research is not aiming to determine factors that lead to 
successful bids, the difference between the focus of successful and 
unsuccessful bids is stark. 
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 Conclusions 
This chapter analysed the results of a content analysis of the Candidate Files 
submitted as part of the bid process. 16 bid cities have answered the question 
‘What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your city/region, 
irrespective of the outcome of the bid?’ (IOC, 2009:66). The answers to this 
question that have been analysed, coded, and held up against Chalip’s (2004) 
‘schematic representation of event leverage’. 
Chalip’s model classifies four stages for successful leverage; identification of 
a leverageable resource, which provides an opportunity to achieve the 
strategic objective. Finally, the means are the strategies utilised to ultimately 
achieve the strategic objective. While Chalip’s model was first applied to a 
country’s portfolio of events, this research has adapted the model to show how 
an Olympic bid can be used to leverage positive outcomes. 
This chapter started by considering the four strategic objectives identified by 
the coding process: 
1. Sport participation 
2. Community building 
3. Urban development 
4. Global profile 
Sport participation was the strategic objective that was most prominent within 
the candidate files, although there was little information included in the bid 
documentation as to how this increased level of sport participation would be 
achieved. This raises the question as to how realistic this is as a strategic goal. 
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If, as discussed in the literature review, the hosting of an Olympic Games does 
not naturally result in enhanced sport participation (Reis et al. 2017), is it likely 
it can be achieved through a bid? Four bidders did specify the creation of 
specific plans to encourage sport participation. This chapter is offering an 
analysis of the ways in which a bid city will seek to leverage a bid; as such, 
there has been no attempt to view whether these channels were successful. 
Given the prevalence for bidders to state that enhanced sport participation will 
occur, this is an area for research to be conducted in the future. 
This research found a second strategic objective, that of community building 
through the bid. As with the objective of sport participation, there appears to 
be a general feeling from bid cities that an Olympic bid will automatically unite 
the populace; however, this is clearly not the case. Both Oliver (2011a) and 
Coates and Wicker (2015) detail negative feelings that are created by an 
Olympic bid. Similarly, the number of referenda that have resulted in cities 
ultimately not bidding shows that the pure act of bidding will not necessarily 
engender public support (Lauermann, 2016). Indeed, despite Budapest 2024 
(2017:20) claiming that the bid would ‘unite, integrate and mobilise society’, 
Budapest’s candidacy was withdrawn before the vote following a petition 
against hosting that gained more than 260,000 signatures (BBC Sport, 2017a). 
The third strategic objective discovered in this research is that of urban 
development, and in particular sport and transport infrastructure. This finding 
corresponds with the literature, suggesting that urban development is one fo 
the primary benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games (Alberts, 2009; 
Masterman, 2008; Bilsel and Zelef, 2011; Moss, 2011; Oliver, 2017). Further, 
Chapter 5 | Candidate File Analysis 
220 
three of the bid cities detailed that this development is funded by the 
government, supporting Lauermann’s (2015) contention that an Olympic bid 
can draw government investment to a region. 
Finally, a strategic objective of raising the global profile of a region was 
identified. Of the four objectives that were identified, this was the least 
prevalent in the Candidate Files. This might be due to a lack of evidence within 
the literature that bidding for Olympic Games raises the profile of a city, or 
indeed a nation. The strategies that could be employed to achieve this 
objective are worthy of further research. 
This chapter offered a more nuanced view of Olympic bids than has previously 
been covered in the literature. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, aside from one or 
two quantitative studies, most of the research into failed Olympic bids has used 
the case study approach. This has resulted in several discrete case studies 
that do not take into account the political and economic differences between 
the bidders. Section 5.4 categorised the bids into five distinct areas, allowing 
a comparison between nations in different situations. For example, this 
research found that bidders in emerging economies focused their leveraging 
plans around tangible infrastructure, perhaps because these cities do not 
already have the levels of infrastructure found in more developed nations. This 
adds a new dimension to the literature surrounding sport mega-event bids. 
The analysis of the Candidate Files also has potential practical implications. It 
was not until 2009 that bid cities needed to provide an answer to the question 
investigated in the chapter; therefore, the results from this chapter provide 
future bid teams with information as to how previous bid cities have sought to 
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exploit the opportunities provided by their Olympic bid. The categorising of the 
bidders in Section 5.4 could also assist the IOC. For example, if the IOC 
wishes to encourage more emerging nations to bid for the Olympic Games, 
then, using this research, it could provide more assistance for these cities to 
develop their infrastructure as part of the bid. The current IOC plans (Agenda 
2020 and The New Norm) do not appear to offer any sort of differentiation 
between bid cities. This research may assist the IOC in targeting specific types 
of cities, or cities from specific nations, to bid for the Olympic Games. 
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6 Cape Town 2004 
 Introduction and Purpose 
This chapter comprises a case study on Cape Town’s bid to host the 2004 
Olympic Games, an event ultimately hosted by Athens. This chapter is 
structured using Chalip’s (2004) model. The three opportunities that the Cape 
Town bid team identified for leveraging are introduced (Section 6.2.1) and, 
following this, the strategic objectives of Cape Town’s leveraging plans are 
each discussed in turn (Section 6.2.2). The first strategic objective, that of 
community reintegration (Section 6.2.2.1), is investigated. The plans for 
community integration used similar means to the plans for sport development, 
so the latter will be discussed second (Section 6.2.2.2). Third and finally, there 
was an objective to use the bid for international recognition as Cape Town 
wished to change its image in the eyes of the world (Section 6.2.2.3). In each 
of these sections, the strategic objective will be introduced, together with the 
means employed to achieve it. Each section concludes with an evaluation of 
the success of the leveraging strategy.  
 Leveraging the Olympic Bid 
This section discusses the leveraging strategies put in place as part of Cape 
Town’s bid for the 2004 Olympic Games, and the impact on the City of Cape 
Town and South Africa as a whole. From the outset, the bid team (hereafter 
called CT-Bid) recognised that Cape Town was an outsider in the bid 
competition and was unlikely to be successful. Therefore, plans to leverage 
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the bid were put in place from the outset. Indeed, the formal bid charter set out 
the expectation that the bid would have a positive impact, stating that: 
the opportunity of the Bid and hosting the Games (would) 
promote the political, social and economic development of the 
people of the region and promote the principles of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
(Cape Town 2004, 1997a:3-4). 
Further, a preliminary study into the economic impacts of hosting, highlighted 
the need to ensure that the bid brought benefits to the city through the building 
of facilities and general investment into the bid process (KPMG/NN Gobodo 
and Associates, 1995). 
The data collection found that the Olympic bid provided three clear 
opportunities for the bid to provide benefits for the city: government funding, 
global exposure, and access to international expertise. These three 
opportunities were leveraged by CT-Bid to achieve its three clear strategic 
objectives: community reintegration, sport development, and image change. 
As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, the same opportunities can be leveraged 
for different goals. Therefore, this section will first introduce the three 
opportunities before going on to discuss the strategic objectives and the 
means by which they were achieved. Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage 
is then adapted to demonstrate the leveraging strategies employed. 
6.2.1 Opportunities 
An Olympic bid is a unique resource that provides unique opportunities for a 
bidding city. First, the ability of Cape Town to gain central government funding 
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will be reviewed. Following this, Cape Town’s access to global media and 
expertise will be considered. 
6.2.1.1 Government Support 
As has been discussed extensively in Chapter 3, Cape Town was singular 
within South Africa. Its demographics were predominantly coloured and 
Afrikaans-speaking, in comparison to the rest of South Africa which had a far 
greater proportion of IsiXhosa- and IsiZulu-speaking Black South Africans. 
Furthermore, in 1994, the Western Cape was the only province to re-elect the 
National Party that had embraced apartheid for so long. This caused conflict 
between the national and provincial governments, which were dominated by 
two parties with extremely different political views. Consequently, the Western 
Cape, and therefore Cape Town, was towards the back of the queue when it 
came to government funding (CT03, 2016). 
Thus, the Olympic bid was used to lever government funds that Cape Town 
would not otherwise have been able to access. The national government had 
identified sport as a vehicle with which to promote unity, and Cape Town 
bidding for the Olympic Games tapped into this. Furthermore, the Olympic bid 
process requires national governmental guarantees, ensuring that the 
government has to be supportive of the bid from the outset. Thus, Cape Town 
was able to gain substantial funding resources from the national government 
(CT06, 2016). 
The majority of the funding for Cape Town’s bid and subsequent infrastructural 
projects came from private sponsorship and national funding. The City of Cape 
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Town itself ultimately invested just R3 million14 into the bid. CT-Bid was 
successful in attracting R100 million15 from private sponsors, in a mixture of 
cash and services in kind. A similar amount was also secured from the national 
government for the bid itself, together with R350 million16 additional funding 
from the government for investment in the Priority Projects from 1996-1998 
(CT09, 2016; CT11, 2016). Given the political environment in which Cape 
Town’s bid took place, it was extremely unlikely that Cape Town would have 
received this level of government funding had it not been bidding for the 
Olympic Games. 
Interviewees identified several reasons for the government investment into the 
bid. First, South Africa was very much an outsider in the race, competing with 
global cities such as Rome and Athens, and had a poor global profile (Alden 
and le Pere, 2004). CT-Bid believed that South Africa was viewed as a ‘third 
world country with inadequate sporting and accommodation facilities and 
transport and utilities infrastructure’ (CT11, 2016). Therefore, CT-Bid were 
able to persuade the ANC government that investment was necessary in the 
city before the IOC Evaluation Commission arrived to view Cape Town. CT-
Bid feared that if there was no evidence of investment at the time of the 
inspection, then the IOC Evaluation Commission would have doubts about the 
levels of support that Cape Town would receive from the government for the 
Games themselves (CT11, 2016). 
                                            
14 Approximately £200,000 
15 Approximately £6 million 
16 Approximately £21 million 
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Second, the bid also gave the government the opportunity to promote itself 
within the country. The ANC was a new government that was not just ‘finding 
its feet’; it was also needing kudos, and to be seen to be involved in a hugely 
important international event (CT07, 2016). At the time, the South African 
government was embarking on its Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) policy, which replaced the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme implemented following the first national elections (Streak, 2004). 
GEAR sought to grow the South African economy through freeing the private 
sector from the apartheid policies that had constrained it in the past (Michie 
and Padayachee, 1998). This highlights the issues that the ANC was facing at 
the time in working with both the previously disadvantaged and marginalised 
and those who had prospered during apartheid. While the Cape Town bid had 
a strong developmental theme, it was still a bid to host the Olympic Games, 
an event that has long been thought to benefit the elite (Ziakas, 2015). 
Therefore, the initial governmental investment in the priority projects was an 
attempt to help both the white elite and the previously disadvantaged. It 
demonstrated to the former that South Africa’s post-apartheid reformation was 
going to be evolutionary, and that South Africa was going to be a global player. 
On the other hand, the government investment was spent on the ‘priority 
projects’, which were specifically developed to benefit those who were 
previously disadvantaged. Thus, the ANC saw this investment as a way of 
reaching out to two different communities with diametrically opposed needs 
(CT11, 2016). As discussed in Chapter 3, the ANC viewed sport as a means 
of bridging this divide, with the National Sport Congress highlighting the 
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government’s responsibility to ‘finance and provide facilities and services’ 
(National Sports Congress, 1993). The funding provided by the government to 
Cape Town in reaction to the bid therefore fitted into the wider national 
strategy. 
It was these arguments that CT-Bid drew upon to secure the funding from the 
government. At this stage, it should be made clear that while these priority 
projects benefited the City of Cape Town, it was CT-Bid which was responsible 
for securing the funding. CT-Bid was able to leverage the national 
government’s need to ‘be seen to be as an active partner, not just to the Bid 
and its private sector donors, but to the various local levels of government that 
needed to approve the Bid and for whom the spend would kick-start local 
facilities and transport development projects’ (CT11, 2016). 
This was supported by another respondent, who noted that the national 
government’s support of the bid allowed it more access into the politics within 
the Western Cape, with the funding of the bid legitimising the government’s 
involvement within the province (CT01, 2016). Indeed, it was another bid that 
provided the inspiration for this. Members of CT-Bid worked with stakeholders 
involved in Manchester’s unsuccessful bid for the 1996 and 2000 Olympic 
Games. The funding that Manchester secured from the UK government (see 
Chapter 3 for more detail) inspired CT-Bid to seek similar funding from the 
South African government (CT11, 2016). This emphasises the need for the 
IOC to ensure that knowledge can be passed from bidder to bidder. It is only 
because CT-Bid purposefully sought out Manchester’s bid team that there was 
an awareness of this leveraging opportunity. 
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6.2.1.2 Global Exposure 
A second opportunity provided for Cape Town was the global exposure that 
entering a bid process affords a city such as Cape Town. Given that South 
Africa had been a segregated nation and excluded from the rest of the world 
less than a decade before the bid submission, it still had a negative image 
(Alden and le Pere, 2004). Indeed, the primary image of South Africa was still 
apartheid, and so there was an intention to change this image and 
demonstrate South Africa and Cape Town’s capabilities to the rest of the 
world. Therefore, the bid and the bid process were seen as an opportunity to 
leverage a change in image.  
Simply being part of the bid process ensured that there was a global focus on 
Cape Town. A tourism destination manager within the City of Cape Town said, 
‘I think from day one, when we internally announced that we were going to bid, 
it started creating an awareness’ (CT08, 2016). Similarly, the bid process 
allowed Capetonian delegates the opportunity to travel the world, promoting 
Cape Town as a city and a destination. One member of the bid team detailed 
the opportunity provided: 
In 1997, once we were a finalist city and were allowed access 
to IOC members (and they could visit us), I visited Argentina, 
Chile, Ecuador, Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guatemala. I 
have some Spanish, and was able (assisted by a translator, 
Francisco) to describe the Olympic Plan and projected 
improvements in Spanish. I used it to present the Olympic 
Plan to both French- and Spanish-speaking IOC members 
when they visited Cape Town. I also went to the Continental 
Assembly of NOCs of Pan America in Winnipeg in July. At 
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this, I presented our bid, as did Athens, Rome, Stockholm and 
Buenos Aires. 
(CT11, 2016) 
Crucially, this media attention provided the city with marketing opportunities it 
would not otherwise have been able to afford. The same respondent detailed 
that: 
As one example, the value of the international television 
exposure of Cape Town, when the IOC announced the five 
Finalist Cities on 7th March 1997, has been estimated to be at 
least R20 million. The equivalent exposure on 5th September 
would be worth even more. From 7th March, Cape Town 
received virtually continuous visits from international 
television crews, filming the city and its countryside, and 
documenting its technical preparations and facilities. 
(CT11, 2016) 
Another noted that mainstream media outlets across the world were featuring 
Cape Town: 
On one occasion, I was sitting in my hotel room watching TV 
– Euronews – and they had a special feature on Cape Town, 
and I thought, my goodness, do you know what… we just 
don’t have the money to do that kind of marketing… you know, 
to sell Cape Town across all the major cities of Europe. 
Euronews is watched in all the major countries in Europe, and 
maybe even internationally. There is no way that we can 
afford that kind of marketing. 
(CT07, 2016) 
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6.2.1.3  International Expertise 
The final opportunity that was provided to Cape Town, was the exposure to 
international expertise that came as part of the bid. CT-Bid received support 
from private sponsors, typically including some of the largest firms in South 
Africa. Table 6.1 below shows the national and international companies who 
were stakeholders in Cape Town’s bid. 
Table 6.1: Supporters and Suppliers of the Bid 
Supporters of the Bid Olympic Bid Suppliers 
Mercedes-Benz (SA) IBM 
Unifruco Siemens 
Caltex Eskom 
Nedbank Victoria & Alfred Waterfront 
Pick ‘n’ Pay Ernst & Young 
South African Airways Primedia Ad Displays 
Sun International Opportuniti Communications 
Telkom SAPSA 
 Anglo-American 
 
Not all sponsors contributed financially. Rather, ‘in-kind resources, including 
professional skills in formulating the Bid and addressing other issues raised 
by it, were provided free or at significant discounts’ (KPMG/NN Gobodo and 
Associates, 1995:38). These professional skills were particularly important for 
Cape Town, and South Africa as a whole, as South Africa had been excluded 
from global markets and networks for much of the preceding 50 years. 
One of the sponsors to contribute expertise was Mercedes-Benz, who 
seconded a manager from Daimler-Benz Aerospace to CT-Bid, bringing with 
him access to the expertise of the German organisation (Cape Town 2004, 
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1997b). A clear example was given by an architect working on the Candidate 
File and designing the facilities for the Games: 
I went into the building in November 1995, and I started writing 
instructions or briefs for the buildings, and [manager from 
Daimler-Benz Aerospace] came to me after a short while and 
he said to me, ‘Do you need help with that? I think I can get 
you help…’ And so I said, ‘I can take any help you can give…’ 
And he then phoned up Deutsche Aerospace, assembled in 
Germany, and got them to talk to a firm in Germany called 
Weibe Blum, and there’s a load of material in there from 
Weibe Blum, who are… quite a big firm of architects. I think it 
has disbanded now… but [manager from Daimler-Benz 
Aerospace] arranged for an architect to come out from 
Germany and help me write briefs for sporting buildings. 
(CT01, 2016) 
As can be seen, international expertise fed into the design and construction of 
the priority projects, to be discussed further in Sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2. 
The priority projects were not the only strategic objective to benefit from 
international expertise. Daimler-Benz Aerospace also contributed to Cape 
Town International Airport, planning its long-term strategy: 
When we went to Cape Town International Airport and said, 
‘Show us your long-term plan, because we have the 
Olympics, you’re going to need to be able to...’ they said, ‘No, 
we don’t have a long-term plan.’ We said, ‘But you’ve an 
airport, surely you’ve got, like, a 30-year plan for the airport?’ 
They answered, ‘No.’ So, what happened then… on the 
phone to Daimler-Benz, ‘Do you have any technicians, 
whatever, guys that can help with long-range planning of 
airports?’ They said, ‘Yes, we’ll send you a couple of 
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Germans.’ Okay, whoosh, and the next thing, there’s a couple 
of Germans working in our office, working with the airport 
guys, saying, ‘Listen, guys, you’ve got to build a long-term 
plan here. When are you going to build a second landing 
strip? When are you going to build the terminal?’ 
(CT09, 2016) 
This expertise from Daimler-Benz Aerospace directly contributed to the third 
strategic objective of Cape Town, to change the image of the country and seek 
to become a global destination. However, while this additional expertise 
certainly provided an opportunity to enhance Cape Town’s leveraging of the 
bid, it is also a resource that was not fully capitalised. Following the bid, no 
post-bid evaluation took place. Many working on the bid were seconded from 
other organisations and, once Athens was named as host, contracts ended, 
and workers returned to their normal jobs (CT10, 2016). Those who had 
gained knowledge while working as part of the bid then took this back with 
them to their regular jobs, but this did not necessarily benefit the city directly. 
Indeed, as will be discussed, many of the same issues that beset Cape Town’s 
Olympic bid also hindered the 2006 Football World Cup bid two years later 
(CT03, 2016). 
6.2.1.4 Summary of Opportunities 
This section has detailed the opportunities provided to Cape Town, in 
accordance with Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage. The data collection 
found three clear opportunities brought by an Olympic bid: 1) the national 
government focuses on the city, 2) the international nature of the bid process 
provides an opportunity to promote a city on a global scale, and 3) international 
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sponsors wish to work with the city, and this brings additional expertise. The 
next section of this chapter is similarly structured around Chalip’s (2004) 
model, as it details the strategic objectives for which these opportunities were 
leveraged, together with the means by which they were achieved. 
6.2.2 Strategic Objectives 
It is clear, that entering the Olympic bid provided Cape Town with three clear 
opportunities: access to central government funding, global exposure, and 
international expertise. CT-Bid sought to leverage these opportunities to 
achieve three clear strategic objectives: community reintegration, sport 
development, and image change. The next section will take these in turn; first 
discussing the strategies put in place to achieve these objectives, followed by 
an analysis of the success in the years since. 
6.2.2.1 Community Reintegration 
At the time of Cape Town’s bid in the mid-1990s, there was not the emphasis 
on legacy that there has been since 2000 (Leopkey and Parent, 2012). 
Whereas current Candidature Files include specific sections on the vision and 
legacy of the Games, this was not a requirement for Cape Town. Despite this, 
Cape Town and South Africa recognised the opportunity for the Games to 
provide a legacy for the nation, and so pledged a ‘developmental’ bid and 
event. In addition to the three existing pillars at the heart of the Olympic 
Movement Charter (sport, culture and environment), CT-Bid sought to add 
‘human development’ as a fourth pillar (Cape Town 2004, 1996a:6). Bid 
documentation made specific note of the fact that this should go beyond being 
Chapter 6 | Cape Town 2004 
235 
a legacy of hosting the Olympic Games, and that human development be a 
key part of the bid (Cape Town 2004, 1997a:3). 
The primary strategic objective of South Africa’s bid for the 2004 Olympic 
Games was to contribute to Cape Town bonding together a city ripped apart 
by apartheid. CT-Bid identified a number of ‘Priority Projects’ were to be built 
regardless of the outcome of the bid (CT01, 2016). While the building of 
facilities needed for the Games is certainly not unique to Cape Town, CT-Bid 
took a more strategic approach, and concentrated on the building of venues 
that were not necessarily sport venues. Rather, training facilities were built, 
that, while still necessary if the bid was successful, would be used to benefit 
communities beyond the bid due to ‘lower maintenance costs and wider multi-
purpose functionality’ (Chittenden Nicks Partnership, 1997:14). Had Cape 
Town not bid for the Olympics, these facilities would not have been built (CT01, 
2016). Table 6.2 shows the community facilities that were constructed as part 
of the bid, together with the cost of each. As can be seen, these costs were 
not insignificant, and relied on the government funding that was detailed in 
Section 6.2.1.1. 
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Table 6.2: Community Facilities Constructed as Part of the Bid 
Area Use Cost17 
Ward 
Number 
(1996) 
% white 
population 
Prevalent 
Race 
Philippi 
East 
Multipurpose 
hall 
R18 
million 
80 1.9% 
Coloured18 
(87.6%) 
Khayelitsha 
Boxing/ 
multipurpose 
hall 
R17 
million 
83 4.3% 
Coloured 
(84.6%) 
Belhar 
Multipurpose 
hall 
R18.25 
million 
22 0.1% 
Coloured 
(91.0%) 
Langa 
Multipurpose 
hall 
R5 
million 
53 51.7% 
White 
(51.7%) 
Scottsdene 
Multipurpose 
hall 
R4 
million 
12 7.4% 
Coloured 
(50.6%) 
Culemborg 
Transnet 
Exhibition 
Centre 
 55 42.2% 
White 
(42.2%) 
 
On a map, these facilities appear to be located sparsely across the city. For 
example, Scottsdene is more than 30 kilometres away from Central Cape 
Town station, and is geographically closer to Stellenbosch than Cape Town 
(see Figure 6.1). The facilities were constructed in strategic locations. As 
Table 6.2 shows, these were typically areas of Cape Town with a small 
percentage of white population. Despite Cape Town having a 21% of white 
population, many of the wards that received new facilities had a very small 
white population. It is noticeable, that of the five multi-purpose halls that were 
built, four of them had white populations of less than 8%, and all had large 
coloured populations. These were areas that were termed ‘previously 
                                            
17 Costs are provided by interviewee CT11 
18 While this phrase is not deemed acceptable in UK society, it is a term still used in 
common parlance in South Africa  
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disadvantaged’19. Specifically, Khayelitsha and Philippi were specifically 
identified as being home to households in the bottom 20% in terms of socio-
economic status within the city (Ninham Shand, 1997).  
 
Figure 6.1: Locations of the Priority Projects 
One member of CT-Bid specifically noted the way that the Scottsdene facilities 
(the red marker at the top right in Figure 6.1) were placed in order to benefit 
the community: 
That was the other thing as well, and this is part of our 
portfolio, looking at locating facilities in a very strategic way, 
to actually start reintegrating communities. So, for example, 
the Scottsdene facility was located very strategically on the 
edge of a particular community but where other communities 
                                            
19 ‘Previously disadvantaged communities’ refers to ‘persons or categories of persons 
who, prior to the new democratic dispensation marked by the coming into force of the new 
constitution of Republic of South Africa (no 108), were disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination on the basis of their race and includes juristic persons or association owned 
or controlled by such persons’ (Nefcorp, 2005). 
Chapter 6 | Cape Town 2004 
238 
could access it as well. And that has become a massive 
community focus. 
(CT03, 2016) 
Scottsdene was not the only facility identified in the interviews as being built 
in a strategic location. A second member of CT-Bid also noted the location of 
Khayelitsha: 
That was one of the important principles from a social and an 
environmental point of view, to look at land that was under-
utilised and in poor condition, and also to look at putting 
facilities in poorer areas, within communities. So that’s why 
the Khayelitsha multipurpose centre is in Khayelitsha; the 
idea being that it should benefit those communities directly. 
(CT10, 2016) 
This planning went beyond providing previously disadvantaged areas of Cape 
Town with much-needed facilities. A key aspect of apartheid was the spatial 
planning that occurred, to facilitate urban segregation (Maylam, 1995). This 
resulted in cities being fragmented, with little connection between the different 
areas of the city that were typically occupied by different racial groups. As 
South Africa exited from apartheid, different agencies within the city 
coordinated to find a way to reunite the different areas of the city (CT11, 2016). 
This resulted in the document ‘A Vision for the Future of Metropolitan Cape 
Town’ being produced (Cape Town City Council, 1993). This report proposed 
that ‘location, timing and character of development’ be managed within the city 
and was then developed further by the newly-formed Cape Metropolitan 
Council. The Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) was 
published in April 1996. 
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Watson (2002) offers a full review of the MSDF and the factors contributing 
towards it, but the key points are as follows. The MSDF was based on four 
‘development principles’: equality of opportunity, social justice, sustainable 
development, and openness and accountability (Watson, 2002:110). These 
principles helped to define the vision of the MSDF, which sought to use the 
development of nodes, corridors and the metropolitan open space to address 
the basic needs of all Capetonians and provide opportunities for further 
progression (Cape Metropolitan Council, 1996). This not only had the intention 
of breaking down the geographical segregation that was still a legacy of the 
apartheid policy, but also to provide previously disadvantaged communities 
with access to transport and job opportunities. This was to be achieved 
through the development of urban nodes (urban areas with infrastructural 
connections to other regions), corridors (areas for pedestrian and transit with 
business, retail and residential integration; corridors are used to link nodes), 
Metropolitan Open Space System (open spaces within the city, for example 
parks and nature reserves), and an urban edge (an agreed-upon city boundary 
to prevent urban sprawl). Watson (2003:58) provides an image of the MSDF 
plans for Cape Town in Figure 6.2 below. As can be seen, the areas of 
Claremont and Wynberg, Belville, Philippi and Somerset West were to be 
urban nodes, with corridors proposed to provide transport links. 
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Figure 6.2: Cape Town Urban Nodes and Corridors20 
These plans informed the work by CT-Bid. When Figure 6.1 (showing the 
location of the priority projects on page 237) is compared to Figure 6.2 above, 
it is clear that the priority projects were built in the areas identified by the MSDF 
as in need for urban development. This had a further strategic plan. While 
these nodes had been identified as areas for urban development, this was not 
yet forthcoming from private enterprise. The building of priority projects within 
these regions was seen as being important in providing a lead for private 
enterprise to follow (Chittenden Nicks Partnership, 1997). 
Thus, CT-Bid sought to use these new facilities to bring together these 
different areas that would previously have had little interaction. It was stated 
that the position of these venues should ‘contribute to the emergence of more 
                                            
20 Image taken from Watson (2003:58) 
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efficient and supportive urban environments for large numbers of people’ (Day, 
1997:16). CT-Bid sought external assistance for the plans. Local professors 
David Dewar and Lucien le Grange argued that the building of sport and 
community facilities could be used to improve the issues within the City of 
Cape Town, proposing ‘a hierarchy of community sports facilities which is 
inter-penetrated by Olympic Games-required facilities’ (CT11, 2016). In 
addition, the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was asked 
to consider the spatial planning that had been a part of the apartheid regime, 
and the ways in which this could be altered. A member of CT-Bid gave details 
as to CSIR plans, and how Cape Town built this into the bid plans: 
They were working for the Department of Transport, and then 
various other cities, and they were involved in the project, 
saying, ‘Our cities are so fractured, because of apartheid 
planning, because of the separation of workplaces to places 
of living.’ So, their task was a simple one, to say, ‘Look, map 
out the traffic flows, people flows across the city, where they 
come from, where they go to, and start identifying the strategic 
locations for high end shopping centres, businesses, that can 
start assisting to reintegrating our cities… We then tacked on 
to that and said, ‘Utilising that same model, identify where the 
strategic placement of high order sports facilities could be,’ so 
that, for example, they had then identified the Scottsdene 
facility, in terms of pathways between the railway line and 
various communities. How you can use the strategic location 
of that facility to not only integrate, but also for it to become a 
central meeting place, for these communities? 
(CT03, 2016) 
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The development of the priority projects had a further strategy for supporting 
those who were previously disadvantaged through ‘affirmative tendering 
procedures’ when finding designers and architects. One of the key strategies 
for this was the development of an ‘architectural competition’ (CT03, 2016). 
This is a common event in South Africa, with architects being invited to submit 
plans which might then be used. Traditionally, entry to the competition would 
be limited to registered, qualified architects, but this was open to anyone who 
wished to enter. This action had further social implications, as it made it easier 
for black and coloured architects to enter the competition and work with the 
bid team. Indeed, as one of the respondents claimed, the ‘real legacy from the 
bid was the information and knowledge that was passed to the building 
industry’ (CT02, 2016). This resulted in 55% of the contracts being filled by 
black and local contractors, who would previously not have had the opportunity 
to work on such a prestigious contract (Cape Argus, 1997a). 
The use of previously disadvantaged workers was a clear aim of the games, 
with bid documentation stating that ‘half the money spent by the Olympic Bid 
on its operations will go to black business in accordance with its economic 
empowerment policy’ (Cape Town 2004, 1997a:30). However, this was not 
necessarily wholly successful. The Strategic Environmental Assessment 
notes that ‘the black construction industry, which represent SMME (Small, 
Medium and Micro-sized Enterprises) from this sector (civil engineering), 
complain that they have not made any impact from this sector’ (Merrifield, 
1997:16). Indeed, it appears that these decisions were often left up to 
individual local authorities. 
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These plans went beyond just the building of community facilities. The plans 
for city restructuring also required investment in transport infrastructure, in 
order to develop the ‘corridors’ needed to link to the urban nodes (CT06, 
2016). A government white paper released in 1996 stated that the goal was to 
provide: 
A system which will provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient 
and fully integrated transport operations and infrastructure 
which will best meet the needs of freight and passenger 
customers at improving the levels of service and cost in a 
fashion which supports government strategies for economic 
and social development whilst being environmentally and 
economically sustainable. 
(Department of Transport, 1996) 
Indeed, this extract features in a public CT-Bid document, which goes on to 
highlight the requirements for transportation during an Olympic Games. 
Further, it recognises how these transport upgrades would add to the city’s 
developmental goals, stating that ‘the meshing of land use with transport is 
fundamental to the city’s planning, as it is only through the integration of these 
two disciplines that the developmental nature of the plan can be achieved’ 
(Cape Town 2004, 1997c:25). CT-Bid was aware that the city’s existing 
transport infrastructure could not handle an Olympic Games but, perhaps 
more pertinently, upgrades were needed for a public transport system that was 
not designed to support previously disadvantaged communities (Cameron, 
1997). 
Chapter 6 | Cape Town 2004 
244 
As part of the bid, the city managed to secure R250 million21 of transportation 
development (Cape Town 2004, 1997a), an amount that was subsequently 
downgraded to R200 million22 once the bid had been lost (CT11, 2016). 
Previously, central funding for transport was around R8 million per year 
(KPMG/NN Gobodo and Associates, 1995). This additionally leveraged 
funding was spent on upgrading the rail and road networks in the city, with a 
focus on developing the corridors and linking the nodes as seen in Figure 6.2 
on page 240 (CT03, 2016; CT05, 2016; CT06, 2016). 
The transport infrastructural upgrades that came about as part of the bid are 
detailed in Table 6.3. While the spending did include significant improvements 
linking the airport to the city centre, the developmental aim of these priority 
projects is clearly evidenced. The identified urban hubs of Philippi and Bellville 
both received significant funding for transport upgrades in order to develop the 
corridors in the plan. Similarly, Lansdowne Road, the N2, and Stock Road 
were three of the roads that received additional funding. Lansdowne Road can 
be seen in Figure 6.2 on page 240 as one of the corridors identified by the 
MSDF; the N2 upgrade (including dedicated public transport) provided better 
access from Khayelitsha to the city centre, and Stock Road in Philippi is one 
of the hubs. It is clear to see how these transport infrastructure upgrades 
contributed to the MSDF. 
                                            
21 Approximately £22 million 
22 Approximately £18 million 
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Table 6.3: Transport Upgrades23 
Transport Development Type Cost 
New transport interchange in Philippi Rail R6.3 million 
Mowbray interchange upgrade Rail R7.7 million 
Commuter facility improvement including access 
and ticket control on the Cape Town to Khayelitsha 
line 
Rail R27.5 million 
Improved taxi facilities in Fish Hoek, Khayelitsha, 
Koeberg, Langa and Maitland 
Rail R12.1 million 
Bellville Transport Interchange upgrade Rail R3.9 million 
Improvements to transfers at Philippi Station Rail R3.5 million 
Upgrade to airport links Road R16.7 million 
Phase one of Bellville-Philippi corridor development Road R32.6 million 
Road improvements Road R28.5 million 
Public transport upgrades, including dedicated bus 
lanes and provision of new stops 
Road R17.7 million 
 
6.2.2.1.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy 
Cape Town’s bid was specifically leveraged to bring about community 
integration within the city, through the building of strategically placed 
community facilities and transport investment. CT-Bid recognised that this was 
not something that could be achieved just through the bid, and so it built upon 
the plans put in place by the MSDF. In order to view the success of the 
leveraging strategy, the success of the MSDF needs to be considered. 
Crucially, the MSDF was never formalised, and instead, a redrafted document 
was instituted within Cape Town in 2001 (City of Cape Town, 2012). In this 
                                            
23 Data from Cape Argus (1997b:6) 
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same year, Turok and Watson (2001:136) wrote that ‘there is a gulf between 
Cape Town’s impoverished townships and its affluent areas, which appears to 
be widening in important respects’. In the years since, further changes to Cape 
Town’s urban development plans have been implemented, resulting in a new 
spatial development plan being released by the City of Cape Town in 2012 
(City of Cape Town, 2012). This was reviewed in 2017, and a new five-year 
plan introduced, designed to build on the prior work (City of Cape Town, 2017). 
Watson’s (2002) work provides an insight into the development of the MSDF 
and the issues that beset the plans from the outset. The number of plans that 
have been implemented within the City of Cape Town in the years since, 
suggests that these plans, at least to date, have not yet been wholly 
successful. However, there is some evidence that inequality within Cape Town 
has fallen in the years since.  
Statistics South Africa released a report in 2014 entitled ‘Poverty Trends in 
South Africa: An Examination of Absolute Poverty between 2006 and 2011’. 
This details the progress that has been made in the Western Cape between 
these years: 
 The number classified as ‘poor’ fell from 36.9% to 24.7% 
 The poverty gap decreased from 13.8% to 8.5% 
 The cost to eradicate poverty is estimated at R3.3 billion24 
 In 2006, one in four households was living in poverty. This fell to one in 
six by 2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2014) 
                                            
24 Approximately £186 million 
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However, while there is clearly progress, inequality in Cape Town is still 
prevalent. UN-Habitat (2008) estimated that Cape Town’s Gini coefficient (a 
measure of income inequality) fell from 0.69 in 2001 to 0.67 in 2005. To put 
these figures into context, a Gini coefficient of over 0.4 is considered 
‘unacceptably high’ (UN-Habitat, 2008:72). While on a global scale this 
inequality may seem extreme, the same report noted that South Africa’s Gini 
coefficient was over 0.7, and Cape Town had the most equality of the eight 
South African cities ranked in the sample. A later UN-Habitat report ranked 
Cape Town as a city with ‘solid prosperity factors’ (UN-Habitat, 2013:20). Of 
the five dimensions that contribute to the UN-Habitat’s City Prosperity Index, 
Cape Town is weakest on equity, and in fact, of the 72 global cities included 
in the study, only Johannesburg has a lower Equity Index. However, Cape 
Town scores highly on infrastructural development, being ranked 30th of the 
72 cities included. This perhaps indicates that the work done following the 
Olympic bid on urban infrastructure has played a role in developing the city.  
However, given the decades of spatial planning, it is unlikely that a single event 
would be able to restructure a city. Indeed, the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment stresses that even the hosting of an Olympic Games would not 
fully achieve these goals (Cameron, 1997), and therefore it is inconceivable 
that purely bidding would change the city. Therefore, the success of Cape 
Town’s leveraging plans should not be judged on whether Cape Town is now 
a well-integrated city. The leveraging plans implemented by CT-Bid 
contributed to the planned MSDF and the latterly introduced redrafted plan. 
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As is clear, Cape Town leveraged the bid to put in place plans that had already 
been identified as being vital for the future of the city. The placement of the 
new sport facilities in previously disadvantaged areas necessitated that 
transport upgrades also occurred in these poor regions of the city; however, 
much of the work on the road networks, while catalysed by the bid, were not 
achieved until much more recently (CT11, 2016). Indeed, one of the 
respondents believed that the lack of road infrastructure resulted in the new 
facilities being isolated, and initially actually negated the impact of the new 
facilities within the communities (CT05, 2016). It is clear that Cape Town had 
two clearly planned infrastructural developments to reintegrate the city: the 
building of community facilities in previously disadvantaged areas, and the 
provision of transport infrastructure to bond the two together. 
6.2.2.2 Sport Development 
The already discussed building of facilities contributed to Cape Town’s second 
strategic objective of improving sport development. As South Africa had been 
excluded from global sport for much of the previous 30 years, the nation’s 
passion for playing sport was waning (CT01, 2016). Indeed, the interviewee 
noted that South Africans do not have a sporting culture, and particularly not 
for participating in sport. Therefore, Cape Town sought to leverage the bid to 
improve sport participation. 
In addition to the community facilities that were built, detailed in Table 6.2 on 
page 236, the priority projects also included a number of sporting-specific 
venues. CT-Bid continued their strategic approach here. The sporting venues 
that were built were not competition facilities; rather, they were built to Olympic 
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and competition standard but would have been the training venues rather than 
the actual competition venues. The rationale for this is clear. Given the 
widespread poverty in Cape Town in the mid-1990s, the building of facilities to 
be used for elite sport was not the priority. Rather, the intention was to build 
sporting facilities that could be used by children and amateurs. As one 
interviewee stated: 
You need proper facilities for competition sport, but you do not 
need them for everyday social use… If you don't build the 
competition venues, you need to build the training venues. 
And then, I think that you then are strategic. 
(CT01, 2016) 
Table 6.4: Sport-Specific Priority Projects Constructed 
Area Use Cost25 
Ward 
Number 
(1996) 
% white 
population 
Prevalent 
Race 
Hartleyvale  
International 
Hockey venue26 
R21 
million 
55 42.2% 
White 
(42.2%) 
Khayelitsha 
Boxing/multipurpose 
hall 
R17 
million 
83 4.3% 
Coloured 
(84.6%) 
Bellville Velodrome26 
R45 
million 
7 88.5% 
White 
(88.5%) 
Turfhall Softball facility 
R14 
million 
19 0.3% 
Coloured 
(90.1%) 
Grassy 
Park 
Baseball 
R2.5 
million 
66 0.3% 
Coloured 
(77.6%) 
 
Table 6.4 shows the sporting Priority Projects built as part of the bid. In addition 
to the multi-purpose training halls that were constructed, a number of sport-
specific venues were constructed. Again, the softball and baseball facilities 
                                            
25 Costs are provided by interviewee CT11 
26 These were existing facilities renovated as part of the bid 
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were strategically located in previously disadvantaged areas so as to provide 
the poorer areas of Cape Town with facilities that could be used. 
The construction of sporting venues was not the only way that Cape Town 
leveraged the bid to develop its sporting infrastructure. Both the City of Cape 
Town, and indeed South Africa as a whole, had little experience of dealing with 
Olympic Sport Federations. First, the sports with which South Africa is typically 
associated are not traditional Olympic sports: rugby union, cricket, and 
football. Furthermore, while there are more traditional Olympic sports played 
in South Africa, the nation’s exclusion from international sporting competition 
reduced the exposure that South Africa had with these sporting federations. 
For the first time, Cape Town was dealing with 28 different sport federations 
and benefiting from the expertise of individuals within these federations. One 
interviewee, who dealt directly with the sport federations, said that:  
I think similarly during the bid, and then becoming exposed to 
sort of key decision makers in the international sports 
federations as well. So, in addition to IOC members being 
exposed to the Cape Town offering, a lot of work was also put 
into getting to know the international sports federations and 
getting their role players to visit Cape Town. 
(CT04, 2016) 
This access to, and communication with sporting federations, allowed Cape 
Town and South Africa as a whole to accelerate their reintroduction into the 
sporting world. This will be discussed further in the next section. 
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6.2.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy 
While the building of sport facilities, and the bid itself, allowed South Africa to 
push sport development within the nation, it was identified by interviewees as 
not having the full impact that it could have achieved. Cape Town certainly 
captivated the IOC members. CEO Chris Ball claimed to have received a letter 
from an IOC member saying that the CT-Bid ‘should not be disappointed about 
not winning. Considering where South Africa came from since 1991, to be 
placed third was an outstanding achievement… now you must prepare for 
2008’ (Ball, 1997). However, this second bid failed to materialise, and instead, 
South Africa quickly re-engaged with its traditional sports, winning the Rugby 
World Cup in 1995 and 2007, in addition to finishing third in 1999. Similarly, 
domestic rugby teams were competitive in continental competition, with the 
Sharks being losing finalists in the first Super Rugby tournament in 1996. Of 
similar note, the South African cricket team have been competitive globally 
since re-entry, with the One Day International team reaching four Cricket 
World Cup semi-finals (having often been the favourite to win the tournament) 
and the Test team being ranked Number 1 in the world in 1999. 
However, these are only two sports, and therefore it can be argued that South 
Africa did not successfully capitalise on the opportunities afforded by the 
Games. As one interviewee, of the Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport, 
said: 
But there are, like, 70 other sports; cycling and table tennis 
and squash, and all of it is not professionalised. And I think 
there is a missed opportunity there, perhaps, to get a little bit 
of rigour into many of these sports, which I think we could 
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have, because we had that opportunity to work with them, we 
could have taken it, but we didn’t because we were so focused 
on ‘You know what? We've actually got to get the physical 
stuff sorted, because if we don’t get the physical stuff sorted, 
we actually stand no chance’. 
(CT06, 2016) 
A member of the bid team further recognised this as a missed opportunity, 
noting that for all the tangible investment in facilities, South Africa did not take 
the opportunity to cultivate the soft skills needed for sport development: 
And we go through the infrastructure benefits, we can go 
through all sorts of benefits, but the single benefit of sports 
development, either skills, technical officials… the facilities 
maybe upgraded, but very little of the soft skills… To be able 
to say, ‘We were able to train a hundred new international 
standard technical officials, and that’s the legacy we leave for 
sport’. And I think that in terms of sport, they’ve always been 
short-changed. Certainly in the bid, but even in the hosting as 
well. I mean, you can still forgive, in a sense, to say, ‘Look, it’s 
not the objective.’ But certainly, in terms of hosting, the 
technical officials, administrative capacity, you know what I 
mean? A lot of our sports federations are still out of the boot 
of a car. 
(CT03, 2016) 
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Figure 6.3: South Africa Olympic Medals, 1992-2016 
 
As Figure 6.3 shows, having won three Gold medals in 1996, South Africa won 
just one in total at the 2000, 2004, and 2008 Olympic Games, finishing 55th, 
43rd and 72nd in the medal tables. In the immediate aftermath of the bid, South 
Africa failed to capitalise on the opportunity of ‘Olympism’ within the city. As 
can be seen, Olympic performance improved in the 2012 Olympic Games, 15 
years on from Cape Town’s bid. While it may be possible that a 10-year-old 
Capetonian was inspired by the bid and then competed in London 15 years 
later, it should be noted that none of South Africa’s medallists at the London 
2012 Games were from Cape Town. South Africa went on to win 10 medals 
during the 2016 Games, one of which was the Silver medal in the Rugby 
Sevens. Of the 13 members of the team, three were from Cape Town and two 
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from Paarl (a city 40 miles from Cape Town). Comparatively, of the other nine 
medallists, just one was from Cape Town and one from Paarl. This is 
significant, as the Western Cape’s most successful Olympic sport is rugby, a 
sport in which South Africa was already experienced. 
It should be noted that one of South Africa’s medallists at the 2016 Games, 
Wayde van Niekerk, who won the Men’s 400m, is from Cape Town. 
Furthermore, van Niekerk is from Bellville, one of the areas in which facilities 
were constructed as part of the bid (Bellville Primary School, 2016). While the 
facilities may have contributed to van Niekerk’s progress as an elite athlete, 
he moved to Bloemfontein to attend secondary school (Chabalala, 2016). It is 
more likely that South Africa’s progress in the Olympics is due to the nation’s 
natural progression since re-entering the Olympics, rather than being 
attributed to Cape Town’s bid. Indeed, van Niekerk was born in 1992, and so 
is of the first generation where South Africa competing in the Olympic Games 
could be viewed as being ‘normal’. 
6.2.2.3 Image Change 
The final strategic objective that South Africa sought as part of the Olympic bid 
was a change in image. South Africa targeted two distinct areas. First, South 
Africa and Cape Town wished to become known as a nation and a city that 
could host sporting events. Second, there was an aim to demonstrate to the 
world the change that had occurred since the abolition of apartheid, and that 
South Africa could re-enter the international stage. These two objectives will 
be taken in turn. 
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6.2.2.3.1 A Place for Sport 
The building of facilities was used to contribute to the previous strategic 
objectives of community reintegration and sport development, and it also 
contributed to a further objective; that of hosting additional sporting events. 
As Table 6.4 on page 249 shows, Cape Town built a number of sporting 
venues, with the intention of hosting further sporting events in Cape Town. 
The South African government had recognised sport as a tool with which to 
reunite the nation (National Sports Congress, 1993), with Cape Town’s 
Olympic bid following in the footsteps of South Africa hosting the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup and the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations. Indeed, President Nelson 
Mandela was later quoted saying that ‘sport has the power to change the 
world. It has the power to inspire, it has the power to unite people in a way that 
little else does’ (Nelson Mandela Foundation, 2000). Thus, South Africa was 
embarking on a strategy to host a number of sporting events, and the new 
stadia that were constructed were the means by which this could be achieved. 
Table 6.5 shows the international sporting events hosted following Cape 
Town’s bid. As can be seen, the Bellville Velodrome and Hartleyvale Hockey 
stadium, which were renovated as part of the bid, have both hosted several 
international sporting events since. Similarly, Turfhall Stadium which was built 
as part of the bid, also hosted the Junior Women’s Softball World 
Championship in 2011.  
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Table 6.5: International Events hosted in Cape Town, 1998-2013 
Year Sport Event Location 
1998 Sailing 
ISAF World Junior Sailing 
Championships 
Simon’s Town 
Annually 
since 
2000 
Canoeing ICF Canoe Marathon Cape Town 
2003 Cycling 
UCI Track Cycling World Cup 
Classics Round 3 
Bellville 
Velodrome 
2004-2010 Sailing Volvo Ocean Race (one stage) 
Cape Town 
Harbour 
Annually 
since 
2004 
Cycling 
Cape Epic Mountain Bike stage 
race 
Western Cape 
2005 Volleyball Swatch-FIVB World Tour Camps Bay 
2006 Gymnastics African Gymnastics Championships 
Bellville 
Velodrome 
2008 Cycling 
2008 UCI Junior World 
Championships 
Bellville 
Velodrome 
2008 Cycling 
UCI Junior Track World 
Championships 
Bellville 
Velodrome 
2008 
Rope 
skipping 
World Rope Skipping 
Championships 
Good Hope 
Centre 
2009 Hockey 
Women's Hockey Champions 
Challenge 
Hartleyvale 
Hockey Stadium 
2010 Karate 
African Karate Championships
  
Bellville 
Velodrome 
2011 Judo World U20 Championships 
International 
Convention 
Centre 
2011 Softball 
Junior Women’s Softball World 
Championship 
Turfhall Stadium 
2012 Table tennis 
ITTF World Junior Table Tennis 
Championships 
Grand Arena 
2013 Hockey 
Women's FIH Hockey World 
League Round 2 
Hartleyvale 
Hockey Stadium 
 
In addition to the building of the new stadia, another opportunity that has 
already been discussed contributed to the hosting of these events, through the 
building of relationships with the international sporting federations. Given 
South Africa’s absence from the international sporting world during the 
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apartheid era, they had not kept up with international regulations. Therefore, 
working with these federations provided Cape Town with the information 
needed so that the facilities being constructed would be eligible to hold 
international competitions (CT04, 2016). Indeed, one interviewee who dealt 
directly with the different sporting federations said that: 
International sports federations as well as IOC members who 
were exposed to South Africa for the first time, then just 
making the visit to South Africa, to Cape Town. If we didn’t 
bid, we would not have had those key people, decision 
makers essentially, being exposed to what we could offer. 
(CT04, 2016) 
The interviewee went on to note the impact that the stadia construction and 
relationships with the sporting federations had had on the hosting of 
international events: 
The building of some of it, and sporting facilities, certainly led 
to some of the international sports federations hosting the 
World Championships in South Africa, and probably for the 
first time as well. 
(CT04, 2016) 
These events were chosen strategically, for two reasons. South Africa had 
long been excluded from the international world of sport, having not competed 
in an Olympic Games since the 1960 Games in Rome. While South Africa did 
host the 1995 Rugby World Cup, and the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations, these 
competitions are different from the needs and requirements of hosting an 
Olympic Games.  
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Table 6.6: Comparison of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, 1996 Africa Cup of 
Nations, and 1996 Olympic Games 
 
1995 Rugby 
World Cup 
1996 Africa Cup 
of Nations 
1996 Atlanta 
Olympic Games 
Number of sports 1 (rugby) 1 (football) 26 
Number of 
competing 
nations 
16 16 197 
Number of cities 
used to host 
9 4 1 
Number of events 32 29 271 
Total Attendance 878,616 516,380 8,300,00027 
 
As Table 6.6 above shows, while the hosting of the 1995 Rugby World Cup 
and 1996 Africa Cup of Nations showed South Africa’s capability to host a 
second order mega-event, CT-Bid did not believe that they showed the 
capabilities of Cape Town as a city. First, Cape Town had not been used as a 
venue for the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations and hosted just four games at the 
1995 Rugby World Cup across 24 days. Second, the hosting of rugby and 
football events was viewed as having little relevance to hosting an Olympic 
Games, which in 1996 had 26 different sports. While football was one of these 
events, with women’s football being introduced, it is a minor part of the Olympic 
Games. Thus, Cape Town sought to prove to both the sporting world and the 
IOC that it was a city capable of hosting an event of the magnitude of the 
Olympic Games. This had the added advantage of building up support within 
Cape Town for an event, and sports from which South Africa had been 
                                            
27 Guinness World Records (2018) 
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excluded for the previous 45 years (CT04, 2016). As one interviewee stated, 
this was recognised as an issue that CT-Bid sought to overcome: 
Those were also planned as almost sort of test events, to 
showcase our capability of hosting world championships, and 
that was one of the challenges with the bid, that because of 
isolation during apartheid, we did not have a lot experience 
with a lot of the Olympic sports, other than non-Olympic sports 
such as rugby and cricket. 
(CT04, 2016) 
Thus, Cape Town concentrated on hosting Olympic sports for which South 
Africa was not well-known, with the intention of showcasing Cape Town’s 
capabilities for hosting numerous sports. One member of the bid team 
discussed this in detail: 
We always knew we needed to show our capability to be able 
to host international events. So, for example, we then went on 
a very strategic approach with regards to identifying, for 
example, gymnastics events; world youth gymnastics or 
continental gymnastics, plus fencing, swimming, triathlon. So, 
we targeted very specific events to show our capabilities of 
hosting events. Obviously, that then leads to facility upgrades 
and facility development. 
(CT03, 2016) 
Thus, a ‘Sport Events Strategy’ was created and put in place (Cape Town 
2004, n.d.). This identified sporting events that could be hosted by Cape Town 
prior to July 1997. Fifteen events across 13 sports were identified and ranked, 
based on: 1) the importance of the sport to the IOC, 2) financial risk to Cape 
Town, 3) ability to market Cape Town’s bid through the event, 4) extent to 
Chapter 6 | Cape Town 2004 
260 
which it would demonstrate Cape Town’s hosting capabilities, 5) social 
benefits, and 6) timing of the event compared to the bid decision (Cape Town 
2004, n.d.:3). The events considered included World Championships in 
weightlifting, handball, modern pentathlon and badminton, together with 
smaller athletics and cycling events. 
There was a further strategic goal for the selection of the events. CT-Bid 
identified which IOC members had an interest in these sports, and thus aimed 
to host events that might potentially persuade IOC members to visit Cape 
Town, providing networking opportunities. For example, in the document, it is 
noted that Pál Schmitt, the IOC member for Hungary, is a fan of the sport of 
fencing. It is then suggested, that if Cape Town were to host a fencing event, 
Mr Schmitt could be invited to Cape Town to attend the event (Cape Town 
2004, n.d.:38). 
Each event was ranked on the six criteria, with athletics events (World Cross-
Country and Africa vs USA competition) scoring highest. While it was 
concluded that it was financially viable for Cape Town to host all of the 
identified events, this was deemed to be unlikely, and so, in a period of two 
years, Cape Town and nearby town Stellenbosch hosted nine international 
sporting events, as seen in Table 6.7. 
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Table 6.7: Sport Events hosted by Cape Town, 1996-1997 
Year Sport Event Location 
1996 Cross Country 
IAAF World Cross-Country 
Championships 
Stellenbosch 
1996 Hockey 
Atlanta 1996 Olympic Hockey 
qualifying tournament 
Hartleyvale Hockey 
Stadium 
1996 
Modern 
Pentathlon 
Modern Pentathlon World Cup 
Final 
Stellenbosch 
1996 Golf World Cup of Golf Somerset West 
1997 Fencing FIE World Championships 
Transnet Exhibition 
Centre 
1997 
Mountain 
Biking 
UCI Mountain Bike World Cup Stellenbosch 
1997 Weightlifting 
World Junior Weightlifting 
Championships 
Good Hope Centre 
1997 Track Cycling 
UCI Junior Track World 
Championships 
Bellville Velodrome 
 
Thus, the construction of sport facilities and the exposure to international 
sporting federations, allowed Cape Town to host a number of sporting events, 
contributing to the nation’s plans to develop its sporting infrastructure. This in 
turn created further opportunities, as it allowed the City of Cape Town to 
receive additional funding that it otherwise would not have been eligible for 
(CT11, 2016). The Department of Sport provided R10 million for the hosting of 
the fencing, cycling and weightlifting events. This allowed the Transnet 
Exhibition Centre to receive further development due to the modifications 
needed to be able to host a world fencing tournament (CT09, 2016). 
It was not just Cape Town that sought to host additional events and become a 
‘sporting city’. South Africa also wanted to be known as a nation that could 
host the largest sporting mega-events, and so needed to raise its profile on 
the international sporting stage. Prior to the bid, there was little global 
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knowledge of South Africa or its sporting capabilities and, as a result, the IOC 
officials who visited were astonished by what Cape Town could offer (CT02, 
2016). Several interviewees felt that Cape Town’s bid directly led to South 
Africa ultimately hosting the ‘other’ mega-event, the 2010 FIFA World Cup: 
I think one can attribute some of it to the fact that we started 
to put ourselves sort of firmly on the international sports stage 
during the Olympic bid process; I think that was a major thing. 
(CT07, 2016) 
Another specifically linked the trajectory from Cape Town’s Olympic bid to the 
2010 FIFA World Cup: 
In hindsight, it also put us in a position, which we didn’t know 
the week after, the year after, or the two years after the bid, 
that it put us in a great position to bid for the FIFA World Cup 
many years later, because we based our departure point on 
the results of the Olympic Games. So future bids might benefit 
from, and successful bids might benefit from, the groundwork 
that was done. 
(CT08, 2016) 
This was mentioned by two further interviewees: 
I think that Cape Town 2004 was an important pogo stick for 
Cape Town bidding to be part of the 2010 Football World Cup. 
(CT11, 2016) 
The second interviewee also noted that: 
The Olympic bid, in my view, provided the core leadership 
team for the soccer World Cup. Finance, strong finance but 
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we also, obviously, empowered a lot of people coming out of 
the... the more technical-based people. 
(CT09, 2016) 
This can be demonstrated, as one member of the bid team was asked to write 
a guide for sport organisations who wish to bid for sporting events in the future. 
They told me that: 
I was then commissioned by the South African Sports 
Commission to write up the bidding frameworks. It cost me 
more than they paid me for it, but that’s not the point. And then 
that stimulated chapters in this book as well. Yes, it’s actually 
become an Act of Parliament now. 
(CT03, 2016) 
This document does not directly mention the Olympic bid, but it is clear that 
successes from the bid process have been incorporated into it (The South 
African Sports Commission, 2003). The year after the publication of this 
document, South Africa was awarded the 2010 FIFA World Cup. 
6.2.2.3.1.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy 
This can be viewed as a missed opportunity. The Olympic bid, and the events 
hosted by Cape Town in the bid period, did not necessarily then lead to the 
hosting of large-scale events that might be expected, despite South Africa 
hosting the 2010 Football World Cup. It should not be forgotten that South 
Africa lost a bid to host the 2006 Football World Cup. While there are clearly 
links between the Olympic and 2006 FIFA World Cup bids, it is also obvious 
that the lessons of the Olympic bid were not necessarily learned. The 2004 
Olympic bid assumed that it would receive support from other African nations 
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and that the Olympic bid was a ‘bid for Africa’. Yet, the nature of an Olympic 
bid makes this assumption difficult and, as a result, it was viewed across Africa 
purely as a Cape Town bid (CT03, 2016). During the final vote, at least four 
African IOC members did not vote for Cape Town in the first round of voting 
(Morris, 1997). This lesson was not heeded, and subsequently South Africa 
failed to attract the level of support from the African nations that it expected 
during its bid for the 2006 Football World Cup (Cornelissen, 2004a). A member 
of the bid team supported this by saying that: 
I think there was a lot of assumptions that the African IOC 
members would bid for Cape Town to support. So, you had 
the African Union giving their support, but it came down to 
individual IOC members. And whether we could have 
changed it, I’m not so sure, but I think there were a lot of 
assumptions made that they would automatically support the 
South African bid, African bid. It was supposed to be a lesson 
learnt but I don’t think… again, the 2006 bid was again 
claimed as a bid for Africa, which should have been a lesson. 
And probably this is sort of one of the negative aspects of 
bidding and hosting in South Africa, we tend not to learn as 
much as we should from one bid to the next. Or the lessons 
are not applied, possibly because of circumstances in terms 
of different committees, different people, different time 
periods, but I think that’s the importance of catching the 
knowledge and the lessons learnt and archiving it and using 
it for the next bid. 
(CT04, 2016) 
While some members of the Cape Town bid did go on to work on the 2006 
and 2010 FIFA World Cup bids, there was a clear lack of formal knowledge 
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transfer. Indeed, one respondent claimed to have offered support to the 2006 
World Cup bid, only to be turned down (CT03, 2016). South Africa announced 
to CAF (Confederation of African Football) in February 1998 that it would be 
bidding for the 2006 FIFA World Cup. By the deadline for submission of bids, 
in December 1998, four further African nations (Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria and 
Morocco) had also submitted bids. Egypt, Ghana and Nigeria ultimately 
withdrew from the race, and Morocco finished fourth in the voting behind 
Germany, South Africa, and England (Griffiths, 2000). The fact that the 
federation did not support South Africa, which ultimately proved to be the 
federation’s best chance of hosting, shows the lack of support; an issue that 
also beset Cape Town’s bid. 
It appears that South Africa’s successful 2010 FIFA World Cup bid owed as 
much to external factors as it does to Cape Town’s Olympic bid. South Africa 
controversially finished second to Germany for the 2006 Football World Cup, 
by one vote, after New Zealand delegate Charlie Dempsey abstained from 
voting in the final round (Alegi, 2001), and Germany secured an arms deal with 
Saudi Arabia in exchange for votes (Gibson, 2015). These controversies led 
to a change in FIFA’s World Cup hosting regulations and, following the 
controversy of the 2006 World Cup vote, FIFA introduced a rotation policy, 
taking the World Cup from continent to continent. The first continent to be 
awarded a Football World Cup was Africa, meaning that South Africa only had 
to beat off competition from Morocco, Nigeria, Egypt, and a joint bid from 
Tunisia and Libya, rather than facing more developed nations (FIFA, 2002). 
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Despite rumours of further Cape Town Olympic Bids in 2008 or 2012, and 
even a Commonwealth Games 2006 bid, the only other large-scale event that 
South Africa has successfully bid for was the 2022 Commonwealth Games, 
awarded to Durban. However, financial constraints meant that the 
Commonwealth Games Federation removed Durban from hosting just two 
years after awarding the Games (BBC Sport, 2017b). Despite the guide 
highlighting the need for government approval, recognising the government as 
one of five key stakeholders (The South African Sports Commission, 2003:37), 
it is claimed that the South African government did not sign the host city 
contract (BBC Sport, 2017b). Indeed, this is just one of a number of 
controversies relating to South Africa’s hosting of sporting events. In April 
2016, the South African government banned SA Rugby, Cricket South Africa, 
Athletics South Africa, and Netball South Africa from bidding to host any future 
sporting events due to those federations failing to fulfil ‘transformation targets’ 
i.e. the number of black players in the sports (Rumsby, 2016). 
It should be noted here, that it was Durban and not Cape Town that was put 
forward to host the Commonwealth Games. This further shows how the base 
created by Cape Town in the late-1990s did not transpire into the hosting of 
further events. While several sporting events have been hosted, they lack the 
prestige of the type of events that a truly sporting city would seek to host. Many 
of the events hosted are junior tournaments rather than senior international 
competitions that garner world attention. While it has been discussed that 
Cape Town may bid for an Olympic Games again in the future, no official bid 
has yet been submitted. Indeed, South Africa as a nation has not submitted a 
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bid since 1997. It could be argued that South Africa and Cape Town have been 
overtaken by the likes of UAE and Qatar; Middle Eastern nations that are now 
associated with sport to a far greater degree (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 
2014). 
6.2.2.3.2 Global Exposure 
While South Africa and Cape Town may not have been able to successfully 
reimagine themselves as a place for sport, this was not the only aim. South 
Africa wished to demonstrate to the world that it had moved beyond its colonial 
and apartheid past and sought to leverage the levels of global exposure that 
the Olympic bid provided. South Africa was, at the time, known predominantly 
for the apartheid regime (Alden and le Pere, 2004), and so there was an 
intention to change this image and demonstrate South Africa and Cape Town’s 
capabilities to the rest of the world. The worldwide media attention on the bid 
process provided the opportunity to promote Cape Town on a global scale. 
This was an opportunity that the bid team sought to leverage. One interviewee 
recalled that: 
(This) is just when the international news became important, 
like CNN and that. So, (respondent CT09) went to New York, 
and I can’t remember who he met with, but the simple 
objective was to have Cape Town on the weather maps of the 
international weather reports. We knew that Johannesburg 
was the finance capital, the business capital of the country, 
and people would know Johannesburg, but people didn’t 
really know Cape Town. So, part of the idea then was to get 
it into the international eye as a possible destination of choice. 
So, when the Cape Town 2004 bid comes up, you know, 
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‘Okay, ahh.’ So, it’s those little things. And, I don’t want to 
exaggerate its importance, but it was one of those things that 
you stumble upon and you say, ‘Ah, let’s take this…’ So, I 
think CNN still has Cape Town as opposed to Johannesburg. 
(CT03, 2016) 
As can be seen, Cape Town sought to use the media attention that came as 
part of the bid to raise the city’s and nation’s profile and change its negative 
image. In particular, the city sought to show that the apartheid era was gone, 
and that a new nation was emerging. The local Cape Town newspaper claimed 
that the bid ‘is the chance of a lifetime, and the hospitality industry dare not be 
caught by surprise as it was after the 1994 elections’ (Cape Argus, 1997c:13). 
A tourism manager working for the City of Cape Town said that: 
The city leveraged a lot on the international media to 
showcase post-apartheid South Africa and the progress that 
has been made in terms of the recovery of the economy and 
the social structures, and the progress that the country has 
made. 
(CT08, 2016) 
Cape Town also took the opportunity to show that it compared favourably with 
other bid cities, with Athens, Buenos Aires, Rome and Stockholm all being 
prominent cities. As Figure 6.4 shows, while South Africa tourism compared 
favourably with that of Argentina and Sweden, it lagged far behind that of 
Greece and Italy.  
Chapter 6 | Cape Town 2004 
269 
 
Figure 6.4: Number of International Arrivals, 1995-199728 
The very fact that Cape Town was competing with these global cities 
demonstrated its capabilities. Figure 6.4 shows a rise in visitors to South Africa 
from 1995 to 1996. It was reported at the time that the winter of 1996/1997 
saw a 20% rise in visitors compared to previous years, an increase which 
Cape Town Tourism put down to the bid (Blignaut, 1997). One interviewee 
said that: 
For one of its major cities to have competed internationally… 
I can’t remember all the other competitors… I think it was 
Stockholm, and Istanbul, and Athens, I can’t remember them 
all… But, I mean, it quickly occurred to me that, my goodness, 
we are competing internationally. This was a South African 
city, and one could say a new South African city, for the first 
time competing on the international stage. 
(CT07, 2016) 
                                            
28 Data taken from The World Bank (2018b) 
Argentina Greece Italy Sweden South Africa
1995 2,289,000 10,130,000 31,052,000 2,310,000 4,488,000
1996 2,614,000 9,233,000 32,943,000 2,376,000 4,915,000
1997 2,764,000 10,070,000 34,692,000 2,388,000 4,976,000
 -
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
M
ill
io
n
s
Chapter 6 | Cape Town 2004 
270 
An interview with the department of Leisure and Tourism confirmed this, with 
the point being made that the bid had a large impact on South Africa even 
though it was unsuccessful. 
The fact that it wasn’t a successful bid compared to Athens, I 
think it’s not a bad thing, necessarily, but it played an 
instrumental role in us becoming really one of the top 
destinations globally and that our accolades are a constant 
result of. So, we might have lost one bid, but we’ve gained on 
so many other levels and broadened our menu of offerings. 
(CT13, 2016) 
6.2.2.3.2.1 Evaluation of the Leveraging Strategy 
As Figure 6.5 shows, foreign visitors to South Africa have risen steadily since 
the end of apartheid. This should not be surprising. South Africa’s global image 
was extremely poor at the time, and the end of the apartheid regime and the 
release of Nelson Mandela from prison altered the global views. At the time, 
this was viewed as a boom due to the end of apartheid, with South Africa 
seeking to use the Olympic Games as a way of ensuring that the nation’s 
tourism growth continued. There were fears that the image of South Africa as 
a Third World nation, beset by crime and poverty, were challenges that needed 
to be overcome (Cape Town 2004, 1996). At this stage, South Africa’s tourism 
and hospitality industries were still in development. An article in the Cape 
Argus newspaper, following the bid decision, recognised that South Africa still 
needed a ‘comprehensive plan and strategy to encourage investment’ and that 
‘(t)ourism must be recognised as a major sector. It isn’t a Mickey Mouse 
industry and we can’t afford to treat it half-heartedly’ (Cape Argus, 1997:8). 
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However, it was certainly believed that the bid contributed to raising Cape 
Town’s global profile. Twelve days after the bid decision, Philip Krawitz, 
member of CT-Bid and President of SA Chamber and Commerce, claimed that 
‘(o)ur bid video was watched by millions around the globe. Cape Town is now 
on the map, and will attract increasing attention from tourists, business people 
and investors’ (Krawitz, 1997:10). 
 
Figure 6.5: South Africa Tourism Figures and Projections, 1993-200229 
Studying South Africa’s tourism figures provides interesting results. Foreign 
visitors to South Africa actually decreased 0.31% from 1996 to 1997 (the year 
that the bid was submitted) but rose significantly (14%) from 1997 to 1998. 
This figure has continued to rise ever since. Comparatively, world tourism rose 
by 6% from 1996 to 1997, and 5% in the following year. 
However, as can be seen, despite overseas tourism being an aim for the bid, 
‘overseas’ arrivals are only a small proportion of total tourist arrivals. The 
Environmental Assessment Reports published before the Games projected 
                                            
29 Actual data provided by Statistics South Africa. Projections are taken from Keyser 
(1997) 
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the number of overseas visitors who would arrive in South Africa due to the 
hosting of the Olympic Games, with a best-case (high projection), and worst-
case (low projection) scenarios considered (KPMG/NN Gobodo and 
Associates, 1995; Keyser, 1997). The actual number of visitors to South Africa 
is not dissimilar to the worst-case projections should Cape Town’s bid have 
been successful, albeit being significantly worse than the best-case scenarios. 
However, the actual number of visitors levelled-off in the late-1990s, and 
actually declined from 2000 to 2001. This is in stark contrast to the projected 
figures, which anticipated a large increase in foreign visitors to South Africa as 
the hosting of the Games approached. 
Consideration needs to be paid as to the validity of these results. While it is 
clear that South Africa tourism arrivals increased during the bid period, this 
occurred at a time when global tourism was approaching maturity (Richards, 
2011). Thus, Figure 6.6 shows tourism figures indexed to the year 1995. As 
can be seen, while South Africa’s tourism figures generally rose quicker than 
the world average, other nations in Sub-Saharan Africa saw their tourism 
figures rise a similar amount in the years in which Cape Town was bidding. 
Furthermore, following the climax of the bid, tourism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
outstripped that of South Africa, suggesting that the increase in tourism in 
South Africa may well have been due to global trends rather than the Olympic 
bid. 
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Figure 6.6: Indexed Tourism Figures, 1995-200630 
An increase in tourism is not the only measure when considering whether CT-
Bid achieved the goal of changing the image of South Africa. The bid also had 
the intention of showing that South Africa was a nation worthy of investment. 
A member of the Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport said that: 
But what it does is, it acts as a beacon to attract... it’s like a 
lighthouse, you know, it attracts people, attracts investment, 
and it brings people, and people say, ‘Do you know what… 
actually, this place is not so bad. It’s actually well-run and 
maybe worthy of further investment.’ That’s what we want to 
demonstrate through that, that actually, investments are quite 
safe. 
(CT06, 2016) 
                                            
30 Our World in Data (2017) 
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As Figure 6.7 below shows, foreign direct investment in South Africa rose 
dramatically in the early 1990s, as the apartheid regime ended. It is noticeable, 
that in 1997, the year of the bid submission, foreign direct investment 
increased by 366% from 1996 levels. While this investment fell the following 
year, and there have been year-on-year fluctuations since, the general trend 
has seen foreign direct investment in South Africa increasing steadily. In order 
to show this dramatic increase, Figure 6.8 shows the year-on-year increase of 
foreign direct investment into South Africa compared to the global trend. From 
1995 to 2005, South Africa’s foreign direct investment increased, on average, 
173% compared to a world increase of 22% each year. However, it is 
noticeable that foreign direct investment into South Africa started to rise 
following the awarding of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in 2004. 
 
Figure 6.7: South Africa Foreign Direct Investment Inflows, 1992-201631 
                                            
31 The World Bank (2018c) 
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Figure 6.8: South Africa and World Foreign Direct Investment, 1995-200532 
This is further demonstrated when considering the exports of the nation. As 
Figure 6.9 shows, South African exports rose steadily during the 1990s, with 
a significant rise in 1995. Following the bid decision in 1997, exports then fell 
in 1998. Perhaps more pertinently, aside from a large increase in the mid-
1980s, prior to the bid, South Africa’s export growth had consistently been 
below the world average. Exports even declined in South Africa in the early 
1990s, while the rest of the world saw year-on-year export growth. During the 
period of the bid, and then thereafter, South African exports tracked world 
trends consistently. 
                                            
32 The World Bank (2018c) 
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Figure 6.9: South Africa and World Exports Year on Year Change, 1981-
200733 
 Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates the ways that Cape Town used its bid for the 2004 
Olympic Games to leverage positive outcomes, using Chalip’s (2004) model 
of event leverage. This model is adapted to demonstrate Cape Town’s 
leveraging strategies (Figure 6.10 on page 278). 
First, it is important to appreciate that, while Cape Town wanted to host the 
Games, the international context meant that many involved in the bid 
recognised that Athens’ bid was more likely to be successful. Thus, Cape 
Town, and to a lesser degree South Africa, sought to ensure that even if the 
bid was unsuccessful, it would garner positive outcomes. The Cape Town 
2004 Olympic bid had three clear strategic objectives: community 
                                            
33 The World Bank (2018d) 
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reintegration, sport development, and image change. It is clear that the 
Olympic bid contributed to each of these. 
First, being part of an Olympic bid provided Cape Town with the opportunity to 
access significant funding from the central government that it would not 
otherwise have had access to. This, combined with the international expertise 
that was brought to the bid via sponsors, provided a key opportunity for two of 
these objectives: community reintegration and sport development, supporting 
the arguments of Lauermann (2015). These two objectives were achieved by 
way of the planned priority projects. These projects were community and 
sporting facilities, strategically located to provide ‘previously disadvantaged’ 
communities with access to facilities that they had previously been denied, 
and also planned transportation improvements to link these new hubs. 
Cape Town was not the first bid city to utilise a bid in this way. Cape Town, 
crucially, avoided the trap into which Istanbul would later fall (Bilsel and Zelef, 
2011), in so much as Cape Town focused on constructing non-competition 
venues that would have community use, and therefore could be utilised on a 
daily basis. Alberts (2009) gives detail as to how Berlin revamped its sport 
infrastructure, interestingly as part of the same bid process as Cape Town.  
While sport development was a strategic goal in its own right, it was also a 
means that contributed to Cape Town’s third strategic goal; that of changing 
the image of South Africa and Cape Town, while at the same time raising its 
profile. This third strategic goal used the development of sport to host a 
number of sporting events within Cape Town, and also the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup. While the idea of Olympic bids leading to hosting further events has been 
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covered (Smith, 2005), there has been little consideration as to how an 
Olympic bid may lead to the hosting of sporting events during the bid period 
itself. 
This was not the only way in which the image change was achieved. Being 
part of a bid process put Cape Town in the global spotlight. CT-Bid sought to 
use the bid opportunity to persuade the world of the development of Cape 
Town and South Africa, as both a potential tourist destination and a country 
with which others could do business. However, the impact that this had is 
unclear; while there were clearly strategies put in place, the data in Section 
6.2.2.3 suggests that these strategies were not wholly successful. 
Chalip’s (2004) model is adapted to demonstrate the leveraging that took 
place in Cape Town as part of the bid process (Figure 6.10 below). 
 
Figure 6.10: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage: Cape Town 2004(adapted 
from Chalip, 2004) 
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While the contextual factors of Cape Town’s bid, and in particular South 
Africa’s emergence from apartheid, may mean that this case lacks external 
validity, there are clear managerial implications for future Olympic bids. CT-
Bid successfully used the Olympic bid to lever central government funding. 
While this was used in Cape Town to contribute to the Metropolitan Spatial 
Development Framework, other cities could similarly leverage an Olympic bid 
to secure further funding for their own infrastructural plans. Further, cities in 
developing nations that do not have large degrees of international expertise 
may wish to similarly utilise the capabilities of international sponsors. 
Therefore, it is important for bid cities to consider the sponsors involved from 
the outset. If these sponsors are local organisations, it may be that they do not 
offer anything further beyond the capabilities within the bid team itself; 
therefore, bid teams should seek to work with international sponsors who can 
provide different expertise to those internal stakeholders already involved in 
the bid. 
A second lesson that other cities could take from this case study is from an 
opportunity that was missed; that of the latent knowledge that was built up as 
part of the bid. While it is evident that some of this information was used, as 
South Africa secured the hosting of the 2010 Football World Cup, much of this 
information stayed internalised within those who were part of the bid, and no 
attempt was made to capture this knowledge and use it to benefit Cape Town 
or South Africa. Cities, or indeed nations who are bidding for multiple events 
in a short period of time (for example, Istanbul), should attempt to ensure that 
this knowledge is captured, and therefore can be used in the future.
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7 Toronto 2008 
 Introduction and Purpose 
This chapter also offers empirical findings, presenting a case study of 
Toronto’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. The format is slightly different to 
the previous case study on Cape Town. Whereas CT-Bid sought to leverage 
the opportunities provided by an Olympic bid, Toronto’s bid sought two, 
distinct, strategic objectives for leveraging the Olympic bid: development of 
the waterfront area of the city, and sport development. These are taken in turn. 
First, the background to the waterfront development is provided in detail in 
Section 7.2.1, before the three specific means that were employed to achieve 
it are presented. Following this, the success of the leveraging will be 
deliberated (Section 7.2.1.4). The second strategic objective of sport 
development is then put forth in Section 7.2.2. This takes the same form as 
the waterfront discussion. First there is consideration of the reasons for the 
leveraging plan, followed by the means employed to see that it is achieved. 
The final section is an appraisal of this strategy. Finally, the data in this chapter 
is collated and applied to an adapted version of Chalip’s (2004) model for 
event leverage (Section 7.3). 
 Leveraging the Olympic Bid 
This section will detail the ways in which Toronto sought to leverage the 
Olympic bid to generate specific strategic objectives. As will be seen, the 
benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games were always part of the bid plans. 
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The first paragraph in the Master Plan for the Games stated that ‘the bidding 
and hosting of the Olympic Games creates two separate additional 
opportunities for city building and legacy building’ (Toronto 2008, 1999: 1). 
This research found that there were two strategic objectives for the Toronto 
bid: to develop Toronto’s waterfront area, and the development of sport. These 
strategic objectives will be discussed in detail, together with the opportunities 
and means that allowed them to happen. Further, just because Toronto sought 
only to achieve two specific strategic objectives, this does not mean that other 
opportunities did not arise as part of the bid process. These will then be 
identified, together with the impact that they have had in the years since. 
7.2.1 The Waterfront Redevelopment 
As the interviews progressed, it became increasingly clear that Toronto’s bid 
for the 2008 Olympic Games could be described as one of Torres’ (2012) 
utilitarian bids, that is, the primary focus of the bid was not in hosting the 
Olympic Games. Rather, as will be demonstrated, the key aim of the bid was 
to leverage government funding to achieve the strategic objective of  
redevelopment of the waterfront area on Lake Toronto (Figure 7.1). 
Chapter 7 | Toronto 2008 
283 
Figure 7.1: Toronto Waterfront Map34 
Ironically, considering the name ‘Toronto’ is derived from ‘wood on the water’, 
the waterfront area was, at the time, severely underdeveloped and played little 
role within the city (TO09, 2017). Plans to develop the waterfront date back to 
the early 20th century, with the Toronto Harbour Commission (THC) being 
founded in 1911 (City of Toronto, 1999). The THC was regularly in conflict with 
the City of Toronto, not least THC’s focus on private enterprise taking 
precedent over the waterfront being a public good (Sanderson and Filion, 
2011). This conflict contributed to ‘jurisdictional gridlock’ (Laidley, 2011:207) 
on the waterfront, and thus a lack of development. One interviewee, who 
worked on both the Olympic bid and for the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, 
noted the lack of awareness of the waterfront within Toronto: 
Toronto kind of ignored the waterfront. It’s hard to believe 
now, 20 years later, but at the time, when I left the mayor’s 
office, I went down to join the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, 
and the office was in the Queens Quay terminal building, 
which was south of front, and I mentioned to a number of 
                                            
34 Image taken from Waterfront Toronto (2015a) 
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people that it was difficult, transit-wise, to get down to south 
of front, and I think people said, ‘Why would you go south of 
front?’ My mother was actually wondering where exactly this 
was, and so people really didn’t have any kind of 
consciousness about the waterfront. 
(TO09, 2017) 
By the 1980s, the lack of development on the waterfront came onto the city 
agenda, as the federal government authorised a royal commission to consider 
developmental opportunities in that area (TO14, 2017). The Olympic Games 
actually played a part in catalysing this interest, as Barcelona’s waterfront area 
was developed in preparation for the hosting of the 1992 Summer Olympic 
Games, while other cities such as Shanghai and Boston had similarly invested 
in waterfront development (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto 
Waterfront, 1989). 
One member of the bid team provided information on the background to the 
waterfront development: 
Toronto had a Royal Commission on the Future of the 
Waterfront a while ago, maybe the ‘70s or ‘80s. David 
Crombie led it… David Crombie was the former Mayor of 
Toronto and then he went on to be a federal cabinet minister, 
and he is still very active in Toronto. When he did the Royal 
Commission on the future of the waterfront, he started 
creating teams of people to think about what the future… to 
figure out what the future of the waterfront would be. 
(TO02, 2017) 
The first, interim report identified four key areas to be considered: Toronto 
Island Airport, Toronto Harbourfront Corporation, Toronto Harbour 
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Commissioners, and the environmental impact. This interim report made one 
clear recommendation that would impact the future development of the 
waterfront; that the THC’s mandate should be reduced to only maintain those 
operations that directly linked to the port operations. THC would retain the land 
needed to operate the port, with the remainder of the land being pooled and 
taken control of by the federal and provincial governments, with an 
environmental analysis to be conducted (Royal Commission on the Future of 
the Toronto Waterfront, 1989). The Royal Commission specified that a new 
‘Waterfront Trust’ be created to manage these lands (Royal Commission on 
the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1992:13). 
The final report took more of an environmental focus and recommended that 
an ‘eco-system approach’ be employed (TO10, 2017). There was a 
recognition that ‘ecosystems are dynamic, interacting, living systems; humans 
are part of them, not separate’ (Royal Commission on the Future of the 
Toronto Waterfront, 1992:32), and the proposals essentially took a triple 
bottom line approach, seeking to develop the environment, society and the 
economy. This wide scope ensured that a number of stakeholders were 
involved. The new waterfront development needed to consider residential 
living, the interests of industry and private enterprise, the three levels of 
government (federal, provincial and municipal governments), all the while 
ensuring that there was minimal negative environmental impact. 
This large number of stakeholders caused a further issue. Who would pay for 
it? There are three levels of Canadian government: federal, provincial and 
municipal. The Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront was 
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a federal commission, resulting in the strong environmental focus; however, 
the eco-system approach was not a requirement of the municipality. The 
difficulties in working with all three levels of government are well-known in 
Canada. One interviewee, who worked within the government systems, said 
that there is a commonly known joke about it: 
We used to have a joke years ago. A graduate school 
professor asks his international students to write an essay on 
the elephant from the point of view of their national 
characteristic. The British kid wrote his on the empire and the 
elephant, the American kid wrote his on freedom of the 
elephant, the French kid wrote his on sex and the elephant, 
the German kid wrote his on an introduction to a preface for 
the possible understanding of the elephant, and the Canadian 
kid wrote his on ‘The elephant: a federal or provincial 
responsibility?’ 
(TO10, 2017) 
A second respondent who was part of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust, also 
discussed the difficulties arising in generating funding from all three levels of 
the government, noting that: 
The Waterfront Regeneration Trust had conceived of its 
mandate to be the waterfront, broadly speaking. Far to the 
east and far to the west, the central waterfront in Toronto was 
by far our most problematic section of the waterfront. There 
were lots of competing jurisdictions, lots of, there wasn’t very 
much happening there in terms of access from the rest of the 
city. 
(TO09, 2017) 
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The Waterfront Regeneration Trust was formed in 1988 by David Crombie, 
who had led the federal commission. This had a prime strategic objective, to 
focus the attention of the city and various stakeholders onto the potential 
regeneration of the waterfront area. Indeed, Crombie noted at the time, that 
successful development of the waterfront relied on ‘the willingness of public 
authorities and private interests to recognize the needs of others and the value 
of concerted action’ (Crombie, quoted in Laidley (2011)). 
Faced with these issues, the Waterfront Redevelopment Trust sought to find 
a way to unite the focus on the waterfront area. The Trust realised that, under 
normal circumstances, the political difficulties would continue; therefore, it 
needed something exceptional to bring together the political parties and raise 
funding. At the time that the Royal Commission was being completed, Toronto 
was in the throes of bidding for the 1996 Olympic Games. The report 
recognised the potential connection between the hosting of an Olympic 
Games and the waterfront development. The 1996 bid proposed that the 
Olympic stadium should be situated in Exhibition Place (see Figure 7.1 on 
283), with ‘all major Olympic facilities (placed) into one compact area along 
the waterfront’ (Toronto 1996, 1989:17). Indeed, the bid documents claim that 
‘if members of the International Olympic Committee grant the hosting of the 
Games to Toronto in 1996, our entire lakefront will become a perpetual 
Olympic legacy for the city’ (Toronto 1996, 1989:16). The Royal Commission 
into the waterfront urges the restructuring of the waterfront governance to 
support the 1996 Olympic and World Fair 2000 bids. 
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However, neither of these bids proposed waterfront development if the bid was 
unsuccessful, but sparked the idea of using an Olympic bid to catalyse 
waterfront development. At the time, each of the three levels of government 
was hesitant regarding the waterfront (Desfor, 1990), and so an Olympic bid 
was seen as the ideal catalyst. One respondent, who had been involved in the 
bid from the outset and was part of the bid for the World Fair, discussed the 
idea of using an Olympic bid to accelerate the funding that was required to 
develop the waterfront area: 
If you hold a big party, people need to spend money to clean 
up their house in order to have a big party. When you spend 
the money to clean up your house then your house is better 
after. But there is a real cost associated with hosting a big 
party. So, the idea was, ‘couldn’t we attract a big party and 
get a bunch of infrastructural spend on the waterfront faster 
and accelerate the infrastructure investment in downtown 
Toronto?’ 
(TO02, 2017) 
A second respondent noted how the Waterfront Regeneration Trust was 
involved in the Olympic bid from the outset: 
In a large city, what's the big thing to focus people's attention? 
Well, the Olympics came in just in time, so we then... the 
Waterfront Regeneration Trust became the little organisation 
that started the bid. 
(TO10, 2017) 
As can be seen, the initial origins of the Olympic bid were not focused on 
winning. Rather, an Olympic bid was viewed as the ideal vehicle to catalyse 
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and accelerate the plans already in place within the city, and thus achieving 
the strategic objective of developing the waterfront. This was highlighted in a 
1999 City of Toronto Report, which stated that: 
Our waterfront vision is big enough to embrace the 2008 
Summer Olympics. We’ll be proud to show our new face to 
the world. But we intend to realize this vision with or without 
the Olympics… it’s just too important to the people who make 
Toronto their home, and to the whole of Ontario. 
(City of Toronto, 1999:3) 
The impact that the Toronto bid had on the waterfront regeneration is clear. 
Simply looking at the individuals involved in both projects shows the crossover. 
David Crombie, head of the Waterfront Trust in 1992, became Chair of the 
Board of Directors for the Toronto 2008 bid team (hereafter TO-bid) (Toronto 
2008, 2001a:i), while Robert Fung contributed to the Olympic bid, before 
becoming head of the Waterfront Taskforce (City of Toronto, 2001). Similarly, 
documents produced by the Toronto Revitalization Taskforce heavily 
reinforced the connection. A report published in 2000 mentions the word 
‘Olympic’ on 50 occasions in 50 pages, with the hosting of the 2008 Olympic 
Games being a key consideration (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization 
Taskforce, 2000a). This demonstrates the strong connections between 
Toronto’s waterfront development and shows the reliance of the waterfront 
development on the Olympic bid. 
As has been demonstrated, the development of the waterfront area in Toronto 
was clearly a strategic objective for TO-bid and the city of Toronto as a whole. 
These next sections will now discuss the opportunities provided by the bid and 
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the means by which this development was made possible: governmental 
investment that the city would not otherwise have had access to, and also, the 
way it brought together levels of government to work together. 
7.2.1.1 Heightened Cooperation Between Levels of Government 
A key issue facing the waterfront development was the number of key 
stakeholders involved. This section will discuss these stakeholders and 
demonstrate how the Olympic bid provided an opportunity for TO-bid 
overcame these problems. 
The key stakeholders involved in the waterfront development were the three 
levels of the government. As already mentioned, the initial investigation into 
the redevelopment of the waterfront area was led by the federal government 
rather than the municipality. Yet, despite the development having a clear 
impact on the municipality, the Waterfront Redevelopment Team struggled to 
bring together the multiple stakeholders required to work on such a project. 
However, as recognised within a TO-Bid report, ‘the new plan’s 
implementation is to meet Olympic Bid deadlines, an expedited planning 
process is essential’ (Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force, 2000b:9). 
This was evident in Toronto, as one interviewee noted: 
In the day-to-day work… you have multiple activities going on, 
and every now and then there’s a deadline… When you get 
an entire organisation focused like that, it’s pretty powerful. 
(TO06, 2017) 
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Securing the support of the three levels of government (federal, provincial, and 
municipal), together with private organisations, was a key aspect of the bid 
from the outset. One board member said that: 
Right from the beginning, the four of us understood that all of 
this was about making sure we got people focussed; three 
levels of government, corporations, union groups, all of that 
stuff, all focussed on the waterfront. 
(TO10, 2017) 
The three levels of government involved in the Greater Toronto Area were not 
all from the same political party, causing similar issues to those noted in the 
case study on Cape Town. Several members of TO-Bid had previous 
experience in politics and working within government, working for various 
political parties. This provided the bid team with the opportunity to engage with 
each of the different political parties involved. One interviewee, who previously 
worked in politics, spoke of working closely with members of rival political 
parties, with their contrasting views providing the bid team with various 
perspectives (TO11, 2017). 
As shown, a key success of the TO-Bid was in uniting the different political 
factions. This culminated in a photo opportunity on the waterfront in October 
2000, as Jean Chrétien (Canadian Prime Minister), Mike Harris (Premier of 
Ontario), and Mel Lastman (Mayor of Toronto) were brought together to 
announce the formation of the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation 
(Figure 7.2 below). While this may not seem important, it was a significant 
enough event for the Toronto Star to write a feature, and include the photo, on 
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the 15th anniversary in October 2015, with the headline ‘Waterfront Toronto, a 
model of governmental co-operation’ (Hume, 2015). 
 
Figure 7.2: ‘The Three Amigos’35 
The Olympic bid was a key facet in bringing together three levels of 
government which previously had shown little appetite in working together on 
the waterfront. This new cooperation was then crucial in TO-Bid securing the 
investment needed to make the waterfront development a reality. 
7.2.1.2 Government Investment 
As was demonstrated in the previous section, an Olympic bid provides an ideal 
opportunity for different levels of government and different political parties to 
be united and focused on one objective. Yet, political support on its own would 
not guarantee the future of the waterfront. Therefore, in addition to the political 
                                            
35 Image taken from Hume (2015). From left to right: Jean Chrétien (Prime Minister), Mike 
Harris (Ontario Premier) and Mel Lastman (Mayor of Toronto) 
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support that the bid received, TO-Bid also secured CA$1.5 billion worth of 
investment. The bid itself cost CA$40 million, of which half was secured from 
private sources (TO13, 2017). Beyond this, the bid managed to acquire 
CA$500 million from each of the three levels of government. One member of 
the bid team detailed this: 
We obtained a commitment from all three levels of 
government for half a billion dollars, CA$500 million, for 
waterfront redevelopment, regardless of the IOC’s decision. 
So, CA$1.5 billion, you could argue that the CA$500 from the 
city would always have been there, although given the 
stinginess of our city fathers and mothers, I would qualify that, 
but the federal and provincial contributions were clearly 
outside money. So, one concrete, financial legacy of the 
Games was CA$1.5 billion for long-awaited waterfront 
development. 
(TO01, 2017) 
The federal and provincial government contributions are highlighted by the 
interviewee because they were in the form of cash. The City of Toronto 
contribution was an in-kind donation of land. Toronto as a city had 
amalgamated in 1998, with the previous six municipalities being dissolved and 
replaced by the City of Toronto, a single governing municipality. A City of 
Toronto director recalled that this ensured the City of Toronto’s contribution to 
the waterfront development was land: 
Our finances just after amalgamation were all still kind of very 
much a work in progress, and everyone was concerned that 
the bigger the city was through amalgamation, that there was 
no evidence to suggest that it would actually be any cheaper 
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to deliver our public services. So, the decision was made that 
we would contribute via land, because we had land in the 
central waterfront, as opposed to through funding. 
(TO14, 2017) 
The support of the three levels of government, and the financial commitments 
obtained, were identified as being key to achieving the strategic objective of 
developing the waterfront area. Therefore, it is worth considering the means 
by which this funding was secured, regardless of the outcomes of the bid. 
The bid team recognised that there were two opportunities to leverage the 
funding. First, and as has already been detailed, Toronto’s bid for the 1996 
Olympic Games had faced large-scale opposition from the Bread Not Circuses 
movement, something that TO-Bid was eager to avoid. TO-Bid believed that a 
way to avoid these levels of opposition was to show Torontonians that even 
the bid could bring positive benefits (TO10, 2017). 
The second opportunity viewed by TO-Bid was the level of funding that Beijing 
had secured to fund the bid. While Toronto was a bid for a city, Beijing was 
viewed as being a Chinese bid, with the national government being firmly 
behind it, whereas the IOC Evaluation Report noted that Toronto’s bid had 
‘considerable support from… Government authorities’ (IOC, 2001:57), but 
does not mention the national government. Comparatively, Beijing’s bid is 
described as having ‘very strong support from national and local levels of 
government’ (IOC, 2001:60). Indeed, one interviewee noted that Canada’s 
democracy put Toronto at a significant disadvantage, as Beijing had access to 
levels of funding that were unavailable to TO-Bid (TO10, 2017). 
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It should be noted, that while TO-Bid had identified clear strategies (the means 
in the model of event leverage (Chalip, 2004)) to leverage significant levels of 
government funding, this was only possible because it tied in with the plans of 
the Canadian government at the time. As has already been noted, it was a 
federal commission that sparked the waterfront development. Therefore, it is 
clear the federal government already had an interest in the development of 
this area. The plans for the waterfront also aligned with government strategy 
in one further way. As discussed, the Canadian economy had struggled in the 
1990s, and a policy of austerity had been implemented. Therefore, none of the 
levels of government were looking for ongoing investments. The waterfront 
development provided a unique opportunity for the government to invest a 
one-off CA$500 million with no ongoing operating costs. A director within the 
City of Toronto claimed that: 
I think the timing of this was consistent with this idea that, ‘If 
we’re going to fund programs, whether they be waterfront 
redevelopments or something else, even housing, we only 
want to do it one time, and we want to be done, and we don’t 
want this coming off the ledger 15 or 20 years from now 
because we made some commitment that we’re operating 
something’. And so, in that respect, I think it played to the 
politics of austerity in the late 1990s, that had a hard cap on 
what their contributions were deemed to be.  
(TO14, 2017) 
Therefore, the means through which TO-Bid secured the funding was based 
around winning the bid, or, the threat of losing. First, TO-Bid used the 
prospective threat of organised protests to persuade the government that this 
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level of investment was needed to generate public support for the bid. Second, 
TO-Bid was able to show the economic strength of Beijing’s bid, and position 
this as a direct threat to Toronto’s bid. However, these strategies were only 
successful because they were consistent with the government’s policies at the 
time. 
7.2.1.3 Creation of Waterfront Toronto 
The means by which the strategic objective was achieved was through a new 
organisation being formed to deliver the projects on the waterfront. The 
Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation was formally passed into law in 
2002 with the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002. 
Waterfront Toronto was formed to proceed with the plans of the bid, and had 
the following objectives: 
1. To implement a plan that enhances the economic, social and cultural 
value of the land in the designated waterfront area, and creates an 
accessible and active waterfront for living, working and recreation, and 
to do so in a fiscally and environmentally responsible manner. 
2. To ensure that ongoing development in the designated waterfront area 
can continue in a financially self-sustaining manner. 
3. To promote and encourage the involvement of the private sector in the 
development of the designated waterfront area. 
4. To encourage public input into the development of the designated 
waterfront area. 
5. To engage in such other activities as may be prescribed by regulation 
(Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002:2). 
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The tri-level agreement resulted in each of the three levels of government 
sharing responsibility for Waterfront Toronto. The board of directors of 
Waterfront Toronto was made up of 12 members, with each of the three levels 
of government appointing four representatives (Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002). Waterfront Toronto was answerable to 
all three levels of government, and this essentially provided each with a veto 
vote. This was most significantly used in 2004 as the City of Toronto sought to 
enhance Waterfront Toronto’s authority. The original Act stated that ‘The 
Corporation shall not raise revenue unless it has the consent of the federal 
government, the provincial government and city council’ (Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Corporation Act, 2002:3). This was a significant restriction that 
left Waterfront Toronto beholden to the three levels of government for ongoing 
funding. The City of Toronto sought to grant Waterfront Toronto the ability to 
raise funds itself, but neither the provincial or federal governments concurred 
(Eidelman, 2013). A director within the City of Toronto believed that this 
governance model has since hampered the activities of Waterfront Toronto: 
When it came to creating Waterfront Toronto, which, 
essentially, became the agency in which to deliver the 
waterfront agenda, that got watered down, and the decision 
was to leave all the existing agencies in place. So, the 
structure of Waterfront Toronto and the government’s 
approach to this, in my view, was being compromised, and is 
not the kind of central lead agency that was originally 
contemplated and had been recommended by Tony and was 
also not what the Wave of the Future report had 
recommended. 
(TO14, 2017) 
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A review into this arrangement was conducted in 2013, to analyse the first 
decade of Waterfront Toronto, particularly the tri-governmental approach that 
had been taken. This review found that the approach was ‘moderately 
effective’, with positive relationships demonstrated with all three levels of 
government (Eidelman, 2013:19). However, the report highlighted Waterfront 
Toronto’s lack of revenue-raising capabilities, arguing that the ability to raise 
funds would ‘make for a more flexible and self-sufficient development 
corporation’ (Eidelman, 2013:25). The report went on to note that the tri-partite 
agreement placed restrictions on Waterfront Toronto and ensured a large 
degree of accountability. A second strategic review stated that the tri-partite 
model had been a ‘qualified success’, with the funding restraints recognised 
as being the biggest issue (Ernst & Young LLP, 2015:34). 
7.2.1.4 Evaluation of the Waterfront Leveraging Strategy 
The Toronto Olympic bid had one clear strategic goal; to redevelop a 
waterfront area that was in a state of disuse. This is even prominent in the 
Candidate City file, submitted as part of the application (Toronto 2008, 2001a), 
with each of the letters of guarantee from the Canadian Prime Minister, the 
Premier of Ontario, the Mayor of Toronto, and the Canadian Olympic 
Association mentioning not only the planned waterfront development but also 
the CA$1.5 billion secured from the three different levels of government. This 
section will now discuss the impact that the strategy had on the City of Toronto. 
The strategy to leverage the waterfront development through the Olympic bid 
was clearly successful in the eyes of TO-Bid. Each of the interviewees was 
asked, ‘Who do you believe benefited from the Olympic bid the most?’ Five of 
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the respondents named the waterfront area as being the part of the bid with 
the greatest positive impact on the City of Toronto: 
Well, certainly the people connected to the waterfront. 
(TO01, 2017) 
I think Toronto benefited from the bid because it got a better 
waterfront. 
(TO07, 2017) 
I would say the citizens of Toronto, from the waterfront that 
we have. It’s down to them, but it’s been developed to be fairly 
public space, despite all the wretched condos that are 
blocking the view of the actual waterfront, but once you get 
down there, there are some wonderful amenities. 
(TO08, 2017) 
I think the waterfront, I do. I think the waterfront, absolutely. 
(TO09, 2017) 
I mean I have to say the people of Toronto really benefitted 
most, despite the fact they might not realise it, for the simple 
fact that all the things I mentioned, all that waterfront 
development, all that stuff happened because we did a bid. 
(TO13, 2017) 
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Table 7.1: Waterfront Regeneration Projects 
Project Status Reference 
Improvements to Cherry Beach 
Completed 
2005 
Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Corporation, 
2005 
York Quay Promenade 
development 
Completed 
2006 
Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Corporation, 
2006 
Martin Goodman Trail extension 
(1) 
Completed 
2006 
Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Corporation, 
2006 
Martin Goodman Trail extension 
(2) 
Completed 
2006 
Waterfront Toronto, 2010 
Port Lands Sport Fields 
Completed 
2007 
Waterfront Toronto, 2007 
Sugar Beach construction 
Completed 
2011 
Waterfront Toronto, 2011 
Sherborne Common Park 
Completed 
2011 
Waterfront Toronto, 2011 
Port Union Waterfront Park 
Completed 
2011 
Waterfront Toronto, 2011 
Brown College car park 
construction 
Completed 
2013 
Waterfront Toronto, 2013 
Corktown Common park 
Completed 
2014 
Waterfront Toronto, 2014 
Underpass Park 
Completed 
2014 
Waterfront Toronto, 2014 
Union Station Second Platform 
Completed 
2015 
Waterfront Toronto, 2015a 
Pan-AM Athletes Village 
Completed 
2015 
Waterfront Toronto, 2015a 
Cherry Street streetcar line 
Completed 
2016 
Global News, 2016 
East Bayfront Development Ongoing City of Toronto, n.d. 
Billy Bishop Toronto City airport 
noise reduction 
Ongoing City of Toronto, n.d. 
Port Lands redevelopment Ongoing City of Toronto, n.d. 
Gardiner Expressway 
reconfiguration 
Ongoing City of Toronto, n.d. 
Fort York Pedestrian Bridge Ongoing City of Toronto, n.d. 
Jack Layton Ferry Terminal 
improvements 
Ongoing Waterfront Toronto, 2017a 
Queens Quay East revitalisation Ongoing Waterfront Toronto, 2017a 
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The impact of this initiative has also lasted far beyond the time of the bid itself, 
with the Waterfront Revitalization Corporation continuing to work today. It 
should be noted that this is an ongoing process rather than one with a definitive 
finish point (Toronto City Council, 2003). Since the Toronto Waterfront 
Revitalization Corporation was formed in 2001, a number of projects have 
taken place, and these can be seen in Table 7.1. 
A key aspect of the waterfront regeneration was the CA$500 million secured 
from each of the three levels of government. Figure 7.3 shows the government 
spend on the waterfront in the years 2003-2016. 
 
Figure 7.3: Government Contributions to the Waterfront 2003-201636 
An economic impact assessment was conducted in 2013 to determine the 
returns for this investment (Urban Metrics, 2013). This found that the 
investment has generated: 
                                            
36 All data is taken from the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation Annual 
Accounts  
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 16,200 full-time years of employment 
 CA$3.2 billion in economic output to the Canadian economy 
 Government revenues totalling CA$621 million (Urban Metrics, 2013:iii) 
Urban Metrics (2013:10) estimate that future developments will create 21,700 
permanent jobs, generate an additional CA$12.9 billion for the Canadian 
economy, and allow the three levels of government to receive nearly CA$5 
billion in tax revenue (more than three times the investment). 
In 2015, a strategic review of the waterfront development was undertaken. 
This found the following key points: 
 The original mandate was not clear, in particular regarding roles and 
responsibilities 
 The new developments are valued at CA$2.6 billion 
 Construction of waterfront projects has resulted in 23,600 years’ worth 
of employment 
 Government revenues have totalled CA$838 million 
 The tri-partite governance structure is a qualified success, and has 
particularly allowed the triple bottom line focus to be at the fore 
 The restrictions placed on Waterfront Toronto raising its own revenue 
have delayed revitalisation (Ernst & Young LLP, 2015) 
Following the report, the City of Toronto recommended that Waterfront 
Toronto should be given permission to raise funds through borrowing, 
although this was resisted by the national government. An interviewee working 
for Waterfront Toronto said that this does not hinder the operations: 
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It takes time, as any major capital work will take. At least in 
our context, a billion-dollar investment is always going to be 
something that we hem and haw over, as long as possible. 
But the fact that we have had that recent commitment, maybe 
a couple of years later than we'd hoped, I think it's a sign that, 
overall, the model functions as it's supposed to. But there's 
always going to be, at times you always wish that there was a 
way to expedite the process. 
(TO16, 2017) 
Indeed, this response suggests that the tri-partite model works for Waterfront 
Toronto. The respondent went further than this, and suggested that the 
agreement provides a safety net that other similar organisations may not 
benefit from: 
The city is always in a challenging position when it's trying to 
balance the needs of industry and the broader policy 
objectives, as informed by our planning processes, etc. 
Because industry will say, at the end of the day, it needs to be 
feasible, and this is our requirement. Otherwise nothing will 
happen here. So, there's a balancing act that needs to be 
taken.  
It certainly helps to have a broader perspective, or the tri-
partite alignment, in terms of what those objectives are. 
Because it's not as simple as getting the local councillor or the 
community council district all on side with it.  
(TO16, 2017) 
However, there have been faults with the system, as, while there is an 
overarching vision for the waterfront, pockets of land are owned and 
developed by different levels of government. This, for example, has led to an 
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open space on the waterfront, with part of it named ‘Toronto Square’ and part 
of it ‘Canada Square’ due to the provincial and municipal governments each 
owning part of the land (TO18, 2017). 
While it is clear that TO-Bid was successful in its leveraging strategy to 
develop the waterfront area, this does not mean that there were not missed 
opportunities. It became evident throughout the interviews that, while the 
waterfront was an unqualified success, other infrastructural development 
could have been carried out as part of the bid. 
7.2.1.4.1 Public Transport 
The quality of public transportation is known as being an issue within Toronto. 
This was noted in the pre-bid evaluations (The Community Social Planning 
Council of Toronto, 2000) and played a large role in Toronto’s planning for the 
Games. The Master Plan for hosting sought to place host venues in strategic 
locations. This would enable the development of transport infrastructure 
between these venues that would then benefit the city beyond the Games 
(Toronto 2008, 1999). These plans included: 
 Building of Olympic Waterfront East and Olympic Waterfront West GO 
Transit Rail Stations 
 Union Station platform expansion 
 High-speed rail network from Toronto Pearson International Airport to 
Toronto city centre  
 GO Rail shuttle to connect the Olympic Waterfront to the rest of the city 
(Toronto 2008, 2001c:59) 
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The City of Toronto had recommended that these investments take place (City 
of Toronto, 2000a), yet, once the bid was lost, many of the investments were 
shelved. The Union Station upgrade was classed as a ‘Planned Non-Olympic 
Project’ in the environmental assessment (Toronto 2008, 2001b:14-4), and 
after being announced at the same time as the waterfront development, was 
expected to be completed by 2008; however, work on the station did not 
commence until 2010. Similarly, the plan to link Union Station to Toronto 
Pearson International Airport via a new rail network was not constructed until 
the hosting of the 2015 Pan American Games, despite having been promised 
in 1999 (City of Toronto, 1999). Given the current issues faced by Toronto in 
terms of public transportation (for example, The Economist magazine in 2017 
featured a piece entitled ‘Laggard on the Lake: Toronto’s Mayor tries to 
Improve Transport’), it is unlikely that Toronto would have had the 
infrastructure to accommodate the numbers of visitors that an Olympic Games 
naturally brings. Indeed, one member of the bid team, who now works for one 
of the transport companies within Toronto, said that the transport systems 
would not have coped, and as a result was pleased that Toronto did not win 
the bid because of this:  
I think the one thing I would say, now that I’m in transportation, 
that we were clueless. If we had actually won that bid, the 
transportation we were going to need, it was going to be a 
real… we were not going to have it. How realistic was the 
budget? Not so much. It wasn’t way off, but I think there were 
things in there that we were a bit naïve on, and that’s another 
good reason, a good thing we didn’t get the bid. 
(TO06, 2017) 
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This is not to say that there was no investment in Toronto’s transit systems as 
part of the bid, but these would have been accelerated further had Toronto 
hosted the 2008 Olympic Games. One interviewee discussed the plans that 
would have been in place had Toronto’s bid been successful: 
Some transit would have probably been accelerated… 
probably some type of transport. We knew Toronto’s 
downtown couldn’t take all the traffic. We had really cool 
satellite parking locations around the city, where people would 
stop and take transit downtown, probably bus; we wouldn’t 
have had enough time to have put really heavy infrastructure 
in. If we had done that, and pulled that off in three weeks, that 
might have accelerated people’s willingness to change their 
transportation habits. But it is totally speculation. That was the 
coolest. 
(TO02, 2017) 
A lack of transport development was named by one member of the bid team, 
now working for the City of Toronto as a missed opportunity for the city: 
I think our biggest miss is around the transit, for example, as 
you probably already know, there’s a real gridlock problem in 
the city, so big transit issues, and if you’re going to bring 
millions of people to Toronto for the Games, your federal 
government is going to figure out a way to help you fix that 
transit problem and that problem would have been better 
today, for sure. We’d have been further ahead today than it is 
now, if we’d had the Games. They’re trying to build some 
subways along certain cities and streets and that, but it’s all 
well behind. It’s smaller projects now as opposed to bigger 
ones they envisaged originally. It’s all kind of been scaled 
Chapter 7 | Toronto 2008 
307 
back and later, and if we had the Games it would have been 
probably bigger and faster. 
(TO13, 2017) 
7.2.1.4.2 The Port Lands 
Similar to the planned transport infrastructure, a second infrastructural missed 
opportunity is one that would have occurred had Toronto ultimately hosted the 
Games. Several interviewees discussed that a lack of development in the Port 
Lands area (see map on page 283), due east of the developed waterfront, was 
a missed opportunity. The need for development in the Port Lands area was 
longstanding. A report in 1990 stated that the ‘Port Lands will be redeveloped 
in the near future’ (Desfor, 1990:3). The environmental assessment conducted 
by TO-Bid calculated that 110 hectares (45% of the Port Lands) are vacant, 
with there being just 13 employees per hectare (Toronto 2008, 2001b:8-54). 
This area was due to be developed as part of the hosting of the event, with a 
newly-built Olympic Stadium, Aquatic Centre, Broadcast Centre and Olympic 
Village to be built there (Toronto 2008, 2001c). 
As the Games did not take place, the Port Lands area was not touched as part 
of the Olympic bid and is an area that has still not been developed (Reiti, 
2017). The need for development does not just include urban development of 
a similar nature to the waterfront district, but there are also environmental 
concerns. The Don River enters Lake Ontario through the Port Lands area, 
and there is a need for flood-proofing. This was viewed as a key missed 
opportunity by one of the interviewees: 
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Toronto’s (next) biggest infrastructure move is the Don Mouth 
naturalization and flood protection project, which prevents – 
based on a hundred-year storm – the Port Lands from being 
one foot under water. That would have been the only thing 
that I could think of that might have been accelerated 
significantly. 
(TO02, 2017) 
However, the hosting of an Olympic Games would likely lead to an accelerated 
timeline for the development. This may have resulted in the development 
being rushed, and two interviewees noted that allowing the city to take time to 
ensure the project is done correctly is seen as an advantage: 
We haven’t developed the Port Lands, and I would have 
thought that we’d be further along in developing the Port 
Lands than we are now, but it’s not necessarily a bad thing 
that we’re not doing it because we still have to do it right. 
(TO09, 2017) 
We didn’t get the Port Lands yet, we’re still working on that, 
but it is 1,000 acres. We’ve chipped away, and we’re moving 
towards it in terms of… you realise though, it’ll be a city of 
100,000-200,000 people that is five minutes from downtown, 
still sitting there. 
(TO11, 2017) 
Yet, alternatively, another interviewee felt that without the external pressures 
and deadlines created by an Olympic bid, it was unlikely that the Port Lands 
development would occur any time soon: 
There’s a lot of things that were sort of, the whole 
redevelopment of the Port Lands as an opportunity is still not 
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done, and again, without some kind of a deadline, it’s going 
to be another 20 years. Some would argue, maybe that’s the 
right answer, but we keep talking about how we don’t have 
enough affordable housing, we don’t have all this stuff. We 
never have the conversation about what it would take to bring 
that on line. It’s just too hard without a deadline, which I think 
is pretty unfortunate. 
(TO11, 2017) 
In June 2017, it was announced that Waterfront Toronto was to receive 
CA$1.25 billion in government funding to instigate the flood protection that has 
so long been identified as being needed. As with the original funding source, 
each level of government contributed over CA$400 million to the project 
(Waterfront Toronto, 2017b). While this funding was crucial to Waterfront 
Toronto, it does also highlight the reliance that developments have on 
receiving government funding that has not always been forthcoming (Horak, 
2017). However, an interviewee working for Waterfront Toronto said that this 
new commitment by the three levels of government proves that Waterfront 
Toronto, and the governance structure, has been a success: 
I would say that the value of Waterfront Toronto in this regard, 
broadly speaking, is to serve as that kind of tri-governmental 
liaison. So, really, their role is to articulate a vision that they 
know that each of the three government partners can get 
behind. And the fact that each of those partners has made a 
not insubstantial commitment of funding, as of last year, to 
support flood protection and move forward, I think that's a sign 
that it's had some degree of success. 
(TO16, 2017) 
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7.2.1.4.3 Affordable Housing 
The failure to develop the Port Lands contributed to a further missed 
opportunity; that of the development of affordable housing. Toronto, at the 
time, was suffering from a housing crisis (TO04, 2017; TO05, 2017). Indeed, 
the initial Royal Commission that catalysed the waterfront development wrote 
that ‘there are an estimated 20,000 homeless people in Metro Toronto alone; 
in 1986, nearly 28,000 families, seniors, and single people were on the 
provincial waiting list for geared-to-income non-profit housing’ (Royal 
Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, 1992:29). 
This position did not improve throughout the decade and, in 1999, an Action 
Task Force was set up by the City of Toronto to investigate the issue (Mayor's 
Action Task Force on Homelessness, 1999). This followed the Toronto 
Disaster Relief Committee’s (1998:1) claims that the number of homeless was 
a ‘community-wide crisis’. A further study found that the macroeconomic 
issues within Canada in the 1990s hurt Torontonians, with average incomes 
being lower in 1999 than in 1990, and a further 14,310 children living in poverty 
(United Way of Greater Toronto and Canadian Council on Social 
Development, 2002). 
Indeed, the need for affordable housing37 within Toronto was highlighted when 
considering Toronto’s bid. The Environmental Assessment conducted during 
the bid specifically noted that just 114 units of housing were constructed in 
Toronto in 1998, and only six units for every 1,000 were available for rent 
                                            
37 Defined by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation as housing that ‘costs less 
than 30% of a household’s before-tax income’ (Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation, 2018). This is the definition used by Waterfront Toronto. 
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(0.6%). The stark details on homelessness in the city were provided: from 
1988 to 1998, the number of individuals using emergency shelters increased 
by 33%. Further, of the 28,800 using emergency shelters, 6,000 were children, 
an increase of 122% from 1988 (Toronto 2008, 2001b). 
This was not the only bid report that raised the issues facing Toronto’s poor. 
The Socio-Economic Impact and Equity Plan detailed that nearly half of 
Torontonians paid more than 30% of their income on rent, with over 100,000 
households paying over half their income in rent. The report recommended 
that Olympic accommodation should be converted into affordable housing 
post-Games as part of a city-wide strategy to tackle the housing crisis facing 
Toronto (The Community Social Planning Council of Toronto, 2000). This was 
partly adopted into the Toronto 2008 Master Plan, which mentions the need to 
create a ‘legacy of a range and mix of new housing’ through ‘utilizing under-
utilized prime land in the central city to create new neighbourhoods’ (Toronto 
2008, 1999:3-6). Crucially, these plans do not give a clear indication as to the 
levels of affordable housing that hosting the Games would provide. TO-Bid’s 
plan, that was submitted to the City of Toronto Economic Development and 
Parks Committee, stated that the Games plan would result in 4,000 new 
housing units, of which 800 to 1,000 ‘will be available to households at 
affordable rents and purchase prices’ (City of Toronto, 2000b:15). This would 
have contributed to the planned 40,000 new housing units across the central 
waterfront, including 10,000 affordable housing units proposed by the City of 
Toronto (City of Toronto, 2000a). 
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Given the clear need for affordable housing within the city at the time of the 
bid, the lack of funding towards affordable housing could be viewed as a 
missed opportunity. The original documents put forward as part of the 
waterfront development strategy did include the potential for affordable 
housing. The bid was identified by the City of Toronto (2000b:58) as an 
‘opportunity, if carefully planned and executed, to enhance social equity 
opportunities in Toronto’. However, the tri-partite funding in place caused 
issues with these plans, as affordable housing was not on the agenda of the 
Province of Ontario, who had previously cancelled plans for 17,000 new 
affordable housing units. A director within the City of Toronto said that: 
On the issue of affordable housing, the former Ontario 
government under Premier Mike Harris, the Progressive 
Conservatives, had cancelled in 1995, 17,000 new social 
housing units province-wide. So, they had no interest, actually 
a negative interest if you will, in having anything in the 
platform for the waterfront plan to address or deal with the 
issue of housing or affordable housing… And so, for me, it 
was really quite high on the agenda to try to achieve the 
affordable housing for which we’d expropriated these 80 
acres back in 1988. But, meanwhile, you have the new 
Progressive Conservative government in 1995 actually 
cancelling 17,000 units province-wide, and running on a 
campaign, essentially, to pull back social assistance rates by 
21.6% and, basically, get rid of, or scale-back programs 
aimed at helping the poor. 
(TO14, 2017) 
This was further coupled with issues within the Canadian economy in the 
1990s. The decade was bookended by a recession across North America in 
Chapter 7 | Toronto 2008 
313 
the early 1990s and economic crises in Asia and Russia at the end of the 
decade (Bank of Canada, 2001), which resulted in a tightening of the belt by 
the provincial governments, with social housing being one of the key areas 
that were lost.  
Indeed, these financial issues led to criticism of the Olympic bid, and a 
reactivation of the Bread Not Circuses coalition. While there was not the same 
level of opposition regarding the 2008 Olympic bid as there was with the 1996 
bid, Bread Not Circuses published ‘The People’s Anti-Olympic Bid Book’ in 
2001 (The Bread Not Circuses Coalition, 2001). Surprisingly, a number of 
respondents who were part of the bid team reported that there was no 
opposition to the bid at all, which clearly was not the case. Bread Not Circuses 
(2001:47-63) argued that the money spent on the bid was being directed away 
from other areas needed by society, with a lack of social housing being one of 
these key areas. Bread Not Circuses (2001:98) contended that any housing 
built as part of the Olympic bid should be ‘100% affordable and 60% social 
housing at the end of the Games’. As a member of Bread Not Circuses said, 
they were not wholly against an Olympic Games but were concerned about 
the opportunity cost: 
We felt that the Olympics, and the Ballet Opera House, and 
the SkyDome, and the World Expo, the Good Expo Proposal, 
all represented initiatives that were very costly in terms of 
public resources. 
(TO05, 2017) 
Constrained by the approach of the Province of Ontario, Waterfront Toronto 
was not able to contribute to the affordable housing crisis. The waterfront area 
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that did receive funding for redevelopment has since been built up with tall 
condos (TO08, 2017), which typically sell for between CA$400,000 to 
CA$1,000,00038 (ReMax Condos Plus, 2017). The development of these 
condos has inadvertently contributed to another potential missed opportunity. 
A respondent who works for Tourism Toronto noted that these resulted in the 
waterfront being ‘largely built up to support the resident base, much more so 
than the tourism base; I say to great chagrin as a tourism marketer’ (TO18, 
2017). The respondent gave the example of the Harbourfront Centre, the 
building in which Tourism Toronto is situated, that has been taken over by 
residential needs: 
This was a cold-storage building, so it’s a big, heavy building. 
It’s now just offices, with some layers of condos built on top 
about 20 years ago, but I’m mentioning it because, 15, 20 
years ago, 30 years ago, when I was coming down here as a 
teenager… a kid, and a teenager, and young adult… this was 
a vibrant retail hub. It had lots of interesting craft shops, and 
tourists… It was more of a tourism hub than it is today, this 
particular building… It’s not that anymore. It’s now 
commercial tenants, banks. Expedia is moving their offices in 
here, and that. It’s offices, and condos above us, and a 
grocery store on the main floor now, and a bank, and a couple 
of restaurants back on the water, but this building is not a 
destination. 
(TO18, 2017) 
By 2015, Waterfront Toronto claimed that 496 affordable housing units had 
been built in the West Don Lands, with a further 80 being constructed in East 
                                            
38 Approximately £250,000 - £600,000 
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Bayfront (Waterfront Toronto, 2015b), a far cry from the 800-1,000 that were 
planned as part of the Olympic Games planning. Further, this affordable 
housing is not in the waterfront development, but is in the West Don Lands, 
an area to the East of the initial waterfront development that was catalysed by 
the Olympic bid. Waterfront Toronto is seeking to ensure that ‘20% of units 
within the West Don Lands will be affordable rental housing upon full build-out 
of the precinct’ (Waterfront Toronto, 2012:64). While it is clear that Waterfront 
Toronto was catalysed through the Olympic bid, it is questionable the extent 
to which this social housing can be attributed to the bid. Indeed, Waterfront 
Toronto specifically notes the impact that the 2015 Pan American Games had, 
as the Athletes Village was converted into affordable housing units in the West 
Don Lands. TO-Bid planned to use the Port Lands for the 2008 Games 
Athletes Village, so there is little connection between the Olympic plans and 
the resultant Pan American contribution to affordable housing. 
Social and affordable housing continues to be an issue for the City of Toronto. 
The summary of the 2011 National Household Survey says that ‘housing 
affordability continues to be a concern. In 2010, there were 207,097 renter 
households paying 30% or more of their income for rent. This represents 
43.5% of Toronto renter households and 19.8% of all households in the city’ 
(City of Toronto, 2013). In 2009, the City of Toronto adopted a 10-year action 
plan to assist 257,000 households (Housing Opportunities Toronto, 2009), and 
approved the Open Door Affordable Housing Program in 2016. As part of this 
program, there are plans for affordable development housing in East Bayfront 
and the West Don Lands (City of Toronto, 2016). 
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7.2.2 Sport Development 
While the waterfront development was clearly integral to the Olympic bid, TO-
Bid also sought a second strategic objective; to raise the profile of sport in the 
city and increase sport participation levels. Unlike in Cape Town, one of the 
plans that TO-Bid had for sport infrastructure within the city came to fruition. 
All the planned training and event venues were only to be built if the bid was 
successful; however, TO-Bid did put in place plans to develop sport within the 
city. The means by which this was achieved was the formation of the Toronto 
Sports Council (hereafter TSC). One member of the bid team noted this as an 
important legacy of the bid: 
One of the important legacies that I think came out of the 
Olympic bid is something called the Toronto Sports Council… 
It was to address this specific issue that I just talked about, 
that we weren’t really a sports city. 
(TO09, 2017) 
The Olympic bid provided two clear opportunities that contributed to the 
formation of the TSC. The first of these is contextual. As has been alluded to, 
Toronto went through a period of amalgamation in the years prior to the bid. 
This provided TO-Bid with the opportunity to develop a Sports Council. A 
founder member of TSC discussed the opportunity provided by amalgamation: 
The City of Toronto was going through an amalgamation, so 
there were a bunch of regions that were amalgamated. There 
was a (sports) council in North York, which is part of Toronto 
now. That already existed, Myself, Curt Harnett and Karen 
were involved as well, to try and get the sports council up and 
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running, so I remember we pulled some partners together, 
some people together who were interested. 
(TO17, 2017) 
The amalgamation provided the opportunity for a new enterprise to be 
attempted. The Olympic bid then provided a more direct opportunity. The 
Olympic bid brought a wide scope of stakeholders together from TO-Bid and 
the City Council. The same interviewee detailed the contribution of the 
Olympic bid to the formation of the Toronto City Council: 
Toronto (2008) for sure was a catalyst to make that happen, 
and again, our city is so large, and especially when we 
amalgamated, then it became really large… I think city 
council, it’s over 50 people… so it was hard to get things done. 
So it definitely was a catalyst, but there was also a movement, 
and I don’t think it was because of the bid, where our sport 
councils in Ontario in general, there were many that were 
started up, but I don’t think that can be attributed to the bid at 
all because the bid was pretty much Toronto-centric. 
(TO17, 2017) 
It is clear that it was the Olympic bid that provided the impetus needed to bring 
together a wide number of stakeholders to form the TSC. The mandate for 
TSC was to be the leveraging vehicle to deliver the ongoing sport development 
strategies that were part of the bid (Toronto City Council, 2002). It is evident 
that TO-Bid sought to use the bid to develop sport in the city, with TSC being 
the vehicle through which this would be delivered. 
Chapter 7 | Toronto 2008 
318 
7.2.2.1 Evaluation of the Sport Development Leveraging Strategy 
The TSC is still in operation today, indicating a level of success. However, the 
extent to which TSC can be seen as having achieved its objectives can 
certainly be questioned. Throughout the interviews, the idea of a sport legacy 
from the bid was very rarely mentioned. Aside from those interviewees who 
worked specifically on the sporting aspect of the bid, there was no 
consideration that the bid left any sporting legacy. The lack of association of 
TSC with the bid, is possibly due to the fact that TSC was formed in November 
2001, four months after Beijing was awarded the 2008 Olympic Games. Two 
interviewees who have been significantly involved in TSC from the outset, both 
believed that this hampered the TSC for two reasons (TO11, 2017; TO15, 
2017).  
First, part of the success of the waterfront development was that the Olympic 
bid provided strict deadlines that all stakeholders involved needed to meet. 
This was not the case with TSC, which was not formed until after the bid was 
lost. This links to the second limitation. TSC was not able to harness the 
community support that was in evidence at the time of the bid. Council reports 
after the bid detail the celebrations that took place at the time of the 
announcement (Toronto City Council, 2002). An event called ‘Celebrate ’08’ 
took place in the centre of Toronto, with a full day of entertainment leading to 
the IOC vote in Moscow being shown on big screens. It is estimated that 
15,000 people attended, with over 40 media organisations being present. This 
demonstrates the support engendered by the bid and is not unlike the liminality 
that is a key part of Chalip’s (2004) model for event leverage. TSC was 
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incorporated four months after Celebrate ’08 took place, and so was not able 
to harness the communitas and celebration provided by the bid. 
The third stated objective of the TSC, was the promotion of the Foundation for 
Athletes and Sport Training (FAST) which had been created in September 
2000. FAST was specifically formed to enable elite sport development within 
Toronto, Ontario and Canada. FAST was created as a charitable foundation, 
funded from donations, sales of Toronto 2008 merchandise, and 2% of 
revenue from bid sponsors. The Province of Ontario agreed to match all 
donations up to a limit of CA$10 million (Toronto City Council, 2002). However, 
there is little information available regarding FAST today. The website is no 
longer operational (FAST, n.d.), while a resource providing information on 
charities within Canada reports that FAST has no employees and gained 
revenues of just CA$900 in 2016 (CHIMP, 2018). 
TSC has, though, had some success in the years since. The TSC website lists 
two current activities with which it is currently involved (Toronto Sports 
Council, 2017). The first, and largest-scale project, is the Toronto Emerging 
Athletes Fund, a legacy of the 2012 Summer Ontario Games; an event for 
which TSC led the bid. Details were provided by an interviewee working for 
TSC: 
We have an organisation called Canadian Tire, a big 
hardware outlet in Canada, big infrastructure and stores all 
over the place. They give kids $150 twice a year to be 
involved in sport. Well, that doesn’t go very far for those who 
actually start to develop some passion and predisposition for 
higher-level participation. So, we had a fund which would look 
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at emerging athletes and try and bridge them, to allow them 
to continue to participate. This really kind of addresses issues 
around equity in sport. 
(TO15, 2017) 
The second, current TSC activity is less lavish. This is a simple project in 
conjunction with Humber College’s sport management program, designed to 
find placement and internship opportunities with professional sport clubs in 
Toronto for 120 students. (Toronto Sports Council, 2017). These two, relatively 
small projects characterise the impact that the TSC has had on the City of 
Toronto. There are two primary restrictions placed on the TSC. A current 
worker of TSC believed that one of the opportunities that led to the formation 
of the TSC has since hampered the organisation. It was argued that the 
number of stakeholders involved has prevented TSC from engaging with the 
wider sport groups within Toronto: 
Over the years - and here’s where I’m going to be a little bit 
more critical of the Sports Council from my perspective - it has 
never really changed its governance model from a few people 
who define their members as the board of directors. And I 
think that has impaired its credibility over time with the sport 
groups, who don’t feel they have any way to have their voice 
represented on the Sports Council. I think, as you look at it, 
it’s like what would be a governance problem in the legacy 
sports council. And at this point, some might be even cynical 
enough to say it’s a self-interest group. 
(TO15, 2017) 
This demonstrates a first issue faced by the TSC, that of a disconnect between 
the stakeholders and the TSC. This, in part, was caused by the timing of the 
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TSC’s formation. As has been noted, it was not formed until four months after 
Toronto had lost the bid to Beijing. As a result, elements of the TSC’s formation 
were rushed through. Furthermore, the TSC has faced funding issues. 
Ironically, considering both were formed from the bid, TSC suffers from the 
opposite obstacle to that of Waterfront Toronto. Waterfront Toronto is wholly 
reliant on government funding, and thus does not have the scope to raise 
revenue, TSC does not receive government support, and instead relies on 
funding from grant applications. A TSC worker commented on this frustration: 
When I got involved as a city staff person, we put in a request 
for city funding and never received it. So, the pressure came 
to second me to serve as executive director, which I did at the 
time; that was probably around 2006/07. We applied for a 
grant from what’s called the Ontario Trillium Foundation, 
which is our gambling fund really; the fund that provides 
money from gaming and lotteries and all of that. We had good 
funding for a few years, to try and look if we could get a 
different governance model. Although there was interest, it 
never really transpired. 
(TO15, 2017) 
These governance issues have restricted the ability of the TSC to deliver its 
own projects. It has been more successful when working with other 
organisations in the city. On a small scale, TSC contributed to the construction 
of the Cherry Beach Sports Fields. This is particularly pertinent, as this is one 
of the few developments that Waterfront Toronto has managed to deliver in 
the Port Lands (Waterfront Toronto, n.d.). Following the culmination of the bid, 
the Waterfront Regeneration Trust (which latterly became Waterfront Toronto) 
wished to develop the sport facilities of the city further and worked with TSC 
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to achieve this (Waterfront Regeneration Trust, 2002). However, two of the 
three sites identified were on the Port Lands and, as already discussed in 
detail, the Port Lands development has not yet commenced. The final site was 
South Cherry St in the West Don Lands. This area of Toronto has seen 
significant development, but the identified area for sport facilities is currently a 
car park. 
TSC has contributed to the wider scale delivery of sport within Toronto. For 
example, one of TSC’s first projects was to evaluate the number of community 
sport facilities within the city. A member of the bid team who worked at the 
Urban Institute was able to map the facilities (TO09, 2017). This project found 
that, while Toronto had a large number of sports fields and facilities, many of 
these were managed by the Board of Education and ‘were all chained, had 
fences around them, and they were locked off’ (TO09, 2017). More recently, 
the TSC initiated the introduction of the City of Toronto Sport Plan in 2017 
(City of Toronto Sport Plan, 2017). It is currently too early in the plan to 
recognise its success. 
The greatest sporting success from the Olympic bid came over a decade later, 
as Toronto hosted the 2015 Pan American Games. Toronto still wished to host 
a major sporting event, believing that this was a ‘gap in the CV of the city’ 
(TO12, 2017). It was felt that Vancouver’s hosting of the 2010 Winter Games 
made a Canadian Summer Olympic Games unlikely, and so a successful bid 
was put together to host the 2015 Pan American Games. The evaluation of 
sport facilities in Toronto conducted by the TSC following the bid, contributed 
to the Pan American Games being hosted in Toronto. 
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After the Olympic bid, in that first decade of the, I don’t know, 
2002/03/04, somewhere in there, I was involved in a process 
to map all of our sporting facilities, and for the first time ever 
brought together the City of Toronto and the two Boards of 
Education. We have a Catholic Board and a Public Board, and 
I was surprised to learn, when I convened the first meeting, 
that this was the first time that these three organisations had 
ever sat down together, and then we basically brought their 
Excel sheets together and geo-mapped them, and created 
kind of these maps of sport facilities in the city. 
Shocking to find that you could directly correlate the absence 
of sporting facilities to the socioeconomic conditions of the 
population, and I think it was a real eye-opener to a lot of 
people. We’d begun to build more facilities, and tried to talk 
about how we manage and open-up these facilities and that 
kind of stuff, and I think that’s directly led to us hosting the 
Pan Am Games. There’s actually more athletes for that than 
for the Olympics, and it was basically the lessons learned 
were applied to that, and created the facilities that allowed us 
to have a pretty good Games in that respect. 
(TO09, 2017) 
Two of the interviewees worked on both TO-Bid and the 2015 Pan American 
Games. This enabled the Pan American Games to utilise plans put forward by 
TO-Bid. The extent to which this can be considered a direct leveraging strategy 
should be questioned. There were no plans during the Olympic bid to bid for 
the 2015 Pan American Games. Moreover, while the Pan American Games 
utilised TO-Bid’s plans, there was no formal knowledge transfer from one bid 
to another. One respondent, who worked on both bids, criticised the 
independence of the Pan American Games Committee: 
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I actually helped them with the bid book a little bit, but once 
they got the Games, they were an island unto themselves 
which was really unfortunate. I think they could have 
leveraged, frankly, a lot of the stuff that we did, which was 
building connections with people much better. They ended up 
firing half the senior management of the Pan Am Games, but 
in terms of putting together the bid for the Pan Am Games, 
first of all, it’s much smaller, but secondly, they didn’t have 
time. 
(TO11, 2017) 
Rather, the ideas that were carried forward were conveyed by those who 
worked on both bids. An interviewee recalled this. 
Well, who carries those ideas? People who disappeared, 
disappeared. People who had continuity with the Pan Am bid 
eight years later remembered all of this, and, in establishing 
the Organising Committee, remembered some of the specific 
ideas and certainly remembered the concerns. In the 
historical memory of those who had been involved in Games 
bids, and so I was one of those and remember, I was involved 
in the bid for 1996, 2008, and the Commonwealth Games bid 
for 2010. 
(TO01, 2017) 
Thus, it is clear that TO-Bid did not leverage the Olympic bid to host the Pan 
American Games; however, there is still an important lesson that can be 
carried forward from this example. TO-Bid put in place numerous plans as part 
of the Olympic bid. A failed Olympic bid did not have the scope to bring all of 
TO-Bid’s plans for the city to fruition, but through the informal knowledge 
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transfer that occurred, plans such as the rail network linking the airport to the 
city were completed. 
This lack of formal knowledge transfer is all the more surprising when 
considering the number of bids for events made by Toronto and Canada (see 
Table 3.6 on page 129). Canada, despite being a serial bidder for mega-
events, does not appear to have a clear process of leveraging bids. Indeed, 
the Canadian Olympic Committee were contacted regarding this research, but 
declined to take part as ‘the Canadian Olympic Committee doesn’t have an 
internal department for bidding’ (personal communication, April 2017). Indeed, 
the email went on to say that the Canadian Olympic Committee had 
considered bidding for the 2024 Games but did not have information dating 
back to the bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. This further highlights the lack of 
knowledge transfer, as the Canadian Olympic Committee were not able to use 
the information and knowledge gleaned from the 2008 Olympic bid when 
considering a bid for 2024. 
 Conclusions 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the Olympic bid was seen from the outset 
as a resource that could be leveraged to bring positive benefits to the City of 
Toronto. This is not to say that TO-Bid did not want to win, as in each of the 
interviews there was a perceptible regret that Beijing won the bid, and indeed, 
Toronto has considered bids for Olympic Games since. 
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Figure 7.4: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage: Toronto 2008 (adapted from 
Chalip, 2004) 
Figure 7.4 above shows an adapted version of Chalip’s (2004) model of event 
leverage to demonstrate the leveraging strategies that took place as part of 
Toronto’s bid. It is clear that the Olympic bid at least originated as a vehicle to 
achieve a specific strategic objective, utilising the opportunity to catalyse the 
waterfront development. The Waterfront Revitalization Taskforce recognised 
that the ‘jurisdictional gridlock’ (Laidley, 2011:207) was unlikely to be resolved 
in the near future, while only an event like an Olympic bid would provide the 
opportunity to bring the three levels of government to work together, echoing 
Law’s (1994) findings regarding Manchester’s 1996 bid. TO-Bid successfully 
persuaded each of the three levels of government that investment was 
necessary, and on a more shortened timescale than would normally occur. 
Thus, Waterfront Toronto was formed with CA$500 million of funding from 
each of the three levels of government. 
While the idea of an Olympic bid being used to secure government funding is 
not new (Cochrane et al., 1996; Lauermann, 2015), and indeed works by 
Oliver (2011a; 2011b; 2014) have detailed the levels of funding that were 
Chapter 7 | Toronto 2008 
327 
secured as part of Toronto’s Olympic bid, these studies have only recognised 
that the funding was secured. This research took the starting position that the 
funding had been secured, and rather sought to discover the means by which 
TO-Bid secured the funding. 
A crucial managerial implication of Toronto’s experience is the way that it was 
able to secure government funding. TO-Bid was able to persuade three levels 
of government that the Olympic bid required funding to increase the chances 
of the bid being successful. First, TO-Bid did not want to be exposed to the 
levels of criticism regarding costs that occurred in the bid for the 1996 Olympic 
Games, resulting in the formation of the Bread Not Circuses coalition. Second, 
TO-Bid were able to demonstrate the large levels of spending by Beijing as 
part of their bid and convince the government that it would be viewed that the 
bid did not have political support. 
As was seen in Chapter 3, government support for a bid is often a crucial factor 
in determining which bid will be successful (Maennig and du Plessis, 2009; 
Hiller and Wanner, 2016). The secured CA$1.5 billion of funding has clearly 
supported the revitalisation of the waterfront, which now plays a significant role 
in Toronto’s position as a global city. Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 show the 
transformation that occurred between 1990 and 2016. 
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Figure 7.5: Toronto Waterfront in 199039 
 
Figure 7.6: Toronto Waterfront in 201640 
The role that the Olympic bid played in the waterfront development can best 
be seen in the projects that have not progressed since the Olympic bid. The 
Port Lands area, and the mouth of the Don River, were areas with as much 
                                            
39 Image taken from blogTO (2016) 
40 Image taken from Empty Quarter (2016) 
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need for redevelopment as the central waterfront. Yet, the development for 
these areas was identified as being part of the bid only if Toronto actually 
hosted the Games. As Toronto’s bid was ultimately unsuccessful, these areas 
remain undeveloped, with conversations continuing today as to what should 
be done with them. This suggests that had Toronto not bid for the Olympic 
Games, it is likely that the waterfront development would still be stalled in the 
same way as that of the Port Lands. 
As with Cape Town’s experience, Toronto secured government funding 
specifically for one strategic objective; the waterfront development. Therefore, 
future bid cities can learn from the plans put in place by Toronto to enact 
similar strategies to generate central government funding for their own 
projects. However, TO-Bid’s strategies to lever this funding relied on the fact 
that Toronto was facing severe opposition from Beijing; it is therefore unlikely 
that a city which was already the favourite to win the bid would be able to follow 
the same strategy. It is also unlikely that a city in the USA, a neighbouring 
country to Canada, would be able to follow TO-Bid’s plans, as American cities 
would not receive this level of support from the national government (van Dijk 
and Weitkamp, 2014). 
While the waterfront development was clearly the priority for TO-Bid, it was 
not the only strategic objective that came from the bid. There was also a focus 
to develop sport in the city, with the formation of a leveraging organisation, in 
the Toronto Sports Council (TSC). However, this leveraging strategy clearly 
did not have the same level of success as that of Waterfront Toronto. First, it 
was beset by similar governance issues to that of Waterfront Toronto. Second, 
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the timing of the creation was after the bid was completed, and so missed the 
opportunities provided by the bid itself. The fact that the TSC was not formed 
until four months after the conclusion of the bid, suggests that it was bolted-
on, supporting the assertion by Smith (2014) that leveraging plans are often 
only included once it becomes apparent that original promises would not be 
upheld. When considering the leveraging of events, the pregnancy period (the 
build-up to the event) is seen as being crucial (Weed et al., 2012; Dickson, 
2017). That the waterfront development was able to capitalise on the bid itself, 
whereas the TSC was not, suggests that the pregnancy period is equally as 
important when leveraging a bid. 
However, Toronto’s bid experience suggests that should the pregnancy period 
be missed, it may be possible to enact plans in the future. TO-Bid put in place 
many plans for the development of Toronto that hinged on the success of the 
bid. As Toronto’s bid was unsuccessful, this meant that these plans did not 
occur. Many of these plans were enacted as part of Toronto’s hosting of the 
Pan-American Games in 2015. It is perhaps questionable the extent to which 
these can be classed as being leveraged from the Olympic bid, but this 
provides a lesson for future bid cities to plan above and beyond what can be 
leveraged from a bid. Therefore, should the initial bid be unsuccessful, but 
another event be hosted in the future, it might be possible that these plans can 
be resurrected. 
Nevertheless, it was not planned that ideas from the Olympic bid would be re-
enacted through the Pan American Games. Toronto, and Canada, appear to 
have little consideration as to how the lessons learned from one bid could be 
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used to boost future bids. The knowledge that did transfer from the Olympic 
bid to the Pan American Games, was through the individuals involved rather 
than through a knowledge transfer tool. Even though Canada has been termed 
a ‘serial user’ of mega-events (Black, 2017:220), there was little, if any, formal 
knowledge transfer from the 2008 Olympic bid. This went as far as the 
Canadian Olympic Committee revealing that, when planning a potential bid for 
the 2024 Olympic Games, they had very little information on the 2008 Olympic 
Games bid. As with Cape Town’s bid for 2004, a clear managerial 
recommendation for future bidders is to ensure that policy is implemented to 
capture the knowledge that is learned during an Olympic bid. At the very least, 
the National Olympic Committee should ensure that knowledge can be passed 
from one Olympic bid to another, while policy on a national level, to incorporate 
events such as the Commonwealth Games and Pan American Games, would 
also be beneficial.
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8 Discussion and Conclusions 
 Introduction and Purpose 
The previous three chapters have presented the results of this study. First, a 
content analysis was provided of the Candidate Files of 16 bid cities from 
2016-2024. Next, the two case studies of Cape Town and Toronto were 
introduced and analysed. This chapter first brings the findings of these three 
chapters together within the discussion section (Section 8.2). Following this, 
the conclusion section (Section 8.3) demonstrates that the objectives of the 
study were completed and adapts Chalip’s (2004) model to demonstrate how 
Olympic bids have been leveraged. Following this, the academic and practical 
contributions of the study are detailed, before the limitations of the research 
are considered. Finally, areas for future research are presented.  
 Discussion 
Across the content analysis and the two case studies, three key leveraging 
strategies were enacted. These are summarised in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Leveraging Strategies 
Strategic Objective 
Content 
Analysis 
Cape Town Toronto 
Infrastructural Development    
Sport Development    
Image Change    
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Both CT-Bid and TO-Bid had a primary aim: to leverage the bid in order to gain 
access to levels of central government funding that they would otherwise not 
have had access to; a strategy that was identified through the content analysis. 
Similarly, sport development was identified within the content analysis, and 
was sought by both Cape Town and Toronto. Finally, Cape Town sought to 
use the global nature of the bid to promote a change in image of both the city 
and South Africa. Again, this was a leveraging strategy identified within the 
content analysis, and an obvious objective given South Africa’s chequered 
past. 
TO-Bid and CT-Bid employed similar strategies to gain access to government 
funding. Both cities were reliant on their bid not being the favourite to win; 
Cape Town and Toronto were second in the running behind odds-on favourites 
Rome and Beijing respectively (Table 8.2 below). This provided the bid teams 
with the opportunity to persuade national governments that funding was 
required to improve the chances of their bids being successful. If Cape Town 
and Toronto had been the front-runners and favourites to win the bid, then it 
is unlikely that this strategy would have been successful. This raises the 
question as to whether a front-runner is able to leverage the bid if it is likely to 
host the games, and so be able to use the event itself as a leveraging 
opportunity. While the idea of an Olympic bid seeking to gain central 
government funding is not new (see for example, Lauermann (2014a)), this is 
the first research that has sought to investigate the specific strategies 
employed by bid teams to secure this level of funding. 
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Table 8.2: Olympic Games Bidding Odds 
Event bid for Pre-vote 
favourite 
Ultimate host Reference 
2004 Summer 
Games 
Rome (odds-on) 
Athens (7-2 third 
favourite) 
Corrigan, 1997 
2008 Summer 
Games 
Beijing (1-4) Beijing Christie, 2001 
2012 Summer 
Games 
Paris (1-4) 
London (11-4 
second favourite) 
BBC Sport, 2005 
2016 Summer 
Games 
Chicago (8-11) 
Rio de Janeiro 
(11-4 second 
favourite) 
ESPN, 2009 
2020 Summer 
Games 
Tokyo (4-6) Tokyo 
Sora News 24, 
2013 
 
However, being the favourite to host does not mean that a city will win the bid. 
As Table 8.2 shows, Rome, Paris and Chicago were all odds-on favourites to 
be voted host of their Olympic Games, yet none of these bids were successful. 
It is possible that these cities would have struggled to receive government 
funding to boost their bids, given that they were strong favourites. There has 
been little research conducted into these bids with the exception of Weiler and 
Mohan’s (2009) work regarding the World Sport Chicago leveraging vehicle 
that emanated from Chicago’s bid, which provides little information regarding 
government funding. 
Toronto and Cape Town’s leveraging strategies had another similarity. Both 
used the bid to contribute to strategies that were already in place on a local 
and national scale. At the time of the bid, South Africa was undergoing a 
drastic period of change as the nation sought to reunite groups of people 
divided for decades through apartheid. Similarly, the federal government of 
Canada had demonstrated its interest in Toronto’s waterfront area through the 
Royal Commission established in the 1980s. Therefore, CT-Bid and TO-Bid 
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were able to secure funds from the central government that contributed to 
these ongoing plans. Interviews in both case studies argued that this was 
crucial. Had Cape Town and Toronto been seeking government funding for 
new strategies that did not align with the national interest, government funding 
would not have been forthcoming. This supports previous work into bids from 
New York and Berlin, who successfully used the bid to catalyse plans that 
were already in place (Alberts, 2009; Moss, 2011). 
However, this still enables a city to enact plans that benefit the city in ways 
that hosts of mega-events do not. As seen in Chapter 2, hosting an Olympic 
Games, or indeed any other mega-event, will permanently change the urban 
infrastructure of the host, as the event organisation (e.g. IOC or FIFA) dictates 
the level of facilities that are constructed (Searle, 2002; Preuss, 2005; Hiller, 
2006; Müller 2017). This is not the case with an Olympic bid. Both Cape Town 
and Toronto were able to fund infrastructural development through the 
Olympic bid, but, crucially, this was in areas that the city had identified as being 
needed. Cape Town constructed training facilities in underdeveloped areas of 
the city that previously had no access to such resources, while Toronto’s bid 
was leveraged for waterfront development that had already been on the city 
and national agendas for many years. 
This finding is supported by the data collected as part of the content analysis. 
The use of government funding for urban development was prevalent among 
the 16 candidate files analysed. For example, PyeongChang 2018 (2011), 
Beijing 2022 (2015), and Istanbul 2020 (2013) detailed the infrastructural 
development that would come about due to the bid. All three specifically noted 
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how the bid had attracted additional government investment; for example, 
Istanbul 2020 disclosed that the Turkish government had invested US$1.77 
billion into the area. While it is not explicitly stated in any of the bid documents, 
the implication from all three bidders is that the regions would not have 
attracted these levels of government interest were they not bidding for the 
Olympic Games. 
While Toronto and Cape Town both clearly benefited from the levels of 
government funding that they were able to leverage, there are several issues 
that are raised. 
First, it suggests that the strategic objectives a city can seek to attain are highly 
reliant on the strategies of the national government. This limits the ways in 
which a city can benefit from an Olympic bid as any benefit needs to be aligned 
to the national strategy. This means that if the strategies in place are 
unsuccessful, then the outcomes of the bid leveraging may also be considered 
unsuccessful. For example, it is clear that Cape Town’s Priority Projects 
contributed to the ongoing Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework in 
the city; however, it is also clear that this framework was flawed (Watson, 
2002). CT-Bid successfully contributed to the Metropolitan Spatial 
Development Framework, but if this framework was unsuccessful, does this 
mean that the bid leveraging strategy was also unsuccessful?  
Second, the need for a city to obtain funding from a national government 
indicates a degree of tension between the city and national government. In 
both cases in this research, there was an impression that the national 
government was seen as an adversary, and the Olympic bid was used as a 
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way for the cities to manipulate funding from the government. This is unlikely 
to be a healthy status quo; however, the Toronto case study offered a counter 
point to this. The tri-partite agreement that came from the Olympic bid ensured 
that all three levels of government had a stake in the ongoing operations of 
Waterfront Toronto. While this has caused governance issues within the 
organisation, it is also a rare example of a successful tri-partite agreement in 
Canada. Berdahl (2004) argues that tri-partite agreements often have several 
deficiencies, including limited scope and a failure to successfully involve the 
municipal government. The fact that each of the three levels of government 
contributed additional levels of funding in 2017 suggests that this has not been 
the case with Waterfront Toronto. 
The final shortcoming of leveraging federal funds is one that is oft-cited when 
criticising mega-events; that of the opportunity cost of the resources. This 
limitation of the strategy was noted in both cases. CT-Bid’s public finances 
section of the Strategic Environmental Assessment said that ‘certain 
programmes or projects will be foregone in order to honour financial 
commitments. These displaced projects are likely to be predominantly in public 
works and the transport-related sector’ (Abedian & BDM Consulting, 1997:5). 
This, again, highlights the tension between the development of a bid city and 
the national interests. While a bid may be leveraged to funnel funding into a 
city, this may result in other projects in other cities being abandoned. 
This leveraging strategy is very much influenced by the case studies included 
in this research. In democratic states, an Olympic bid often originates from a 
city itself rather than the national government (Law, 1994; Lenskyj, 1996; 
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Andranovich et al., 2001; Shoval, 2002; Westerbeek, 2009; Brown et al., 
2012). This therefore allows cities to put forward a bid with the intention of 
leveraging funds from the central government. It is unlikely that non-
democratic states would have the same opportunity for this leverage. For 
states such as Qatar, an absolute monarchy (see Table 10.5 on page 405), 
the decision to bid is made centrally by the government rather than by a city. 
Therefore, as Könecke and de Nooij (2017) allude to, there is unlikely to be 
the same opportunity for a bid city to leverage funding from the centralised 
government. This is also the case for US cities, as van Dijk and Weitkamp 
(2014) note. In the USA, it is the cities themselves that are responsible for 
funding a bid, and often rely on private support for the bid (Andranovich et al., 
2001). 
This leveraging strategy is also impacted by the nature of the event that is bid 
for. The term ‘mega-event’ most often refers to Olympic Games or World Cups, 
and these two events are used interchangeably within the field of mega-
events. This is perhaps not an issue when studying the hosting of a mega-
event, given the widespread impacts that the event is likely to have; however, 
the key leveraging strategy enacted by both CT-Bid and TO-Bid was very 
much city-based, with the bids being initiated from within the cities themselves. 
This provides an interesting question regarding the suitability of this leveraging 
strategy for other mega-events. This leveraging strategy relies upon a city 
driving the bid and successfully leveraging funds from a national government; 
and this may not be achievable if the bid does not originate from the city, and 
in events that take place across a country such as the FIFA World Cup. The 
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initial decision to bid for a Football World Cup will likely come from either a 
national government (for example, Russia’s bid for 2018 (Sputnik 
International, 2009)) or from the national football association (for example, 
England’s 2018 bid). While it may be possible for a city included in the bid to 
leverage funding, it is not known whether this would be as successful as a city 
bid for an Olympic Games. This perhaps limits the type of events for which an 
Olympic bid would benefit an individual city, to those events that wholly take 
place within the city itself such as an Olympic Games and Commonwealth 
Games. 
The second leveraging strategy that was identified within this research 
involves sport development. Both Cape Town and Toronto sought different 
ways to achieve this objective, and it also features heavily in the plans of the 
bid cities considered in the content analysis. Indeed, half of the 16 candidate 
files that were analysed believed that the bid would be used to drive sport 
participation. Three bid cities created leveraging vehicles to develop this 
strategy: Chicago 2016 created World Sport Chicago (2009), Tokyo 2016 
established the Master Plan for the Advancement of Sports (2009), and 
Istanbul 2020 developed the National Sports Plan (2013). This mirrors the plan 
of Toronto, which established the Toronto Sports Council (TSC) to deliver the 
sport development goals of the city; however, there has been little research 
into the impact that these vehicles have had post-bid. The TSC was hampered 
from the start and feels like a bolt-on strategy that was never an integral part 
of the bid in the way that the waterfront development was. This is highlighted 
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by the fact that the TSC was not created until months after the final bid decision 
and was not awarded a regular source of funding. 
The idea of a ‘pregnancy period’ is one that is prevalent within the literature 
surrounding leveraging the hosting of an event. The pregnancy period is the 
time building up to the event in which awareness of the event is raised and is 
viewed as the ideal time for leveraging strategies to commence as they can 
then harness the event itself. In terms of bidding, this is considered to be the 
time before the bid decision, with the decision itself fostering the liminality 
described by Chalip (2004). Both Cape Town and Toronto arranged events for 
the general public at the time of the decision, and this is something that has 
been seen in more recent Olympic Games decisions as well. For example, 
thousands of people watched the 2005 Olympic bid decision in different areas 
of London (The Guardian, 2005), while 2,000 watched Tokyo be awarded the 
2020 Games, at Komazawa Olympic Park Gymnasium (The Japan Times, 
2013). These were one-off events, with thousands coming together to 
hopefully celebrate their city succeeding on a global scale. Even if a bid should 
not be successful, the crowds would likely stay in the area to commiserate. 
This is an opportunity that neither Cape Town nor Toronto took advantage of. 
Furthermore, beyond reports in the media about these celebrations, there is 
no evidence of any Olympic bidder seeking to harness this emotion for 
leveraging purposes. 
This demonstrates the importance of the pregnancy period in the build-up to 
the bid, and the drop-off in interest following the bid decision. Members of TO-
Bid and CT-Bid spoke of the deflation following the bid decision, with both 
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describing a weekend of partying followed by a return to normality, and the bid 
just a memory. This is demonstrated in the contemporary newspaper reports 
from the time; for example, the Cape Argus newspaper featured news about 
the bid every day for the four weeks leading up to the bid decision, which took 
place on Friday 5th September 1997. By Sunday 7th September, the bid 
decision was displaced on the front page by the death of Princess Diana, 
whose funeral had taken place the previous day. 
The TSC missed out on this opportunity. Rather than a city-wide focus on sport 
and the Olympic Games, the TSC was instead born into a city whose people 
Oliver (2011:22) described as feeling ‘embarrassed’ following the bid decision. 
While the feel-good factor surrounding the hosting of a Games has been 
extensively discussed (Malfas et al., 2004; Kellett et al., 2008), Kim and Petrick 
(2005) found that this enthusiasm waned after three months; however, this still 
provides hosts with up to three months to enact leveraging strategies with the 
event still very much in the minds of the populace. Indeed, leveraging 
strategies may even be able to harness the good memories that people have 
of the event, but this is unlikely to be the case with a bid, which has a very 
finite cut-off date. The relative failure of the TSC in the years since, provides 
an example of how the bid was able to bring together the stakeholders in the 
first place, but then lacked the traction to deliver the impact that was expected. 
The second way in which sport development was identified within the 
candidate files, was through the construction of new facilities. This echoes the 
approach taken by CT-Bid, which identified that previously disadvantaged 
areas sorely lacked the facilities needed to foster sport participation. Thus, the 
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Priority Projects were identified, which, crucially, bought into the city’s MSDF 
plan. Where this strategy fell down, was a lack of further support for sport 
participation within the city. The facilities were constructed, but CT-Bid did not 
put in place plans to improve sport participation. The Olympic bid was the first 
opportunity for Cape Town to interact with sport federations following the 
decades of exclusion during the apartheid regime. Yet, Cape Town and South 
Africa failed to truly engage with the federations and acquire the soft skills 
necessary to develop sport within the nation, aside from the traditional South 
African sports in which South Africa already excelled, such as cricket and 
rugby. 
The final leveraging strategy identified within this research is that of 
international exposure through the Olympic bid. This was prominent in the 
content analysis and also identified by CT-Bid. There is often an assumption 
in the literature that the process of submitting an Olympic bid will automatically 
lead to an increase in media and global attention: 
 ‘… even before an Olympic host is selected, Applicant Cities receive 
increased media exposure’ (Agha et al., 2012:133). 
 ‘(e)ven submitting a bid package to the national Olympic committee is 
enough to warrant media exposure’ (Andranovich et al, 2001:127). 
 ‘Often, bidding competitions in themselves are sufficient for several 
states to reach set objectives around profiling, raising international 
prominence, or transmitting specific messages to the international 
community’ (Cornelissen, 2008:484). 
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 ‘…bids for the Olympic Games have become place-marketing 
measures in their own right due to the international exposure during the 
prolonged bid period’ (Haugen, 2005:217). 
 ‘…global visibility has been seen as an opportunity for bidding cities to 
showcase unique aspects and gain world-city status’ (Kassens-Noor, 
2016:46). 
It is Tolzmann whose work best fits the findings of this research. Tolzmann 
(2014:595) recognised that although ‘candidate cities often do receive 
international attention… these are relatively minor’. As noted in Chapter 5, 
many of the applicant cities appeared to believe that entering the bid process 
would automatically lead to increased global exposure, despite there being no 
empirical evidence to prove that this was the case. 
Cape Town sought a specific strategy to generate a change of image, through 
the development of sporting infrastructure and the subsequent hosting of 
sporting events. This was viewed as an opportunity for Cape Town to promote 
itself as a city for sport; however, the sport events hosted by Cape Town were 
not what would be considered to be of elite level, especially when considering 
the events hosted by oil rich cities that have subsequently developed an 
interest in sport investment (Foley et al., 2012). While South Africa later bid for 
the 2006 Football World Cup, and hosted the 2010 competition, there is little 
evidence that Cape Town’s bid for the Olympic Games had any impact on 
either of these World Cup bids. 
This was not a finding exclusive to Cape Town. Despite South Africa and 
Canada each being regular bidders for sport mega-events (since 2000, both 
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will have bid for a Summer Olympic Games, hosted a Football World Cup, with 
Canada also hosting the Winter Olympic Games and South Africa being 
awarded the Commonwealth Games), it seems implausible that there is a lack 
of policy and knowledge transfer from bid to bid. Emery (2002) suggested that 
a first Olympic bid is only seen as a precursor for a later, legitimate bid, and is 
evidenced in numerous cases such as Sydney 2000 (Burroughs, 1999), Rio 
2016 (Lindau et al., 2016), and Tokyo 2020 (Yuan, 2013). However, there 
appears to be less evidence that this knowledge is transferred if the bid is for 
a different sport event, particularly if the bid is driven by a sport federation 
rather than the government. Indeed, successful examples of a bid learning 
from previous bids all occur when the second bid is in the next Olympic cycle. 
Toronto’s experience suggests that if there is a longer time period between 
Olympic bids, this knowledge transfer is unlikely to occur. 
There was also little evidence to show that Cape Town’s Olympic bid 
significantly impacted on the image of South Africa, analysed through 
consideration of tourism figures, exports, and foreign direct investment. This 
highlights a limitation of this research, and potentially a limitation of Olympic 
Games analysis. The Olympic Games themselves are, on the whole, limited 
to being within one city within a nation. There is often little information available 
regarding individual cities and their image; much of the data available is 
regarding the nation itself. Furthermore, the data that is available regarding 
cities is often more contemporary; therefore, it is difficult to judge the impact 
that Cape Town’s leveraging strategies had on the city itself. This is certainly 
an area for future research, to measure the impact of a bid within a city 
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compared to other cities within the same country. For example, it would be 
interesting to compare Cape Town’s progress as a global city to other South 
African cities such as Johannesburg. 
 Conclusions 
The literature review in Chapter 3 demonstrated that, thus far, there has been 
little consideration of the ways in which cities seek to leverage bids for mega-
events to bring positive benefits. Therefore, this research sought to answer 
the question, ‘in what ways have bids for the Olympic Games been 
leveraged for positive outcomes?’ This was to be achieved through the 
following research objectives: 
 To examine a range of unsuccessful Olympic bids to identify the 
leveraging strategies employed, if any. 
 To scrutinise two bids in detail to explore the leveraging strategies put 
in place and the outcomes of these strategies. 
 To adapt Chalip’s (2004) model of event leverage to view demonstrate 
leveraging opportunities for bidding cities. 
The first objective of this research was to examine a range of Olympic bids to 
identify the leveraging strategies enacted. Chapter 5 analysed 16 candidate 
files to view the ways in which these cities sought to leverage Olympic bid, and 
used these findings to adapt Chalip’s (2004) model for event leverage (Figure 
5.1 on page 206). This research found four strategic objectives: sport 
participation, community building, urban development and global profile. 
Crucially, this research identified that these strategic objectives do not exist in 
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isolation; the achievement of one strategic objective can contribute to the 
achieving a second, different strategic objective. 
This research had a second objective; to study two cases in detail to view the 
leveraging strategies put in place and the outcomes (Chapters 6 and 7). This 
is achieved through two in depth studies of Cape Town and Toronto’s bids for 
the 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games respectively. A total of 31 stakeholders 
were interviewed across both cases, including members of the bid teams to 
determine the leveraging strategies put in place, and those who dealt with the 
aftermath to view the impact of these strategies. This information was further 
corroborated through a documentary analysis. 
Cape Town, South Africa and Toronto, Canada are cities and states in very 
different economic and political positions at the time of their bids. While both 
states are democracies, Canada is an advanced economy with a rich Olympic 
Games history, having bid 17 times for Winter and Summer Games, and 
having hosted the 1976 Summer Olympic Games and the 1988 and 2010 
Winter Olympic Games respectively. Comparatively, South Africa is a 
developing economy with a GDP nearly five times smaller than that of Canada, 
and a GDP per capita that is just 16% of Canada’s (see Table 10.5 on page 
405) and had been excluded from the Olympic network for much of the 
preceding 50 years. Toronto and South Africa are two of the more diverse 
nations to have bid for the Olympic Games, yet both sought to use the bid for 
similar reasons. Both bid teams recognised that an Olympic bid is an ideal 
opportunity to lever funding from the national government 
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The final objective of this research is to adapt Chalip’s (2004) model to 
demonstrate how Olympic bids have been leveraged. Figure 8.1 shows a 
model of Olympic Bid Leverage. 
 
Figure 8.1: A Model of Olympic Bid Leverage 
As seen in Figure 8.1, Olympic bid cities have three clear opportunities for 
leverage. The first is the bid process itself, which a) provides deadlines which 
need to be met, and b) brings a vast array of stakeholders together to work 
together. This can provide bid cities with the impetus to get projects started, 
supporting the findings of Oliver (2011b) and Lauermann (2014a). These 
stakeholders are not just within the bid team itself; as demonstrated by Cape 
Town’s experience, the involvement of multi-national firms through 
sponsorship brings levels of expertise that would not otherwise be found. 
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Another key stakeholder is the government, and this is the second opportunity; 
that of political support. It was noted by both CT-Bid and TO-Bid that the 
Olympic bids fostered central government support into Cape Town and 
Toronto that it would not otherwise have received. Finally, the third opportunity 
is the idea that an Olympic bid brings a general focus on sport to the city. This 
was an opportunity that Cape Town and Toronto particularly sought to utilise, 
as a general lack of interest in sport (and in particular, Olympic sports) in both 
cities was thought to have hindered their bids. 
These opportunities allow several strategic objectives to be sought; however, 
the outcome of the leveraging strategy is not as important as the means by 
which strategic objectives can be sought (Chalip, 2014). The key means was 
the investment that TO-Bid and CT-Bid secured from their central 
governments. Both bid cities used this funding for urban development, but CT-
Bid also built sporting facilities; in a similar way to that identified by Alberts 
(2009). While this development could be seen as an outcome in its own right, 
CT-Bid placed the sporting facilities in disadvantaged areas and saw them as 
a way of encouraging greater sport participation. The final means is the 
creation of a leveraging body. CT-Bid did not do this. However, TO-Bid 
formalised two organisations to deliver the strategic objectives. First, 
Waterfront Toronto was clearly a success, in that the redevelopment of the 
waterfront area was identified by most of the interviewees as being the key 
outcome of the bid. However, the Toronto Sport Committee (TSC) was less 
successful, in part due to the timing of its creation, missing the crucial 
pregnancy period that is necessary for leveraging strategies (Minnaert, 2012). 
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This was also a strategy employed by several of the bid cities in the content 
analysis, such as Chicago’s implementation of World Sport Chicago. 
This model crucially makes two changes from Chalip’s original model. First, it 
recognises that opportunities, strategic objectives and means do not occur on 
their own; often the same opportunity and means can result in different 
strategic objectives. Similarly, the strategic objective itself is often not the end 
goal. It was clear that both Cape Town and Toronto sought urban development 
through their Olympic bids, yet, while this urban development can be identified 
as being a strategic objective, the urban development itself contributed to 
further strategic objectives. Cape Town specifically used its urban 
development to contribute to the city’s spatial planning policy, through the 
strategic placement of priority projects and development of transport 
infrastructure. Similarly, while Toronto’s prime plan for the Olympic bid was to 
develop the waterfront, this in turn contributed to the city’s marketing plans. 
The second adjustment to Chalip’s model is through recognition that these 
leveraging strategies do not occur in a vacuum. This was not evident in the 
content analysis but was manifest in the two case studies. Both CT-Bid and 
TO-Bid’s primary aim from their bids was for urban development that tied into 
a wider city or national strategy. It is very evident that these two strategies not 
only received the funding from central government, but were also the 
strategies that saw the most success. This supports the work conducted by 
Lauermann (2016a) and Oliver (2011a), that an Olympic bid can be used to 
catalyse already existing plans. Where this study takes Oliver and 
Lauermann’s work further, is through identification that this also provides bid 
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teams with opportunities to leverage funding from the central government. It 
was clear throughout this research, that the support of the national 
government was crucial for these projects to be successful, demonstrated by 
the fact that similar infrastructural projects that are part of the urban strategy 
in both cities that a) were not included as part of the bid projects, and b) did 
not receive central government funding, have still not been completed. 
8.3.1 Significance and Original Contribution 
While the development of Chalip’s leveraging model above can be considered 
a contribution to the knowledge, this research has made further 
methodological, theoretical and practical contributions and implications for 
future research. 
This research took a hard-interpretivist approach, utilising a qualitative 
methodology. This approach was applied to two stages of data collection: 1) a 
content analysis of Candidature Files, and 2) a multiple-case study comprising 
interviews and documentary analysis. This is a relatively new methodological 
approach, and it provides new insights into the impacts of Olympic bids. The 
current literature available concerns a small number of case studies: Berlin 
2000 (Alberts, 2009), Cape Town 2004 (Hiller, 2000; Swart and Bob, 2004), 
Istanbul 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 (Bilsel and Zelef, 2011), Manchester 2000 
(Hill, 1994; Law, 1994; Cochrane et al., 1996; Lawson, 2006; Cook and Ward, 
2011), New York 2012 (Masterman, 2008; Moss, 2011), PyeongChang 2010 
and 2014 (Merkel and Kim, 2011; Kim et al., 2015), and Toronto 1996 and 
2008 (Oliver 2011a; Oliver, 2011b; Oliver, 2014; Bellas and Oliver, 2016). The 
current thesis also includes Cape Town and Toronto, but links the strategies 
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of both cases through Chalip’s model of leverage to provide a more rounded 
discussion of the opportunities and strategies available to potential bidders. 
Furthermore, the content analysis of Chapter 5 has added an additional 
dimension to the literature. There is a paucity of research that compares 
multiple bids from different states with differing political systems and economic 
statuses. Those that do (Rose and Spiegel, 2011; Maennig and Richter, 2012; 
Lauermann, 2016a) have typically been positivist, quantitative studies that 
concentrate on the macro impacts of a bid rather than considering the nuances 
between the different bidders. Given the widescale differences in various 
national statistics between Olympic bidders (see Table 10.5 on page 405), this 
is an area that could be explored further. It would be interesting to see, for 
example, whether cities such as Havana or San Juan have the same 
leveraging opportunities as global cities such as New York, Toronto and Paris. 
Beyond this contribution to the Olympic literature, this is one of the first 
research to explicitly investigate the way in which an Olympic bid can be 
leveraged, and the first to consider the bid as a leverageable resource itself, 
rather than a phase in the hosting process. The previous research into 
unsuccessful Olympic bids mentioned above has very much focused on 
legacy. This has resulted in significant discussion regarding the legacies from 
Olympic bids, but little consideration as to how these legacies are realised. For 
example, Alberts (2009) and Moss (2011) provide significant detail regarding 
the outcome of Berlin and New York’s bids respectively, but, given that both 
of these studies concentrate on just the end result, it is not obvious how this 
was achieved. As Chalip (2014) argued in his advancement of leverage as a 
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concept, this makes it difficult for future bid cities to replicate this success if 
there is no information available regarding how these strategies came about. 
Thus, this research has furthered the knowledge regarding the ways in which 
mega-events can be leveraged. The current research regarding leverage has 
focused explicitly on the events themselves (O’Brien, 2006; Weed, 2014; Perić 
et al., 2016; Rogerson, 2016; Mhanna et al., 2017; Grix et al., 2017), yet 
hosting the event is only part of the process. Therefore, this research provides 
information regarding the way a failed bid can be leveraged, thus 
supplementing the burgeoning interest into how an event can be leveraged. 
The next step could be to investigate the ways in which hosts have leveraged 
a bid, and the extent to which strategies put in place during the bid phase may 
contribute to successful event leverage. 
This thesis has not only identified the strategies that provided these outcomes, 
it has also sought to evaluate the success of them. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study that has considered an Olympic 
bid from two angles: 1) what were the strategies put in place to leverage the 
Olympic bid? and, 2) what were the outcomes of these strategies? This 
provides bidding cities with information not only to the strategies that have 
been sought in the past, but also the success of them. There are lessons that 
can be learned from this research, which encompass not only the leveraging 
strategies that were successful but also those that did not provide the 
outcomes that were intended. 
Indeed, it is evident that this is information that the IOC is seeking. The recent 
focus from the IOC regarding the impact that bidding can have on a city 
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demonstrates this; starting with the addition to the Candidature File of the 
question, ‘What will be the benefits of bidding for the Olympic Games for your 
city/region, irrespective of the outcome of the bid?’ (IOC, 2009:66), through to 
the adoption of Agenda 2020 and the modification through the New Norm. 
Furthermore, personal correspondence with the IOC has revealed that the IOC 
is currently in the process of producing marketing material around the impact 
of unsuccessful Olympic bids to entice potential bid cities. Indeed, research 
from this study has already contributed to the IOC’s plans. 
The following are recommendations for cities wishing to leverage a bid for an 
Olympic Games: 
1) An Olympic bid allows a city to enhance areas of a city where 
development is needed. A bidder does not face the same restrictions 
imposed by event owners (such as the IOC) as does a host. 
2) An Olympic bid is unlikely to significantly impact upon a nation’s global 
image, and so should be concentrated on domestic policy. 
3) Securing funding from the central government is key. This is most likely 
to be secured when facing a strong rival bidder. 
4) This central government funding is best used in conjunction with 
already existing plans. The focus of an Olympic bid, and the strict 
deadlines, can be used to accelerate these plans, or even unlock stalled 
plans.  
5) But, do not expect the bid to be a panacea for all city-wide issues. An 
Olympic bid can contribute to a plan but will not deliver the outcomes 
itself. 
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6) Use of a leveraging vehicle, while useful, does not guarantee success. 
Ongoing government support may be required to continue the work of 
the bid. 
7) The pregnancy period (i.e. in the build-up to the bid decision) is crucial 
for enacting plans. Without the deadlines that an Olympic bid enforces, 
the impetus may be lost. 
8) Olympic bids provide a unique opportunity to gather various 
stakeholders to work on one project with stringent deadlines. This can 
contribute to achieving outcomes that would not otherwise be realised. 
8.3.2 Limitations of the Research 
There are, as always, some limitations to this research. The first is regarding 
the period of time since the bids took place. It is more than 20 years since 
Cape Town submitted its bid, and 18 years since the submission of Toronto’s 
bid, and this elapsed time caused issues in collecting the data regarding these 
two case studies. First, many of the stakeholders who were sought could not 
be contacted, or, in more extreme cases, had passed away. This was 
particularly the situation with the Cape Town case study, whose bid team was 
significantly older than that of Toronto. Many of the Cape Town bid members 
had long since retired, making it difficult to contact them; however, this did 
provide an advantage, in that those who were involved in CT-Bid felt no 
restrictions in relation to their answers as they were no longer part of the 
system. The make-up of the interviewees is also a limitation. While the author 
attempted to speak to many different stakeholders, this was not always 
possible. As a result, most of the stakeholders spoken to were members of 
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their respective bid teams, so are likely to have provided biased views in favour 
of the bid and its impacts. 
A second issue caused by the passing of time was that people’s memories 
had changed. Many of the respondents mentioned that due to the length of 
time since the bid, they could not remember full details. This research sought 
to overcome this limitation in two ways. First, the study aimed to interview as 
many respondents as possible in order to corroborate the information 
provided. This included interviews both with those directly involved in the bid, 
and also those who were outside the bid but dealt with its impact. Second, a 
document analysis was performed in order to triangulate the information 
provided. 
This leads on to the third limitation of this research, regarding time, and access 
to documentation. This was particularly the case with the Cape Town bid, 
which was submitted in 1997. At this point in time in South Africa, there was 
little access to computer systems or internet infrastructure. Indeed, one 
respondent spoke about having access to a computer for just five hours from 
5.00 a.m. As a result, there is little information available online regarding Cape 
Town’s bid, and so all documents had to be accessed manually. This leads to 
a further limitation; the geographical location of the cases and access to the 
documents required. The empirical research for the two case studies, for 
example, had to be conducted in three visits over a nine-week period in 2016 
and 2017.  
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8.3.3 Areas for Future Research 
The limitations described in the previous section provide an opportunity for 
discussion about the areas in which future research could be conducted in this 
area. As has been noted, the idea of leveraging the bid rather than the hosting 
of an event is still relatively new in the extant literature, and there are a number 
of different avenues yet to be explored. It is apparent that there are two clear 
routes in which this research area could be expanded upon. 
The first research avenue is the type of city to be studied. This research used 
Cape Town and Toronto as the two case studies, but expanded upon this with 
the content analysis; however, only those cities that reached the Candidate 
Stage of the Olympic Games bids were considered. As Tolzman’s (2014) 
research demonstrated, those cities that reach this stage are likely to be global 
cities already, and it would therefore be worth considering those cities who do 
not have the global profile to be candidate cities. For example, since the turn 
of the century, cities such as Tashkent, San Juan and Havana have all bid for 
the Olympic Games. None of these cities reached the IOC vote and could all 
reasonably be considered utilitarian bidders (Torres, 2012). Research into the 
reasons why these cities chose to bid initially, and then the extent to which 
they achieved the goals of their bid, should be considered. 
The second research avenue is the type of event being bid for. A key finding 
of this research is that bid cities can lever additional funding from the national 
government. Yet, it is not known whether this could be achieved through single 
city events that do not have the global attention of the Olympic Games, or 
multi-city events such as the World Cup. This has further implications, in that 
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cities involved in the hosting of these events do not require the same profile, 
infrastructure or investment as a city hosting the Olympic Games. Therefore, 
this would further enable research into the ways in which smaller cities, which 
realistically would never have the opportunity to host an Olympic Games, can 
use a bid for city benefits. For example, Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea 
(a city with a population of 350,000), is considering a bid for the 2026 
Commonwealth Games (ABC News, 2015), while Plymouth was a proposed 
venue in England’s bid for the 2018 Football World Cup.  
The final avenue for future research is to consider the national benefits. Aside 
from the economic studies conducted (Brückner and Pappa, 2011; Rose and 
Spiegel, 2011; Maennig and Richter, 2012), there has thus far been very little 
consideration as to the benefits that unsuccessful bids can bring to a nation 
rather than a city. This has become more pertinent in recent years, as nations 
with authoritarian governments (such as Russia, China and Qatar) have come 
to the fore in bidding for mega-events, and research should be considered into 
whether cities under authoritarian governments have the same leveraging 
opportunities as cities of democratic nations. 
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10 Appendices 
Table 10.1: South Africa National Statistics 1990-200441 
Year Population 
GDP (per current £US) 
GDP per capita (per current 
US$) 
Unemployment, total (% 
of total labour force) 
Foreign 
visitors to 
South Africa 
Corruptions Perception 
Index 
(US$000,000) 
Global 
Rank 
US$ 
Global 
Rank 
(% of total 
labour force) 
Global 
Rank 
Score (0 = 
highly corrupt, 
10 = very 
clean) 
Global 
Rank 
1990 35,200,000 112,014.84 68 (223) 3,182.24 68 (223)      
1991 35,933,108 120,225.99 66 (223) 3,345.83 69 (223) 25% 4 (219)    
1992 36,690,739 130,513.68 64 (224) 3,557.13 67 (223) 24% 7 (219) 2,891,721   
1993 37,473,796 134,309.81 64 (228) 3,584.10 68 (227) 25% 6 (219) 3,358,193   
1994 38,283,223 139,752.37 63 (230) 3,650.49 74 (229) 20% 14 (219) 3,896,547   
1995 39,120,000 155,460.23 64 (237) 3,973.93 76 (237) 17% 22 (219) 4,684,064 5.62 21 (41) 
1996 40,000,247 147,608.05 69 (238) 3,690.18 87 (238) 21% 11 (219) 5,186,221 4.95 33 (52) 
1997 40,926,063 152,586.03 68 (237) 3,728.33 87 (237) 23% 7 (219) 5,170,096 5.68 23 (47) 
1998 41,899,683 137,774.70 69 (239) 3,288.20 98 (239) 25% 6 (219) 5,898,236 5.20 32 (85) 
1999 42,923,485 136,631.88 70 (240) 3,183.15 101 (240) 25% 5 (219) 6,026,086 5.00 34 (99) 
2000 44,000,000 136,361.79 70 (244) 3,099.13 104 (244) 27% 4 (219) 6,000,538 5.00 34 (90) 
2001 44,909,738 121,515.88 77 (244) 2,705.78 106 (244) 25% 7 (219) 5,908,024 4.80 38 (91) 
2002 45,448,096 115,482.30 77 (244) 2,540.97 107 (244) 27% 6 (219) 6,549,916 4.80 36 (102) 
2003 46,034,026 175,256.87 69 (244) 3,807.12 94 (244) 27% 7 (219) 6,640,095 4.40 48 (133) 
2004 46,641,103 228,593.70 68 (245) 4,901.12 89 (245) 25% 8 (219)  4.60 44 (146) 
  
                                            
41 Please see page 405 for references 
  
 
4
0
2
 
Table 10.2: South Africa Demographic Data, 1991-1996 
  1991
42  1996
43 
 
 Cape Province South Africa  Cape Town Western Cape South Africa 
Population  4,518,403 41,733,424  2,563,612 3,956,875 40,583,573 
Race 
African 790,822 18% 21,646,000 70%  644,199 25% 826,691 21%  31,127,631 77% 
Coloured 2,473,050 55% 3,286,000 11%  1,240,072 48% 2,146,109 54% 3,600,446 9% 
Indian 39,579 1% 987,000 3%  37,908 1% 40,376 1% 1,045,596 3% 
White 1,214,952 27% 5,068,000 16%  543,709 21% 821,551 21% 4,434,697 11% 
Other  0%  0%  97,724 4% 122,148 3% 375,204 1% 
Gender 
Male 2,213,302 49% 15,748,000 50%  1,241,540 48% 1,860,844 49% 19,520,887 48% 
Female 2,305,101 51% 15,507,000 50%  1,321,531 52% 1,974,478 51% 21,062,685 52% 
First 
Home 
Language 
(%) 
IsiXhosa 575,937 11%    593,558 23% 747,978 19% 7,196,118 18% 
IsiZulu 3,385 0%    3,668 0% 4,344 0% 9,200,144 23% 
Sepedi 2,223 0%    649 0% 1,135 0% 3,695,946 9% 
Sesotho 10,506 0%    9,327 0% 14,677 0% 3,104,197 8% 
Setswana 129,619 3%    2,472 0% 3,312 0% 3,301,774 8% 
Xitsonga 1,315 0%    241 0% 535 0% 1,756,105 4% 
Afrikaans 2,859,383 56%    1,156,928 46% 2,315,067 59% 5,811,547 14% 
English 844,796 17%    743,074 29% 795,212 20% 3,457,467 9% 
Other 640,469 13%    20734 1% 29,019 1% 1,687,794 4% 
Employed 
Employed      2,056,817 80% 1,374,174 82% 9,113,847 66% 
Unemployed      506,794 20% 299,114 18% 4,671,647 34% 
Religion 
Christian Churches 2,977,078 66%    
 
 2,983,838 78% 30,051,008 75% 
Judaism 15,471 0%      15,193 0% 68,058 0% 
Hinduism 5,527 0%      4,916 0% 537,428 1% 
Islam 142,034 3%      263,911 7% 553,585 1% 
Other 3,693 0%    
 
 18,666 0% 193,830 0% 
No religion 23,525 1%    
 
 198,997 5% 4,638,897 12% 
Refused 1,351,075 30%    
 
 349,450 9% 3,746,706 9% 
                                            
42 South Africa Central Statistical Service (1992) 43 Statistics South Africa (1996) 
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Table 10.3: Canada National Statistics, 1995-200844 
Year Population 
GDP (per current £US) 
GDP per capita (per 
current US$) 
Unemployment, total (% 
of total labour force) 
Foreign visitors to 
Corruptions Perception 
Index 
(US$000,000) 
Global 
Rank 
US$ 
Global 
Rank 
(% of total 
labour force) 
Global 
Rank 
Canada Ontario 
Score (0 = 
highly 
corrupt, 10 
= very 
clean) 
Global 
Rank 
1995 29,354,000 604,031.62 35 (237) 20,577.49 29 (237) 9% 38 (131) 41,656,912 2,089,660 8.87 5 (41) 
1996 29,671,900 628,546.39 35 (238) 21,183.22 31 (238) 10% 50 (140) 43,256,452 2,273,089 8.96 5 (47) 
1997 29,987,200 652,825.36 34 (237) 21,770.13 30 (237) 9% 51 (137) 45,076,152 2,043,372 9.1 5 (52) 
1998 30,247,900 631,813.28 34 (239) 20,887.84 32 (239) 8% 55 (130) 48,063,740 1,779,791 9.2 6 (85) 
1999 30,499,200 676,082.65 32 (240) 22,167.23 30 (240) 8% 75 (129) 49,055,476 1,803,324 9.2 5 (99) 
2000 30,769,700 742,293.45 32 (245) 24,124.17 25 (245) 7% 74 (148) 48,637,502 1,934,849 9.2 5 (90) 
2001 31,081,900 736,379.78 32 (245) 23,691.59 26 (245) 7% 76 (141) 47,146,628 1,722,048 8.9 7 (91) 
2002 31,362,000 757,950.68 33 (249) 24,167.80 32 (249) 8% 76 (139) 44,896,262 1,615,865 9 7 (102) 
2003 31,676,000 892,380.99 34 (249) 28,172.15 31 (249) 8% 78 (141) 38,902,630 1,250,808 8.7 11 (133) 
2004 31,995,000 1,023,196.00 34 (250) 31,979.87 31 (250) 7% 88 (146) 38,844,670 1,699,009 8.5 12 (146) 
2005 32,312,000 1,169,357.98 34 (250) 36,189.59 26 (250) 7% 93 (163) 36,160,104 1,821,490 8.4 12 (54) 
2006 32,570,505 1,315,415.20 34 (251) 40,386.70 27 (251) 6% 90 (148) 33,390,210 1,830,816 8.5 14 (137) 
2007 32,887,928 1,464,977.19 37 (251) 44,544.53 25 (251) 6% 86 (150) 30,373,466 1,832,626 8.7 9 (134) 
2008 33,245,773 1,549,131.21 37 (250) 46,596.34 24 (250) 6% 80 (144) 27,370,102 1,847,352 8.7 9 (137) 
  
                                            
44 Please see page 405 for references  
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Table 10.4: Canada Demographics 200145 
  Toronto Ontario Canada 
Population 4,647,955 11,410,045 30,007,095 
Gender 
Male 2,241,212  48%  5,577,060  49% 14,706,850  49% 
Female 2,406,743  52%  5,832,985  51% 15,300,245  51% 
Number of Immigrants 2,091,095  45%  3,120,690  27%  5,647,125  19% 
Mother 
Tongue 
English 2,684,195  58%  7,965,225  70% 17,352,315  58% 
Italian  195,960  4%  295,205  3%  469,485  2% 
Chinese  165,125  4%  202,125  2%  425,080  1% 
Cantonese  145,490  3%  158,040  1%  322,310  1% 
Portuguese  108,935  2%  152,115  1%  213,810  1% 
Punjabi  95,945  2%  110,540  1%  271,220  1% 
Spanish  83,240  2%  118,690  1%  245,495  1% 
Polish  79,875  2%  138,935  1%  208,375  1% 
Tagalog (Pilipino)  77,215  2%  88,870  1%  174,060  1% 
Tamil  72,715  2%  76,810  1%  92,010  0% 
French  57,485  1%  485,630  4%  6,703,330  22% 
Ethnic 
Origins 
European origins 1,652,530  36%  3,882,500  34%  8,731,955  29% 
British Isles origins 1,273,500  27%  4,454,010  39%  9,971,615  33% 
North American origins  882,465  19%  3,405,215  30% 11,919,290  40% 
Southern European origins  848,045  18%  1,445,855  13%  2,331,330  8% 
East and Southeast Asian origins  682,045  15%  840,710  7%  1,787,685  6% 
South Asian origins  504,005  11%  592,500  5%  963,190  3% 
Eastern European origins  410,400  9%  980,845  9%  2,520,770  8% 
Western European origins  326,490  7%  1,447,220  13%  3,790,025  13% 
Caribbean origins  281,310  6%  347,865  3%  503,805  2% 
French origins  221,805  5%  1,240,065  11%  4,710,580  16% 
Other European origins  167,270  4%  207,730  2%  379,060  1% 
                                            
45 Statistics Canada (n.d.) 
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Table 10.5: Economic and Political data for bidding nations for the Olympic Games 1993-2017 
City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Sydney Australia 1993 17.67 311.95 17,657 Industrial 10.9 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
8.8 1 1 F 
Manchester UK 1993 57.72 1,061.39 18,389 Industrial 10.5 
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
8.57 2 1 F 
Berlin Germany 1993 81.16 2,068.56 25,489 Industrial 7.9 
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
8.14 2 1 F 
Milan Italy 1993 56.83 1,061.83 18,684 Industrial 10.2 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
2.99 3 1 F 
Brasilia Brazil 1993 157.81 437.80 2,774 Developing 6.0 
Federal 
Presidential 
Republic 
2.7 4 3 PF 
Istanbul Turkey 1993 56.71 180.17 3,177 Developing 9.0 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
4.1 4 4 PF 
Beijing China 1993 1,178.44 442.87 376 Developing 4.3 
Communist 
State 
2.16 7 7 NF 
Tashkent Uzbekistan 1993 21.94 13.10 597 Developing 10.9 
Presidential 
Republic 
 7 7 NF 
Stockholm Sweden 1997 8.85 264.48 29,898 Advanced 10.2 
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
9.35 1 1 F 
                                            
46 The World Bank (2018e) 
47 The World Bank (2018a) 
48 The World Bank (2018f) 
49 International Monetary Fund (2017) 
50 The World Bank (2018g) 
51 CIA World Factbook (2018) 
52 Transparency International (2018): 1=most corrupt, 10=least corrupt 
53 Freedom House (2018): 1=best, 7=worst 
54 Freedom House (2018): F=Free, PF=Partially Free, NF=Not Free 
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City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Sydney Australia 1993 17.67 311.95  17,657  Industrial 10.9  
Parliamentary 
Democracy  
8.8 1 1 F 
Brasilia Brazil 1993 157.81  437.80  2,774  Developing 6.0  
 Federal 
Presidential 
Republic  
2.7 4 3 PF 
Beijing China 1993 1,178.44  442.87  376  Developing 4.3  
 Communist 
State  
2.16 7 7 NF 
Berlin Germany 1993 81.16  2,068.56  25,489  Advanced 7.9  
 Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic  
8.14 2 1 F 
Milan Italy 1993 56.83  1,061.83  18,684  Advanced 10.2  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
2.99 3 1 F 
Istanbul Turkey 1993 56.71  180.17  3,177  Developing 3.6  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
4.1 4 4 PF 
Manchester UK 1993 57.72  1,061.39  18,389  Advanced 10.5  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy  
8.57 2 1 F 
Tashkent Uzbekistan 1993 21.94  13.10  597  Developing 10.9  
 Presidential 
Republic  
 7 7 NF 
Quebec City Canada 1995 29.35  604.03  20,577  Advanced 9.5  
 Federal 
Parliamentary 
Democracy  
8.87 1 1 F 
Östersund Sweden 1995 8.83  264.05  29,914  Advanced 8.9  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy  
8.87 1 1 F 
Sion Switzerland 1995 7.04  341.76  48,541  Advanced 3.3  
 Federal 
Republic  
8.76 1 1 F 
Salt Lake 
City 
USA 1995 266.28  7,664.06  28,782  Advanced 5.6  
Constitutional 
Federal 
Republic  
7.79 1 1 F 
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City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Buenos Aires Argentina 1997 35.83  292.86  8,173  Developing 14.9  
 Presidential 
Republic  
2.81 3 2 F 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
Brazil 1997 167.89  886.33  5,279  Developing 7.7  
 Federal 
Presidential 
Republic  
3.56 4 3 PF 
Lille France 1997 59.96  1,460.71  24,359  Advanced 12.6  
 Semi-
Presidential 
Republic  
6.66 2 1 F 
Athens Greece 1997 
               
10.78  
             
143.16  
             
13,284  
Advanced 9.6  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
5.35 3 1 F 
Rome Italy 1997 
               
56.89  
         
1,239.51  
             
21,788  
Advanced 12.0  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
5.03 2 1 F 
San Juan Puerto Rico 1997 
                 
3.76  
               
48.19  
             
12,818  
 14.1  
 Presidential 
Democracy  
    
Saint 
Petersburg 
Russia 1997 147.92  404.93  2,738  
In 
Transition 
11.8  
 Semi-
Presidential 
Federation  
2.27 4 3 PF 
Cape Town 
South 
Africa 
1997 
               
40.93  
             
152.59  
               
3,728  
Developing 22.9  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
4.95 2 1 F 
Seville Spain 1997 39.58  588.69  14,873  Advanced 3.5  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy  
5.9 2 1 F 
Stockholm Sweden 1997 8.85  264.48  29,898  Advanced 3.4  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy  
9.35 1 1 F 
Istanbul Turkey 1997 60.39  189.83  3,143  Developing 3.2  
 
Parliamentary 
Republic  
3.21 5 4 PF 
Klagenfurt Austria 1999 7.99  216.73  27,117  Advanced 4.7  
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
8.7 1 1 F 
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City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Helsinki Finland 1999 5.17  135.23  26,179  Advanced 11.7  
Parliamentary 
Republic 
9.8 1 1 F 
Turin Italy 1999 56.92  1,248.56  
             
21,937  
Advanced 11.7  
Parliamentary 
Republic 
4.7 2 1 F 
Zakopane Poland 1999 38.66  169.72  4,390  Transition 12.3  
Parliamentary 
Republic 
4.2 2 1 F 
Poprad-Tatry Slovakia 1999 5.40  30.42  5,637  Transition 15.9  
Parliamentary 
Republic 
3.7 1 1 F 
Sion Switzerland 1999 7.14  289.88  40,577  Advanced 3.7  
Federal 
Republic 
8.9 1 1 F 
Toronto Canada 2001 31.08  732.72  23,574  Advanced 7.2  
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
8.9 1 1 F 
Beijing China 2001 1,271.85  1,332.23  1,048  Developing 4.5  
Communist 
State 
3.5 6 7 NF 
Havana Cuba 2001 11.15  
               
31.68  
2,841   4.1  
Communist 
State 
 7 7 NF 
Cairo Egypt 2001 69.60  97.63  1,403  Developing 9.4  
Presidential 
Republic 
3.6 6 6 NF 
Paris France 2001 61.36  1,382.22  22,527  Advanced 8.6  
Semi-
Presidential 
Republic 
6.7 2 1 F 
Osaka Japan 2001 127.15  4,159.86  32,716  Advanced 5.0  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
7.1 2 1 F 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
Malaysia 2001 23.92  92.78  3,879  Developing 3.5  
Federal 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
5 5 5 PF 
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City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Seville Spain 2001 40.76  625.98  15,359  Advanced 3.2  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
7 2 1 F 
Bangkok Thailand 2001 63.42  120.30  1,897  Developing 4.2  
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
3.2 3 2 F 
Istanbul Turkey 2001 64.18  196.01  3,054  Developing 8.4  
Parliamentary 
Republic 
3.6 5 4 PF 
Salzburg Austria 2003 8.12  260.72  32,103  Advanced 4.8  
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
8 1 1 F 
Vancouver Canada 2003 31.68  892.38  28,172  Advanced 7.6  
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
8.7 1 1 F 
Pyeongchang 
South 
Korea 
2003 47.86  680.52  14,219  Advanced 3.6  
Presidential 
Republic 
4.3 2 2 F 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
Brazil 2005 188.48  892.10  4,733  Developing 9.3  
Federal 
Presidential 
Republic 
3.7 2 2 F 
Havana Cuba 2005 11.26  42.64  3,787   1.9  
Communist 
State 
3.8 7 7 NF 
Paris France 2005 63.18  2,203.68  34,880  Advanced 8.9  
Semi-
Presidential 
Republic 
7.5 1 1 F 
Leipzig Germany 2005 82.47  2,861.41  34,697  Advanced 11.1  
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
8.2 1 1 F 
Moscow Russia 2005 143.52  764.02  5,324  Emerging 7.1  
Semi-
Presidential 
Federation 
2.4 5 6 NF 
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City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Madrid Spain 2005 43.65  1,157.28  26,511  Advanced 3.2  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
7 1 1 F 
Istanbul Turkey 2005 67.86  482.98  7,117  Developing 10.6  
Parliamentary 
Republic 
3.5 3 3 PF 
London UK 2005 60.40  2,418.94  40,048  Advanced 4.8  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
8.6 1 1 F 
New York USA 2005 295.52  13,093.73  44,308  Advanced 5.2  
Constitutional 
Federal 
Republic 
7.6 1 1 F 
Salzburg Austria 2007 8.30  386.46  46,587  Advanced 4.9  
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
8.1 1 1 F 
Sochi Russia 2007 142.81  1,299.71  9,101  Emerging 6.1  
Semi-
Presidential 
Federation 
2.3 5 6 NF 
Pyeongchang 
South 
Korea 
2007 48.60  1,122.68  23,102  Advanced 3.7  
Presidential 
Republic 
5.1 2 1 F 
Baku Azerbaijan 2009 8.95  44.29  4,950  Emerging 5.7  
Presidential 
Republic 
2.3 5 6 NF 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
Brazil 2009 196.70  1,664.59  8,463  Emerging 8.3  
Federal 
Presidential 
Republic 
3.7 2 2 F 
Prague 
Czech 
Republic 
2009 10.44  205.73  19,699  Advanced 6.7  
Parliamentary 
Republic 
4.9 1 1 F 
Tokyo Japan 2009 128.05  5,035.14  39,323  Advanced 5.0  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
7.7 2 1 F 
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City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Doha Qatar 2009 1.59  97.80  61,464  Emerging 0.3  
Absolute 
Monarchy 
7 5 6 NF 
Madrid Spain 2009 46.36  1,499.07  32,334  Advanced 3.6  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
6.1 1 1 F 
Chicago USA 2009 306.77  14,418.74  47,002  Advanced 9.4  
Constitutional 
Federal 
Republic 
7.5 1 1 F 
Annecy France 2011 65.34  2,862.50  43,807  Advanced 8.8  
Semi-
Presidential 
Republic 
7.3 1 1 F 
Munich Germany 2011 80.27  3,757.46  46,807  Advanced 5.8  
Federal 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
7.8 1 1 F 
Pyeongchang 
South 
Korea 
2011 49.78  1,202.46  24,156  Advanced 3.7  
Presidential 
Republic 
5.1 2 1 F 
Baku Azerbaijan 2013 9.42  73.56  7,812  Emerging 5.0  
 Presidential 
Republic  
2.8 6 6 NF 
Rome Italy 2013 60.23  2,133.54  35,421  Advanced 12.2  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
4.3 1 1 F 
Tokyo Japan 2013 127.34  4,919.56  38,634  Advanced 4.0  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy  
7.4 1 1 F 
Doha Qatar 2013 2.10  201.89  96,077  Emerging 0.3  
 Absolute 
Monarchy  
6.8 5 6 NF 
Madrid Spain 2013 46.62  1,369.26  29,371  Advanced 3.7  
Parliamentary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy  
5.9 1 1 F 
Istanbul Turkey 2013 75.01  823.24  10,975  Emerging 8.7  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
5 4 3 PF 
  
 
4
1
2
 
City Country 
Bid 
Year 
Population 
(million)46 
GDP 
(Current 
US$ 
billion)47 
GDP per 
Capita 
(Current 
US$)48 
Economic 
Status49 
Unemployment 
(% of Labour 
Force)50 
Political 
System51 
Corruption 
Index52 
Civil 
Liberties53 
Political 
Rights53 
Political 
Status54 
Beijing China 2015 1,371.22  11,064.66  8,069  Emerging  
 Communist 
State  
3.5 6 7 NF 
Almaty Kazakhstan 2015 17.54  184.39  10,510  Emerging 5.0  
 Presidential 
Republic  
2.1 5 6 NF 
Paris France 2017 325.72  19,391.00  59,531  Advanced 4.3  
Constitutional 
Federal 
Republic  
8.1 1 2 F 
Rome Italy 2017 67.12  2,583.00  38,477  Advanced 9.4  
 Semi-
Presidential 
Republic  
7 1 2 F 
Budapest Hungary 2017 9.78  139.00  14,225  Emerging 4.2  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
4.3 2 3 F 
Los Angeles USA 2017 60.55  1,935.00  31,953  Advanced 11.2  
Parliamentary 
Republic  
5 1 1 F 
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Indicative Interview Schedule 
 During the bid process, how much consideration was there that the 
Toronto bid may be ultimately unsuccessful? 
 Which legacies from the event did you set out to realize? 
 Which strategies were put in place to achieve your desired legacies? 
 Were there any legacies built into the bid for the event that the Toronto 
bid would be unsuccessful? 
 If not, do you think that legacies should have been built into the bid 
should it be unsuccessful? 
 If so, what were these legacies, and how successful do you feel that 
they were?  
 How were legacies evaluated post-event? 
 Do you feel that the bid brought about any unplanned legacies, whether 
positive or negative? 
 Which of these do you feel is the most important? 
 Do you feel that any positives that can be gained from a bid can 
outweigh the costs? 
 How do you think the bid will be remembered within the city? 
 Do you feel that there is anything more the Toronto bid could have done 
to ensure that it left a legacy, despite it being ultimately unsuccessful? 
 Who do you feel ultimately benefited the most from the bid? 
